UNMASKE 


iiiVI'iM;-.-  I  ■u(fii.'t-<t-ij-|nio-i^i-';?'t: 


ANDRE  CHEME 


■^^^■O 

i^=:^=^ 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT  UNMASKED 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT 
UNMASKED 

BERLIN'S   FORMIDABLE   PEACE-TRAP  OF 
"THE   DRAWN   WAR" 


BY 

ANDRE   CHERADAME 


WITH   AN  INTRODUCTION   BY 

THE    EARL    OF    CROMER,    O.M. 


WITH   MAPS 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

1918 

6i 


Copyright.  1916,  by 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

Published  January,  1917 

Reprinted  February,  March.  April.  June, 

October,  December,  1917;  March,  1918 


All  Rights  Reserved 


PUBLISHER'S  NOTE 

As  will  be  understood  from  the  author's  preface, 
M.  Cheradame's  book  was  published  in  Paris  in  the 
summer  of  this  year,  before  the  important  occur- 
rences in  the  Balkans  accompanying  and  following 
Roumania's  entrance  into  the  war.  In  issuing  this 
translation  no  consideration  of  these  events  has  been 
added;  but  their  bearing  on  M.  Cheradame's  fore- 
cast will  be  noted  by  the  reader. 

The  maps  have  been  reproduced  direct  from  the 
French  edition,  without  translating  the  names  into 
English,  as  they  answer  their  purpose  perfectly  well 
in  their  present  form. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction  by  Lord  Croher         ------  xiii 

Author's  Preface       ---------  xix 


PROLOGUE 

Pangermanism  and  William  II.         ------ 

I.  The  Pangerman  Doctrine,  p.  i. — II.  The  Kaiser  as  originator 
of  the  Pangerman  plan,  p.  5. 


CHAPTER  I 

The  Pangerman  Plan         

I.  The  Pangerman  plan  of  19 11,  p.  11. — II.  The  stages  by  which 
it  has  been  effected,  p.  16. — III.  Why  it  has  been  ignored,  p.  19. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Causes  of  the  War ---26 

I.  Why  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest  suddenly  raised  a  formidable 
obstacle  to  the  Pangerman  plan,  p.  26. — II.  How  it  was  that 
the  internal  state  of  Austria-Hungary  drove  Germany  to  let 
loose  the  dogs  of  war,  p.  31. — III.  General  view  of  the  causes 
of  the  war,  p.  37. 


CHAPTER  III 

How  FAR  THE  PaNGERMAN  PLAN  WAS  CARRIED  OUT  AT  THE  BEGIN- 
NING  OF    1916  -.-....-_45 

I.  German  pretensions  in  the  West,  p.  45. — II.  German  preten- 
sions in  the  East,  p.  52. — III.  German  pretensions  in  the  South 
and  South-East,  p.  56. — IV.  General  view  of  the  execution  of 
the  Pangerman  plan  from  1911  to  the  beginning  of  1916,  p.  62. 


viii         PANGERMAN  PLOT  UNMASKED 
CHAPTER  IV 

PAGE 

Special  features  given  to  the  war  by  the  Pangerman  plan       66 

I.  All  the  great  political  questions  of  the  old  world  are  raised  and 
must  be  solved,  p.  67. — II.  As  the  war  is  made  by  Germany 
in  order  to  achieve  a  gigantic  scheme  of  slavery,  it  follows  that 
it  is  waged  by  her  in  flagrant  violation  of  international  law, 
p.  69. — III.  A  struggle  of  tenacity  and  of  duplicity  on  the  side 
of  Berlin  versus  constancy  and  solidarity  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies,  p.  71. 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Dodge  of  the  "Drawn  Game"  and  the  scheme  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gxh-f"        -----    77 

I.  What  would  really  be  the  outcome  of  the  dodge  called  the 
"Drawn  Game,"  p.  78. — II.  The  financial  consequences  for 
the  Allies  of  this  so-called  "Drawn  Game."  p.  83.— III.  The 
Allies  and  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf," 
p.  88. — IV.  Panislamic  and  Asiatic  consequences  of  the 
achievement  of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf,"  p.  94. — V.  Consequences  for  the  world  of  the  achieve- 
ment of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf," 
p.  100. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  crucial  point  of  the  whole  problem      ....  108 

I.  The  obligation  which  the  threat  of  the  scheme  "from  Ham- 
burg to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  imposes  on  the  Allies,  p.  108. — 
II.  The  capital  importance  of  the  question  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary, p.  114. — III.  All  the  racial  elements  necessary  for  the 
destruction  of  the  Pangerman  plan  exist  in  Central  Europe, 
p.  121. 


CHAPTER  VTI 
The  Balkans  and  the  Pangerman  Plan 131 

I.  The  connexion  between  the  Pangerman  plan  and  the  plan  of 
Bulgarian  supremacy,  p.  132. — II.  Greece  and  Pangerman 
ambitions,  p.  146. — III.  Roumania  and  the  Pangerman  plan, 
p.  152. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  ix 

CHAPTER  VIII 

PAGE 

German  manceuvres  to  play  the  Allies  the  trick  of  the 
"Drawn  Game,"  that  is,  to  secure  the  accomplishment 
OF  THE  "Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  scheme  as  the 

MINIMUM  RESULT  OF  THE   WAR  -  -  -  -  -  -    158 

I.  The  exceptional  importance  of  the  economic  union  of  the  Cen- 
tral Empires,  and  the  danger  for  the  Allies  of  establishing  a 
connexion  between  that  union  and  their  own  economic  mea- 
sures after  the  war,  p.  159. — II.  Reasons  for  the  Turko-German 
dodge  of  making  a  separate  peace  between  the  Ottoman  em- 
pire and  the  Allies,  p.  167. — III.  Why  a  separate  and  prema- 
ture peace  with  Bulgaria  would  play  the  Pangerman  game, 
p.  174- 


CHAPTER  DC 

The  STILL  NEUTRAL  STATES  WHOSE  INDEPENDENCE  WOULD  BE 
DIRECTLY  THREATENED  BY  THE  ACHIEVEMENT  OF  THE  "  HaM- 
BtlRG    TO    THE    PERSIAN    GuLF"    SCHEME    AND    THEREFORE    BY 

Germany's  capture  of  Austria-Hungary    -        -        -        - 

I.  The  example  of  Portugal,  p.  183. — II.  Holland,  p.  187. — III. 
Switzerland,  p.  191. — -IV.  The  States  of  South  America,  p.  193. 
—V.  The  United  States,  p.  198. 


CONCLUSIONS 

What  has  been  set  forth  in  the  preceding  nine  chapters  appears 
to  justify  the  following  conclusions 213 


MAPS 

SAGS 

The  Poles  in  the  East  of  Germany         ------      i 

The  Danes  in  Prussia     ---------2 

The  Germans  and  the  non-Germans  in  Austria-Hungary         -        -      3 

The  Pangerman  plan  of  1911  ..--...    12 

The  Antigermanic  barrier  in  the  Balkans  after  the  treaty  of  Bu- 

karest  (loth  August,  1913)      -------28 

The  nationalities  in  Austria-Hungary     -        -        -        -        -        -32 

The  three  barriers  of  Antigermanic  peoples  in  the  Balkans  and  in 

Austria-Hungary     ---------43 

The  German  claims  in  the  West  (beginning  of  1916)       -        -        -    46 

The  German  claims  in  the  East      -------53 

The  German  claims  in  the  South  and  South-East  -        -        -        -    57 

The  plan  of  191 1  and  the  extent  of  its  execution  at  the  beginning  of 

1916        -----------64 

The  great  political  questions  raised  by  the  war       -        -        -        -    68 

The  German  fortress  at  the  beginning  ofi9i6        -        -        -        -72 

The  consequences  of  the  dodge  called  "The  Drawn  Game"  -        -     79 

Asiatic  consequences  of  the  accomplishment  of  the  scheme  "From 

Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"       ------     95 

World-wide  consequences  of  the  "Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf" 

scheme,  as  provided  for  by  the  plan  of  1911     -        -        -        -  loi 

The  crucial  point  of  the  European  problem    -        -        -        -        -  113 

Great  Bulgaria       ..-------.  133 

Serbian  Macedonia         ..-...._.  137 

Greece  after  the  treaty  of  Bukarest        -._---  147 
Great  Roumania    -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -153 

The  nationalities  in  Turkey    -        -        -        -        -        -        -        -170 

Encroachments  planned  by  Bulgaria  on  neighbouring  States  -        -  181 
Portugal  and  Colonial  Pangermanism     ------  185 


PANGERMAN  PLOT  UNMASKED  xi 

PAGE 

The  Neutral  States  of  Europe  and  Pangermanism  ...  i88 

Colonial  Pangermanism  and  South  America   -----  194 

Distribution  of  German-bom  Germans  in  the  United  States   -        -  201 

Relation  between  the  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  and  the  Pangerman 
gains  at  the  beginning  of  1916         ------  217 

The  Pangerman  gains  at  the  beginning  of  19 16       -        -        -        -  223 

European  States  interested  in  the  solution  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
question  .....-..-.  231 

The  States  of  Asia  and  America,  interested  in  the  solution  of  the 

Austro-Hungarian  question     .-.-.--  23.3 


INTRODUCTION. 
By  the  Earl  of  Cromer,  O.M. 

My  reasons  for  commending  M,  Cheradame's 
most  instructive  work  to  the  earnest  attention  of 
my  countrymen  and  countrywomen  are  three-fold. 

In  the  first  place,  M.  Cheradame  stands  con- 
spicuous amongst  that  very  small  body  of  politi- 
cians who  warned  Europe  betimes  of  the  German 
danger.  The  fact  that  in  the  past  he  proved  a  true 
prophet  gives  him  a  special  claim  to  be  heard  when 
he  states  his  views  as  regards  the  present  and  the 
future. 

In  the  second  place,  I  entertain  a  strong  opinion 
that  M.  Cheradame's  diagnosis  of  the  present 
situation  is,  in  all  its  main  features,  correct. 

In  the  third  place,  in  spite  of  the  voluminous  war 
literature  which  already  exists,  I  greatly  doubt 
whether  the  special  aspect  of  the  case  which  M. 
Cheradame  wishes  to  present  to  the  public  is  fully 
understood  in  this  country;  neither  should  I  be 
surprised  to  hear  from  those  who  are  more  qualified 
than  myself  to  speak  on  the  subject  that  the  same 
remark  appHes,  though  possibly  in  a  less  degree,  to 
the  public  opinion  of  France. 

It  is  essential  that,  before  the  terms  of  peace  are 
discussed,  a  clear  idea  should  be  formed  of  the 
reasons  which  led  the  German  Government  to  pro- 
voke this  war.     It  is  well  that,  if  such  a  course  be  at 


xiv       PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

all  possible,  those  who  are  personally  responsible 
for  the  numerous  acts  of  barbarity  committed  by 
the  Germans  should  receive  adequate  punishment. 
But  attention  to  points  of  this  sort,  however  rational 
and  meritorious,  should  not  in  any  degree  be  allowed 
to  obscure  the  vital  importance  of  the  permanent 
political  issues  which  call  loudly  for  settlement. 
Otherwise,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  a  peace  may 
be  patched  up,  which  may  have  some  specious 
appearance  of  being  favourable  to  the  Allies,  but 
which  would  at  the  same  time  virtually  concede  to 
the  Germans  all  they  require  in  order,  after  time 
had  been  allowed  for  recuperation,  to  renew,  with 
increased  hope  of  success,  their  attempts  to  shatter 
modern  civilization  and  to  secure  the  domination  of 
the  world. 

M.  Cheradame  explains — and  I  believe  with 
perfect  accuracy — the  nature  of  the  German  objec- 
tive. It  is,  in  his  opinion,  to  lay  secure  and  stable 
foundations  for  the  system  known  as  Pan-German- 
ism. What  is  Pan-Germanism  ?  It  may  be 
doubted  whether  all  that  is  implied  in  that  term  is 
fully  realized  in  this  country.  One  interpretation 
may  be  given  to  the  word,  which  is  not  merely 
innocuous,  but  which  may  even  reasonably  appeal 
to  the  sympathies  of  those  who  approve  of  the  new 
map  of  Europe  being  constituted  with  a  view  to 
applying  that  nationalist  principle,  which  finds 
almost  universal  favour  in  all  democratic  countries. 
It  cannot  be  too  distinctly  understood  that  the 
political  programme  now  advocated  by  Germany 
has  no  sort  of  affinity  with  a  plan  of  this  sort.  The 
Germans  contend  not  only  that  all  those  who  are 
generally  denominated  Germans  by  the  rest  of  the 
world  should  be  united,  but  that  all  who  are  of 
what  is  termed  "German  origin"  should  be  brought 
into  the  German  fold.  Moreover,  they  give  to 
this  latter  phrase  an  expansion  and  a  signification 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

which  is  condemned  and  derided  by  all  who  have 
paid  serious  attention  to  ethnological  studies.  This, 
however,  is  far  from  stating  the  whole  case.  The 
object  of  the  German  Government  is  to  effect  the 
whole  or  partial  Germanization  of  countries  in- 
habited by  races  which  cannot,  by  any  conceivable 
ethnological  process  of  reasoning,  be  held  to  be  of 
German  stock.  In  fact,  M.  Cheradame  very 
correctly  describes  Pan-Germanism  when  he  says 
that  its  object  is  to  disregard  all  questions  of  racial 
and  linguistic  affinity  and  to  absorb  huge  tracts  of 
country  the  possession  of  which  is  considered  useful 
to  advance  Hohenzollern  interests.  In  other  words, 
what  they  wish  is  to  establish,  under  the  name  of 
Pan-Germanism,  a  world  system  whose  leading  and 
most  immediate  feature  is  the  creation  of  an 
empire  stretching  from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  the 
North  Sea. 

That  this  project  has  for  a  long  while  past  been 
in  course  of  preparation  by  the  Kaiser  and  his 
megalomaniac  advisers  cannot  for  a  moment  be 
doubted.  When,  in  November,  1898,  William  II. 
pronounced  his  famous  speech  at  Damascus,  in 
which  he  stated  that  all  the  three  hundred  millions 
of  Mohammedans  in  the  world  could  rely  upon  him 
^  as  their  true  friend,  the  world  was  inclined  to  regard 
the  utterance  as  mere  rhodomontade.  It  was 
nothing  of  the  sort.  It  involved  the  declaration  of 
a  definite  and  far-reaching  policy,  the  execution  of 
v/hich  was  delayed  until  a  favourable  moment 
occurred  and,  notably,  until  the  Kiel  Canal  was 
completed.  The  whole  conspiracy  very  nearly 
succeeded.  In  spite  of  their  careful  attention  to 
detail,  their  talent  for  organization,  and  their 
elaborate  preparations  to  meet  what  appears  to 
them  every  contingency  which  may  occur,  the 
Germans  seem  to  have  a  constitutional  inability 
to  grasp  the  motives  which  guide  the  inhabitants  of 


xvi       PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

I  other  countries.  A  very  close  analogy  to  the  mis- 
take made  by  the  Kaiser  is  to  be  found  in  an  incident 
of  recent  English  history.  It  is  alleged,  I  know  not 
with  what  truth,  that  when,  in  1886,  Lord  Ran- 
dolph Churchill  resigned  his  position  as  Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer  in  Lord  Salisbury's  administra- 
tion, he  ''forgot  Goschen,"  who,  as  it  will  be 
remembered,  was  speedily  nominated  to  succeed 
him.  The  Kaiser  forgot  England.  For  various 
reasons,  which  are  too  well-known  to  require 
repetition,  he  and  his  advisers  were  firmly  convinced 
that  England  would  not  join  in  the  war.  The 
programme  was,  first,  to  destroy  the  power  of 
France  and  Russia,  and  then,  after  that  had  been 
done,  to  fall  upon  England.  In  one  sense  it  was 
fortunate  that  the  Germans  committed  the  gross 
international  crime  of  invading  Belgium.  Had 
they  not  done  so,  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  Eng- 
lish nation  would  not  have  woke  up  to  the  realities 
of  the  situation.  As  it  was,  however,  it  became 
clear,  even  to  the  most  extreme  pacificists,  that 
honour  and  interest  alike  pointed  to  the  necessity 
of  decisive  action.  Thus  as  M.  Cheradame  indi- 
cates, the  original  German  plan  was  completely 
upset.  The  advance  on  Paris  had  to  be  stayed. 
But  the  programme,  which  was  the  result  of  long 
and  deliberate  contemplation,  has  by  no  means 
been  abandoned.  On  the  contrary,  with  the 
adhesion  of  the  Bulgarians,  who  will  eventually, 
unless  the  Allies  secure  a  decisive  victory,  become 
the  victims  of  Pan-Germanism,  and  also  that  of  the 
Turks,  who  were  manoeuvred  into  the  war  by  an 
adroit  and  absolutely  unscrupulous  diplomacy,  a 
very  considerable  portion  of  the  plan  has  already 
been  put  into  execution. 

M.  Cheradame  states  with  great  reason  that 
France,  Italy,  Russia,  England,  and  all  the  minor 
Powers    are    vitally    interested    in    frustrating    the 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

German  project  of  establishing  their  dominion 
from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  the  North  Sea.  He  also 
warns  us  against  making  a  separate  peace  with 
either  Austria-Hungary  or  Turkey,  both  of  these 
Powers  being  merely  vassals  of  Germany.  He  is 
very  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  mere  cession  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  and  the  rehabilitation 
of  Belgium  cannot  form  the  foundations  of  a  durable 
peace.  If  peace  were  concluded  on  this  basis,  the 
Germans  would  have  achieved  their  main  object, 
and,  as  Herr  Harden  pointed  out  last  February, 
even  if  Germany  was  obliged,  under  pressure,  to 
cede  Alsace-Lorraine,  there  would  still  be  seventy 
millions  of  Germans  firmly  determined  to  regain 
possession  of  those  provinces  at  the  first  suitable 
opportunity.  In  fact,  the  realization  of  the  Ger- 
man project,  although  accompanied  by  certain 
temporary  disabilities  from  the  German  point  of 
view,  would  eventually  enable  Germany  to  strangle 
Europe. 

I  need  not  dwell  upon  all  the  proposals  set  forth 
by  M.  Cheradame  with  a  view  to  the  frustration  of 
this  plan,  but  the  corner-stone  of  his  programme  is 
similar  to  that  advocated  with  great  ability  in  this 
country  by  Mr.  Wickham  Steed  and  Mr.  Seton 
Watson.  It  is  to  create  a  Southern  Slav  State, 
which  will  afford  an  effectual  barrier  to  German 
advance  towards  the  East.  It  is  essential  that 
the  immense  importance  of  dealing  with  the  terri- 
tories of  the  Hapsburgs  as  a  preliminary  to  a  final 
settlement  of  all  the  larger  aspects  of  the  Eastern 
question  should  be  fully  realized.  It  constitutes 
the  key  of  the  whole  situation. 

For  these  reasons,  I  hope  that  M.  Cheradame's 
work,  which  develops  more  fully  the  arguments 
which  I  have  very  briefly  stated  above,  will  receive 
in  this  country  the  attention  which  it  certainly 
merits.     I  should  add  that  the  book  is  written  in  a 


xviii     PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

popular  style,  and  that  M.  Cheradame's  arguments 
can  be  easily  followed  by  those  who  have  no  special 
acquaintance  either  with  Eastern  policy  or  with 
the  tortuous  windings  of  Austrian  and  German 
diplomacy  during  the  last  quarter  of  a  century. 

Cromer. 
Sepxembek  4,  1916. 


PREFACE. 

The  Pangerman  plot  is  the  only  cause  of  the  war. 
It  is,  in  fact,  the  cause  at  once  of  its  outbreak  and 
of  its  prolongation  till  that  victory  of  the  Allies 
has  been  won  which  is  indispensable  to  the  liberty 
of  the  world.  In  this  book  I  propose  to  demon- 
strate this  truth  by  a  series  of  documents,  precise, 
clear,  and  intelligible  to  all.  The  fate  of  every  man 
in  the  allied  countries,  and  even  in  some  of  the 
countries  which  are  still  neutral,  really  depends  on 
the  issue  of  the  formidable  war  now  being  waged. 
This  cataclysm,  unprecedented  in  history,  let  loose 
by  Prussianized  Germany,  will  have  infinite  rever- 
berations in  every  sphere,  reverberations  which 
will  affect  every  one  of  us  individually  for  good  or, 
ftlas !  too  often  for  ill.  Every  one,  therefore,  has 
a  direct  interest  in  knowing  clearly  why  these  in- 
evitable reverberations  of  the  immense  struggle 
will  be  produced,  and  on  what  fundamental 
conditions  those  of  them  which  bode  ill  for  the 
Allies,  and  are  yet  but  imperfectly  understood,  can 
and  must  be  avoided.  Hence  every  one  of  the 
Allies  should  acquire  an  exact  notion  of  the  present 
realities.  Once  fortified  by  the  evidence,  his 
opinion  will  become  a  force  for  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments; it  will  then  contribute  to  the  victory  and 
to  the  imposition  of  the  conditions  necessary  for 
the  peace. 

In  writing  this  popular  book  my  aim  has  been  to 
bring  home,  even  to  those  who  are  least  versed  in 
foreign  affairs,  the  formidable  problems  raised  by  the 
war.     In  my  opinion  this  work  is  addressed  to  women 


XX         PAN  GERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

quite  as  much  as  to  men.  The  reading  of  it  may 
perhaps  bring  not  only  instruction  but  consolation 
to  those  whose  affections  have  been  so  cruelly 
wounded.  When  they  comprehend  better  by  what 
an  atrocious  plan  of  slavery  the  world  is  threatened, 
they  will  understand  more  fully  for  what  a  sublime, 
what  a  stupendous  cause  their  husbands,  their 
sons,  their  plighted  lovers,  are  fighting  or  dying 
with  such  heroic  self-sacrifice.  May  that  larger 
understanding  of  the  formidable  events  now  occur- 
ring yield  to  the  women  of  the  Allies  at  least  some 
alleviation  of  their  suflferings. 

But  if  this  book  is  a  popular  work,  I  beg  my 
readers  to  remark  that  it  is  not  the  result  of  a 
hasty  effort,  vamped  up  by  a  mere  desire  to  treat 
of  the  moving,  the  tragic  subject  of  the  hour.  The 
book  is,  indeed,  the  logical  conclusion  of  a  labour 
on  which  I  have  been  engaged  for  twenty-one 
years.  As  my  readers  have  an  interest  in  knowing 
how  far  they  may  trust  me,  they  will  allow  me  to 
explain  to  them  how  I  was  led  to  concentrate  my 
studies  on  the  Pangerman  policy  of  Germany,  what 
has  been  the  result  of  my  efforts,  and  how  they  are 

linked  together. 

* 
*  * 

In  former  days  I  was  the  pupil  of  Albert  Sorel  at 
the  Free  School  of  Political  Science.  That  great 
master  was  good  enough  to  admit  me  to  his  inti- 
macy; and  he  brought  to  light  and  maturity  the 
latent  and  instinctive  propensity  which  I  had  for 
foreign  politics.  My  practical  studies  abroad  led 
me  to  Germany  in  1894,  just  at  the  time  when  the 
Pangerman  movement  had  begun.  As  the  move- 
ment was  manifestly  the  modern  development  of 
the  Prussianism  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  I  was  then 
extremely  struck  by  its  importance.  The  move- 
ment appeared  to  me  so  threatening  for  the  future 
that  I  resolved  to  follow  all  the  developments  of 


PREFACE  xxi 

the  Pangerman  plot,  which  was  already  the 
consequence  of  the  movement,  and  which  from 
1895  onward  had  taken  definite  shape.  The  task 
which  I  thus  laid  on  myself  was  at  once  arduous, 
vast,  and  thrilling,  for  from  that  time  it  was  certain 
that  the  Germans  based  their  political  and  military 
Pangerman  plan  on  a  study  of  all  the  political, 
ethnographical,  economic,  social,  military  and  naval 
problems  not  only  of  Europe  but  of  the  whole 
world.  In  truth,  the  intense  labour  accomplished 
in  the  cause  of  Pangermanism  by  the  Germans  in 
the  last  twenty-one  years  has  been  colossal.  They 
have  carried  it  out  everywhere  with  a  formidable 
tenacity  and  a  methodical  thoroughness  which  will 
be  the  astonishment  of  history.  Indisputably,  the 
Pangerman  plan,  which  is  the  result  of  this  gigantic 
effort,  is  the  most  extraordinary  plot  which  the 
world  has  ever  witnessed. 

I  made  the  study  of  that  plot  for  twenty-one 
years  the  work  of  my  life,  convinced  as  I  was,  in 
spite  of  the  scepticism  which  long  greeted  my 
efforts  to  give  warning  of  the  peril,  that  the  study 
would  serve  a  useful  purpose  one  day. 

The  study  has  necessitated  very  many  and  very 
long  journeys  of  inquiry.  I  was  obliged  in  fact  to 
go  and  learn,  on  the  spot,  at  least  the  essential 
elements  of  the  complex  problems  mentioned 
above,  which  have  been  the  base  of  the  Pangerman 
plan,  in  order  that  I  might  be  able  to  grasp  the 
most  distant  ramifications  of  the  Prussian  pro- 
gramme for  dominating  the  world. 

This  obligation  led  me  to  sojourn  in  very  different 
countries.  That  the  reader  may  have  an  idea  of 
at  least  the  material  extent  of  my  inquiries,  I  will 
indicate  the  number  of  the  towns  in  which  I  have 
been  led  to  work  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  the 
constituent  elements,  direct  and  indirect,  of  the 
Pangerman  plan. 


xxii      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

The  United  States,  14  ;  Canada,  11  ;  Japan,  11  ; 
Corea,  4  ;  China,  11  ;  Indo-China,  19;  British 
India,  24  ;  Spain,  i  ;  Italy,  4  ;  Belgium,  6  ; 
Luxemburg,  i  ;  Holland,  5  ;  Switzerland,  4  ; 
England,  8;  Greece,  2;  Bulgaria,  4;  Roumania,  3; 
Serbia,  8  ;  Turkey,  3  ;  Germany,  16  ;  Austro- 
Hungary,  18. 

In  these  towns,  according  to  the  requirement  of 
my  studies,  I  passed  days,  weeks,  or  months,  often 
on  repeated  occasions.  I  endeavoured,  so  far  as 
the  opportunities  and  the  time  admitted  of  it,  to 
enter  into  direct  relations  with  the  acting  ministers, 
the  leaders  of  the  various  political  parties,  the 
diplomatists  and  the  consuls,  both  French  and 
foreign,  some  heads  of  states,  influential  journalists, 
officers  of  repute,  military  and  naval  attaches, 
well-informed  merchants  and  manufacturers.  It 
was  thus  that,  by  means  of  information  of  many 
sorts  drawn  from  the  most  diverse  sources,  and 
checked  by  comparison  with  each  other,  I  have 
attempted  to  set  forth  the  Pangerman  political  and 
military  plan. 

Since  1898  I  have  endeavoured  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  public  to  the  immense  danger 
which  that  plan  was  laying  up  for  the  world,  as  my 
former  works  testify,  particularly  UEurope  et  la 
Question  d^Atttriche  au  seuil  du  XXe  Steele,  which 
appeared  in  1901,  therefore  fifteen  years  ago,  and 
contained  an  exposition,  as  precise  as  it  was  then 
possible  to  make  it,  of  the  Pangerman  plan  of 
1895,  summed  up  in  the  formula  "Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf"  ;  also  Le  Chemln  de  fer  de  Bagdad, 
published  in  1903,  wherein  I  set  forth  the  danger 
of  that  co-operation  between  Germany  and  Turkey, 
which  was  then  only  nascent,  but  which  we  see 
full-fledged  to-day. 

I  attempted  also  by  numerous  lectures  to  diffuse 
among  the  public  some  notion  of  the  Pangerman 


PREFACE  xxiii 

peril.  I  did  not  content  myself  with  warning  my 
countrymen.  I  am  proud  to  have  been  one  of  the 
first  Frenchmen  to  preach  a  cordial  understanding 
between  France  and  England  at  a  time  when  there 
was  perhaps  some  merit  in  doing  so.  I  deemed  it, 
therefore,  a  duty  to  inform  the  British  public,  so  far 
as  it  lay  in  my  power,  that  the  Pangerman  peril 
concerned  Great  Britain  quite  as  much  as  France. 
In  1909  the  Franco-Scottish  Society  kindly  invited 
me  to  lecture  to  its  members  at  Edinburgh,  Glasgow 
and  Aberdeen.  I  seized  the  opportunity,  and  took 
for  the  subject  of  my  lectures,  "The  problem  of 
Central  Europe  and  universal  politics." 

The  Aberdeen  Free  Press,  of  May  8th,  1909, 
summed  up  very  exactly  as  follows  the  substance 
of  what  I  said,  seven  years  ago,  to  my  British 
hearers: 

*'....  The  lecturer  attached  enormous  im- 
portance to  the  Pan- German  movement,  which  he 
regarded  as  the  decisive  factor  in  the  situation,  and 
he  pointed  out  that  the  propaganda  which  had 
gone  on  in  Germany  and  in  Austria  was  part  of  a 
great  policy  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  the  German 
State  and  dominate  middle  and  south-eastern 
Europe.  The  rapport  personnel  established  in 
recent  years  between  Berlin  and  Vienna  pointed,  he 
said,  to  the  conclusion  that  Germany  and  Austria 
were  working  hand  in  hand.  In  the  recent  Balkan 
crisis  he  described  Aehrenthal  as  playing  a  partie 
de  poker,  in  which  his  bluff  had  been  crowned  with 
success.  The  off-set  to  the  Pan- German  movement 
was  to  be  found  in  the  Triple  Entente  between 
England,  France  and  Russia,  and  it  followed  from 
a  consideration  of  European  politics  that  the 
questions  confronting  England  with  regard  to  the 
supremacy  of  the  sea  were  intimately  bound  up 
with  the  question  which  concerned  the  land  powers 
of  Europe.    In  particular,  the  speaker  thought  that 


xxiv     PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

the  Pan- German  aspirations  would  be  effectually 
combatted  by  the  growing  social  and  political 
development  of  the  various  minor  Slav  peoples  in 
the  south-east  of  Europe.  The  development  of 
these  peoples  was  a  thing  which  it  was  with  the 
interests  of  England,  France  and  Russia  to  encour- 
age to  the  utmost." 

My  Scottish  hearers  gave  me  a  very  kind  recep- 
tion, of  which  I  have  preserved  a  lively  recollection. 
But  truth  compels  me  to  declare  that  I  had  the 
impression  that  the  great  majority  of  them  did  not 
believe  me.  I  strongly  suspect  that  they  then  saw 
in  me  simply  a  Frenchman,  who,  moved  by  the 
spirit  of  revenge,  tried  above  all  to  stir  up  the 
British  public  against  Germany.  The  impression 
did  not  discourage  me  any  more  than  many 
similar  instances  of  want  of  success.  In  191 1  the 
Central  Asian  Society  did  me  the  honour  of  inviting 
me  to  express  my  views  in  London  (22nd  March) 
on  the  Bagdad  railway.  I  used  this  fresh  oppor- 
tunity to  expound  a  method  of  Franco-English 
co-operation  which  seemed  to  me  necessary  to 
parry  the  dangers  of  the  near  future. 

"Such  is,"  I  then  said,  "broadly  speaking,  the 
affair  of  Bagdad.  The  most  moderate  conclusion 
which,  in  my  judgment,  inevitably  follows  is  that 
from  beginning  to  end  the  logical  and  methodical 
spirit  of  Germany  has  got  the  better  of  the  French, 
English,  and  Russian  interests,  which  have  been 
compromised  by  our  slowness  to  grasp  the  import- 
ance of  the  problem  confronting  us,  and  by  the 
lamentable  want  of  cohesion  between  the  diplo- 
macies of  the  three  countries. 

"The  lesson  apparently  to  be  drawn  from  these 
considerations  is,  that  for  the  future  we  ought  no 
longer  to  be  satisfied  with  a  hand-to-mouth  policy 
and  with  seeking  solutions  only  when  the  ditliculties 
take  an  acute  form. 


PREFACE  XXV 

''If  we  wish  to  serve  and  defend  our  interests 
effectually,  we  must,  as  Talleyrand  said,  keep  the 
future  in  mind,  and  learn  something  of  that  German 
method  of  which  the  good  results  are  incontestable. 

"So  far  as  the  eye  can  range  to  the  visible 
political  horizon,  the  essential  interests  of  England, 
France,  and  Russia  are  in  agreement;  it  is,  there- 
fore, to  all  appearance,  absolutely  necessary  that 
the  men  who  exercise  an  influence  on  public 
opinion  in  this  country,  in  France,  and  in  Russia, 
should  enter  into  personal  relations  in  order  to 
discuss  the  great  national  interests  which  they  have 
in  common,  and  to  adopt  a  useful  line  of  conduct, 
while  there  is  yet  time.  Such  a  course  would  be 
effectual,  because  it  would  be  determined  before 
the  decisive  events  instead  of  after  them,  that  is  to 
say,  when  it  is  too  late." 

"Were  we  to  adopt  this  method,  which  after  all 
is  very  simple,  the  future  attempts  of  our  adversaries 
against  our  interests  would  encounter  effectual  ob- 
stacles, and  we  should  no  longer  have  to  regret  mis- 
carriages such  as  those  of  which  the  Bagdad  affair  is 
an  example." 

Has  the  method  thus  recommended  been  fol- 
lowed? Apparently  not;  otherwise  could  France 
and  England  have  been  surprised  by  the  war? 

My  propaganda  having  had  little  practical  result, 
I  endeavoured  at  least  to  keep  myself  well  informed 
of  the  events  that  were  happening. 

In  December,  1913,  and  January,  February,  and 
March,  1914,  I  made  new  and  minute  inquiries  in 
Central  Europe,  the  Balkans,  and  Turkey,  and 
these  inquiries  were  of  particular  value  to  me. 
The  truth  is,  that  the  treaty  of  Bukarest  of  August 
loth,  1913,  by  reason  of  its  far-reaching  and  im- 
portant consequences,  had  completely  upset  the 
former  state  of  affairs,  so  much  so  that  without  my 
journey    of    1914,    I    should    certainly    have    been 


xxvi     PAN  GERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

unable  to  understand  the  new  situation.  In  the 
course  of  my  journey  I  set  myself  to  apply,  with 
great  rigour,  my  method  of  research,  which  consists 
essentially  in  trying  to  see  the  situations  as  they 
are,  without  preconceived  ideas,  while  listening  to 
all  opinions  in  order  to  compare  them  afterwards 
and  extract,  if  possible,  the  average  truth.  In 
Serbia,  in  Greece,  in  Turkey,  in  Roumania,  in 
Bulgaria,  where  for  a  long  time  I  had  been  in 
personal  relations  with  people  of  many  different 
sorts,  I  was  able  to  have  long  talks  with  persons 
in  the  most  diverse  walks  of  life.  In  particular,  I 
had  the  good  fortune  to  be  graciously  received  by 
the  sovereigns  and  princes  of  the  Balkans:  King 
Peter  of  Serbia  (23rd  December,  1913),  Prince 
Alexander,  heir  of  Serbia  (December,  1913),  King 
Constantine  (25th  January,  1914),  Prince  Nicholas 
of  Greece  (28th  January),  King  Charles  of 
Roumania  (i8th  February),  Tsar  Ferdinand  (28th 
February),  Prince  Boris,  heir  of  Bulgaria  (29th 
February).  If  I  record  the  audiences  which  these 
high  personages  were  so  good  as  to  grant  me,  it  is 
because  they  were  really  not  commonplace.  These 
sovereigns  and  princes  knew  that  I  had  long 
studied  their  country  impartially,  and  they  con- 
sented to  speak  with  me  of  the  great  interests 
which  guided  their  policies.  During  these  various 
audiences,  which  lasted  from  half  an  hour  to  two 
hours,  I  heard  many  points  of  view  of  real  import- 
ance set  forth.  No  doubt  each  of  my  various 
interlocutors  only  said  to  me  what  he  wished  to  say; 
but,  thanks  to  the  multiplicity  of  the  opinions 
expressed  and  to  the  variety  of  my  sources  of 
information,  I  was  able  at  least  to  construct  a 
general  picture  of  the  true  Balkan  situation,  and  to 
connect  it  afterwards  with  the  problem  of  Central 
Europe  and  the  general  policy  of  Germany. 


PREFACE  xxvii 

This  inquiry,  which  in  returning  I  completed  in 
Hungary  and  Austria,  convinced  me  that,  contrary 
to  the  opinion  which  has  been  held  down  to  quite 
recent  times  in  many  Allied  circles,  the  treaty  of 
Bukarest  by  no  means  constituted  an  injustice,  as 
the  Allies  have  supposed — a  belief  which  has  been 
the  source  of  most  of  their  mistakes  in  the  Balkans 
in  191 5.  On  the  contrary,  the  treaty  of  Bukarest, 
particularly  because  it  for  the  first  time  drew 
Roumania  out  of  the  German  orbit,  appeared  to  me 
the  most  astonishingly  favourable  event  which  had 
happened  on  the  Continent  since  1870,  and  which  was 
entirely  in  accordance  with  the  interests  of  France, 
England,  and  Russia.  The  consequences  of  this 
treaty  formed  in  fact,  as  we  shall  see,  the  most 
effectual  arrangement  that  could  be  conceived  for 
arresting  the  Pangerman  danger  and  maintaining 
peace  in  Europe.  But  this  pacific  dam  to  keep  back 
the  Pangerman  flood  was  only  possible  on  condition 
that  the  Entente  powers  held  themselves  ready  for 
war,  which  would  probably  have  sufficed  to  prevent 
it,  and  that  at  the  same  time  they  resolutely  and 
unanimously  supported  Greece,  Roumania,  and 
Serbia. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  check  which  the  treaty  of 
Bukarest  gave  to  the  Pangerman  plan  in  Europe, 
appeared  to  me  so  pregnant  with  consequences  that 
I  considered  it  highly  probable  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Vienna,  instigated  by  that  of  Berlin,  would 
not  shrink  from  war  for  the  purpose  of  undoing  the 
treaty  of  Bukarest,  with  its  far-reaching  effects, 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  unless  the  other 
powers  put  themselves  on  their  guard.  On  my 
return  to  France  I  tried  to  explain  the  imminence 
of  the  danger,  but  no  one  would  believe  it. 

In  truth,  German  aggression  caught  the  present 
Allied  countries  napping  for  the  following  funda- 
mental  reason.     No   doubt,   before   the   war.   Pan- 


xxviii     PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

germanism,  as  a  doctrine,  was  well  enough  known 
in  some  circles,  but  the  political  and  military 
Pangerman  plan,  the  application  of  which  has  been 
pursued  methodically  by  the  government  of  Berlin 
since  the  opening  of  hostilities,  had  not  been 
studied  and  taken  very  seriously  except  by  an 
extremely  small  number  of  private  persons  in 
France,  England,  and  Russia. 

The  efforts  made  by  these  private  persons  to 
convince  the  men  at  the  helm  in  the  now  Allied 
countries  of  the  awful  danger  ahead,  were  vain.  The 
principal  reason  why  their  warnings  fell  unheeded 
was  this.  When  by  the  help  of  documents  they 
explained  that  William  II. 's  ultimate  aim  was  the 
establishment  of  German  supremacy  on  the  ruins 
of  all  the  great  powers,  they  were  taken  for  crazy 
dreamers,  so  chimerical  did  such  formidable  projects 
appear. 

That  is  why  among  the  Allies  the  political  and 
military  Pangerman  plot  was  ignored  in  its  true 
character  and  its  extent,  down  to  the  outbreak  of 
war.  This  lack  of  knowledge  in  France  is  proved 
by  a  statement  in  Le  Temps  of  i6th  December, 
191 5.  Before  the  war,  *Sve  did  not  believe  in  the 
possibility  of  a  war,  and  we  took  no  pains  to  prepare 
for  that  redoubtable  event."  It  was  absolutely  the 
same  in  England,  as  was  demonstrated  by  the 
complete  surprise  of  Great  Britain  at  the  German 
aggression. 

More  than  that,  the  Kaiser's  entire  plan  has 
continued  to  be  misunderstood  in  the  Allied 
countries  down  to  a  date  which  seems  quite  recent. 
In  fact.  Sir  Edward  Carson,  when  explaining  his 
resignation  in  the  House  of  Commons,  November 
2nd,  191 5,  said:  "I  hope  that  the  new  plan  of 
campaign  has  been  definitely  settled,  for  while  I 
was  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  the  Cabinet  had  no 
plan"  (quoted  by  Le  J'ernps,  4th  November,  191 5). 


PREFACE  xxix 

But  if  the  Pangerman  plan  had  been  known  in 
London,  the  English  and  consequently  the  French 
would  certainly  have  long  ago  adopted  the  counter- 
plan  which  could  not  have  failed  to  destroy  it;  for 
the  Pangerman  plan  consists  of  such  definite  and 
precise  elements  that  the  mere  recognition  of  them 
at  once  suggests  the  means  of  frustrating  it;  in 
particular,  the  advantages  and  the  necessity  of  the 
Salonika  expedition,  which  has  been  so  sharply 
opposed  and  so  tardily  undertaken,  would  have 
been  understood  from  the  beginning  of  191 5,  when 
M.  Briand  recommended  it  in  principle.  Besides,  as 
anybody  may  convince  himself,  if  the  Pangerman 
plan  had  been  fully  known,  it  is  highly  probable 
that  the  Allies  would  never  have  perpetrated  the 
blunders  which  they  have  committed  in  the 
Balkans,  the  Dardanelles,  and  Serbia.  It  appears 
that  the  magnitude  of  the  Pangerman  plan,  and 
particularly  the  part  which  is  masked  behind  the 
pretended  "drawn  game,"  has  not  even  yet  been 
clearly  apprehended  in  many  circles  which  imagine 
themselves  well  acquainted  with  the  aims  pursued 
by  Germany  in  the  war.  In  fact,  quite  recently, 
in  France  and  in  England,  certain  important 
organs,  though  not,  it  is  true,  of  an  official  character, 
have  argued  that  since  Germany  means  to  extend 
her  Zolherein  to  Austria-Hungary,  the  Allies  ought 
to  form  a  powerful  economic  league  with  the 
view  of  combatting  the  Austro-German  union 
after  the  war.  But  as  we  shall  see,  the  question 
really  could  not,  except  by  some  deplorable  in- 
advertence, be  stated  in  these  terms  in  the  Allied 
countries.  No  connexion  should  be  voluntarily 
established  by  them  between  the  economic  union 
of  the  Allies,  however  natural  it  may  be,  and  the 
economic  union  of  Central  Europe.  In  truth,  to 
permit  the  future  extension  of  the  German 
ZoUverein  to  Austria-Hungary,  in  other  words,   to 


XXX      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

acquiesce  in  that  economic  alliance,  under  any  form, 
between  the  two  Central  empires,  which  has  formed 
the  base  and  condition  of  the  whole  Pangerman 
plot  for  twenty-one  years  (the  plot  of  1895),  would 
be  to  permit  implicitly  the  seizure  by  Germany  of 
fifty  millions  of  inhabitants,  of  whom  nearly  three- 
fourths  are  not  Germans;  the  inevitable  conse- 
quence, as  I  shall  prove,  would  be  to  accept  the 
German  supremacy  over  the  Balkans  and  Turkey. 
Now  it  is  manifest  that  such  results  would  be  in 
absolute  contradiction  to  the  declarations  of  the 
Allied  governments,  which  have  proclaimed  that 
their  object  in  waging  the  war  has  been  to  destroy 
Prussian  militarism  and  not,  consequently,  to 
allow  such  a  new  state  of  things  as  the  seizure, 
direct  or  indirect,  of  Austria-Hungary  by  Germany, 
which  would  multiply  her  power  ten-fold. 

The  fact  that  such  ''inadvertences"  can  still 
be  committed,  after  twenty  months  of  war,  in 
circles  which,  though  not  official,  are  nevertheless 
important,  suffices  to  prove  that  the  widest  possible 
publicity  of  the  Pangerman  plot  throughout  the 
great  masses  of  the  enlightened  public  in  the 
Allied  countries  is  really  needful,  if  not  indispens- 
able. It  is  also  extremely  desirable  that  neutrals 
should  know  exactly  what  the  Pangerman  plot  is  in 
its  nature  and  in  its  extent.  In  particular,  those 
Americans  who  imagine  that  they  can  stand  alool 
from  the  present  formidable  conflict,  will  then 
clearly  understand  that  their  future  liberty  really 
depends  on  the  victory  of  the  Allied  soldiers,  who 
are  fighting  not  only  for  their  own  independence, 
but  in  reality  for  the  independence  of  the  whole 
civilized  world,  and  particularly  for  that  of  the 
United  States. 

I  earnestly  trust  that  the  English  edition  of  this 
book  may  contribute  to  bring  about  this  result. 
Its  object  is  to  inform  public  opinion  exactly,  so  far 


PREFACE  xxxi 

as  the  English  tongue  is  spoken,  as  to  the  Berlin 
plot  for  the  domination  of  the  globe.  Moreover, 
an  exact  knowledge  of  the  Pangerman  political  and 
military  plot  throws  a  flood  of  light  on  all  the 
essential  problems  of  the  war:  it  brings  out  the  deep- 
seated  cause  of  the  war;  it  explains  the  immediate 
causes,  which  are  still  almost  unknown;  it  shows 
why  it  is  indispensable  to  the  freedom  of  the  world 
that  the  Allies  should  achieve,  not  a  hollow  and 
treacherous  peace,  but  a  complete  victory  resulting 
in  the  destruction  of  Prussian  militarism,  which 
alone  can  put  an  end  to  the  great  armaments  in 
Europe  and  ensure  a  really  lasting  peace. 

In  order  that  the  demonstration  may  be  as 
convincing  as  possible,  I  shall  refrain,  as  far  as  I 
can,  from  giving  my  readers  my  own  personal 
opinions  and  impressions.  I  shall  do  my  utmost, 
above  all,  to  lay  before  them  exact  documents  and 
arguments  intelligible  to  all,  thus  furnishing  them 
with  facts  which  will  enable  them  to  form  a  judg- 
ment for  themselves. 

In  any  case,  this  work  has  no  other  aim  than  to 
speak  the  truth,  and  to  serve  a  cause  the  justice  of 
which  will  appear  more  and  more  manifest  to  a 
world  long  deceived  by  the  energetic  and  astute 
propaganda  of  Germany. 

$tk  August,  1 91 6. 


PROLOGUE. 

PANGERMANISM   AND   WILLIAM   II. 

I.    The  Pangennan  Doctrine. 
II.     The  Kaiser  as  originator  of  the  Pangerman  plan. 

The  Germans  are  truly  methodical  people.  In 
every  department  of  life  their  plans  are  based  on  a 
theory,-  it  may  be  a  true  one  or  a  false  one,  but 
once  they  have  conceived  it  they  forge  ahead  with 
bull-dog  tenacity.  It  is  therefore  necessary  for  us 
to  grasp  the  exact  meaning  of  the  Pangerman 
doctrine,  for  the  whole  universal  Pangerman  plot, 
both  political  and  military,  springs  from  that  tenet. 


It  might  be  supposed   that  the  expression  Pan- 
germanism  embodies  the  theory  in  virtue  of  which 


%Drcs!3u  ^\  ^^ 


oPrsquc  \*    \  W>>^-' 


CHE 


THE  POLES  IN  THE  EAST  OF  GERMANY. 

the   Germans  claim   to   annex  only   the  regions  in- 
habited by  dense  masses  of  Germans,  on  the  border,; 


2  PANGERMAN   PLOT    UNMASKED 

of  the  Empire,  which,  after  all,  would  be  in  accord- 
ance with  the  principle  of  nationalities. 

But  Pangermanism  has  by  no  means  such  a  re- 
stricted and  legitimate  aim.  Again,  it  might  be 
thought  that  its  object  was  to  gather  within  the 
same  political  fold  the  peoples  who  are  more  or  less 
Germanic  by  origin.  Such  a  claim  would  of  itself 
be  quite  inadmissible.     But  Pangermanism  is  more 


THE  DANES  IN  PRUSSIA. 


than  that.  It  is  really  the  doctrine,  of  purely 
Prussian  origin,  which  aims  at  annexing  all  the 
various  regions,  irrespective  of  race  or  language,  of 
which  the  possession  is  deemed  useful  to  the 
power  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 

It  was  in  the  name  of  Pangermanism,  a  theory 
bred   of  cupidity   and   wanton  greed,   that  Prussia 


PANGERMANISM   AND    WILLIAM   IL      3 

charged  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort  to  claim  as 
German  lands  the  Eastern  Provinces,  where  in 
reality  the  Slavs  predominate  to  such  an  extent, 
that  they  still  contain  a  population  of  about  four 
million  Poles. 

It  was  in  the  name  of  Pangermanism  that  in  1864 
Prussia  seized  that  part  of  Schleswig  which  was 
entirely  Danish. 


^^  ^-..9.  N 


1         I  Allemands 
^%^  Non  Allemands 
0         100        200       aoo'P 


THE  GERMANS  AND  THE  NON-GERMANS  IN  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 


It  is  in  the  name  of  Pangermanism  that  Austria- 
Hungary  has  been  for  long  the  object  of  German 
covetousness,  although  the  Germans  in  that  country 
are  in  a  very  small  minority.  Statistics  show  12 
millions  of  Germans  against  38  millions  of  non- 
Germans,  and  that  must  be  above  the  mark,  for 
we  have  to  remember  that  German  statistics 
systematically  exaggerate  the  number  of  Germans 
dwelling  in  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy. 


4  PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

Already  in  1859  the  Augsburg  Gazette  avowed  the 
object  of  Germany's  designs  on  Austria  with 
absolute  cynicism: 

"We  loudly  declare  that  if  Austria*  were  not  a 
member  of  the  Confederation  ;  if  it  were  not 
Austria  who  happened  to  be  the  legitimate  owner 
of  these  non-German  regions,  it  would  be  the  duty 
of  the  German  nation  to  conquer  them  at  all  costs, 
because  they  are  absolutely  necessary  for  her 
development  and  for  her  position  as  a  great  power." 

The  future  Marshal  von  Moltke,  also  inspired  by 
Pangermanism,  had  written,  as  far  back  as  1844: 
"We  hope  that  Austria  will  uphold  the  rights  and 
protect  the  future  of  the  Danube  lands,  and  that 
Germany  will  finally  succeed  in  keeping  open  the 
mouth  of  her  great  rivers"  (see  V.  Moltke  Schriften, 
t.  II.,  p.  313). 

The  author  of  a  pamphlet  published  in  1895,  i.e. 
exactly  twenty-one  years  ago,  inspired  by  this 
doctrine  of  fraud  and  protected  by  the  Alldeutscher 
Verband,  the  most  powerful  Pangerman  Society, 
after  expounding  the  main  plan  of  future  annexa- 
tions, concludes  with  simple  effrontery  thus: 

No  doubt  the  newly-constituted  Empires  will  not 
be  peopled  merely  by  Germans,  but:  "Germans 
alone  will  govern;  they  alone  will  exercise  political 
rights;  they  alone  will  serve  in  the  Army  and  in  the 
Navy;  they  alone  will  have  the  right  to  become 
landowners;  thus  they  will  acquire  the  conviction 
that,  as  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the  Germans  are  a 
people  of  rulers.  However,  they  will  condescend 
so  far  as  to  delegate  inferior  tasks  to  foreign  subjects 
subservient  to  Germany "  (see  Grossdeutsclilmid  und 
Mitteleuropa  um  das  Jahr  1950,  published  by  Thormann 
und  Goetsch,  Berlin,  p.  48). 


*  At    that   date    the    designation   Austria   was    comprehensive    of 
what  we  now  call  .•\ustria-Hungary. 


PANGERMANISM    AND    WILLIAM    II.      5 

Identity  of  race  and  language  served  for  a  long 
time  to  justify  Pangermanism;  but  the  facts  we 
have  shown  and  the  expHcit  declarations  we  have 
quoted  prove  clearly  that  race  and  language  were 
merely  a  pretext  for  the  diffusion  of  the  Pangerman 
doctrine  inspired  by  Prussia.  If  we  dissect  this 
doctrine  we  find  it  is  composed  of  cupidity  both 
political  and  economic.  The  truth  is  that  Pan- 
germanism is  a  scheme  of  piracy  to  be  carried  on 
for  the  benefit  of  the  Prussian  monarchy.  Its 
object  is,  by  successive  and  indefinite  expansions  of 
territory  to  include  within  the  same  boundaries, 
at  first  economic  but  afterwards  political,  such  lands 
and  such  peoples  as  are  likely  to  prove  a  profitable 
possession  to  the  Hohenzollerns  themselves  and  to 
their  main  support,  the  German  aristocracy. 

To  sum  up,  Pangermanism  is  a  doctrine  of 
international  burglary,  and  therefore  it  is  exactly 
the  reverse  of  the  principle  of  nationality,  that 
noble  idea  ushered  into  the  world  by  the  French 
Revolution. 

II. 

From  the  Pangerman  doctrine  the  military  and 
political  Pangerman  plot  was  bred  and  stage- 
managed  by  William  II.  Outside  of  Germany,  the 
Kaiser  was  looked  upon,  for  a  long  time,  as  a  peace- 
loving  monarch.  It  is  difficult  to  explain  how  such 
a  very  serious  error  could  have  arisen.  Shortly 
after  his  accession  in  1888,  William  II.  was  secretly 
hatching  that  plot  which  so  recently  has  caused 
the  European  conflagration,  and  subsequently,  by 
his  public  utterances,  he  has  clearly  showed  his 
Pangerman  tendencies. 

On  August  28th,  1898,  in  reply  to  the  Burgo- 
master of  Mayence's  speech,  the  Kaiser  declared 
that  his  wish  was  to  keep  inviolate  the  heritage 
bequeathed  by  his  "immortal  grandfather."    "But," 


6  PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

added  William,  "I  can  only  reach  that  goal  if  our 
authority  firmly  keeps  sway  over  our  neighbours. 
For  this  object  the  unity  and  the  co-operation  of 
every  German  tribe  is  required."  On  the  4th 
October,  1900,  William  II.,  on  laying  the  founda- 
tion stone  of  the  Roman  Museum  of  Saalburg, 
again  said: 

''May  our  German  Fatherland  become  in  the 
future  as  strongly  united,  as  powerful,  as  wonderful 
as  was  the  Roman  universal  empire;  may  this 
end  be  attained  by  the  united  co-operation  of 
our  princes,  of  our  peoples,  of  our  armies  and  of 
our  citizens,  in  order  that  in  the  times  to  come  it 
may  be  said  of  us  as  it  used  to  be  said  of  yore: 
Civis  Romanus  sum." 

On  the  28th  October,  1900,  speaking  at  an 
officers'  mess,  William  II.  affirmed:  "My  highest 
aim  is  to  remove  whatever  separates  our  great 
German  people."  Now,  in  September,  1900,  at 
Stettin,  the  Kaiser  had  just  declared:  "I  have 
no  fear  of  the  future.  I  am  convinced  that  my 
plan  will  prove  successful."  In  the  Kaiser's  mind 
the  whole  matter  was  summed  up  in  the  chief 
formula  of  Pangerman  domination:  From  Ham- 
burg to  the  Persian  Gulf.  To  accomplish  this  ob- 
ject the  Kaiser  had  decided  to  forge  closer  and 
still  closer  links  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Germany.  In  order  to  consolidate  his  supremacy 
over  the  Balkan  peoples  he  reckoned  on  the  co- 
operation of  such  of  their  Kings  as  were  Germanic 
by  origin  (Bulgaria  and  Roumania),  or  on  others 
who  were  strongly  influenced  by  Germany — in 
reality  by  himself. 

Thus  he  arranged  the  marriage  of  his  own  sister, 
Sophia,  in  1889,  with  the  heir  of  the  Throne  of 
Greece,  King  Constantine  of  to-day.  Finally,  al- 
most immediately  after  his  accession  he  had  begun 
to  think  of  showering  his  Imperial  favours  on  the 


PANGERMANISM   AND    WILLIAM   II.      7 

Turks  and  the  Musulmans;  this  was  with  the 
object  of  seizing  the  Ottoman  Empire,  later  on,  and 
of  making  use  of  the  Mahometans  of  the  whole 
world  as  a  mighty  lever  against  all  other  powers. 

On  November  8th,  1898,  at  Damascus,  William 
XL  pronounced  the  famous  words,  the  full  sig- 
nificance of  which  is  only  made  clear  now  that  we 
have  seen  the  German  action  develop  in  Turkey  and 
Persia,  and  that  we  have  learnt  about  William's 
endeavours  to  cause  an  agitation  among  the 
Musulmans  of  Egypt,  India  and  China: 

*'May  His  Majesty  the  Sultan,  as  well  as  the 
three  hundred  millions  of  Musulmans  who  venerate 
him  as  their  Khalifa,  be  assured  that  the  German 
Emperor  is  their  friend  for  ever." 

The  adulation  of  the  sanguinary  Sultan  Abdul- 
Hamid  proved  of  practical  use  to  William  II.  He 
obtained  on  the  27th  November,  1899,  the  first 
concession  of  the  Bagdad  railway;  now  that  rail- 
way, although  still  unfinished,  has  just  been 
utilized  by  the  German  offensive  both  against 
Russia  and  England. 

All  over  his  Empire  William  II.  had  encouraged 
the  formation  of  military  and  naval  leagues — 
which  number  millions  of  members  who,  for  the 
last  twenty  years  have  carried  on  an  incessant 
propaganda  in  favour  of  such  German  armaments 
by  land  and  sea — as  were  wanted  by  the  Kaiser. 

Again,  William  II.  encouraged  the  creation  of  the 
AUdeutscher  Verband.  This  association  or  Pangerman 
Union,  counts  among  its  members  a  large  number 
of  important  and  influential  persons,  and  at 
the  door  of  this  society  must  be  laid  the  most 
overwhelming  responsibility  for  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.  Founded  in  1894,  it  has  organized 
thousands  of  lectures  besides  scattering  broad- 
cast millions  of  pamphlets  to  spread  Pangerman 
notions   and    to   get    the    masses   of    the   people    to 


8  PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

favour  schemes  of  aggrandizement.  It  was  due  to 
the  Alldeiitscher  Vcrband  that  all  the  Germans 
living  outside  the  Empire  were  formed  into  a 
systematic  organization  for  the  present  war;  this 
being  specially  the  case  in  Austria  and  in  the 
United  States. 

Is  it  possible  to  believe  that  such  an  autocrat 
as  William  II.  had  not  desired  this  end  ?  How 
could  three  powerful  associations,  with  ever-growing 
means  of  action,  have  carried  on  a  most  costly,  as 
well  as  a  most  violent  propaganda,  in  a  police- 
ridden  country  like  Germany,  unless  they  had  been 
approved  of  by  the  authorities  usually  so  meddle- 
some or  so  vigilant? 

* 

*  * 

As  to  the  hour  of  the  war,  who  set  the  clock 
going,  if  it  were  not  the  Kaiser?  As  a  matter  of 
fact  he  put  the  hands  of  the  dial  forward  (see 
Chapter  II). 

From  November,  1913,  onward,  the  Kaiser  was 
busy  preparing  for  early  hostilities;  he  was  aware 
that  the  enlargement  of  the  Kiel  Canal  would  be 
complete  by  July,  19 14 — therefore  he  arranged  to  be 
ready  by  that  date,  and  as  we  know  war  was 
declared  on  August  ist,  i.e.,  a  few  days  after  the 
completion  of  the  Kiel  Canal.  The  Arch-Duke 
Francis-Ferdinand,  the  heir  to  the  Austria-Hun- 
garian throne,  tempted  by  the  Kaiser,  is  dazzled  by 
the  mirage  of  great  profits  which  were  to  accrue 
from  a  joint  action  of  the  Central  Powers.  In 
April,  1 9 14,  the  Kaiser  goes  on  a  visit  to  the  Arch- 
duke at  Miramar,  near  Trieste.  Again  he  meets 
him  at  Konopischt  in  June,  1914,  and  is  then 
accompanied  by  von  Tirpitz,  that  notorious  Chief 
of  Pirates,  that  submarine  Corsair.  Now  comes 
the  right  moment  for  drafting  the  bold  main  lines 
of  the  combined  action  of  the  German  and  Austrian 


PANGERMANISM    AND    WILLIAM    II.      9 

forces  by  land  and  sea.  The  murder  of  the  Arch- 
Duke  Ferdinand,  on  June  28th,  1914,  made  no 
change  in  the  Kaiser's  plans,  it  merely  precipitated 
events  by  furnishing  an  excellent  pretext  for 
intervention  against  Serbia.  Thus  the  criminal 
action  of  the  Kaiser  stands  revealed;  for  twenty- 
five  years  he  had  been  elaborating  the  Pangerman 
plan. 

According  to  Ba.'on  de  Beyens,  who  before  the 
war  was  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  "it  has  been 
maintained  that  William  II.  was  an  unconscious 
tool  in  the  hands  of  a  caste  and  of  a  party  who 
needed  war  in  order  to  assert  their  own  power. 
William  has,  indeed,  listened  to  them,  but  he  has 
lent  them  an  ear  because  their  designs  chimed  in 
with  his  own.  In  the  judgment  of  history  it  is  he 
who  is  doomed  to  bear  the  responsibility  for  the 
disasters  by  which  Europe  has  been  overwhelmed" 
(Baron  Beyens,  L'Allemagne  avant  la  guerre,  p.  41, 
G.  Van  Oest,  Paris). 


For  twenty-five  years,  and  by  order  of  the  Kaiser, 
a  violent  Pangerman  propaganda  had  been  carried 
on  throughout  the  Empire;  therefore,  let  there  be  no 
mistake,  William  II.,  in  declaring  war,  was  sup- 
ported in  his  decision,  not  only  by  the  influential 
circles  of  German  opinion,  but  by  the  large  majority 
of  the  German  people.  A  very  notorious  German, 
Maximilian  Harden,  has  explicitly  acknowledged 
this  fact  in  his  review  Zukunft  of  November,  19 14: 

"This  war  has  not  been  forced  on  us  by  surprise; 
we  have  desired  it,  and  it  was  our  bounden  duty 
thus  to  desire  it.  Germany  wages  war  because  of 
her  immutable  conviction  that  greater  world  ex- 
pansion and  freer  outlets  are  due  to  her  by  right 
of  her  own  works"  (quoted  by  Le  Temps,  20th 
November,  19 14). 


lo        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

Having  thus  formed  and  perfected  for  twenty 
years  the  Pangerman  plot  of  a  European  conflagra- 
tion, William  II.  had  the  prodigious  audacity  to 
declare,  in  his  Manifesto  to  the  German  people 
(August  ist,  1915),  after  drenching  Europe  with 
streams  of  blood  for  a  whole  year:  "Before  God 
and  before  History,  I  swear  that  my  conscience  is 
clear.     I  did  not  desire  war." 


CHAPTER   I. 

THE   PANGERMAN   PLAN. 

I.    The  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1. 
n.    The  stages  by  which  it  has  been  effected. 
III.    Why  it  has  been  ignored. 

The  Pangerman  plot  in  its  broad  outlines  was 
laid  as  early  as  1895,  but  since  that  date  events 
have  happened  throughout  the  world,  which  en- 
couraged Pangermans  to  enlarge  the  structure  of 
their  scheme. 

In  1898  the  Fashoda  incident  almost  caused  a 
breach  between  France  and  England.  In  1905 
Japan  compelled  Russia  to  sign  peace  after  a  long 
war  which  exhausted  all  the  Tsar's  military- 
resources  and  disturbed  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe  for  a  long  time  to  the  advantage  of  Ger- 
many. In  1909  the  Vienna  Government,  under 
cover  of  the  veiled  ultimatum  which  Berlin  sent  to 
the  Tsar,  carried  out  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  countries  which  are  almost  entirely 
peopled  by  Serbians.  This  seizure  of  a  huge  Slav 
territory  was  a  great  triumph  for  Germanism.  On 
November  3rd,  1910,  at  the  Potsdam  meeting,  the 
Kaiser  obtained  from  the  Tsar's  Government  the 
abandonment  of  all  opposition  to  the  completion 
of  the  Bagdad  railway.  England  and  France  took 
up  the  same  attitude.  On  July  ist,  191 1,  the 
Kaiser  ventured  on  the  Agadir  episode,  which  was 
clearly  an  attempt  to  force  a  quarrel  on  France.  It 
led  to  the  Franco- German  treaty  of  November  4th, 


12 


PANGERMAN  PLOT  UNMASKED 


191 1,  which  ceded  to  Germany  275,000  square 
kilometres  of  the  French  Congo,  while  at  the  same 
time  the  commerce  of  Morocco  was  heavily  mort- 
gaged in  favour  of  Germany. 

These  various  events  deeply  injured  the  interests 
of  France,  England  and  Russia;  but  these  powers 
preferred  to  submit  to  the  hardest  sacrifices  rather 
than  undertake  the  dreadful  responsibility  of 
letting  loose  a  fearful  war  on  Europe.  The  Pan- 
germans  misread  this  attitude  as  a  sign  of  weakness, 
and  of  a  desire  to  keep  the  peace  at  all  costs;  and 
accordingly  they  were  encouraged  to  entertain  high 
hopes  of  huge  success  in  a  near  future.  That  is  why 
the  original  Pangerman  plan  of  1895,  considerably 
altered,  became  the  perfected  plan  of  191 1. 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  OF  1911. 


This  plan  of  191 1   (see  map)  provided  in  Europe 
and  in  Western  Asia: 


THE    PANGERMAN    PLAN 


13 


1°.     The  establishment,  under  German  rule,  of  a 
vast  Confederation  of  Central  Europe,  comprising: 


Square 
Kilometres. 

Inhabitants. 

In  the  West: 

Holland 

Belgium 

Luxemburg 

Switzerland* 
The  Departments  of  the  North  of 
France  to  the  N.E.  of  a  line  drawn 
from    the    S.    of     Belfort    to    the 
mouth  of  the  Somme            . .   about 

Total 

To  the  East: 
Russian  Poland 
Baltic        Provinces,        Esthonia, 

Livonia,  Courland 
The  three  Russian  Governments 

of  Kovno,  Vilna,  Grodno 

Total 

To  the  South-East: 
Austria-Hungaryt 

38,141 

29,451 

2,586 

41,324 
50,271 

6,114,000 

7,500,000 

260,000 

3,800,000 

5,768,000 

161,773 

23,442,000 

127,320 

94,564 
121,840 

12,467,000 
2,686,000 
5,728,000 

343,724 

20,881,000 

676,616 

50,000,000 

These   three  groups  form  a  grand  total  of   1,182,113   Square 
Kilometres  and  94,323,000  inhabitants. 

This  confederation  was  thus  to  group  under  German 
supremacy 

Square 

Kilometres.  Inhabitants. 

Actual  German  Empire  . .  .  .  540,858  68,000,000 

New  territories  of  the  Confederation  1,182,113  94,000,000 


Total 


1,722,971       162,000,000 


of    whom    only    77    millions    are    Germans    and    85 
millions  non-Germans. 

*  Minus  eventually  the  French  and  Italian  Cantons  which  the  Pangermans  declare 
that  they  do  not  care  to  annex. 

t  Minus  the  Italian  regions  of  the  Trentino,  which  Berlin  decided  to  cede  (at  the  ex- 
pense of  Austria)  to  Italy  as  the  price  of  her  neutrality. 


14        TANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

2°.  The  absolute  subordination  of  the  Balkan 
countries  (containing  499,275  square  kilometres  and 
22  millions  of  non-Germans)  to  the  Great  Central 
European  Confederation.  The  Balkan  States  to 
become  mere  satellites  of  Berlin, 

3°.  Germany's  political  and  military  seizure  of 
Turkey,  which  was  afterwards  to  be  enlarged  by  the 
annexation  of  Egypt  and  Persia.  It  was  provided 
that  Turkey  should  be  dealt  with  in  two  successive 
stages.  During  the  first,  the  handful  of  ''Young 
Turks"  who  have  ruled  the  Ottoman  Empire  since 
1908,  and  who  play  the  German  game,  were  to 
remain  in  power  merely  as  figure-heads.  Turkey 
was  to  retain  a  nominal  independence  during  this 
phase,  though  in  reality  she  was  to  have  been  tied 
to  Germany  by  a  treaty  of  military  alliance.  Under 
pretence  of  effecting  reforms,  numerous  German 
officials  were  to  be  placed  at  the  head  of  all  the 
Ottoman  administrations,  and  that  would  have 
paved  the  way  for  the  second  stage.  The  latter 
had  for  its  aim  the  putting  of  Turkey,  with  her 
1,792,000  square  kilometres  and  her  20  millions  of 
non-German  inhabitants,  under  the  strict  protec- 
torate of  Germany,  to  say  nothing  of  the  subject 
provinces,  Egypt  and  Persia. 


The  Germanic  Confederation  of  Central  Europe 
was  to  form  a  huge  Zollverein  or  Customs  Union. 
Treaties  of  Commerce  of  a  special  character  im- 
posed on  the  Balkan  States  and  on  subjected 
Turkey  would  have  provided  for  Great  Germany 
an  economic  outlet  and  reserved  for  her  exclusively 
those  vast  regions. 

Finally,  we  can  sum  up  the  Pangerman  plan  of 
191 1  in  four  formulas: 

Berlin  —  Calais  ;  Berlin  —  Riga  ;  Hamburg  — 
Salonika  ;    Hamburg  —  Persian  Gulf. 


THE   PANGERMAN   PLAN  15 

The  union  of  the  three  groupings — Central  Europe, 
Balkan  States  and  Turkey — would  have  placed 
under  the  predominating  influence  of  Berlin  4,015,146 
square  kilometres  and  204  millions  of  inhabitants, 
of  whom  127  millions  were  to  be  ruled  directly  or 
indirectly  by  merely  77  millions  of  Germans. 

This  continental  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  was  to 
have  been  completed  by  colonial  conquests  of  great 
magnitude,  of  which  an  account  is  given  at  the  end 
of  Chapter  V. 

William  II,  was  well  aware  that  such  a  project 
could  only  become  an  enduring  reality  if  all  other 
great  powers  disappeared  from  the  face  of  the  earth. 
The  Kaiser  had  therefore  positively  resolved,  when 
hatching  his  Pangerman  plot,  to  accomplish  the 
destruction  of  five  great  powers.  It  is  necessary 
to  grasp  fully  this  fundamental  truth,  if  we  wish 
to  understand  the  nature  of  the  present  war.  It 
was  foreseen  that  Austria-Hungary  would  disappear 
by  her  absorption  under  cover  of  entrance  into  the 
German  Zollverein.  France  and  Russia  were  to 
have  been  totally  ruined  by  means  of  a  furious 
preventive  war  which  would  entirely  destroy  their 
military  forces.  England  was  to  be  put  out  of 
action  by  a  subsequent  operation,  which  would 
have  been  an  easy  matter  when  once  France  and 
Russia  had  been  dismembered  and  reduced  to  utter 
impotence.  As  to  Italy — destined  to  become  a 
vassal  state — she  was  not  considered  as  being 
capable  of  hindering  in  the  least  the  Pangerman 
ambitions.  One  of  the  Kaiser's  agents  for  prop- 
agating this  scheme  wrote  in  1900  :  ''Italy  cannot 
be  looked  upon  as  a  rival  for  she  is  too  incompetent 
in  warfare  "  {Deutschland  bet  Beginn  des  20  Jahr- 
hunderts,  p.  53.  Military  publishers,  R.  Felix, 
Berlin,   1900). 

It  must  be  added  that  the  Pangerman  plot  of 
191 1  did  not  include  war  with  England.     When  he 


i6        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

declared  hostilities  in  August,  1914,  William  II. 
was  convinced  that  England  would  take  no  share 
in  them,  at  least  not  immediately.  The  Kaiser 
had  laid  every  conceivable  kind  of  trap  to  add 
fuel  to  the  flames  of  all  inlernal  English  disturb- 
ances and  to  deceive  the  London  Cabinet.  At  one 
moment  he  almost  succeeded  in  his  endeavours. 
England's  decision  to  participate  without  delay  in 
the  struggle  only  hung  by  a  thread,  but  that  thread 
was  broken.  If  England  had  tarried,  if  she  had 
tarried  only  for  a  few  days,  German  landings  in 
Normandy,  Brittany,  and  as  far  as  Bordeaux  would 
have  been  effected.  France  being  thus  rendered 
quickly  powerless  on  all  sides,  the  English  inter- 
vention would  have  proved  futile  at  a  later  stage, 
and  the  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  would  thus  have 
been  fully  achieved.  But  in  going  to  war  just  at 
the  right  moment  and  in  controlling  the  sea,  Great 
Britain  has,  while  saving  herself,  furnished  to 
civilized  humanity  the  means  of  avoiding  the  Prus- 
sian yoke.  The  initial  German  plan  has  truly  been 
upset  by  English  intervention  following  on  the 
respite  gained  by  the  splendid  resistance  of  Belgium 
in  arms. 

But  the  Germans  are  clever,  they  are  stubborn 
and  crafty.  Adapting  themselves  to  new  condi- 
tions thrust  on  them,  they  are  still  endeavouring  to 
make  an  enormous  profit  out  of  the  war.  We  must, 
therefore,  try  to  understand  what  operations  they 
have  devised  for  carrying  out,  even  now,  the  Pan- 
german plot  almost  in  its  entirety. 

II. 

As  it  is  necessary  to  open  the  eyes  of  neutrals, 
many  of  whom  have  been  misled  by  the  German 
propaganda,  we  must  try  to  expose  very  clearly  the 
inner  workings  of  the  Pangerman  plot  as  it  is 
revealed  to  us  in  the  searchlight  of  facts. 


THE    PANGERMAN    PLAN  17 

From  1892  down  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War, 
that  is  to  say,  for  twenty-two  years,  the  Pangerman 
movement  has  developed  with  ever  growing  in- 
tensity ;  a  multitude  of  publications,  giving  full 
details  of  the  plan,  were  scattered  among  the  Ger- 
man people,  in  order  to  excite  in  them  the  greed 
of  conquest  and  so  prepare  them  for  the  struggle 
through  the  allurement  of  plunder.  Of  these  pub- 
lications two  are  of  special  importance:  first,  the 
pamphlet  published  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Alldeutscher  Verhand :  namely,  Grossdeutschland 
und  Mitteleuropa  um  das  Jahr  1950  (Thormann 
und  Goetsch,  Berlin,  1895),  which  gives  the  Pan- 
german plan  of  1895  :  second,  the  book  of  Otto 
Richard  Tannenberg  :  Grossdeutschland,  die  Arbeit 
des  2ofcn  Jakrhunderts  (Bruno  Volger,  Leipzig- 
Gohlis,  1911),  which  gives  all  suitable  details; 
of  the  plan  of  191 1. 

Unfortunately,  although  this  Pangerman  litera- 
ture is  very  considerable,  full  of  documentary 
evidence  and  spread  broadcast  among  the  masses 
by  most  powerful  associations,  whose  patrons  are 
the  highest  authorities  in  the  land,  few  people  out- 
side of  Germany  would  believe  in  its  extreme  im- 
portance. But  now  the  facts  speak  for  themselves. 
The  reality,  the  extent,  and  the  successive  stages 
of  the  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  are  shown  by: 

1°.  The  course  which  Germany  has  taken  since 
August  ist,  1914,  in  her  political  and  military 
operations  which  have  for  their  object  not,  as  many 
have  supposed,  the  obtaining  of  securities,  but  the 
annexation  of  territories  in  the  manner  set  forth  in 
Tannenberg's  book,  and  more  or  less  in  accordance 
with  the  plan  of  191 1. 

2°.  The  memorial  delivered  on  May  20th, 
191 5,  to  the  German  Chancellor  by  the  League  of 
Agriculturists,  the  League  of  German  Peasants, 
the    Provisional    Association    of    Christian    German 


i8        PANGERMAN    TLOT    UNMASKED 

Peasants,  now  called  the  Westphalian  Peasants' 
Association,  the  Central  German  Manufacturers' 
Union,  the  League  of  Manufacturers,  and  the 
Middle-Class  Union  of  the  Empire  {see  Le  Temps, 
i2th  August,  1915).  The  importance  of  this  docu- 
ment cannot  be  overrated,  for  it  is  issued  by  the 
most  powerful  associations  of  the  Empire,  including 
all  the  influential  elements  of  the  German  nation, 
specially  the  agrarians  and  the  iniquitous  Prussian 
squires.  Now  the  purport  of  that  memorial,  as  will 
be  shown,  is  to  demand  all  such  annexations  men- 
tioned in  the  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1,  as  the 
development  of  military  operations  has  so  far 
rendered  feasible.  Any  one  who  knows  Germany 
can  hardly  doubt  that  this  memorial  was  not 
handed  in  to  Bethmann-Hollweg  without  a 
previous  understanding  with  him.  Doubtless  it 
was  intended  that  this  document  should  seem  to 
exercise  an  overmastering  pressure  of  public  opinion 
on  William  II.'s  government.  But  if  the  ideas  ex- 
pressed in  this  memorial  reflect,  as  they  certainly 
do,  the  wishes  of  influential  German  circles,  it  is 
also  unquestionable  that  they  correspond  very 
closely  to  the  scheme  of  aggrandizement,  which 
William  II.  has  been  nursing  for  over  twenty 
years. 

3°.  The  declarations  made  at  the  sitting  of  the 
Reichstag  of  the  nth  December,  191 5,  prove  the 
exactitude  of  this  statement.  The  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor said: 

''  If  our  enemies  will  not  submit  now,  they  will 
be  obliged  to  do  so  later  on.  .  .  When  our  enemies 
shall  offer  us  such  peace  proposals  as  are  compatible 
with  the  dignity  and  security  of  Germany  we  shall 
be  ready  to  discuss  them.  .  .  But  our  enemies  must 
understand  that  the  more  unrelentingly  they  wage 
war,  the  higher  will  be  the  guarantees  exacted." 

Bethmann-Hollweg    could    hardly    have    spoken 


THE   PANGERMAN   PLAN  19 

more  explicitly,  but  his  diplomatic  game  was 
naturally  to  unmask  Germany's  enormous  preten- 
sions only  bit  by  bit,  in  order  that  the  eyes  of 
neutrals  should  not  be  opened  to  the  Pangerman 
monster  in  all  its  horror  until  the  last  moment.  But 
hardly  had  the  Chancellor  finished  his  speech  than 
the  Deputy  Spahn  explained  the  real  drift  of  it 
with  great  precision: 

''We  await,"  said  Herr  Spahn,  "the  hour  which 
will  allow  of  peace  negotiations  which  will  safe- 
guard in  a  permanent  way  and  by  all  means, 
including  the  needful  territorial  annexations,  all 
military  economic  and  political  interests  of  Ger- 
many in  its  total  extent." 

The  thundering  applause  which  greeted  these 
words  proves  that  they  echoed  the  sentiments  of 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  German  deputies, 
who  at  that  moment  still  believed  that  it  was 
possible  for  Germany  to  achieve  enormous  annexa- 
tions. 

III. 

The  preparation  of  the  Pangerman  plan  has 
required  for  over  twenty  years  a  huge  propaganda 
among  the  German  masses  as  well  as  a  world-wide 
organization.  How  is  it  that  this  plan  has  been 
ignored  in  its  nature  and  in  its  extent  by  the 
diplomats  of  France,  England  and  Russia?  Such, 
however,  has  been  the  case,  for  otherwise  the  war 
could  not  have  come  upon  these  three  powers  as  a 
surprise.  We  deal  here  with  a  matter  which  at 
first  sight  seems  improbable  and  which,  therefore, 
needs  explanation. 

The  diplomatic  agents  of  the  Allies  are  certainly 
not  inferior  personally  to  those  of  William  II.,  but 
the  Kaiser's  foreign  service,  as  a  whole,  includes 
novel    instruments    of    observation    and    influence 


20        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

by  which,  for  the  last  twenty  years,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Berlin  has  seconded  its  official  diplo- 
macy without  allowing  the  connexion  between  it 
and  them  to  transpire.  None  of  the  Allied 
countries  have  employed  similar  instruments,  the 
result  being  that  the  Entente  is  considerably 
inferior  in  this  department  of  foreign  policy. 


The  Pangerman  plan  is  founded  on  a  very  exact 
knowledge  of  all  political,  ethnographical,  economic, 
social,  military  and  naval  problems,  not  only  of 
Europe,  but  of  the  whole  world;  the  Germans  have 
acquired  that  knowledge  by  means  of  an  intense 
labour  of  over  twenty-five  years.  But  this  task  has 
not  been  performed  by  the  official  German  diplomats; 
it  has  been  carried  out  either  by  the  members  of  the 
AUdeutscher  Verhand,  the  Pangerman  Union,  or 
by  the  agents  of  the  German  secret  service,  which 
has  been  enormously  extended.  These  agents 
might  be  called  connecting  links  betw^een  the 
regular  spies  and  the  official  diplomats;  Baron  von 
Schenk,  w^ho  worked  at  Athens  from  1915-1916,  is  a 
sample  of  that  category  of  agents  who  have  studied 
methodically  all  the  root  questions  of  the  Pangerman 
plan,  who  have  prepared  means  to  delude  the 
minds  of  neutrals,  to  paralyze  the  revolt  of  the 
Slavs  in  Austria-Hungary,  to  corrupt  all  such 
neutral  individuals  or  neutral  newspapers  as  were 
susceptible  of  corruption,  etc.  After  these  numer- 
ous agents  had  made  their  reports,  and  when  once 
these  had  been  examined  and  summarized,  they 
were  sent  to  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  to  the  great 
German  General  Staff,  whose  concerted  operations 
are  always  so  combined  as  to  answer  both  to  political 
and  to  military  needs.  At  the  same  time  the  re- 
ports reached  William  II. 's  private  study,  and  his 
brain  was  thus  able  to  store  up  all  technical  means 


THE   PANGERMAN   PLAN  21 

necessary    for     the    achievement    of    his    plan    of     \ 
domination. 

Was  the  diplomatic  corps  of  the  Allies  so  well 
served  that  it  could  grasp  in  its  universal  signifi- 
cance the  immense  work  of  preparation  accom- 
plished by  the  secret  Pangerman  agents?  Indeed, 
they  were  not  properly  supplied  with  the  right 
tools  for  such  a  task,  and  we  shall  see  why  it  w^as  so. 

First  of  all  it  is  necessary  to  dispel  a  false  notion 
which  "the  man  in  the  street"  has  of  diplomacy. 
He  fondly  thinks  that  diplomats,  while  preparing 
clever  and  mysterious  combinations,  fashion  His- 
tory. Now  the  experience  of  centuries  shows  that 
as  a  general  rule  diplomats  merely  chronicle 
History  but  do  not  make  it.  My  teacher,  Albert 
Sorel,  neatly  expressed  that  truth  by  saying: 
"Diplomats  are  History's  attorneys."  In  fact,  the 
diplomacy  of  any  country  helps  to  prepare  and  to 
fashion  history  only  when  there  happens  to  be  at 
y  its  head  a  great  man  of  large  and  just  ideas,  who 
knows  how  to  apply  these  ideas  by  all  the  means 
available  in  his  time. 

It  is  a  strange  fact  and  worthy  of  notice,  that 
such  a  great  man  is  rarely,  if  ever,  a  professional 
diplomat.  For  example,  Richelieu,  Napoleon, 
Palmerston,  Disraeli,  Cavour,  Bismarck,  who  all 
prepared  and  fashioned  History,  were  not  trained 
diplomatists.  Unfortunately,  it  does  not  seem  that 
Fortune  has  endowed  any  of  our  Allied  countries, 
either  before  or  since  the  war,  with  a  head  capable 
of  leading,  on  grand  lines,  the  diplomatic  affairs  of 
the  Entente.  The  latter  therefore  has  been  only 
served  by  those  diplomats  who  are  mere  officials, 
and  who  as  such  await  instructions  from  higher 
quarters,  and  these  instructions  are  very  often 
found  wanting. 

Besides,  the  diplomacy  of  the  Allies,  not  being 
seconded,  like  that  of  Germany,  by  novel  means  of 


22        PANGERMAN   PLOT    UNMASKED 

observation,  can  only  obtain  the  information  it 
needs  by  methods  still  so  old-fashioned  that  they 
are  almost  identical  with  those  used  a  century  ago. 
They  are  totally  inadequate  to  point  out  the 
sequence  of  ideas  or  the  rapid  development  of 
events  which  in  Central  Europe  and  the  Balkans 
have  been,  as  will  be  seen,  the  immediate  causes 
of  the  war;  nor  are  the  means  employed  by  our 
diplomats  at  all  sufficient  if  they  wish  to  recognize 
what  forms  the  whole  chain  of  the  Pangerman 
organization.  Just  because  this  organization  is 
huge,  just  because  it  is  so  complex,  its  total  im- 
portance cannot  be  properly  gauged  unless  the 
connecting  links  between  the  varied  elements  are 
clearly  perceived. 

The  typical  professional  diplomat  lives  in  a 
world  of  his  own.  Either  his  information  comes 
from  the  office  or  it  is  second-hand;  it  rarely  is 
reached  by  direct  observation  of  people  or  facts. 
The  secretaries  at  the  Embassies  divide  their  time 
between  office  work,  copying  documents  in  copper 
plate  hand,  or  social  functions,  pleasant  enough 
but  confined  to  a  particular  and  narrow  set.  Few 
of  the  secretaries  know  the  language  of  the  country 
in  which  they  reside,  fewer  still  travel  in  the 
interior  of  the  land  in  order  to  study  it. 

The  events  which  have  led  to  the  European 
conflagration  spring  from  two  main  causes:  the 
stupendous  scope  of  the  German  ambitions  and  the 
progress  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  and  Balkan 
nationalities.  Now  both  these  factors  have  been 
revealed  on  many  occasions,  by  purely  local  events 
which,  to  a  keen  observer,  would  have  betrayed 
most  significantly  the  end  in  view,  but  they  have 
occurred  for  the  most  part  in  places  far  removed 
from  capital  cities,  and  to  appreciate  fully  their 
importance  would  have  needed  direct  observation 
on  the  spot. 


THE   PANGERMAN   PLAN  23 

This  is  quite  contrary  to  the  tradition  followed  by- 
official  diplomats.  Those  of  the  Entente  had  not, 
at  their  disposal,  agents  who  could  go  and,  for 
instance,  hear  the  numerous  lectures  given  by  the 
Pangerman  propaganda,  and  who  could  have  pro- 
cured and  translated  for  them  the  illuminating 
pamphlets  of  the  Alldeutscher  Verhand.  Also  they 
had  no  means  of  getting  into  personal  touch  with 
the  party  leaders,  either  Slav  or  Latin,  of  Austria- 
Hungary;  often  these  leaders  were  men  without  a 
place  in  parliament,  frequently  without  fortune  or 
social  rank;  all  they  had  was  their  national  ideal, 
their  strength  of  conviction,  but  they  were  real 
and  novel  forces,  for  they  acted  on  the  popular 
masses  with  whom  they  were  in  complete  intellec- 
tual sympathy. 

As  the  diplomatic  corps  of  the  Entente  was  not 
provided  with  that  indispensable  aid — an  organiza- 
tion of  secondary  agents  of  observation — they  have 
been  reduced  to  accept  information  of  a  superficial 
and  incomplete  nature.  Often  it  was  merely 
provided  by  press  cuttings  and  even  those  were 
frequently  from  papers  written  in  a  tongue  which 
the  diplomats  could  not  read;  at  best  these  cuttings 
were  without  any  connecting  link  and  quite  in- 
sufficient to  warn  them  of  the  approach  of  a  great 
peril.  We  must  add  that  in  diplomatic  circles  of 
all  periods — unless  they  are  led  by  some  eminent 
man — there  are  certain  formulas  current,  such  as: 
"No  fuss,"  "it  is  necessary  to  wait  and  see," 
"we  must  not  believe  that  it  has  happened," 
which  have  had  a  baneful  influence.  The  result 
has  been  a  sceptical  attitude  which  in  diplomatical 
circles  passes  for  essential  and  in  good  taste.  If  we 
add  to  this  frame  of  mind  the  absence  of  varied, 
direct  and  coherent  information,  we  can  understand 
how  it  was  that  before  the  war,  when  any  one  tried 
to  persuade  a  professional  diplomatist  that  William 


24        PANGERMAN    PLOT   UNMASKED 

II. 's  political  aim  was  nothing  short  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  German  supremacy  over  the  whole 
world,  he  was  soon  set  down  as  a  visionary  with  a 
head  stuffed  full  of  groundless  suspicions. 

Finally,  we  must  realize  that  the  system  by  which 
a  diplomat  is  sent  from  pillar  to  post,  often  to  the 
antipodes,  every  four  or  live  years,  is  not  conducive 
to  the  acquirement  of  a  general  and  exact  know- 
ledge, founded  on  documentary  evidence,  of  events 
still  in  progress,  in  a  wide  zone,  so  complex  and  so 
difficult  to  study  as  Central  Europe  and  the  Balkans. 

These  various  considerations  help  us  to  under- 
stand why,  during  the  twenty-five  years  which 
preceded  the  war,  no  diplomat  of  the  Allies  has 
been  able  to  grasp  the  total  Pangerman  plan  in  its 
nature  and  in  its  extent,  though  possibly  a  few  of 
them  may  have  indicated  in  their  reports  now  and 
then  some  local  Pangerman  act  which  aroused 
suspicion.  These  considerations  explain  also,  at 
least  in  part,  the  failure  of  the  diplomatic  corps 
of  the  Entente  in  the  Balkans. 


To  sum  up,  allied  official  diplomats  are  not 
personally  inferior  to  German  official  diplomats,  but 
the  latter  have  an  enormous  advantage  over  their 
colleagues  of  the  Entente  in  knowing  the  general 
plan  of  the  Berlin  policy,  in  knowing,  each  in  his 
own  post,  in  what  direction  to  proceed  and  what 
must  be  done  or  prevented  in  order  to  attain  the  final 
end.  During  the  last  twenty-five  years  the  Kaiser's 
foreign  policy  has  been  constructive  and  framed  on 
a  definite  plan,  while  the  diplomats  of  the  Allies, 
reflecting  the  policy  of  their  Governments  without 
concrete  plans,  have  been  hampered,  because  they 
believed  obstinately  in  Peace,  in  a  vague  and  stag- 
nant defensive. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  allied  dir)lomacy,  regarded 


THE   PANGERMAN   PLAN  25 

as  an  instrument  of  observation,  confined  to  old- 
fashioned  methods,  is  like  an  ordinary  magnifying 
glass  which  shows  nothing  but  the  largest  objects. 
On  the  contrary,  the  German  foreign  policy,  thanks 
to  the  new,  busy  and  secret  organs,  by  which  the 
German  diplomacy  has  been  seconded,  may  be  com- 
pared to  a  workshop  provided  with  powerful  micro- 
scopes by  which  facts  can  be  studied  not  only  in 
their  general  aspect,  but  also  in  their  most  minute 
details,  details  which  often  are  not  without  their 
importance. 

Finally,  the  allied  diplomacy,  regarded  as  an 
instrument  of  action,  still  clinging  to  antiquated 
traditional  methods,  may  be  compared  to  an  army 
which  possesses  only  field  guns,  while  the  foreign 
diplomacy  of  Germany,  in  its  totality,  is  comparable 
to  an  army  equipped  both  with  heavy  and  with 
field  artillery. 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE    CAUSES    OF    THE    WAR. 

I.  Why  the  Treaty  of  Bukarest  suddenly   raised  a   formidable 

obstacle  to  the  Pangerman  plan. 

II.  How    it    was    that    the    internal    state    of    Austria-Hungary 

drove  Germany  to  let  loose  the  dogs  of  war. 
III.     General  view  of  the  causes  of  the  war. 

Although  the  Pangerman  plan  is  unquestionably 
the  chief  ultimate  cause  of  the  war,  yet  when 
William  II.  started  it  in  August,  1914,  he  did  so  for 
nearer  and  for  secondary  reasons  which  we  must 
examine  carefully  if  we  wish  to  have  a  clear  view 
of  events. 


Up  to  1911,  when  Tannenberg  published  the 
programme  of  annexations,  all  previous  great 
events  had  favoured  William  II. 's  aims;  but  from 
191 2  onward  events  suddenly  raised  very  serious 
and  quite  unexpected  obstacles  to  the  execution  of 
the  Pangerman  plan. 

In  191 2,  Italy  conquered  Libya  at  the  cost  of 
Turkey  and  against  the  will  and  pleasure  of  Berlin. 
Again  in  191 2  Greece,  Montenegro,  Serbia  and 
Bulgaria  became  united  against  the  Ottoman 
Empire;  this  also  was  contrary  to  the  will  and 
pleasure  of  Berlin.  What  was  quite  unexpected 
by  the  Kaiser's  Staff  was  the  victory  of  the  Balkan 
peoples  over  the  Turks.  As  Germany  had  upheld 
the  latter  she  felt  profoundly  humiliated.  Then, 
in  order  to  hinder  the  foundation  of  an  efficient 
Balkanic    Confederation — that    is,    one    constituted 

26 


THE    CAUSES    OF   THE    WAR  27 

on  the  principle  of  a  fair  balance — Vienna,  and 
above  all,  Berlin,  used  as  their  tool  the  Tsar  Ferdi- 
nand's well-known  ambition  to  establish  Bulgarian 
supremacy  in  the  peninsula.  Accordingly  insti- 
gated by  the  Germanic  powers,  the  Bulgarians  in 
June,  1913,  attacked  their  allies,  the  Serbians  and 
Greeks.  But  once  more  the  Kaiser's  calculations 
were  upset.  Roumania,  escaping  for  the  first 
time  from  German  leading  strings,  intervened 
against  Bulgaria,  which  was  struggling  with  her 
former  allies,  and  thus  Bulgaria  was  vanquished. 
Now,  the  new  condition  of  things  which  arose  from 
the  Bukarest  treaty  of  August  loth,  1913,  suddenly 
formed  a  formidable  obstacle  to  the  Pangerman 
scheme  in  the  East,  and  this  is  the  reason: 

The  treaty  of  Bukarest  created  in  the  peninsula 
two  groups  of  states  sharply  opposed  to  each  other. 
The  first  was  formed  of  the  beaten  and  sullen 
participants  in  the  Balkan  wars,  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey.  The  second  group  was  composed  of  those 
peoples  who  had  benefited  by  the  wars  and  were 
satisfied  with  the  result,  to  wit,  Roumania,  Serbia, 
Montenegro  and  Greece.  These  four  last  states, 
seeing  that  their  vital  interests  had  become  closely 
bound  together  by  the  territorial  annexations 
made  at  the  cost  of  the  common  enemy,  had  joined 
all  their  forces  to  insure  the  maintenance  of  the 
Bukarest  treaty  which  they   considered  inviolable. 

On  the  other  hand,  this  sharp  division  of  the 
Balkan  States  into  two  groups  whose  interests  were 
diametrically  opposed,  reacted  deeply  on  general 
European  politics.  The  force  of  events  led  the 
conquered  states  of  191 2  and  1913,  Turkey  and 
Bulgaria,  to  support  Germanism  in  the  Balkans; 
on  the  contrary,  Roumania,  as  well  as  Serbia, 
Montenegro  and  Greece,  because  of  their  recent 
acquisitions,  were  leaning  more  and  more  towards 
the  Triple  Entente,  quite  contrary  to  the  views  of 


28        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 


lU'rIin  and  at  the  cost  of  Turkey,  which  even  then 
was  bound  hand  and  foot  to  Germany. 


THE  ANTIGERMANIC  BARRIER  IN  THE  BALKANS  AFTER  THE 
TREATY  OF  BUKAREST  (10th  August,  1913). 

Previous  to  the  Balkan  wars  the  Triple  Entente 
enjoyed  an  influence  in  the  peninsula,  vastly 
inferior  to  that  of  Germany;  after  the  treaty  of 
Bukarest,  however,  the  Entente  found  support 
in  that  group  of  states  which  was  most  powerfully 
organized  and  which  presented  (see  map)  a  very 
solid  barrier  to  the  accomplishment  of  Pangerman 
designs  in  the  East. 


THE    CAUSES    OF   THE    WAR 


29 


This  new  order  of  things  lashed  Berlin  into  a  fury 
which  though  outwardly  restrained  was  none  the 
less  intense  because  the  only  group  (Turkey  and 
Bulgaria)  which  was  still  under  German  influence, 
was  bound  to  remain  for  a  very  long  time  to  come 
practically  impotent  and  powerless  to  make  singly 
any  attempt  against  the  other  group  which  favoured 
the  Entente. 

Indeed,  Turkey,  which  in  her  defeats  had  lost 
almost  the  whole  of  her  military  stores,  could 
hardly,  at  the  beginning  of  1914,  put  250,000  men 
under  arms.  Her  financial  difficulties  were  such 
that,  if  left  to  her  own  resources,  it  would  have 
taken  her  many  years  to  replace  her  military  power 
on  a  solid  basis. 

Bulgaria  was  in  a  similar  financial  predicament. 
Besides,  if  she  had  taken  action  it  would  have  been 
at  great  risk  to  herself,  in  as  much  as  those  states 
which  profited  by  the  Bukarest  Treaty  (Roumania, 
Serbia  and  Greece),  surrounding  as  they  do  (see  the 
arrows  of  the  map)  Bulgaria  on  three  sides,  could 
then  have  delivered  a  concentric  attack  on  Sofia. 

Finally,  great  was  the  disproportion  of  men 
eligible  for  the  army  or  capable  of  bearing  arms 
between  the  two  groups. 


Cermanophile  Group. 
Turkey       .  .  . .      250,000 

Bulgaria     . .  .  .      550,000 


800,000 


Group  of  the  Entente. 
Greece         .  .  .  .      400,000 

Serbia  .  .  .  .      400,000 

Montenegro  .  .        50,000 

Roumania  . .  . .      600,000 


1,450,000 


These  figures,  taken  in  conjunction  with  the 
geographical  situation,  show  clearly  that,  left  to  its 
own  resources,  the  Germanophile  group  could 
attempt  no  attack  on  the  Entente  group. 


30        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

The  new  balance  of  military  forces  in  the  Balkans 
which  was  the  outcome  of  the  Bukarest  treaty, 
therefore  reduced  almost  to  naught  Germany's 
power  of  intrigue  in  the  Peninsula. 

Had  peace  reigned  for  a  few  years,  the  new 
Balkan  situation  would  have  been  consolidated 
and  the  obstacle  to  Pangerman  ambition  in  the 
East  would  have  been  still  more  serious.  It  was 
for  these  varied  reasons  that  Berlin  decided  to 
intervene  directly.  Without  doubt  Serbia  was 
the  pivot  on  which  turned  the  new  Balkanic 
equilibrium.  It  was  therefore  decided  to  destroy 
her  without  delay,  kindling  at  the  same  time  the 
European  conflagration,  and  thus  by  one  single 
blow  to  accomplish  the  plan  of  191 1. 

The  Bukarest  treaty  was  signed  on  the  tenth  of 

August,     1913.      On    November    6th,     1913,    King 

Albert  of  Belgium  was  at  Potsdam,  and  the  Kaiser 

said   to  him   that  in   his  opinion  war  with   France 

was    near    and    unavoidable    (see    Baron    Beyen's 

U Allemagne  avant  la  Guerre,  p.  24). 

* 
*  * 

From  this  survey  it  follows  that,  if  the  treaty  of 
Bukarest,  through  its  consequences,  proved  dis- 
astrous to  the  Pangerman  aims,  it  was,  on  the 
contrary,  extremely  advantageous  to  the  powers  of 
the  Triple  Entente,  for  it  brought  to  their  side  the 
majority  of  the  Balkanic  forces. 

Unfortunately  the  diplomacy  of  the  Entente 
had  not  even  a  notion  how  favourable  the  situation 
was  to  them.  This  ignorance  was  due  to  the  old- 
fashioned  methods  of  observation  still  used  by 
diplomats  which  prevented  them  from  believing 
in  the  Pangerman  scheme,  and  which  also  hindered 
them  from  entertaining  general  and  correct  views  of 
the  varied  problems  which  form  such  a  tangle  in 
that  large  territorial  zone.  Indeed,  though  one  of 
the  immediate   causes  of  the  war  was   Germany's 


THE    CAUSES    OF   THE    WAR  31 

wish  to  upset  the  Bukarest  treaty,  because  the 
consequences  of  that  treaty  ruined  the  Pangerman 
aims  in  the  East,  the  Triple  Entente  powers  were 
no  sooner  at  war  with  Germany  than  they  did  all 
in  their  power  during  ten  months  to  cancel  in  like 
manner  the  consequences  of  the  Bukarest  treaty; 
for  that  was  in  fact  the  result  of  the  Entente's 
ingenuous  wish  to  satisfy  Bulgaria  at  all  costs. 
Theoretically,  the  attempt  inspired  by  the  noble 
thought  of  avoiding  the  horrors  of  war  in  the 
Balkans,  was  just,  but  in  practice  it  was  an  im- 
possibility owing  to  the  fierce  hatred  the  Bulgarians 
entertain  towards  their  conquerors  of  1913,  and 
above  all  towards  the  Serbians. 

What  is  certain  is  that  the  diplomacy  of  the 
Allies,  during  the  first  year  of  war,  followed  such  a 
policy  in  the  Balkans  that,  evidently  without 
knowing  it,  they  played  entirely  into  the  hands  of 
Berlin. 

11. 

Not  only  were  the  consequences  of  the  Bukarest 
treaty  disastrous  to  Pangerman  ambitions  in  the 
Balkan  peninsula,  they  also,  to  the  boundless  fury 
of  William  II.,  considerably  accelerated  that  inter- 
nal political  evolution  of  Austria-Hungary  which 
of  itself  had  already  threatened  to  upset  all  his 
plans. 

Unfortunately  the  notions  held  about  Austria- 
Hungary  in  France,  and  above  all,  in  England,  have 
far  too  long  been  of  a  very  vague  nature.  Public 
opinion  in  France  and  England  was  totally  unable 
to  grasp  the  situation,  when  war  broke  out.  It  was 
incapable  of  seeing  the  important  part  played 
during  the  war,  and  to  be  played  after  the  war,  by 
the  populations  living  in  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy. 
The  vast  majority  of  these  peoples  devoutly  pray 
for  the  victory  of  the  Triple  Entente,  for  they  only 


32        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

fight  against  it  because  they  are  forcibly  constrained 
to  do  so.  At  heart  they  look  to  the  victory  of  the 
Allies  for  deliverance  from  a  hateful  yoke  which  has 
weighed  on  them  heavily  for  centuries.  That  is 
why  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  educate  public 
opinion  in  the  allied  countries  as  to  the  actual  racial 
facts  in  Austria-Hungary.     Then  it  will  be  clearly 


THE  NATIONALITIES  IN  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 


understood  of  what  abominable  treason  Francis 
Joseph  was  guilty  against  his  peoples;  then  it 
will  be  clearly  understood  also  that  as  these  peoples 
were  more  and  more  inclined,  before  the  war,  to  lean 
to  the  side  of  France  and  England,  quite  as  much 
as  to  that  of  Russia,  William  II.  had  a  strong 
additional  motive  for  precipitating  hostilities. 


THE    CAUSES    OF    THE    WAR 


33 


The  nine  different  nationalities   who  live  in   the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy  can  be  divided  into  four  races: 


Germanic. 

Magyar. 

Germans 

12,000,000 

Magyars    .  .          .  .   10,000,000 
(peculiar     race     of 
Asiatic  origin) 

Latin. 

Slav. 

Italians 

1,000,000 

'  Czecks     and 
Slovak               .  .     8,500,000 

Roumanian 

3,000,000 

Poles      .  .          .  .     5,000,000 
Ruthenes           .  .     3,500,000 

Slovenes            .  .     1,000,000 

Serbo-Croats     .  .     6,000,000 

4,000,000 

24,000,000 

In  a  political  sense  the  Germans  and  Magyars, 
forming  a  total  of  22  millions,  have  agreed  since 
1867  to  exercise  and  maintain  for  their  own  profit 
the  supremacy  over  the  Slavs  and  Latins,  although 
these  latter  form  the  majority  of  the  subjects  of 
the  Monarchy,  since  they  constitute  a  group  of 
28  million  inhabitants. 

Now,  it  is  needful  to  note  and  it  is  important  to 
remember,  that  the  figures  which  I  quote,  are  in- 
correct, because  they  are  those  furnished  by  the 
Government  statistics  at  Vienna  and  at  Budapest 
by  German  and  Magyar  officials.  These  have  their 
instructions  to  use  various  artful  tricks  for  falsifying 
systematically  the  true  statistics  in  favour  of  their 
own  races,  in  order  to  contribute  by  that  stratagem 
to  the  maintenance,  as  long  as  possible,  of  the 
supremacy  held  by  the  Germans  and  the  Magyars. 
In  truth,  there  are  in  Austria-Hungary  far  less 
than  22  million  Germans  and  Magyars,  and  far  more 
than  28  Slavs  and  Latins.  What  again  is  certain, 
is  that  for  centuries  the  Slavs  and  Latins  have  been 
oppressed  in  Austria-Hungary  in  the  most  odious 
fashion  by  a  feudal  aristocracy,  who  engross  enpr- 


34        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

mous  landed  properties,  and  who  exercise  in  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy  as  baneful  a  social  influence 
as  that  of  the  Junkers  in  Prussia. 

With  the  exception  of  the  Polish  aristocracy  of 
Galicia  and  a  small  group  of  Ruthenes,  who  since 
1867  joined  hands  with  the  Germans,  all  these  Slavs 
and  Latins  have  been  endeavouring  to  the  very 
utmost,  especially  for  the  last  thirty  years,  to  obtain, 
in  accordance  with  modern  justice,  such  political 
rights  as  are  proportionate  to  their  numbers.  In 
that  way  they  hope  to  win  for  themselves  in  the 
Monarchy  the  legal  majority  that  is  their  due,  by 
reason  of  their  being  human  flesh  and  blood  liable 
to  be  taxed  and  to  be  called  on  for  service  at  the 
will  of  the  Government. 

These  tendencies  have  long  excited  extreme 
alarm  in  William  II.  and  his  Pangermans.  This 
is  readily  understood,  for,  if  the  political  power,  in 
the  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  were  vested,  as  justice 
demands,  in  the  Slavs  and  Latins,  who  hate 
Prussianism,  that  in  itself  would  have  been  the 
ruin  of  the  Kaiser's  plan  for  the  economic  absorp- 
tion of  Austria-Hungary.  Yet  this  very  absorption 
is  indispensable  to  William  II.  if  he  is  to  carry 
out  his  inadmissible  plans  of  exclusive  influence 
in  the  Balkans  and  in  the  East.  His  game  has 
therefore  been,  especially  since  1890,  to  say,  in  the 
main,  to  Francis  Joseph  and  to  the  Magyars: 
"Above  all,  do  not  concede  the  claims  of  your  Slav 
and  Latin  subjects.  Keep  up  absolutely  the 
Germano-Magyar  supremacy.  I  will  uphold  you, 
with  all  my  power,  in  your  struggle  with  the  Slav- 
Latin  elements."  For  a  long  time  these  tactics  of 
the  Kaiser  were  successful  but  they  were  on  the 
point  of  breaking  down  a  short  time  before  the 
war. 

In  spite  of  the  most  ingenious  and  cynical 
obstacles  raised  by  the  Germans  and  Magyars  the 


THE    CAUSES    OF    THE    WAR  35 

culture  of  the  Slavs  and  Latins  kept  growing;  their 
national  organizations  kept  progressing;  also  they 
were  much  more  prolific  than  their  political  rivals. 
All  these  conditions  together  gave  Francis  Joseph 
and  his  henchmen  at  Budapest  increasing  trouble 
in  their  efforts  to  resist  the  enlarged  demands  of 
their  Latin  and  Slav  subjects.  Berlin  had  already 
become  anxious  on  that  score,  when  the  mental 
effervescence  stirred  up  among  the  Slavs  and  Latins 
of  Austria-Hungary  by  the  result  of  the  Bukarest 
treaty  suddenly  changed  for  the  worse  the  out- 
look of  the  Pangerman  scheme. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  almost  the  whole  of  the  28 
million  Slav  and  Latin  subjects  of  the  Hapsburgs 
had  been  roused  to  enthusiasm  by  the  victories 
of  the  Slavs  in  the  Balkans  in  191 2,  and  by  the 
success  of  Roumania  in  1913;  for  they  saw,  above 
all,  in  these  events,  the  triumph  of  the  principle  of 
nationality,  that  is,  their  very  own  cause.  Hence 
they  became  more  than  ever  determined  in  their 
endeavours  to  obtain  from  Vienna  and  Budapest 
those  political  rights,  proportionate  to  their  number, 
which  the  Germano-Magyars  persisted  in  refusing, 
although  of  late  years  that  refusal  had  lost  much 
of  its  energy. 

If  peace  had  been  maintained,  the  effect  of  the 
Bukarest  treaty  on  Austria-Hungary  would  have 
lent  irresistible  force  to  the  claims  of  the  Slav  and 
Latin  subjects  of  Francis  Joseph.  On  the  other 
hand,  Roumania,  exulting  in  her  annexation  of  the 
Bulgarian  Dobrudja,  cast  longing  eyes  on  Transyl- 
vania, and  hoped  to  secure  it  at  the  expense  of 
Hungary.  The  moment  appeared  opportune  when 
a  thorough  transformation  of  the  Hapsburg  Mon- 
archy might  be  effected,  and  that  transformation 
seemed  relatively  so  near  that  Roumania  already 
looked  upon  Transylvania  as  a  ripe  fruit  which 
merely  needed  gathering. 


36        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

If  this  new  order  of  things  resulting  from  the 
treaty  of  Bukarest  had  been  allowed  to  develop 
fully,  the  influence  of  Germanism  would  have  been 
infallibly  ruined  in  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  just  as 
had  happened  in  the  Balkans.  Under  the  growing 
pressure  of  her  Slav  and  Latin  elements  the  partition, 
or  at  any  rate,  the  evolution  towards  federation 
of  Austria-Hungary  would  have  become  a  necessity. 
This  federalism  would  not  have  affected  the  frontiers 
of  the  Hapsburg  Dominions,  but  it  would  neces- 
sarily, and  without  doubt,  have  given  political  pre- 
ponderance to  the  Slav  and  Latin  elements,  which 
were  the  most  numerous  and  the  most  prolific. 
Now,  those  elements  form  an  enormous  majority, 
which  was  and  is  resolutely  hostile  to  any  alliance 
with  Germany.  Thus,  progressively,  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy  in  evolution  would  have  become  more 
and  more  independent  of  Berlin  in  regard  to  her 
foreign  policy,  and  as  it  gradually  shook  itself  free 
from  its  bondage  to  Berlin,  it  would,  as  a  necessary 
consequence,  have  drawn  closer  and  closer  to 
Russia,  France  and  England.  Thus  Germany 
would  have  been  deprived  of  the  artificial  prop 
which  she  has  found  at  Vienna  and  at  Budapest 
ever  since  the  days  of  Sadowa  through  the  Germano- 
Magyar  predominance.  Finally,  as  a  result  of 
peaceful  development,  William  II.  would  have  been 
confronted  by  a  state  of  things  in  Austria-Hungary 
which  would  have  opposed  a  far  more  formidable 
barrier  to  his  oriental  ambitions  than  that  which 
was  created  in  1913  in  the  Balkans,  as  a  consequence 
of  the  treaty  of  Bukarest. 

If  we  bear  in  mind  the  powerful  and  extra- 
ordinarily important  series  of  after-effects  which 
must  have  followed  on  the  new  situation  produced 
by  the  treaty  of  Bukarest  and  its  inevitable  in- 
fluence on  the  28  million  Slavs  and  Latins  of  Austria- 
Hungary,    we    can    readily    understand    that    had 


THE    CAUSES    OF   THE    WAR  37 

the  European  peace  been  maintained,  the  chances 
of  executing  the  Pangerman  plan  would  have  been 
totally  and  simultaneously  ruined  in  Turkey,  in 
the  Balkans,  and  in  Austria-Hungary;  that  is  to 
say  in  the  three  territorial  zones  which,  as  will  be 
seen  from  Chapter  III,  constituted  by  far  the  most 
important  part  of  the  regions  mapped  out  for 
Pangerman  operations  in  the  plan  of  1911. 

Thus  we  see  how  the  internal  evolution  of  Austria- 
Hungary  had  reached  a  point  at  which,  as  the 
result  of  the  treaty  of  Bukarest,  it  was  just  about  to 
escape  for  ever  from  the  influence  of  Berlin;  this 
would  have  broken  the  pivot  on  which  all  the  Pan- 
german combinations  revolved.  It  was  that  con- 
sideration which  decided  William  XL  to  make  war  at 
once. 

III. 

The  Allies  will,  in  accordance  with  the  general 
principles  of  justice,  bring  Germany  to  account  for 
her  unheard  of  crimes,  and  will  exact  a  full  repara- 
tion for  the  enormous  moral  and  material  injuries 
which  she  has  done  them.  Therefore  it  is  necessary 
to  set  forth  the  causes  of  the  war  by  a  general 
survey  of  the  facts,  to  the  end  that  in  the  eyes  of  the 
civilized  world,  it  may  be  clearly  demonstrated  that 
Germany  must  pay,  and  legitimately  so,  the  price 
of  a  responsibility  which,  in  all  justice,  should  rest 
on  her  and  on  her  alone. 

To  understand  the  practical  necessity  of  such  a 
survey,  if  we  are  to  influence  the  opinion  of  neutrals, 
it  is  needful  to  bear  in  mind  that  all  discussions 
which,  so  far,  have  been  held  on  the  causes  of  war, 
have  been  merely  based  on  diplomatic  documents 
published  by  the  various  belligerents,  and  that  these 
documents  merely  refer  to  facts  which  preceded 
the  outbreak  of  war  only  by  a  few  weeks.  But 
in  a  discussion  which  turns  on  a  multitude  of  texts, 


38        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

belonging  to  different  dates,   all  more  or  less  near 

each    other,    and    therefore    liable    to    be    confused, 

nothing   is   easier    than    for   subtle,    interested    and 

dishonest  reasoners  like  the   Germans,  to  interpret 

the  same  facts  in  different  ways,  and  so  to  arrive 

at  conclusions  diametrically  opposed  to  the  truth. 

In  fact,  this  is  exactly  what  has  happened. 

* 
*  * 

Thanks  to  its  intense  intellectual  mobilization, 
which  has  been  foreseen  and  carried  out  as  power- 
fully as  its  military  mobilization,  Germany  has  suc- 
ceeded, by  fallacious  interpretations  of  diplomatic 
documents,  in  profoundly  misleading  neutrals, 
even  honest  neutrals,  as  to  the  real  responsibility 
for  the  outbreak  of  war.  Nothing  could  give  a 
better  idea  of  the  effect  thus  produced  by  Germany 
than  the  following  remarks  of  the  Swiss  Colonel 
Gortsch  published  in   the  InteUigcnzblatt  of  Berne: 

"The  events  which  happened  at  the  end  of  July 
have  convinced  every  reasonable  man  that  Germany 
has  been  provoked  to  war,  and  that  the  Emperor 
William  II.  has  waited  long  before  he  took  up  this 
challenge.  History  will  lay  the  main  guilt  of  the 
war  and  its  intellectual  responsibility  on  England; 
Russia  and  France  will  be  considered  as  her  accom- 
plices. ...  It  is  the  British  policy,  openly  and 
selfishly  free  from  any  scruples,  which  has  caused 
the  World-War"  (quoted  by  the  Echo  de  Paris, 
3rd  January,  1916). 

This  is  exactly  the  proposition  which  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  wishes  neutrals  to  believe.  It  is  an  absurd 
proposition  to  be  entertained  by  any  one  who  knew 
England  intimately  in  the  years  before  the  war. 
During  that  period  the  leaders  of  the  British 
Government  were  led  by  the  one  guiding  thought — 
pleasant  enough  in  itself,  but  entirely  inaccurate 
— that  war  would  not  occur,  since  Great  Britain  did 


THE   CAUSES    OF   THE   WAR  39 

not  wish  war.     The  whole  foreign  poHcy  of  Great 

Britain  has  been  inspired   by   this  conception.     It 

explains  the  attitude  of  extreme  conciliation  taken 

by  the  London   Cabinet  towards   Germany  at  the 

time  of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  of  Herzegovina 

(1909),   during  the  Balkan  wars   (1912-1913),   and 

also  when  it  came  to  the  question  of  the  Bagdad 

railway,  which  most  obviously  threatened  the  road 

to  India.     The  Liberal  Cabinet  of  London  reflected 

the     dominant     British     opinion,     which     believed 

implicitly  in  Lord  Haldane's  assurances.      He  was 

considered,     though    quite    wrongly    so,     to    have 

a  most  perfect  knowledge   of    Germany,   and  in   a 

speech  at  Tranent  he  affirmed  to  his  countrymen: 

*'  Germany  has  not  the  slightest  intention  of  invading 

us"  (quoted  by  the  Morning  Post,  i6th  December, 

1915).     Up  to  the  declaration  of  war.  Sir  Edward 

Grey,  always  inclined  to  believe  in  the  acumen  of 

his    friend    Lord    Haldane,    had    resorted    to    every 

conceivable  combination  which  might  have  allowed 

peace  to  be  maintained  if  William  II.   had  really 

wished  to  maintain  it.     Finally,  does  not  the  total 

unpreparedness  of  England  for  a  continental  war, 

which    has    been    evident    since    the    outbreak    of 

hostilities,   furnish   the  best  proof  of   her   sincerely 

pacific  intentions  before  the  war? 

* 
¥  * 

Other  neutrals,  and  even  some  Frenchmen,  still 
think  that  the  struggle  is  a  result  of  the  so-called 
Delcasse  policy.  They  say:  "The  Emperor 
William  frequently  tried  to  show  himself  friendly 
to  France.  If  his  advances  had  been  accepted,  war 
would  have  been  avoided."  It  is  undeniable  that 
at  certain  moments  William  11.  has  tried  to  draw 
France  into  his  own  orbit,  but  it  was  precisely  in 
order  the  better  to  insure  the  accomplishment  of 
the    Pangerman    plan,    which    has    been    his    main 


40        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

pre-occupation  ever  since  his  accession.  The 
present  military  events  show  clearly  that  if  France 
had  been  beguiled  by  the  smile  of  the  Berlin  tempter, 
any  further  efficient  coalition  of  the  great  powers 
against  Germany  would  have  been  a  sheer  impossi- 
bility. As  to  France,  if  she  had  believed  in  William 
II.  she  would  not  have  suffered  from  war,  for  war 
would  have  been  useless  for  German  ends.  Indeed, 
without  a  struggle,  France  would  have  practically 
been  reduced  to  such  a  state  of  absolute  slavery  as 
has  never  yet  been  achieved  in  history  except  as 
the  result  of  a  totally  ruinous  war.  Facts  which 
have  come  to  light  enable  us  to  convince  ourselves 
by  the  most  indisputable  evidence,  that  such  would 
have  been  the  outcome  of  a  *' reconciliation" 
between  France  and  Germany.  We  now  know  to 
what  extent  the  Germans  had  already  gained  a 
footing  in  the  greater  part  of  the  organic  structure 
of  French  finance  and  industry.  If  the  Paris 
Government  had  come  to  terms  with  Berlin  nothing 
could  have  stopped  the  total  pacific  permeation  of 
France  by  Germany.  Little  by  little  France  would 
have  ceased  to  be  her  own  mistress;  at  the  end  of 
a  few  years  she  would  have  been  exactly  in  the 
same  position  as  Austria-Hungary,  unable  to  free 
herself  unaided  from  the  Prussian  hug. 

Finally,  can  we  believe  for  a  moment  that,  had 
France  carried  out  such  a  policy  of  "conciliation" 
with  Berlin,  it  would  have  induced  William  II.  to 
relinquish  his  dreams  of  domination  ?  On  the 
contrary,  his  easy  capture  of  France  in  full  enjoy- 
ment of  peace,  would  merely  have  whetted  the 
hereditary  appetites  of  the  Hohenzollerns.  Had 
France  once  been  disposed  of  by  reason  of  her 
pacific  permeation  by  Germany,  the  bulwark  which 
she  now  forms  against  the  Prussian  domination 
would  have  been  broken.  The  execution  of  the  rest 
of  the   Pangerman  plan,   at   the  expense  of   Russia 


THE    CAUSES    OF    THE    WAR  41 

and  England,  could  then  have  been  effected  with- 
out encountering  any  insuperable  obstacle. 

It  is  therefore  not  the  policy  called  after 
M.  Delcasse  which  has  caused  the  war.  M.  Delcasse 
will  have  quite  enough  to  answer  for  in  regard  to 
the  application  of  his  policy  before  and  during  war, 
without  being  reproached  for  a  general  principle 
which  evidently  was  theoretically  sound. 

In  upholding  the  alliance  with  Russia,  in  bringing 
about  the  slackening  of  tension  with  Italy,  in 
achieving  the  Entente  Cordiale,  M.  Delcasse  has 
followed  a  policy,  the  principles  of  which  are  just. 
Actual  events  prove  it  convincingly. 


Having  laid  bare  the  fallacy  of  the  German 
argument,  let  us  now,  for  the  benefit  of  honest 
neutrals,  attempt  to  give  a  general  view  of  the  true 
causes  of  the  war,  and  to  indicate  their  sequence. 
Let  us  distinguish  between  the  deep-seated  and 
the  immediate  causes  of  the  struggle. 

The  war  can  be  traced  to  a  single  deep  and  remote 
cause,  namely,  the  will  of  William  II.  to  achieve  the 
Pangerman  plan;  all  secondary  causes,  that  is 
to  say,  the  economic  ones,  spring  from  it.  One 
aim  of  the  Pangerman  plan  was  actually  to  put  an 
end  to  the  enormous  difficulties  which  Germany 
had  created  for  herself  by  the  hypertrophy  of  her 
industries,  and  by  thus  upsetting  the  proper  balance 
which  had  formerly  existed  between  her  agri- 
cultural and  her  industrial  productions. 

The  truth  of  this  deep-seated  and  unique  cause 
of  the  war  is  demonstrated  by: 

1°.  The  intellectual  preparation,  in  all  domains, 
of  the  Pangerman  plan  for  twenty-five  years. 

2°.  Such  explicit  and  ancient  avowals  as  the 
following.  In  1898  Rear- Admiral  von  Goetzen,  an 
intimate    friend    of    the    Kaiser,    being    at    Manilla, 


42        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

said  to  the  American,  Admiral  Dewey,  who  had  just 
destroyed  the  Spanish  fleet  before  Manilla:  "You 
will  not  believe  me,  but  in  about  fifteen  years  my 
country  will  begin  war.  At  the  end  of  two  months 
we  shall  hold  Paris;  but  that  will  only  form  one  step 
towards  our  real  goal — the  overthrow  of  England. 
Every  event  will  happen  exactly  at  its  proper  time, 
for  we  shall  be  ready  and  our  enemies  will  not" 
(quoted  by  the  Echo  de  Paris,  24th  September, 
1915,    from    the    Naval   and    Military    Record). 

3°.  The  material  facts  of  world-wide  prepara- 
tion, obviously  for  war,  made  several  months 
previous  to  its  outbreak,  but  not  till  the  Kaiser  had 
decided  to  start  it,  that  is,  towards  November,  1913. 
(Proofs:  declaration  of  William  II.  on  6th  Novem- 
ber, 1913,  to  King  Albert  of  Belgium;  interview  of 
the  Kaiser  with  the  Arch-Duke  Ferdinand,  April, 
1914,  at  Miramar,  and  in  June,  1914,  at  Konopischt, 
where  Admiral  Tirpitz  accompanied  the  Kaiser.) 

These  material  facts  are  endless,  but  it  will 
suffice  to  recall  the  following  as  truly  significant, 
because  they  have  required  a  long  and  compli- 
cated effort:  first,  the  organization  for  the  victualling 
of  the  piratical  German  cruisers  on  all  the  seas  of 
the  globe,  in  view  of  a  long  war  of  piracy;  and 
second,  the  preparation  of  the  revolt  against 
England  in  South  Africa. 

The  immediate  causes  which  decided  William  11. 
to  precipitate  the  war  are: 

1°.  The  defeat  of  Turkey  in  191 2  by  Italy  and 
the  Balkan  peoples — a  defeat  which,  by  threatening 
Berlin  influence  in  Constantinople,  endangered 
the  hold  which  Germany  already  had  on  the  Otto- 
man Empire. 

2°.  The  consequences  of  the  Bukarest  treaty, 
which  in  1913  had  erected  automatically  a  formid- 
able barrier  against  the  Pangerman  pretensions  in 
the  Balkans. 


THE    CAUSES    OF   THE    WAR 


43 


3°.  The  internal  evolution  of  Austria-Hungary, 
which,  because  of  the  steady  progress  made  by  the 
Latin  and  Slav  subjects  of  Francis  Joseph,  threat- 
ened shortly  to  free  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  from 
the  tutelage  of  Berlin. 


MER. 


^  A  MEE    co:^^::^ 


THE  THREE  BARRIERS  OF  ANTIGERMANIC  PEOPLES  IN  THE 
BALKANS  AND  IN  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 


The   facts    of    the    last    two    groups    would    have 
completed  in   Central   Europe  and  in   the   Balkans 


44        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

the  three  anti-German  barriers  indicated  on  the 
map  (sec  p.  43)  by  deep  black  lines.  Now,  these 
barriers  would  have  hindered  once  and  for  ever  the 
achievement  of  the  Pangerman  plan. 

To  parry  these  blows  only  one  resource  remained 
to  William  II.,  and  that  was  war — "the  national 
industry  of  Prussia,"  as  Mirabeau  used  to  say,  and 
his  very  pithy  and  apt  remark  has  been  too  long 
forgotten. 


CHAPTER   III. 

HOW  FAR  THE  PANGERMAN   PLAN  WAS   CARRIED   OUT  AT 
THE   BEGINNING   OF    1916. 

I.  German  pretensions  in  the  West. 

II.  German  pretensions  in  the  East. 

III.  Grerman  pretensions  in  the  South  and  South-East. 

IV.  General  view  of  the  execution  of  the  Pangerman  plan  from 

191 1  to  the  beginning  of  19 16. 

In  this  chapter  we  shall  inquire  what  relation 
existed  between  the  actual  gains  and  the  pre- 
tensions of  the  Pangermans  at  the  beginning  of 
1916,  and  those  which  were  foreseen  in  the  191 1 
plan.  In  order  to  be  quite  explicit  we  shall  analyse 
successively  those  gains  and  pretensions  in  the 
west,  east,  south,  and  south-west.  This  analysis 
will  enable  us  finally  to  present  a  general  view  of 
the  execution  of  the  Pangerman  plan  at  the  period 
under  consideration.  -~- 

I. 

The  map  (p.  46)  sums  up  Prussianized  Germany's 
pretensions  which  she  still  expected  to  carry  out 
west  of  the  Rhine  at  the  beginning  of  1916. 

The  best  way  to  prove  this  intention  is  by  means 
of  extracts  from  the  memorial  sent  by  the  most 
powerful  German  associations  on  May  20th,  191 5, 
to  the  Imperial  Chancellor  (quoted  by  Le  Temps, 
12th  August,  1915).  I  have  mentioned  {see  page 
18)  why  this  document  must  be  looked  upon  as  of 
extremely  exceptional  importance. 

As  to  what  concerns  Belgium  the  memorial  says: 

"Because  it  is  needful  to  insure  our  credit  on 
sea   and   our   military   and   economic   situation   for 

4.') 


46        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

the  future  in  face  of  England,  because  the  Belgian 
territory,  which  is  of  the  greatest  economic  impor- 
tance, is  closely  linked  to  our  principal  industrial 
territory,     Belgium     must     be     subjected     to     the 


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ET-MARNtV.        /'       \ 


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liiriiiiiiil  Bassin  Mimer  (Fer)  de  Bncy 


A\IBE       ""■•.HAlirb^ 

MApNE  /;S^  VOSG\S 

■.,.rr(l'-'  SAONe'^'^'J 
COTE  DOR  •■•   ""        y 


Front  de  I  'Armee  Alle/nande 


THE  GERMAN  CLAIMS  IN  THE  WEST  (Beginning  of  1916). 


legislation  of  the  Empire  in  monetary,  financial 
and  postal  matters.  Her  railways  and  her  water 
courses  must  be  closely  connected  with  our  com- 
munications. By  constituting  a  Walloon  territory 
and  a  Flemish  territory  with  a  preponderance  of 
the  Flemish,  and  by  putting  into  German  hands 
the  properties  and  the  economic  undertakings  which 
are  of  vital  importance  for  dominating  the  country, 
we  shall  organize  the  government  and  the  adminis- 
tration   in    such    a    manner    that    the    inhabitants 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  47 

will  not  be  able  to  acquire  any  influence  over  the 
political  destiny  of  the  German  Empire." 

In  a  word,  it  is  slavery  that  is  promised  to  the 
Belgians.  In  order  to  prove  clearly  that  this 
means  exactly  the  achievement  of  the  plan  Berlin 
had  elaborated  for  twenty-five  years,  it  is  impor- 
tant to  notice  that  the  fate  of  the  annexed  popula- 
tions, meted  out  in  the  above  memorial,  is  exactly 
the  same  fate  mentioned  in  the  pamphlet  pub- 
lished under  the  auspices  of  the  Alldeutscher  Ver- 
band,  the  Pangerman  Union,  wherein  the  Panger- 
man  plan  of  1895  is  set  forth  {see  the  text  already 
quoted,  p.  4). 

The  only  difference  to  be  noticed  in  the  evolution 
of  the  Pangerman  ideas  between  1895  and  1916  is 
that  after  their  experience  with  the  Slavs  and  Latins 
of  Austria-Hungary,  the  Germans  deem  it  possible 
and  advantageous,  by  an  application  of  Prussian 
methods  of  terrorism,  to  compel  non-Germans  to 
fight  for  the  benefit  of  Pangermany;  true,  these 
people  shudder  with  horror  at  the  notion,  but 
stiffened  by  a  strong  infusion  of  Germans,  they  are 
forced  to  march  to  the  shambles  in  order  to  secure 
slavery  and  bread  for  their  families  under  the 
German  yoke. 

*'As  to  France,"  continues  the  memorial  of 
the  20th  May,  1915,  to  the  Imperial  Chancellor, 
"always  in  consideration  of  our  position  towards 
England,  it  is  of  vital  interest  for  us,  in  respect  of 
our  future  on  the  seas,  that  we  should  own  the 
coast  which  borders  on  Belgium  more  or  less  up  to 
the  Somme,  which  would  give  us  an  outlet  on  the 
Atlantic  Ocean.  The  Hinterland,  which  it  is 
necessary  to  annex  at  the  same  time,  must  be  of 
such  an  extent  that  economically  and  strategically 
the  ports,  where  the  canals  terminate,  can  be  utilized 
to  the  utmost.  Any  other  territorial  conquest  in 
France,    beyond    the    necessary    annexation    of    the 


48        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

mining  basins  of  Briey,  should  only  be  made  in 
virtue  of  considerations  of  military  strategy.  In 
this  connection,  after  the  experience  of  this  war,  it 
is  only  natural  that  we  should  not  expose  our 
frontiers  to  fresh  enemy  invasions  by  leaving  to  the 
adversary  fortresses  which  threaten  us,  especially 
Verdun  and  Belfort  and  the  Western  buttresses  of 
the  Vosges,  which  are  situated  between  those  two 
fortresses.  By  the  conquest  of  the  line  of  the  Meuse 
and  of  the  French  coast,  with  the  mouths  of  the 
canals,  we  should  acquire,  besides  the  iron  districts 
of  Briey  already  mentioned,  the  coal  districts  of  the 
departments  of  the  Nord  and  of  the  Pas  de  Calais. 
This  expansion  of  territory,  quite  an  obvious  matter 
after  the  experience  obtained  in  Alsace-Lorraine, 
presupposes  that  the  populations  of  the  annexed 
districts  shall  not  be  able  to  obtain  a  political 
influence  on  the  destiny  of  the  German  Empire, 
and  that  all  means  of  economic  power  which  exist 
on  these  territories,  including  landed  property,  both 
large  and  middling,  will  pass  into  German  hands; 
France  will  receive  and  compensate  the  land- 
owners." 

In  order  to  justify  these  formidable  annexations 
the  memorial  of  the  20th  May,  in  harmony 
with  the  frank  cynicism  of  the  Pangerman  doctrine, 
adduces  no  argument  but  the  convenience  of  Prussia 
and  the  profitableness  of  the  booty  to  be  got. 

"If  the  fortress  of  Longwy,  with  the  numerous 
blast  furnaces  of  the  region,  were  returned  to  the 
French,  and  if  a  new  war  broke  out,  with  a  few  long 
range  guns  the  German  furnaces  of  Luxemburg 
(list  of  which  is  given)  would  be  paralyzed  in  a  few 
hours.  .  .  .  Thus  about  20%  of  the  production  of 
crude  iron  and  of  German  steel  would  be  lost.   .   .   . 

"Let  us  say,  bye  the  bye,  that  the  high  produc- 
tion of  steel  derived  from  the  iron-ore  gives  to 
German   agriculture   the   only   chance   of   obtaining 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  49 

the  phosphoric  acid  needed  when  the  importation 
of  phosphates  is  blockaded. 

"The  security  of  the  German  Empire,  in  a  future 
war,  requires  therefore  imperatively  the  ownership 
of  all  mines  of  iron-ore  including  the  fortresses  of 
Longwy  and  of  Verdun,  which  are  necessary  to 
defend  the  region." 

These  various  declarations,  made  on  high  authority 
enable  us  to  affirm,  that  on  the  whole  the  annexations 
which  the  Pangermans  intended  to  make  in  the 
West  would  have  extended  in  France  more  or  less 
to  a  line  drawn  from  the  South  of  Belfort  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Somme,  that  is,  so  far  as  concerns 
France,  they  would  comprise  a  total  area  of  50,271 
square  kilometres,  which,  before  the  war,  held 
5,768,000  inhabitants. 

Further,  as  regards  France,  the  intended 
annexations  were,  according  to  Pangerman  con- 
ceptions, to  have  had  a  double  effect. 

1°.  By  taking  over  the  richest  industrial  and 
mining  French  regions,  Germany  would  secure  an 
enormous  booty. 

2°.  Deprived  of  her  most  productive  depart- 
ments, which  bear  the  main  burden  of  taxes,  and 
which  hold  mining  elements  indispensable  to  eco- 
nomic life,  France  would  have  been  maimed  and 
reduced  to  a  state  from  which  it  would  have  been  a 
sheer  impossibility  for  her  to  recover  or  ever  again 
to  become  a  power  capable  of  thwarting  in  any 
shape  whatsoever  the  future  determinations  of 
Germany. 

A  few  figures  will  enable  us  to  verify  this  forecast. 
At  the  beginning  of  1916  the  Germans  were  holding 
138,000  hectares  of  the  coal  basin  of  the  department 
of  the  Nord,  being  41%  of  the  total  superficies 
worked  in  France  (337,000  hectares),  or  about 
three-fourths  of  the  total  French  production.  The 
Germans  also  occupied  63,000  hectares  of  the  iron-ore 


50        PANGER.MAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

basin  of  Lorraine  which  represents  75%  of  the 
superficies  of  all  the  iron  beds  worked  in  France 
(83,000  hectares),  and  nine- tenths  of  the  total 
production.  It  is  clear,  that  were  such  a  state  of 
things  to  continue,  economic  and  therefore  national 
life  would  be  made  radically  impossible  in  France, 
shorn  of  her  vital  organs.  In  reaHty  France 
would  be  in  a  position  of  entire  dependence  on 
Germany  in  accordance  with  the  Pangerman 
schemes  for  the  future. 

It  is  still  necessary  .  to  mention  that  in  the 
territories  occupied  by  Germany  in  the  West,  as 
well  as  everywhere  else,  the  measures  already  taken 
by  the  Germans  in  1916  were  not  merely  measures 
of  military  defence,  but  measures  for  the  organiza- 
tion and  permanent  possession  of  the  said  terri- 
tories. These  measures  to  ensure  permanent  pos- 
session may  be  classed  in  the  following  categories: 

Measures  of  terrorism  applied  in  Prussian  fashion 
so  as  to  bring  into  subjection  all  refractory  elements. 

Measures  of  division,  such  as  in  Belgium,  the 
Germans  take  in  order  to  rouse,  by  all  possible 
means,  opposition  between  the  Flemish  and  the 
Walloons  for  the  purpose  of  neutralizing  the  one  by 
the  other. 

Measures  of  strict  and  regular  administration  in 
order,  by  the  bait  of  some  external  or  economic 
advantages,  to  accustom  to  the  German  yoke  those 
elements  of  the  population  whose  moral  resistance, 
in  the  opinion  of  Berlin,  can  be  most  easily  broken. 

Measures  tending  to  prepare  the  German  coloniza- 
tion of  the  new  territories.  These  have  mostly 
consisted  in  applying  the  Pangerman  theory  of 
Evacuation,  that  is,  by  systematically  transporting 
the  unfortunate  women  or  old  people  whom  Germany 
considers  absolutely  useless  in  her  future  possessions. 
She  found  it,  for  instance,  very  convenient  to  rid  her- 
self without  delay  of  these  poor  creatures  especially 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  51 

when  the  question  of  feeding  them  cropped  up;  so 
these  ''useless  mouths"  were  promptly  transferred 
to  the  shoulders  of  the  enemy,  whom  Germany 
already  looked  upon  as  vanquished.  That  is  the 
theory  of  Evacuation,  which  explains  to  a  large 
extent  why  the  German  authorities  have  sent  back 
to  France  that  part  of  the  populations  of  the 
occupied  territories  in  France  and  Belgium  whom, 
on  exact  inquiry,  they  regarded  as  human  wastage. 


No  doubt,  as  is  shown  on  map  (p.  46),  Germany 
did  not  at  the  beginning  of  1916  occupy  quite  all  the 
territories  she  coveted.  She  missed  Calais,  Belfort, 
and  Verdun,  but  it  is  easy  to  see  that  she  did  so  only 
by  a  hair's  breadth. 

The  Western  territories  which  were  to  enter 
into  the  Germanic  Confederation  of  the  191 1  plan 
include: 

Square  Kilometres. 

Holland  38,141 

Belgium  . .  . .        29,451 

Luxemburg  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  2,586 

French  Departments       . .         . .         . .         . .        50,271 

Total      ..         ..         ..         ..         ..      120,449 

Now  Luxemburg  and  Belgium  were  entirely 
occupied  (excepting  a  patch  of  Belgium).  If 
Germany  was  to  hold  Belgium,  Holland,  which  is 
not  occupied,  but  which  is  geographically  invested, 
would  inevitably  be  forced  to  enter  into  the 
Germanic  Confederation.  We  must,  therefore,  con- 
sider Holland  as  being  virtually  under  Germany's 
thumb.  As,  on  the  other  hand,  out  of  50,271  square 
kilometres  which  she  wished  to  annex  at  the  expense 
of  France,  Germany,  at  the  beginning  of  191 6, 
occupied  20,300,  we  conclude  that  the  German 
enterprises  in  the  West,  which,  according  to  pro- 
gramme,  ought  to  have  comprised   120,449   square 


52        TANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

kilometres,    in    point    of    fact    extended    directly    or 
indirectly  over  90,478  square  kilometres. 

Germany  therefore,  early  in  1916,  had  achieved 
in  the  West  an  occupation  foreseen  by  the  plan  of 
191 1  and  at  the  expense  of  non-Germans  in  the 
proportion  of  76%  or  three-fourths. 


II. 

The  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  had  provided  for  the 
permanent  exclusion  of  Russia  as  a  great  power 
by  means  of  two  measures: 

1  °.  To  carve  out  of  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars 
and  annex  to  the  German  Confederation  a  slice  of 
territory  large  enough  to  cut  off  Russia  entirely 
from  the  West. 

2  °.  To  constitute  at  the  expense  of  Russia,  thus 
reduced,  new  States  which  should  bow  the  knee  to 
Berlin. 

Mr.  Dietrich  Schaefer,  the  well-known  historian, 
in  the  Review  Panther,  afifirmed,  early  in  February, 
191 5:  "It  is  absolutely  necessary  for  us  to  expand 
the  sphere  of  our  power,  especially  eastward  .  .  . 
the  immense  Russian  force  must  recede  behind 
the  Dnieper"  (quoted  by  U  Information,  5th 
February,   1915). 

A  Swedish  pamphlet,  ascribed  to  the  Germano- 
phile,  Adrian  Molin,  explained,  also  early  in  191 5, 
that  Germany,  with  the  help  of  Sweden,  was  to 
have  given  the  fmishing  stroke  in  separating  Russia 
from  Europe  by  means  of  a  barrier  formed  of 
Buffer-States,  to  wit,  Finland  and  the  Ukraine. 
Now,  for  the  last  twenty-five  years  in  particular, 
the  Pangerman  agents  have  endeavoured  to  sow 
the  seeds  of  rebellion  among  the  20  millions  of 
Small-Russians  who  live  in  the  Russian  Govern- 
ments grouped  around  Kieff.  Finally,  the  Moslem 
regions    of    Russia    (Caucasus,    Central    Asia,    etc.) 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  53 

were  to  form  special  States  under  the  sway  of 
Turkish  suzerainty,  and,  through  that  channel,  to 
bear  the  yoke  of  German  influence. 

Such    were    the    means    elaborated    at    Berlin    to 
bring  about  the  annihilation  of  Russia  as  a  great 


O    T    B    1    C    H    E 


Vienne 


/   TrietU 


Budapest 

HO    N    GB    1    E 


•Qitesa 


Front  des  Armees     Austro-A/Zemandea 


THE  GERMAN  CLAIMS  IN  THE  EAST. 


power,  when  once  her  armies  had  been  destroyed; 
and  this  might  have  happened  perhaps,  if  the  English 
intervention,  by  enabling  France  to  make  a  stand, 
had   not   prevented    Germany   from    first   smashing 


54        PANGERMAN   PLOT    UNMASKED 

France  and  then  concentrating  all  her  forces  against 
the  Empire  of  the  Tsar,  in  accordance  with  the 
plan  of  the  General  Staff  of  Berlin. 

We  can  form  an  estimate  of  the  annexations 
which  Germany,  as  late  as  the  beginning  of  1916, 
still  hoped  to  effect  at  the  cost  of  Russia  by  examin- 
ing the  memorial  of  May  20th,  191 5,  addressed  to 
the  Imperial  Chancellor;  although  the  phraseology 
in  which  it  is  drawn  up  aims  at  concealing  the  full 
extent  of  the  Pangerman  demands,  it  yet  tallies,  in 
its  tendencies,  with  the  programme  published  by 
Tannenberg  in  191 1: 

"With  regard  to  the  East,"  says  that  memorial, 
"the  following  consideration  must  guide  us: 
For  the  great  increase  of  industrial  power  which  we 
expect  in  the  West  we  must  secure  a  counterpoise 
by  the  annexation  of  an  agricultural  territory  of 
equal  value  in  the  East.  It  is  necessary  to  strengthen 
the  agricultural  basis  of  our  national  economy;  to 
secure  room  for  the  expansion  of  a  great  German 
agricultural  settlement;  to  restore  to  our  Empire 
the  German  peasants  living  in  a  foreign  land, 
particularly  in  Russia,  who  are  now  actually 
without  the  protection  of  the  law;  finally,  we 
must  increase  considerably  the  number  of  our 
fellow  countrymen  able  to  bear  arms;  all  these 
matters  require  an  important  extension  of  the 
frontiers  of  the  Empire  and  of  Prussia  towards  the 
East  through  the  annexation  of  at  least  some  parts 
of  the  Baltic  provinces  and  of  territories  to  the 
South  of  them,  while  keeping  in  view  the  necessity 
of  a  military  defence  of  the  Eastern  German 
frontier. 

"As  to  what  political  rights  to  give  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the  new  territories  and  as  to  what 
guarantees  are  necessary  to  further  German  in- 
fluence and  economics,  we  will  merely  refer  to  what 
we  have  said  about  France.     The  war  indemnity 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  55 

to  be  exacted  from  Russia  should  to  a  large  extent 
consist  in  the  surrender  of  territory"  (see  Le  Temps, 
12th  August,  1915). 

In  his  speech  of  nth  December,  1915,  William  II. 's 
Chancellor,  in  a  sentence  full  of  significance,  gave 
his  hearers  to  understand  that  such  were  indeed  the 
pretensions  of  Germany: 

"Our  troops."  said  he,  "in  conjunction  with  the 
Austro-Hungarian,  are  taking  up  strongly  fortified 
positions  of  defence  far  within  the  Russian  terri- 
tory. They  are  ready  to  resume  their  forward 
march." 

Just  as  in  the  West,  all  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Germans  in  the  East  have  been  not  only  for  defence, 
but  for  organization  in  view  of  keeping  the  occupied 
territories.  These  measures  come  under  the  various 
heads  I  indicated.     {See  p.  50.) 

With  the  Poles,  the  Germans  used  the  same 
tactics  as  with  the  Flemish  people  of  Belgium. 
After  having  terrorized  the  Poles,  the  Prussian 
authorities  granted  them,  in  the  use  of  their  own 
language  for  scholastic  purposes,  certain  privileges 
which  compare  advantageously  with  the  former 
state  of  things  resulting  from  that  detestable 
bureaucratic  regime  of  Russia,  which,  with  a 
complete  lack  of  foresight,  had  by  its  vexatious 
measures  seriously  imperilled  in  Poland  the  true 
interests  of  the  empire  of  the  Tsars.  Again,  in  the 
East  the  Germans  promoted  husbandry.  They 
constructed  railroads  and  coach  roads.  No  doubt 
all  these  steps  were  taken  mainly  in  the  interest  of 
Germany.  It  is  quite  clear  that  the  advantages 
conceded  to  the  Poles  can  only  be  considered  as 
temporary.  This  is  proved  sufficiently  by  the 
Prussian  system  so  long  pursued  in  Posen.  However, 
the  Germans  flatter  themselves  that  by  these 
measures  they  favourably  impress  some  portion  of 
the  Poles,  who  are  simple  enough  to  imagine  that 


56        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

Germany  will  reconstitute  a  Polish  State  of  20 
millions  of  inhabitants  in  order  to  give  this  State  to 
the  Poles  at  the  expense  of  Russia.  It  was  with 
such  an  end  in  view  that  Berlin  thought  of  pro- 
claiming the  autonomy  of  Poland.  At  the  same 
time  Germany  reckons  on  establishing  in  Poland  a 
system  of  conscription  so  as  to  utilize,  by  force  if 
necessary,  the  Polish  recruits,  just  as  she  has  done 
with  the  Slavs  of  Austria-Hungary,  in  the  interest 
of  Pangermany. 


From  the  territorial  standpoint  the  Pangerman 
pretensions  of  the  191 1  plan  in  the  East  are  sum- 
marized in  the  following  table: 


Square 

Kilometres. 

Inhabitants. 

The  ten  Governments  of  Russian 

Poland 

127,320 

12,467,000 

Three  Baltic  Provinces  (Esthonia, 

Livonia,  Courland) 

94,5^4 

2,686,000 

The   three   Russian   Governments 

at  the  South  of  the  Baltic  Pro- 

vinces (Kovno,  Vilna,  Grodno) 

121,840 

5,728,000 

Total 

343,724 

20,881,000 

Now  at  the  beginning  of  1916,  out  of  these 
343,724  square  kilometres,  as  the  map  will  show, 
the  Germans  occupied  about  260,000.  They  there- 
fore had  carried  out  in  the  East  the  plan  of  191 1  at 
the  cost  of  non-German  populations  to  the  extent 
of  75%,  or  three-fourths. 


III. 

The  zones  of  absolute  influence,  whether  direct  or 
indirect,  which  Germany,  in  accordance  with  the 
191 1  plan,  has  tried  to  secure  for  herself  in  the 
South    and    South-East    of    her    present    frontiers, 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  57 

comprise  three  totally  distinct  groups  of  terri- 
tory: Austria-Hungary,  the  Balkans,  and  Turkey. 
It  is  therefore  advisable  to  examine  separately  how 
at  the  beginning  of  1916  Germany  stood  in  respect 
of  each  of  these  three  groups. 


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THE  GERMAN  CLAIMS  IN  THE  SOUTH  AND  SOUTH-EAST. 


1°.     Austria-Hungary. 

Let  us  make  no  mistake,  Austria-Hungary  is 
actually  as  much  under  William  II. 's  domination  as 
is  Belgium.  The  European  conflict  has  enabled 
Germany  artfully  to  occupy  the  Empire  of  the  Haps- 
burgs  under  the  pretence  of  defending  it,  in  fact  to 
seize  it  as  provided  for  by  the  plan  of  191 1.  Since 
the  beginning  of  191 5  all  the  troops  of  Francis 
Joseph  have  been  entirely  under  the  orders  of  the 
Berlin  General  Staff.  Even  if  Austria-Hungary 
wished  to  make  a  separate  peace,  she  could  not  do  so, 
for  all  her  motive  power,  diplomatic  and  military,  is 
exclusively  controlled  by  the  Kaiser's  agents.     The 


58        PANGERMAN   PLOT    UNMASKED 

Austro-German  alliance  is  merely  a  piece  of  stage 
scenery.  The  much-talked  of  device  of  smuggling 
the  Hapsburg  Empire  into  Germany  by  a  back  door, 
that  is,  by  her  entrance  into  the  Zollverein  or 
Customs  Union,  is  a  broad  farce.  It  can  merely 
deceive  those,  alas  still  too  numerous,  who  are 
insufificiently  informed  of  the  true  facts  in  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  Austro-German  fusion  in  the  shape 
of  a  Customs  Union  is  besides  no  novelty.  The 
process  of  absorbing  Austria-Hungary  was  fore- 
seen and  described  in  detail  in  the  Pangerman 
pamphlet  of  1895,  showing  the  fundamental  lines 
of  the  plan  of  that  date.  All  the  fuss  made  at  the 
beginning  of  1916  by  the  German  Press  about  the 
so-called  wishes  of  the  Austro-Hungarians  to  enter 
into  the  Zollverein  has  been  the  most  "Kolossal" 
and  the  most  dishonest  of  bluffs.  In  truth,  nearly 
three-fourths  of  the  populations  at  present  subject 
to  Francis  Joseph  do  not  want  to  be  absorbed  into 
Germany  at  any  price,  neither  in  a  political,  nor  in 
an  economic  fashion.  All  the  stir  made  in  the 
Central  Empires  about  the  entrance  of  the  Haps- 
burg Monarchy  into  the  Zollverein,  has  been  the 
doing  of  Pangerman  bear  leaders  at  Berlin  or 
Vienna  and  of  the  Magyar  aristocracy,  and  not  at 
all  of  the  Magyar  people,  which  is  not  the  same 
thing.  Let  us  therefore  not  be  duped  by  the  bluff 
of  the  German  press  on  the  Zollverein  question.  The 
microscopic  minority  who  wish  it  in  Austria- 
Hungary  plays  the  Berlin  game.  What  is  undeniable 
is  that  at  present  Austria-Hungary  is  entirely 
under  the  Prussian  thumb. 

2°.     The  Balkans. 

The  whole  of  Serbia  has  been  overrun  by  the 
Germans.  The  predicament  of  the  Serbian  popula- 
tion is  extremely  cruel.  Either  they  have  been 
massacred,  or  systematically  famished  or  deported 
to    Germany    to    work   in    the   factories   or   on    the 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  59 

German  land.  These  appalling  measures  of  coercion 
have  not  prevented  the  Kaiser  from  addressing  a 
manifesto  :  "To  my  noble  and  heroic  Serbian 
People."  The  aim  was,  by  fine  words,  to  disarm 
morally  the  remainder  of  the  Serbian  population, 
terrorized  by  a  series  of  sufferings  unsurpassed  in 
history.  As  to  Serbia,  the  Kaiser  offered  part  of  it 
to  Austria,  always  in  accordance  with  the  plan  of 
1895  which  provided  for  this  solution;  for  to  give  a 
fraction  of  Serbia  to  Austria  as  a  member  of  the 
Zollverein,  is  practically  to  put  it  under  the  direct 
domination  of  Germany. 

As  to  Bulgaria,  the  ally  of  Germany,  she  is  en- 
tirely absorbed,  and  the  Germans  there  behave  as 
rulers  so  far  as  they  possibly  can.  Heroic  Monte- 
negro has  suffered  exactly  the  same  fate  as  Serbia, 
one  part  of  Albania  is  also  occupied.  If  the  Allies 
had  been  fatuous  enough  not  to  understand,  at  the 
eleventh  hour,  the  importance  of  Salonika,  Greece 
and  Roumania,  where  Germanophile  elements  are 
not  numerous  but  very  influential,  would  already 
have  obeyed  to  the  letter  the  orders  of  Berlin. 

Supposing,  for  argument's  sake,  that  there 
were  a  German  victory,  we  would  immediately 
see  Germany  constituting  a  Balkan  Confederation 
under  the  headship  of  Austria,  considered  as  a 
Balkan  power,  simply  because,  under  the  name  of 
Austria,  it  would  really  be  Germany  who  would 
impose  her  will  on  the  future  confederation. 

3°.     Turkey. 

At  the  beginning  of  1916,  before  the  Russian 
advance  in  Armenia,  the  Ottoman  Empire  through- 
out its  entire  length  was  subjected  to  the  influence 
of  Germany;  that  influence  had  even  spread  to 
Persia.  We  have  here  an  event  which  would  have 
had  an  extreme  importance  for  the  development  of 
the  Panislamic  movement  directed  simultaneously 
against  Russia,  France  and  England,  if  the  Anglo- 


6o 


PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 


Russian  attitude  had  not  recently  put  a  stopper  on 
German  intrigues  in  the  Shah's  Empire. 

"The  establishment  of  direct  relations  with 
Turkey  is  of  inestimable  military  value,"  said  the 
German  Chancellor  in  his  speech  of  December  nth, 
191 5,  "while  on  the  economic  side  the  possibility 
of  importing  goods  from  the  Balkan  States  and 
from  Turkey  will  increase  our  supplies  in  a  most 
satisfactory  way"  (see  Le  Temps,  nth  December, 
1915).  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  see  in  these 
words  the  result  of  a  mere  bluff,  of  which  the 
Germans  are  so  often  lavish.  If  the  Allies  left 
Germany  time  to  draw  from  Turkey  all  the  military 
and  economic  resources  expected  from  her  at 
Berlin,  future  events  would  evidently  prove  that 
the  Imperial  Chancellor's  words  deserve  to  be  taken 
seriously. 


To  sum  up,  the  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  provided 
in  the  South  and  South-East  for: 


Square 
Kilometres. 

Inhabitants. 

The  absorption  of  Austria-Hungary 
The     establishment    of     immediate 

and  absolute  German  influence  on 

the  Balkan  States 
The     establishment     of      exclusive 

German  influence  on  Turkey 

Total 

676,616 

490,27s 
1,792,900 

50,000,000 

22,000,000 
20,000,000 

2,959,791 

92,000,000 

Now,  at  the  beginning  of  1916,  the  plan  of  191 1 
was  carried  out  in  the  following  proportions: 

Austria-Hungary  had  her  676,616  square  kilo- 
metres occupied  (minus  the  small  area  in  the  hands 
of  the  Italians),  being  more  or  less  100%. 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  61 

111  the  Balkans,  at  the  same  date,  under  direct 
German  influence,  we  have: 

Square  Kilometres. 

Bulgaria  ii4,ioS 

Serbia       . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .        87,300 

Montenegro        . .         . .        14,180 

Total  215,585 

equalling  43%  of  the  total  of  the  Balkan  States'  territory. 

In  Turkey  the  German  influence  was  exerted  over 
almost  the  entire  territory,  therefore  in  the  pro- 
portion of  100%. 

If  we  now  add  the  figures  belonging  to  the  three 
territorial  groups  aimed  at  by  the  191 1  plan  in  the 
South  and  South-East  we  shall  see  that  Germany  has 
carried  out  her  programme  on 

Square  Kilometres. 
Austria-Hungary  . .  . .  . .  . .        676,616 

Balkans  215,585 

Turkey  ..  ..     1,792,900 

Total  2,685,101 

As  the  total  plan  aimed  at  the  German  direct  or 
indirect  seizure  of  2,968,791  square  kilometres,  we 
see  that,  considered  in  that  light,  the  goal  of  the  191 1 
plan  has  been  reached  in  the  South  and  South-East 
in  the  proportion  of  89%,  being  roughly  nine- 
tenths. 

Now  I  have  shown  {pp.  52  and  56)  that  Germany 
occupied  or  controlled  early  in  1916: 

In  the  West  over  90,478  square  kilometres. 
In  the  East  over  260,000  square  kilometres. 

We  have  just  seen  that  in  the  South  and  South- 
East  the  German  plan  has  been  achieved  over 
2,685,101  square  kilometres. 

Of  course  all  the  territories  included  in  that 
last  figure  are  far  from  having  the  same  value, 
especially  those  of  part  of  Turkey,  but  in  that 
figure  Austria-Hungary  alone  claims  676,616  square 


62        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

kilometres,  that  is,  she  alone  represents  a  seizure, 
disguised  it  may  be,  yet  not  less  real,  which  is 
infinitely  more  considerable  than  the  German 
occupations  in  the  West  and  East. 

From  these  calculations  it  clearly  follows  that  the 
part  of  the  Pangerman  plan  which  concerns  Austria- 
Hungary,  the  Balkans  and  Turkey,  that  is,  Central 
Europe  and  the  East,  forms  by  far  the  main  part 
of  the  Pangerman  scheme.  That  is  an  observation 
of  extreme  importance  for  the  Allies  and  for 
Neutrals,  because  of  the  world-wide  consequences 
which  flow  from  the  scheme  summed  up  in  the 
formula,  "From  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf." 
These  consequences  will  be  stated  in  Chapter  V. 

IV. 

The  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  (see  map,  p.  12) 
included: 

1°.  The  formation  of  a  great  German  Confedera- 
tion which  was  to  put  under  the  absolute  supremacy 
of  the  present  German  Empire  (540,858  square 
kilometres  and  68  million  inhabitants)  foreign 
territories  situated  around  Germany,  which  form  a 
superficies  of  1,182,113  square  kilometres  and  hold 
94  million  inhabitants. 

The  figures  given  (pp.  52,  56  and  61)  suffice  to 
prove  that  the  German  seizure  of  these  territories 
extended  at  the  beginning  of  1916: 

Square  Kilometres. 

To  the  West 90,478 

To  the  East 260,000 

To  the  South  (Austria-Hungary)      . .         . .       676,616 

Total  1,027,094 

Germany  has  therefore,  so  far  as  concerns  the 
territories  to  be  absorbed  into  the  Germanic 
Confederation,  achieved  her  programme  in  the 
proportion  of  86%,  or  about  nine-tenths. 


BEGINNING   OF    1916 


^3 


2°.  The  absolute  subordination  to  Germany  of 
all  the  Balkan  States,  whose  superficies  is  499,275 
square  kilometres,  holding  22  million  inhabitants. 
We  have  seen  above  {p.  61),  that  the  German 
seizure  actually  extends  over  215,585  square  kilo- 
metres. The  German  programme,  therefore,  as  re- 
gards the  Balkans,  has  been  achieved  in  the  pro- 
portion of  43%. 

3°.  The  more  or  less  veiled  seizure  by  Germany 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  being  1,792,900  square 
kilometres,  holding  20  million  inhabitants.  Now, 
early  in  1916  the  exclusive  German  influence  was 
felt  over  the  whole  of  Turkey.  As  regards  her  the 
German  plan  had  therefore  been  achieved  in  the 
proportion  of  100%. 

Let  us  now  group  the  figures  which  will  enable  us 
to  show  in  what  proportion  the  whole  Pangerman 
plan  of  191 1  has  been  actually  achieved  by  Ger- 
many: 


Provisions 

of  the  191 1 

plan.  Square 

Kilometres. 

Actual 
achievements 

Square 
Kilometres. 

1.  Territories  to  be  absorbed  in  the 

great  Germanic  Confederation  . . 

2.  Balkans 

3.  Turkey 

Total 

1,182,113 

499,275 
1,792,900 

1,027,094 

215,585 
1,792,900 

3,474,288 

3,035,579 

These  figures  prove  to  demonstration  that  early 
in  1916  Germany  had  achieved  the  Pangerman  plan 
of  191 1  in  the  enormous  proportion  of  87%,  or 
about  nine-tenths. 

This  figure  is  graphically  confirmed  by  the 
annexed  map;  we  can  see  at  a  glance  the  geo- 
graphical as  well  as  superficial  relations  which 
exist  between  the  boundaries  of  the  plan  of  191 1 


64        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

and    the   fronts   occupied   early   in    1916   by   armies 
exclusively  subordinate  to  Berlin. 

These  geographical  and  mathematical  con- 
siderations, the  importance  of  which  cannot  escape 
us,  explain  why  and  under  what  conditions  Germany 


THE  PLAN  OF  1911  AND  THE  EXTENT  OF  ITS  EXECUTION 
AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  1916. 


wished  to  make  peace.  She  wished  it  simply 
because,  as  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  owned,  with- 
out mincing  matters,  in  December,  1915,  the  goal 
of  the  war  had  been  reached. 

Nine-tenths  of  the  whole  of  the  Pangerman  plan 
of  1911  having  been  practically  achieved,  in  spite 
of  England's  intervention,  which,  however,  had 
upset  the  German  Staff's  plan,  it  is  absolutely  clear 
that  the  results  obtained  by  Germany  have  been 
considerable  in  the  extreme.  Nothing  could  there- 
fore be  more  to  her  advantage  now  than  to  succeed 
in  putting  an  end  to  the  war  at  a  time  when  German 


BEGINNING   OF    1916  65 

influence  extends  unchecked  over  almost  the  whole 
of  the  invaded  territories. 

These  statements  again  explain  why  Berlin  has 
for  such  a  long  time  been  occupied  with  the  most 
subtle  and  most  complex  manoeuvres  for  the 
opening  of  peace  negotiations — attempts  at  a 
separate  agreement  with  Russia,  efforts  to  obtain 
the  Pope's  intervention,  advances  made  by  the 
pseudo-sociaHsts  of  the  Kaiser  towards  their  former 
comrades  of  belligerent  countries,  incitements  to 
pacificists  of  all  neutral  countries,  etc.  Germany 
would  have  concluded  peace  at  the  moment  which 
was  most  favourable  to  her,  so  as  to  be  able  to  impose 
on  the  territories  which  she  has  either  conquered  or 
controls  the  special  status  provided  for  each  of 
them  by  the  Pangerman  plan.  But  of  course 
Germany  would  only  have  made  such  treaties  as 
were  compatible  with  her  retention  of  all  the 
regions  she  occupied  at  the  time.  As  Major  Moraht 
said  very  clearly  in  the  Berliner  Tagehlatt:  "Our 
military  chiefs  are  not  in  the  habit  of  giving  back 
what  we  have  acquired  at  the  price  of  blood  and  of 
sacrifice"  {Le  Matin,  27th  December,  1915). 

Lastly,  the  chief  reason  why  Berlin  wanted 
peace  is  that  the  prolongation  of  the  war  can  only 
compromise  and  finally  ruin  all  the  results  obtained 
by  Germany. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

SPECIAL     FEATURES     GIVEN     TO     THE     WAR     BY     THE 
PANGERMAN   PLAN. 

I.    All  the  great  political  questions  of  the  old  world  are  raised 

and  must  be  solved. 
II.     As   the   war   is   made   by   Germany  in   order   to   achieve   a 
gigantic  scheme  of  slavery,  it  follows  that  it  is  waged  by 
her  in  flagrant  \aolation  of  international  law. 
III.     A  struggle  of  tenacity  and  of  dupUcity  on  the  side  of  Berlin 
versus  constancy  and  solidarity  on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 

The  Diplomatic  Corps,  having  ignored  the  Pan- 
german  plan  for  reasons  already  shown  {pp.  19  et  seq.), 
it  is  quite  natural  that  the  General  Staffs  and  the 
public  opinion  of  Allied  countries  should  have  been 
equally  ignorant.  From  this  general  absence  of 
knowledge  there  has  resulted  a  vagueness  and  in- 
adequacy in  the  view  taken  of  the  ultimate  aims 
of  Germany  in  the  war;  and  in  consequence  the 
co-ordination  of  the  Allied  efforts  has  remained  for 
a  long  while  very  imperfect.  Each  of  the  Allied 
nations,  in  fact,  was  at  first  so  taken  up  with  its 
own  interests  that  they  all  lost  sight  of  what  ought 
to  have  been  the  common  object  of  their  common 
action. 

The  Russians  entered  into  the  struggle  against 
the  Germans  especially  to  prevent  Serbia  from 
being  crushed,  and  at  the  same  time  to  put  an  end 
to  those  veiled  but  profoundly  humiliating  ulti- 
matums which  Berlin  for  some  years  has  delivered 
to  Petrograd.  The  Italians,  specially  fascinated 
by  Trent  and  Trieste,  have  long  thought  that  they 
could  limit  their  war  to  a  conflict  with  the  house  of 
Hapsburg,  when  in  reality  the  only  and  true  enemy 
of  the  Italian  people — as  now  the  latter  is  more  and 

66 


SPECIAL    FEATURES  67 

more  clearly  aware — is  Prussian  Pangermanism. 
As  for  the  English,  they  entered  the  lists  for  two 
fundamental  reasons:  the  violation  of  Belgium's 
neutrality  aroused  their  indignation,  and  a  just 
sense  of  their  own  interests  has  convinced  them 
that  they  could  not  allow  France  to  be  crushed 
without  at  the  same  time  acquiescing  in  the  ultimate 
disappearance  of  Great  Britain.  Completely  un- 
prepared for  Continental  war,  England  has  very 
well  understood  from  the  beginning  of  hostilities 
that  these  might  be  very  much  prolonged,  but  she 
had  not  the  slightest  notion  that  British  interests 
would  be  as  completely  threatened  as  they  have 
been  in  Central  Europe,  in  Turkey,  in  Egypt,  and  in 
India.  As  to  the  French,  the  German  aggression 
immediately  raised  in  their  minds  and  in  their 
hearts  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  This  has 
hypnotized  them  to  such  a  degree,  to  their  own 
loss,  that  they  have  too  long  considered  the  fight 
merely  a  Franco-German  war,  whereas  they  ought 
to  have  viewed  the  European  conflagration  in  its 
full  dimensions. 

This  piece-meal  way  of  looking  at  the  facts  has 
been  of  the  greatest  disservice  to  all  the  Allies. 
Indeed  it  has  had  the  effect  of  preventing  them  from 
discerning  at  the  right  time  the  special  character 
which  the  extraordinary  extent  of  the  Pangerman 
plan  must  necessarily  give  to  the  war. 

I. 

The  very  vastness  of  the  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1, 
demonstrated  beyond  dispute  by  the  facts  that  have 
come  to  light,  suffices  to  prove  that  Berlin  meant  to 
solve  for  her  own  profit,  at  one  single  blow,  all  the 
great  political  questions  latent  in  the  old  world. 

The  claims  of  Germany  on  the  East,  shown  on 
the  accompanying  map  by  the  thinner  black  line, 
raised  the  question  of  Poland  in  its  immense  extent 


68 


PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 


and  in  all  its  complexity.  The  claims  of  Germany 
towards  the  West,  also  shown  on  the  map  by 
the  thinner  black  line,  involved  the  indepen- 
dence of  Holland,  of  Belgium,  of  Luxemburg,  of 
France,  threatened  with  the  loss  of  vital  territories. 
Further,  towards  the  West  the  German  aggression 
has  brought  forward  the  question  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  from  the  French  point  of  view.  Moreover, 
since    Germany    aims   at   establishing    her   absolute 


Petrograd 


THE  GREAT  POLITICAL  QUESTIONS  RAISED  BY  THE  WAR. 


supremacy  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  in 
order  to  stretch  her  political  tentacles  to  the  Far 
East  and  to  the  whole  world  by  means  which  will  be 
shown  in  Chapter  V.  the  present  war  compek  the 
powers  to  face  the  whole  Eastern  question  (Balkans 
and  Turkey,  shown  on  the  map  by  similar  black 
lines),  and  also  the  whole  question  of  Austria. 
(Used  in  this  sense  the  expression  Austria  indicates 
the    whole    of    the    Hapsburg    Dominion,    that    is, 


SPECIAL   FEATURES  69 

the  territory  enclosed  by  a  thick  black  line.)  In 
short,  the  whole  of  the  great  foreign  questions  are 
raised  at  one  blow  before  the  world  by  the  aggres- 
sion of  the  Berlin  Government. 

The  Germans,  having  studied  thoroughly  for  a 
very  long  time  all  these  problems,  have  also  provided 
for  each  of  them  a  solution  in  accordance  with  their 
most  cynical  interests.  The  result  is  that  all  these 
political  problems,  raised  simultaneously,  form  a 
tangled  skein,  and  that  the  Allies  will  never  be 
really  victorious  till  they  can  compel  the  Germans 
to  accept  those  solutions  of  the  great  problems  which 
by  the  nature  of  things  must  be  the  direct  contrary 
of  those  foreshadowed  by  Berlin.  The  Eastern 
question  which  is  now  raised  in  Europe  is  no 
longer  the  old  orthodox  question  but  a  Prussianized 
Eastern  question  coloured  in  all  its  aspects  by  the 
present  and  future  ambitions  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 
In  the  same  way  the  question  of  modern  Austria 
is  no  longer  the  old  Austrian  question  which 
consisted  in  the  traditional  struggle  of  the  Haps- 
burgs  with  their  various  nationalities.  What 
the  Allies  have  now  to  consider  in  Central  Europe 
is  the  question  of  Austria  Prussianized  b}'^  means  of 
two  essential  facts:  the  covert  but  exclusive  in- 
fluence which  Berlin  has  increasingly  exercised  over 
Vienna,  especially  for  the  last  fifteen  years,  and 
the  hold  which  the  Hohenzollerns  have  got  by 
means  of  the  war  over  the  whole  of  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy,  which  includes  28  millions  of  Slav  and 
Latin  populations  bowed  under  the  yoke,  with  no 
hope  of  deliverance  except  through  the  crushing  of 
Prussian  militarism. 

II. 

The  Pangerman  plan  finally  gives  to  the  struggle 
which  it  has  initiated  a  character  of  sanguinary 
horror  without  parallel  in  history. 


70        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

In  short,  William  II.,  after  having  roused  by 
means  of  Pangerman  propaganda  amongst  his 
people  violent  desires  of  conquest  and  plunder,  has 
declared  war  with  the  fixed  idea  that  it  will  lead  in 
Europe  and  in  Turkey  to  the  supremacy  of  77 
millions  of  Germans,  over  127  millions  of  non- 
Germans.  The  small  but  violent  Prussophile 
Camarilla  of  Vienna,  a  group  of  Magyar  aristocrats 
in  league  with  Count  Tisza,  a  handful  of  pseudo 
young  Turks  bought  by  Berlin,  have  been 
the  Kaiser's  accomplices.  Finally,  it  is  these  few 
men  alone  who  have  drawn  into  war  50  million 
Austro-Hungarians  and  20  million  Ottomans,  that 
is,  70  million  belligerents,  the  vast  majority  of 
whom  certainly  did  not  wish  for  a  sanguinary  con- 
flict. From  all  this  it  is  clear  that  these  peoples 
were  betrayed  into  the  war  by  their  Kings  or 
their  Turco-Magyar  governments. 

The  origin  as  well  as  the  object  of  the  war  make 
it  therefore  the  most  cruelly  reactionary  enterprise 
conceivable.  It  is  so  to  such  a  degree  that  those 
who  in  France  are  called  reactionaries  and  who 
compared  to  the  Prussian  Junkers  are  great 
Liberals,  find  themselves  in  close  agreement  with 
the  most  ardent  Socialists  in  desiring  the  total  ruin 
of  an  enterprise  which,  if  successful,  would  put  the 
modern  world  back  into  the  Middle  Ages  in  the 
most  odious  fashion.  But  this  time  it  would  be  a 
mediaeval  state  of  things  made  immutable  through 
the  force  of  the  most  modern  science,  which  would 
stop  the  clock  of  progress.  The  death-dealing 
electric  current  which  runs  in  the  metallic  wires 
actually  forming  an  impassable  barrier  between 
Belgium  and  Holland  forms  a  perfect  symbol  of 
what  the  Pangerman  prison  would  be  for  those  who 
do  not  belong  to  the  German  nationality. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  very  fact  that  they 
pursue  a  plan  of  gigantic  and  unheard  of  slavery  has 


SPECIAL   FEATURES  71 

logically  led  the  Germans,  first  cynically  to  violate 
all  the  laws  of  war  between  belligerents,  and  then 
systematically  to  commit  abominable  crimes  against 
common  law,  whether  at  the  expense  of  neutrals 
whom  they  would  terrorize,  such  as  the  factory 
hands  of  the  United  States,  or  at  the  expense  of  the 
unhappy  civil  populations  of  the  "burglared" 
regions,  populations  whose  sufferings  are  indescrib- 
able. The  events  resulting  from  Pangerman 
terrorism  are  so  numerous  and  so  unutterably 
atrocious  that  historians  will  find  the  greatest  diffi- 
culty in  painting  the  Dantesque  picture  of  all  these 
crimes  in  their  colossal  horror.  Undoubtedly  the 
Germans  wage  war  in  a  manner  which  assimilates 
them  to  vulgar  burglars  and  assassins,  and  therefore 
to  common  criminals.  They  have  thus  placed 
themselves  beyond  the  pale  of  humanity,  and  those 
who  outside  of  Germany  knowingly  help  them  in 
their  task  of  enslaving  Europe  are  nothing  more  or 
less  than  accomplices  and  should  be  dealt  with  as 
such. 

III. 

On  January  19th,  1916,  in  the  Reichstag,  Deputy 
Martin  stated  that  "The  German  nation  would  be 
very  ill-pleased  if  Germany  were  to  restore  the  terri- 
tories she  now  occupies"  {Le  Temps,  21st  January, 
1916).  This  sentence  summarizes  the  opinion 
prevalent  beyond  the  Rhine. 

In  their  endeavours  to  retain  the  greater  part  of 
the  territories  occupied  by  them  at  the  beginning  of 
1916  the  Germans  have  combined  military  measures 
with  political  manoeuvres. 

They  have  entrenched  themselves  tremendously 
on  all  fronts  which  the  Allies  could  possibly  attack. 
By  the  accumulation  everywhere  of  defensive 
works,  machine-guns  and  heavy  artillery,  the 
Germans     hope     to     counter-balance     the     losses 


72        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

of  their  troops  and  thus  to  persevere  in  their 
resistance  to  the  aUied  attacks,  till  the  enemy  grow 
weary  of  the  dreadful  struggle.  The  experience 
of  the  war  having  proved  how  extremely  difficult  it 
is  to  pierce  strongly  fortified  lines,  the  German 
Headquarters  Staff  appears  to  have  taken  this 
knowledge  as  the  base  of  the  following  calculation: 
"We  have  achieved  nine-tenths  of  the  annexa- 
tions on  which  we  counted;    only    Calais,   Verdun, 


THE  GERMAN  FORTRESS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  1916. 

Belfort,  Riga  and  Salonika  are  wanting.  We  will  try 
to  obtain  possession  of  these  places  if  opportunity 
offers;  if  not,  in  order  to  avoid  excessive  risks,  we 
shall  remain  everywhere  in  Europe  on  a  keen 
defensive,  but  we  will  pret^d,  all  the  time,  to 
wish  to  take  the  offensive,  so  as  to  mislead  our 
adversaries.  If  the  Franco-English  insist  on  con- 
centrating their  efforts,  above  all  against  our  lines 
of  the  Western  front,  as  these  lines  are  manifold  and 
very  strong,  the  enemy  losses  will  be  such,  that  even 


SPECIAL   FEATURES  73 

if  they  succeed  in  throwing  us  back,  they  will 
finally  be  so  utterly  exhausted  as  to  be  unable  to 
cross  the  Rhine.  Therefore,  they  will  be  powerless 
to  dictate  peace  to  Germany." 

Surely  the  Allies,  taught  by  experience,  can  foil 
this  probable  calculation  of  their  antagonists  by 
well  managed,  simultaneous  attacks  on  the  whole 
accessible  circuit  of  the  German  fortress.  In 
fact  this  is  what  the  Allies  seem  more  and  more 
inclined  to  do. 

The  indented  line  on  the  map  (p.  72)  shows  what 
a  strange  shape  is  assumed  by  the  enormous  terri- 
tories which  build  up  that  fortress.  For  alimentary 
purposes  it  is  victualled,  firstly,  by  the  resources  of 
non-German  countries  which  are  occupied  and  most 
thoroughly  drained,  and  secondly  by  importations; 
which  come  through  the  channel  of  neutral  countries 
— Holland,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Roumania,  and  Swit- 
zerland— which  have  responded, more  or  less  liberally, 
whether  voluntarily  or  not,  to  the  pressing  appli- 
cations of  Germany. 

On  the  other  hand,  thanks  to  the  passage  through 
the  Balkans,  the  German  fortress,  early  in  1916,  had 
a  wide  open  door  on  Persia,  the  Caucasus,  Central- 
Russian  Asia,  Afghanistan,  India  and  Egypt.  After 
having  armed  all  the  Moslems  on  whom  they  could 
lay  hands,  and  who  were  able  to  shoulder  a  gun,  the 
German  Staff  reckoned  on  striking  at  Great  Britain 
and  Russia  in  all  these  directions.  The  successes 
obtained  by  the  Tsar's  troops  in  Eastern  Turkey 
have,  since  then,  baffled  these  projects. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  Germany  has  nothing 
whatever  to  gain  by  a  prolongation  of  the  war,  she 
will  continue  to  aim  at  a  rupture  of  the  Coalition  by 
means  of  every  possible  political  manoeuvre.  It  is 
clear  that  the  defection  of  one  of  the  principal  Al- 
lies would  necessarily  place  all  the  others  in  vastly 
more  difficult  positions  for  continuing  the  struggle. 


74        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

Assuming  that  such  a  thing  were  to  happen,  the 
Germans  could,  indeed,  hope  to  discuss  peace  on  the 
base  of  the  territories  which  they  actually  occupy. 
They  will  therefore  repeat  and  increase  their  bids 
for  a  separate  peace  with  one  or  other  of  their 
adversaries.  When  once  their  position  becomes  very 
difficult  the  Germans,  so  as  to  shatter  at  all  cost  the 
Coalition,  will  make  propositions  of  separate  peace 
to  one  of  the  Allies,  offering  that  one  country  almost 
complete  satisfaction  in  the  hope  that,  swayed 
perhaps  by  a  section  of  their  people  who  have  grown 
weary  of  war,  that  Allied  country  will  lay  down 
her  arms. 

The  Allied  State  which,  contrary  to  its  plighted 
faith,  should  separately  treat  with  Berlin,  would 
soon  be  punished  for  its  infamy.  By  allowing 
Germany  to  conclude  peace  more  or  less  on  the 
basis  of  the  territories  she  at  present  holds,  the 
traitor  State  would  find  itself  afterwards  confronted 
by  a  formidable  German  Empire,  and  would 
inevitably  become  one  of  its  first  victims. 

The  Germans  will  perhaps  try  to  play  on  the 
Allies  the  "armistice  trick."  Here,  again,  we 
should  have  a  cunning  calculation  founded  once 
more  on  the  weariness  of  the  combatants.  It  is, 
indeed,  conceivable  that  a  simple  armistice  might 
end  in  allowing  Germany  to  hold  finally  most  of  her 
actual  territorial  acquisitions;  but  it  could  so  end 
only  by  means  of  a  manoeuvre  which  we  must  now 
expose. 

No  doubt  they  must  make  at  Berlin  the  following 
calculation,  which  theoretically  has  something  to 
be  said  for  it:  "If  an  armistice  were  signed,  the 
Allied  soldiers  would  think:  'They  are  talking, 
therefore  it  means  peace,  and  demobilization  will 
soon  follow.'  Under  these  conditions  the  effect  will 
be  the  moral  slackening  of  our  adversaries."  The 
Germans  could  not  ask  for  anything  better.     They 


SPECIAL   FEATURES  75 

would  open  peace  negotiations  with  the  following 
astute  idea.  To  understand  the  manoeuvre  we 
must  remember  the  proposals  of  peace  which  that 
active  agent,  Dr.  Alfred  Hermann  Fried,  of  Vienna, 
was  charged  to  throw  out  as  a  sounding-lead  on  the 
27th  December,  1915,  in  an  article  of  the  Nouvelle 
Gazette  de  Zurich,  which  made  a  great  stir.  These 
proposals  were  mixed  up  with  provisoes,  which 
would  allow  the  discussion  to  be  opened  or  broken 
off  at  any  moment  desired.  For  example,  Belgium 
would  preserve  her  independence,  but  "on  condi- 
tion of  treaties,  perhaps  also  of  guarantees,  which 
would  render  impossible  a  repetition  of  the  events 
of  1914."  The  occupied  departments  of  France 
would  be  restored  unconditionally  to  France,  but 
"some  small  rectifications  of  frontiers  might 
perhaps  be  desired  in  the  interests  of  both  parties" 
{Journal  de  Geneve,  29th  December,  1915). 
Assuming  that  the  Allies  committed  the  enormous 
mistake  of  discussing  peace  on  such  treacherous 
terms,  Germany  still  entrenched  behind  her  fronts, 
which  would  have  been  rendered  almost  impregnable, 
would  say  to  the  Allies,  "I  don't  agree  with  you. 
After  all  you  cannot  require  of  me  that  I  should 
evacuate  territories  from  which  you  are  powerless 
to  drive  me.  If  you  are  not  satisfied,  continue  the 
war."  As,  while  the  negotiations  were  pending,  all 
needful  steps  would  have  been  taken  by  the  German 
agents  to  aggravate  the  moral  slackening  of  the 
soldiers  of  such  Allied  countries  as  might  be  most 
weary  of  the  struggle,  the  huge  military  machine  of 
the  Entente  could  not  again  be  put  in  motion  as 
a  whole.  The  real  result  would  be,  in  fact,  the 
rupture  of  the  Anti- Germanic  Coalition,  and  finally 
the  conclusion  of  a  peace  more  or  less  based  on 
actual  occupation.  Berlin's  goal  would  thus  have 
been  reached. 

Finally,   when   the   "armistice   trick"   shall  have 


76        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

also  failed,  and  the  situation  of  Germany  shall  have 
grown  still  worse,  we  shall  see  Berlin  play  her  last 
trump.  Petitions  against  territorial  annexations 
will  be  multiplied  on  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine. 
In  an  underhand  way  they  will  be  favoured  by  the 
Government  of  Berlin,  which  will  end  by  saying  to 
the  Allies:  "Let  us  stop  killing  each  other.  I  am 
perfectly  reasonable.  I  give  up  my  claims  on  such 
of  your  territories  as  are  occupied  by  my  armies. 
Let  us  negotiate  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  'drawn 
game.'  " 

The  day  when  this  proposal  will  be  made,  the 
Allies  will  have  to  face  the  most  astute  of  the 
Berlin  tricks,  the  most  alarming  German  trap. 
At  that  moment  the  tenacity,  the  clearsightedness, 
and  the  solidarity  of  the  Allies  must  be  put  forth  to 
the  utmost.  To  show  the  extreme  necessity  of 
this,  in  the  case  supposed,  I  must  baffle  the  German 
manoeuvre  in  advance  by  proving  clearly  in  the  fol- 
lowing chapter  that  the  dodge  of  the  drawn  game, 
if  it  succeeded,  would  mask  in  reality  a  formidable 
success  for  Germany  and  an  irreparable  catastrophe 
for  the  Allies  and  for  the  freedom  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  DODGE   OP  THE   "  DRAWN  GAME  " 

AND   THE    SCHEME    "  FROM  HAMBURG   TO   THE 

PERSIAN    GULE." 

I.    What   would   really  be   the   outcome   of   the     dodge   called 

the  "Drawn  Game." 
II.     The  financial   consequences   for   the  Allies  of    this  so-called 

"Drawn  Game." 
III.     The  Allies  and  the  scheme  "From  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf." 

IV.  Panislamic    and    Asiatic    consequences    of    the    achievement 

of  the  scheme  "From  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf." 

V.  Consequences    for    the    world    of    the    achievement    of    the 

scheme  "From  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf." 

If  the  Allies  really  wish,  as  their  Governments 
have  often  proclaimed,  to  put  an  end  to  the  peri! 
of  Prussian  militarism,  they  must  resolutely  face 
the  facts  as  they  are,  even  when  these  are 
unpalatable  to  their  self-esteem.  They  must 
understand  fully  that  the  chance  of  carrying  out 
the  Pangerman  plan  rests  in  a  large  measure  on 
the  ignorance  of  the  Allies.  Berlin  knew  that 
before  the  war  the  countries  now  allied  were 
unaware  of  the  totally  new  face  which  within 
recent  years  has  been  put  on  all  the  political 
problems  of  the  Balkans  and  Austria-Hungary  by 
the  labours  of  Pangermanism  and  the  movement 
of  nationalities.  Undoubtedly  that  ignorance  of 
the  Allies  has  been  as  minutely  studied  and 
appraised  as  were  their  military  deficiencies;  the 
conviction  that  the  Allies  did  not  understand 
how  to  grapple  with  the  situation  has  certainly 
contributed  to  Berlin's  decision  to  unloose  the  dogs 

77 


78        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

of  war.  Now,  the  dodge  of  the  **  Drawn  Game," 
the  last  trump  of  the  Berlin  Government,  is  a  fresh 
gamble  based  on  the  ignorance  of  the  Allies  about 
foreign  affairs. 


The  dodge  of  the  ''Drawn  Game"  will  be  based 
on  the  following  train  of  reasoning,  which  un- 
questionably prevails  in  Berlin: 

"The  Allied  diplomats  have  grasped  neither  our 
plan,  nor  our  Pangerman  organization,  although 
that  has  required  a  preparation  lasting  twenty 
years.  The  Allied  diplomats  have  understood 
neither  the  true  position  of  the  Balkans  after  the 
treaty  of  Bukarest  (though  that  position  was  so 
favourable  to  themselves),  nor  the  importance  of 
the  Balkan  forces  for  the  issue  of  the  war.  Still 
less  do  the  Allied  diplomats  and  the  public  of  their 
respective  countries  know  about  the  real  state  of 
affairs  in  Austria-Hungary,  In  France,  and  above 
all  in  England,  a  considerable  proportion  of  the 
public  continue  to  believe  that  Austria-Hungary  is 
chiefly  a  German  country,  and  that  its  more  or  less 
formal  union  with  the  Empire  is  a  natural  and 
almost  inevitable  event.  Therefore,  if  we  are  com- 
pelled to  give  way  in  the  East  and  in  the  West  we 
may  still,  if  we  are  clever,  have  a  chance  of  achiev- 
ing the  third  part  of  our  Pangerman  plan.  The 
Allies  will  not  understand  the  future  danger  in 
store  for  them  if  we  carry  out  that  part  which  is, 
indeed,  the  principal  part  of  our  scheme,  namely, 
our  designs  on  the  South  and  South-East,  symbolized 
by  the  formula:  From  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf." 

Indeed,  the  dodge  of  the  "Drawn  Game"  aims 
at  nothing  less  than  at  that  result.  We  must  own 
that  the  German  argument  which  has  just  been 
summarized  is  not  devoid  of  foundation;    for  up  to 


THE   "DRAWN    GAME" 


79 


now  the  Press  of  the  Allies  has  published  articles 
on  Austria-Hungary  revealing  a  total  misconception 
of  the  facts,  and  they  have  thus  unconsciously 
encouraged  the  Pangerman  project  as  regards  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy. 

In  the  Allied  Press,  also,  the  expression: 
''Drawn  Game"  is  currently  employed  to  mean 
that  Germany  might  be  considered  as  vanquished 
if  she  evacuates  the  now  occupied  territories  in  the 
East  and  in  the  West;    but  nobody  has  yet  pointed 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DODGE  CALLED 
THE  "DRAWN  GAME." 


out  with  the  necessary  precision  that  the  so-called 
"Drawn  Game"  would  not  be  a  draw  at  all,  since 
it  would  allow  Germany  to  effect  enormous  acquisi- 
tions, which  would  make  her  much  more  powerful 
than  before  the  war. 

And   yet   the   Allies   ought   not   to   be   again   the 
dupes  of  a  German  stratagem;  which,  if  it  succeeded, 


8o        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

would  involve  consequences  infinitely  more  serious 
than  all  the  former  errors  of  the  Allies.  To  ward  ofT 
that  danger  it  suffices  to  look  it  full  in  the  face  and 
thoroughly  to  fathom  what  would  be  the  outcome  of 
a  peace  negotiated  on  the  so-called  principle  of  a 
"Drawn  Game." 

The  term  "Drawn  Game"  evidently  denotes  that 
each  country  would  keep  the  frontiers  which  existed 
before  the  war;  also  that  each  country  would 
bear  the  burden  of  the  outlays  it  has  made  during 
the  struggle.  But  we  will  argue  on  a  hypothesis 
infinitely  more  favourable  for  the  Western  Allies 
than  that  of  the  so-called  "Drawn  Game"  in  order 
to  demonstrate  super-abundantly  and  as  decisively 
as  possible  what  would  be  concealed  behind 
this  apparent  and  partial  German  capitulation. 

Let  us  suppose  (see  map,  p.  79)  that,  in  conse- 
quence of  victorious  offensives  of  the  Allies,  Ger- 
many should  declare  herself  disposed,  not  only  to 
evacuate  totally  Poland,  the  French  Departments, 
Belgium,  and  Luxemburg,  but  also  to  restore 
Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  and  even  to  give,  as  an 
indemnity  all  the  rest  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
under  the  sole  and  tacit  condition  that  Germany 
should  keep  her  preponderant  influence,  direct  or 
indirect,  over  Austria-Hungar}^  the  Balkans  and 
Turkey. 

There  are  surely  in  the  Allied  Western  countries 
many  worthy  people  who,  at  present,  no  more 
see  the  result  of  such  a  peace,  than  a  year  ago  they 
understood  the  enormous  influences  which  the 
Balkans  would  exert  on  the  course  of  the  war. 
These  good  creatures,  weary  of  the  prolonged  strife, 
would  at  once  say:  "After  all,  these  are  most 
acceptable  terms:  Alsace-Lorraine,  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine!   ...  let  us  make  peace." 

If  matters  are  probed  to  the  bottom  it  will  be 
easily  seen  that,  should  the  Allies  negotiate  peace 


THE   "DRAWN    GAME"  8i 

with  Germany  on  such  a  basis,  the  restitution  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  could  only  be  temporary;  for 
with  such  a  peace  as  that,  Germany  would  secure 
all  the  elements  of  power  which  might  enable  her, 
after  a  very  short  respite,  to  retake  Alsace-Lorraine, 
and  in  the  end  to  overcome  all  the  Allies  and  to 
achieve  in  its  entirety  the  Pangerman  plan,  not  only 
in  Europe,  but  in  Asia,  nay  in  the  whole  world. 


To  relinquish  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  accord- 
ing to  our  hypothesis,  would  mean  for  Germany 
that  she  would  lose: 

Provinces. 
Rhenish-Prussia 
Rhenish-Bavaria 
Alsace-Lorraine 

Total 

The  present  German  Empire  would  therefore  be 
reduced  to  493,408  square  kilometres  and  58 
million  inhabitants.  But  this  loss  in  the  West 
would  be  far  more  than  counterbalanced  by  that 
close  union  of  Austria-Hungary  to  the  German 
Empire,  which  would  be  none  the  less  real  because 
it  would  be  disguised.  On  this  reckoning  Berlin's 
influence  would  be  exercised  directly  and  absolutely 
over: 

Square 
Kilometres.         Population. 
German  Empire  curtailed  in  the 
West  . .  . .  . .  . .  493,408  58,000,000 

Austria-Hungary  ..  ..  676,616  50,000,000 


Square 
Kilometres. 

Population, 

27,000 

7,000,000 

5,928 

1,000,000 

14,522 

2,000,000 

47,450 

10,000,000 

Total  ..  ..  ..         1,170,024  108,000,000 

It  is  evident  that  a  solid  block  of  States,  estab- 
lished  in    Central    Europe   under   the    direction   of 


82        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

Berlin,    would    exercise,    simply    by    contiguity    an 
absolutely  preponderant  pressure  on: 

Square 

Kilometres.  Population. 

The  Balkans          . .           . .           . .         499,275  22,000,000 

Turkey      ..           ..           ..           ..       1,792,900  20,000,000 


Total  ..  ..  ..       2,292,175  42,000,000 

Therefore  Berlin's  preponderant  influence  would 
be  wielded,  directly  or  indirectly,  over  3,462,199 
square  kilometres  and  over  150  million  inhabitants. 

We  now  see  clearly  that  in  the  end  the  dodge  of 
the  "Drawn  Game"  would  lead  in  reality  to  an 
enormous  increase  of  the  German  Empire,  and  to 
the  achievement  of  the  principal  part  of  the 
Pangerman  plan  summarized  in  the  formula  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  (p.  109  of  original). 
What  then  would  be  the  general  position  of  Great 
Germany  thus  constituted? 

"Having  cut  Europe  in  two,  mistress  of  the 
Adriatic  as  well  as  of  the  North  Sea,  secure  in  her 
fleets  and  in  her  armies,  Great  Germany  would 
be  an  incubus  on  the  world.  Trieste,  the  Hamburg 
of  the  South,  would  feed  her  in  peace  and  revictual 
her  in  war.  Her  industry,  equipped  with  plant  of 
incomparable  power,  would  flood  with  her  wares 
those  very  countries  which  she  now  schemes  so  art- 
fully to  monopolize: — Holland  and  Belgium,  which 
are  already  penetrated;  Hungary,  her  client; 
Roumania,  her  satellite;  Bulgaria,  a  broken 
barrier;  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the  portals  of 
the  East.  And,  beyond  the  Bosphorus,  Germany 
would  reach  Asia-Minor,  that  immense  quarry  of 
wealth.  The  huge  German  railroad  projected  to 
run  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf  without  a 
break,  would  link  Berlin  to  the  Far  East.  Then 
would  the  Emperor  William's  Brobdingnagian 
dream  be  fulfilled.     Germany  would  rule  the  world 


THE   "DRAWN    GAME."  83 

by  her  might  and  by  her  commerical  wealth. 
The  state  of  things  which  then  would  exist 
might  be  described  by  slightly  modifying  what 
Metternich  wrote  of  Napoleonic  France:  'The 
German  system  which  to-day  is  triumphant  is 
directed  against  all  the  great  states  in  their  entirety, 
against  every  power  able  to  maintain  its  own 
independence.'" 

Such  are  the  words  which  I  published  fifteen  years 
ago  in  my  book,  V Europe  et  la  Question  d'Autriche 
au  seuil  du  XX^  siecle,  p.  353  (Plon,  Nourrit, 
editeurs,  Paris).  A  careful  study  of  the  Pan- 
german  plan  of  1895  had  then  convinced  me  that 
the  whole  future  policy  of  Berlin  would  tend  to 
carry  out  the  plan  laid  down  in  the  formula 
*'from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf."  In  what 
I  then  wrote  a  few  minute  discrepancies  may  now 
be  detected,  but,  unfortunately,  the  facts  of  to-day 
show  that  still  on  the  whole  my  words  correspond 
exactly  with  events.  The  dodge  of  the  "Drawn 
Game,"  which  the  Germans  keep  up  their  sleeve, 
hoping  still  to  profit  by  the  ignorance  or  the 
weariness  of  some  of  the  Allies,  would  indeed 
have  for  its  indisputable  object  the  achievement  of 
that  huge  plan. 

The  terrible  danger  which  this  would  bring 
upon  the  Allies  will  be  better  perceived  (sup- 
posing they  fall  into  the  trap  laid  for  them) 
when  we  shall  have  demonstrated  with  precision, 
what  would  be  the  consequences  for  them  if  the 
scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf" 
were  to  succeed. 

II. 

If  we  suppose  for  the  sake  of  argument  that 
the  dodge  of  the  "Drawn  Game"  were  to  succeed 
so  far  as  to  allow  the  Germans,  by  binding  Austria- 
Hungary  to  the  German  Empire,  to  carry  through 


84        PANGERMAN    TLOT    UNMASKED 

their  plan  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf," 
their  success  would  involve  certain  general 
financial  consequences.  These  we  must  unfold,  if 
we  would  clearly  understand  the  full  extent  of  the 
craft  hidden  under  the  cloak  of  that  manoeuvre 
called  the  "Drawn  Game,"  which  is  still  to  be 
played. 

The  Germans  having  failed  to  crush  the  Allies, 
begin  to  think  that  the  expenses  of  war  may  possibly 
fall  on  themselves.  The  Berlin  Post  has  already 
calculated:  "If  we  do  not  receive  a  war  indemnity 
we  must  reckon  on  a  yearly  increase  of  taxes  of  at 
least  four  milliard  marks,"  being  five  milliard 
francs  for  68  million  inhabitants  {Le  Temps,  ist 
February,  191 6). 

The  disappointment  is  certainly  keen  for  the 
Germans  who  counted  on  exacting  from  France  alone 
an  indemnity  of  35  milliard  francs;  but  we  must 
nevertheless  fully  understand  that  the  dodge  of  the 
"Drawn  Game"  (which,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
we  suppose  to  have  succeeded)  would  place  Ger- 
many in  a  financial  position  vastly  more  advantage- 
ous than  that  of  the  Allies. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  cost  of  war  has  been  much 
less  for  Germany  than  for  her  adversaries.  This  is 
a  point  wliich  must  be  fully  considered,  all  the  more 
because  it  helps  to  explain  why  the  economic 
resistance  of  Germany  is  more  prolonged  than  was 
generally  expected. 

From  the  beginning  of  hostilities,  Austro- German 
troops  have  lived  at  the  vast  expense  of  enemy  or 
Allied  territories,  such  as  Turkey  and  Bulgaria, 
whose  accumulated  resources  they  slowly  drain. 
Besides,  in  enemy  countries,  particularly  in  Bel- 
gium and  in  France,  which  are  the  richest  regions  on 
earth,  the  Germans  have  collected  a  large  amount 
of  plunder.  On  Belgium  alone  they  have  levied  a 
war  contribution  in  specie  of  480  million  francs  a 


THE    "DRAWN    GAME"  85 

year.  Out  of  Belgium  and  France  the  Germans 
draw  large  quantities  of  coal  and  iron  scot  free. 
In  both  these  countries  they  have  purloined  raw 
goods,  machines,  furniture,  valuables,  representing 
the  value  certainly  of  several  milliard  francs. 
In  the  French  towns  of  the  Nord  alone  the 
Germans  have  stolen  about  550  million  francs  worth 
of  wool.  Everywhere  they  have  seized  innumerable 
securities  which  they  have  already  tried  to  convert 
into  money,  though  with  small  success,  in  the 
United  States.  But  if  a  complete  victory  did 
not  compel  the  Germans  to  restore  those  bonds 
to  the  Allies  who  own  them,  some  at  least 
of  them  would  suffer  a  heavy  loss  of  capital,  by 
the  mere  fact  of  their  warrants  being  detained; 
the  effect  of  this  would  unavoidably  react  on 
the  general  wealth  of  the  Allied  countries.  To 
these  losses  would  probably  be  added  those  of 
the  numerous  milliards  of  francs,  lent  b}^  the  French 
or  English  to  Austria,  to  the  Balkan  States,  and 
to  Turkey,  and  represented  by  bonds  v/hich  at 
present  are,  it  is  true,  in  Allied  lands,  but  whose 
value  would  become  exceedingly  uncertain  and 
hazardous  the  day  that  Germany  ruled  from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Teutonic  good 
faith  would  then  serve  as  the  only  guarantee  that 
dividends  would  be  paid.  The  war,  therefore,  has 
put  within  Germany's  power  not  only  vast  terri- 
tories which  have  enabled  her  to  carry  on  the  struggle 
with  far  less  expense  than  the  Allies,  but  also  the 
Germans  have  been  able  to  lay  their  hands  on 
enormous  wealth,  representing  tens  of  milliards  of 
francs,  which,  being  partly  convertible  into  specie, 
have  reduced  by  that  amount  the  direct  financial 
war  outlay  of  Germany, 

Clearly,  the  Allies  are  not  in  an  equal  position. 

Always  supposing,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that 
peace  were  concluded  with  Berlin  on  the  basis  of  the 


86        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

"Drawn  Game,"  each  one  of  the  Allies  would  have 
to  bear,  without  any  reduction,  the  immense 
expenses  incurred  to  maintain  a  war  made  by- 
Germany.  It  is  easy  to  perceive  that  these  war 
costs  have  been  and  are  considerably  higher  for 
each  of  the  Allies  and  more  miscellaneous  than  has 
been  the  case  for  Germany.  The  Allies  found  it 
necessary  to  improvise  an  enormous  war  plant 
under  most  costly  conditions,  while  Germany  had 
been  able  during  peace,  that  is,  under  relatively 
economical  conditions,  to  produce  all  the  material 
of  her  fighting  equipment. 

The  Allies  are  bound  to  take  care  of  and  to  main- 
tain millions  of  refugees  from  invaded  regions, 
whereas  the  Germans  have  only  temporarily  borne 
such  a  burden  and  merely  for  a  small  part  of 
Eastern  Prussia.  After  the  war,  Belgium,  Russia 
and  especially  France  will  have  to  provide  for  some 
tens  of  milliards  of  francs  worth  of  extra  charges  for 
repairs  of  the  colossal  damages  done  by  the  Germans 
in  invaded  territories,  to  private  persons,  State 
properties,  railways,  roads,  etc.  The  Germans 
would  not  have  a  similar  outlay,  at  least  not  any- 
thing like  in  the  same  proportion.  In  their  con- 
ception of  the  **  Drawn  Game"  the  Germans 
certainly  reckon  that  these  financial  differences 
would  almost  ensure,  after  peace,  the  ulterior 
impotence  of  the  Allied  countries  as  against  Great 
Germany. 

What,  for  instance,  would  be  the  position  of 
France  if  a  war  indemnity  were  not  paid  to  her? 
A  few  familiar  figures,  which  everyone  can  check, 
will  enable  us  to  form  an  opinion  on  that  score.  If 
the  struggle  lasts,  let  us  say,  for  two  years,  we  can 
estimate  at  50  milliards  of  francs  the  direct  outlay 
for  France,  and  about  20  milliards  would  be  re- 
quired for  her  indirect  expenditure,  that  is,  what  must 
be   paid    after   peace   for   repairing    the   prodigious 


THE   ''DRAWN    GAME"  87 

damage  caused  to  individuals  and  to  the  State — 
remaking  of  roads,  rebuilding  of  railways,  etc.,  the 
total  of  the  expenses  mounting  up  to  some  70 
milliards  of  francs.  As  the  national  debt  of  France, 
before  the  war,  was  30  milliards  of  francs,  it  would 
therefore  have  increased  after  peace  to  about  100 
milliard  francs. 

On  the  other  hand  the  budget  of  France  in  19 14 
was  in  round  figures  five  milliard  francs.  The  single 
item  of  the  rise  in  price  of  daily  commodities 
will  in  itself  inevitably  be  increased  after  war  at 
least  by  10%,  therefore  the  budget  after  peace  will 
require,  let  us  say,  an  initial  increase  of  500  million 
francs.  On  the  other  hand,  this  same  budget  would 
have  to  bear  interest  at  5%  on  the  70  milliard 
francs  of  newly  incurred  war  debts;  this  would 
make  a  yearly  outlay  of  3,500  million  francs. 
Finally,  it  is  clear  that  pensions  to  be  given  to  the 
wounded,  to  widows  of  combatants,  will  burden 
the  budget  by  a  yearly  outlay  of  at  least  a  milliard 
francs.  Probably  even  that  figure  will  be  insufficient. 
Altogether  the  French  budget  of  five  milliard 
francs,  as  it  was  in  1914,  would  have  to  be  increased 
by  about  five  milliard  francs;  in  other  words,  it 
will  have  to  be  doubled.  Already  we  well  know  that 
this  figure  is  much  below  what  would  be  needed. 
And  yet  that  enormous  increase  makes  no  allowance 
for  sums  required  to  effect  important  social  reforms, 
nor  for  the  great  improvements  necessary  to  bring 
up  the  economic  national  plant  of  France  to  a  proper 
standard  for  resuming  business  actively. 

We  remember  how  hard  it  was  in  France  before 
the  war  to  find,  by  means  of  taxes,  even  the  500 
million  of  francs  needed  for  new  expenditures.  How 
could  we  find  annually  an  additional  sum  of  five 
milliard  francs  of  taxes  in  a  country  cruelly  devas- 
tated by  the  struggle  and  where  the  re-organization 
of   economic  life  would   have   to   be   complete?     It 


88         PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

is  obvious  that  the  most  crushing  taxes  levied  on 
every  person  would  not  suffice  for  such  a  sum 
to  be  regularly  raised. 

Such  a  situation  must  inevitably  tend  to 
raise  for  the  State  and  for  every  Frenchman 
individually  considerable  financial  difliculties. 
The  same  would  apply  to  economic  undertakings. 
Thousands  of  these,  at  present  in  the  hands 
of  shareholders  or  bond-holders,  would  be  in 
a  most  precarious  condition,  or  the  securities  would 
be  immensely  depreciated.  Landed  property,  over- 
burdened by  taxes  and  specially  affected  by  the 
shortage  of  labour,  would  lose  a  great  part  of  its 
value.  This  situation  would  lead  to  a  general  rise 
in  prices  for  the  commodities  of  daily  life,  and  that 
again  would  lay  a  fresh  burden  on  the  back  of  every 
Frenchman.  The  financial  position  would  be  analo- 
gous for  the  Russians  and  for  the  English,  who  of 
all  the  belligerents  have  spent  most  on  the  war. 

The  Germans,  in  trying  their  ''Drawn  Game" 
trick,  reckon  on  these  financial  consequences  to 
reduce  the  Allies  to  ultimate  impotence.  The  only 
way  to  avoid  this  danger  is  to  win  that  complete 
victory  which  all  the  Allies  desire,  since  it  would 
enable  them  to  impose  on  Germany  the  payment  of 
the  war  indemnity  which  she  unquestionably  owes, 
as  she  is  responsible  for  the  hostilities.  Annuities 
paid  to  each  of  the  Allies  will  be  used  as  the  basis  of 
loans,  which  will  help  to  tide  over  the  serious 
financial  difficulties  that  infallibly  await  all  the 
belligerents  after  the  war. 

III. 

The  menace  involved  in  the  scheme  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  creates  between 
the  Allies  in  Europe,  a  common  bond  of  interest, 
which    is    far     superior     to     their     own     individual 


THE   "DRAWN    GAME"  89 

interests,  and  which  ought  to  keep  them  firmly 
united  to  the  end. 

France,  England,  Russia  and  Italy  have  an 
identical  and  an  absolutely  vital  interest  in  defeat- 
ing for  ever  the  scheme  of  an  empire  that  should 
reach  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  This  is 
quite  apart  from  the  purely  humanitarian  con- 
sideration that  the  numerous  non-German  peoples 
who  live  between  Bohemia  and  the  Persian  Gulf 
should  not  be  finally  subservient  to  Germany. 
The  achievement  of  the  "Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf"  scheme  threatens  all  neutral  states,  for  it 
would  guarantee  to  Germany,  as  we  shall  see 
presently,  her  domination  over  the  world. 

Always  on  the  supposition  that  this  scheme 
succeeded,  it  would,  regarded  from  the  general 
economic  point  of  view,  place  Germany  in  every 
respect  in  an  infinitely  superior  position  to  that  of 
the  Allies.  Her  direct  or  indirect  seizure  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  of  the  Balkans  and  the  Ottoman  Empire 
would  secure  for  Germany  an  extraordinary 
economic  power,  against  which  all  eventual 
combinations  of  the  Allies  would  be  impotent. 
The  German  dogged  power  of  work,  spirit  of 
enterprise  and  organizing  skill  need  no  further 
demonstration.  We  must  therefore  not  doubt  for 
a  moment  that  they  would  draw,  to  their  enormous 
advantage,  all  possible  profits  from  Austria-Hungary, 
vast  regions  of  which  can  still  be  turned  to  account. 
The  same  would  apply  to  the  Balkan  countries, 
many  of  which  are  still  quite  virgin,  and  contain,  to 
a  considerable  extent,  unexplored  sources  of  wealth, 
both  agricultural  and  mineral.  This  would  also  be 
true  of  Asiatic  Turkey.  As  early  as  1886  the 
German  Orientalist,  Dr.  Spenger,  stated:  "Asia 
Minor  is  the  only  territory  of  the  world  which  has 
not  yet  been  monopolized  by  a  Great  Power.  And 
yet  it  is  the  finest  field  for  colonization.     If  Germany 


90  PANGERMAN  PLOT  UNMASKED 

does  not  miss  the  opportunity  and  seizes  it  before 
the  Cossacks  grab  it,  she  will  have  secured  the  best 
part  in  the  division  of  the  world." 

It  is  an  illusion  to  imagine  that  the  Turks  would 
seriously  raise  obstacles  to  the  economic  exploita- 
tion of  their  country  by  Germany.  If  the  Germans 
were  masters  of  Central  Europe  and  the  Balkans, 
they  would  be  in  a  position  to  sweep  away  all 
obstacles.  The  Prussian  Pangermans  are  quite  sure 
of  it,  thanks  to  their  liege-men  of  Constantinople. 
This  is  proved  sufHciently  by  the  way  in  which  the 
hereditary  prince  of  Turkey,  Yussuf-Izzedin, 
was  "suicided"  at  the  end  of  January,  1916, 
because  he  was  anti-German.  The  Germans  would 
perfectly  understand  the  art  of  showering,  as 
hitherto,  the  amplest  personal  advantages  on  the 
handful  of  Young  Turks  of  Enver  Pasha's  clique, 
while  at  the  same  time  they  would  grant  such 
nominal  concessions  as  would  enable  Berlin  under 
the  same  to  exploit  thoroughly  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

Do  not  let  us  be  deceived,  if  the  scheme  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  succeeded,  it  would 
place  in  Berlin's  hands  every  element  of  a  formid- 
able economic  power  unprecedented  in  history.  It 
would  secure,  in  fact,  to  Germany  the  exclusive 
monopoly  of  economic  influence  on  about  three 
million  square  kilometres  of  European  and  Asiatic 
lands  (Austria-Hungary,  Balkans,  Turkey),  and  it 
would  include,  beside,  the  seizure  of  numerous 
strategical  places  of  the  highest  importance  (the 
coasts  of  the  Adriatic  and  the  ^gean  Sea,  the 
Dardanelles,  etc.). 

Now  the  permanence  of  these  enormous  advan- 
tages would  be  assured  to  Great  Germany  through 
the  expansion  of  Prussian  militarism.  For  it  must 
be  clearly  understood — the  point  is  essential — 
that  Prussian  militarism  would  become  consider- 
ably   more   powerful    than    it    was   in    1914,    if    the 


THE  "DRAWN  GAME"  91 

scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf" 
were  achieved.  Yet  it  is  the  destruction  of 
Prussian  militarism  which  is  the  true,  legitimate, 
and  necessary  object  of  the  war,  an  object  intinitely 
above  any  mere  territorial  annexation  whatsoever. 

The  increase  of  power  which  would  accrue  to 
Prussian  militarism  through  the  accomplishment 
of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf"  is  readily  intelligible.  The  close  attach- 
ment of  Austria-Hungary  to  Germany,  by  placing 
under  the  immediate  authority  of  the  Headquarters 
Staff  of  Berlin  a  population  of  108  millions,  would 
enable  it  to  mobilize  at  least  10  millions  of  soldiers. 
Now,  in  virtue  of  the  central  geographical  position 
of  the  two  empires,  and  of  the  network  of  Austro- 
German  railways,  which  would  be  brought  to 
the  highest  degree  of  technical  perfection,  this 
immense  army  might,  even  more  easily  than  to-day, 
be  very  rapidly  concentrated  on  any  point  of  the 
periphery  of  the  Germanic  confederation.  But 
that  is  not  all.  The  predominance  of  Berlin  over 
the  Balkans  and  Turkey,  by  means  of  political 
alliances  forced  on  the  satellite  states  of  the  South- 
East,  would  give  in  addition  to  the  Berlin  Staff 
control  of  42  million  inhabitants,  that  is  to  say,  of 
about  four  millions  of  soldiers. 

Supposing  then  that  the  mobilization  applied  to 
only  ten  per  cent,  of  the  population,  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf"  would  place  under  the  influence,  direct  or 
indirect,  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  a  total  of  about 
fifteen  millions  of  soldiers.  If  the  mobilization 
applied  to  fourteen  per  cent,  of  the  population, 
which  is  the  proportion  attained  by  Serbia  and 
apparently  by  Austria-Hungary,  the  figure  would  be 
2jf  millions  of  soldiers. 

Now  the  course  of  the  present  war  proves  in- 
contestably    that    the    control    of    great    military 


92        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

masses,  placed  in  a  single  hand  and  elaborated  as 
minutely  as  the  Berlin  Staff,  forms  a  power  infinitely 
greater  than  that  of  far  more  numerous  masses 
under  a  control  which  is  not  sufficiently  co-ordinated. 

Hence  the  accomplishment  of  the  scheme  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  would  place 
Germany  in  a  military  position  considerably  superior 
to  that  of  all  the  Allied  countries  together. 

In  any  case,  those  who  are  lighting  for  the 
purpose  of  putting  an  end  to  great  armaments 
would  find  themselves  once  more  plunged  into  the 
vortex  of  the  most  rigorous  militarism,  for  they 
could  not  contend  with  Great  Germany  except  at 
the  cost  of  formidable  armaments,  which  would 
absorb  all  their  resources  and  all  their  attention. 
Now,  would  they  be  in  a  position  to  undertake  such 
armaments  in  the  infinitely  difficult  financial 
situation  in  which,  according  to  hypothesis, 
they  would  stand?  (see  p.  86).  Would  they  even 
have  the  resolution  to  undertake  them,  after  the 
frightful  moral  disappointment  of  their  peoples, 
who  would  learn  too  late  the  enormous  mistake 
committed  by  their  governments  in  negotiating 
peace  on  the  basis  of  the  so-called  "Drawn  Game," 
which  would  have  enabled  Berlin  to  carry  out  its 
scheme  of  domination  "from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf"? 

Besides,  even  if  the  Allies  were  willing  to  attempt 
once  more  the  overthrow  of  the  atrocious  Prussian 
militarism,  now  much  more  oppressive  than  before 
the  war.  Great  Germany  would  certainly  not  give 
them  time  to  prepare  for  it. 

We  may  be  quite  sure  that  the  day  peace  was 
concluded  on  the  basis  supposed,  Berlin  would  set 
about  organizing  economically  and  militarily,  with 
the  utmost  speed,  the  immense  territory  over  which 
its  supremacy  would  be  extended.  Supposing  that 
Russia,    France,    England   and   Italy   were   disi)osed 


THE   "DRAWN    GAME"  93 

to  renew  the  conflict,  they  would,  in  the  assumed 
financial  and  moral  situation,  be  certainly  reduced 
to  impotence  before  they  could  make  head  against 
the  new  German  colossus. 

Finally,  it  would  be  ignoring  completely  the 
tenacity  and  ambition  of  the  Hohenzollerns  to 
imagine  that  Great  Germany,  once  mistress  of  an 
empire  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  would 
sincerely  renounce  the  ambition  of  dominating  the 
North  Sea  and  the  English  Channel.  Hence  the 
evacuation  of  Belgium  and  the  retrocession  of 
Alsace-Lorraine,  which  on  our  hypothesis  Germany 
would  have  yielded  to  France,  would  only  have  been 
temporary.  The  apparent  capitulation  of  Berlin 
would  have  been,  therefore,  nothing  but  a  cunning 
device  to  allow  Germany,  driven  almost  to  bay,  to 
recover  herself  for  a  renewal  of  the  struggle.  Indeed, 
she  is  already  preparing  for  it  in  union  with  her 
actual  allies.  La  Nation  Tcheque,  of  15th  March, 
1916,  an  excellent  review  edited  by  M.  Ernest 
Denis,  professor  at  the  Sorbonne,  brought  to  light 
the  following  fact.  On  the  29th  February,  1916, 
the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Budapest  met,  all 
members  being  present,  in  order  to  study  what 
measures  to  take  for  a  future  war  intended  to 
complete  the  insufficient  results  of  a  peace,  looked 
upon  as  "imperfect."  In  this  discussion  it  was 
stated  that  with  the  prospect  of  a  fresh  conflagra- 
tion the  States  allied  to  Germany  in  the  present 
war  must  form  an  Economic  Union. 

Thus,  already,  the  Hohenzollern  are  stirring  up 
even  their  allies  to  organize  the  future  conflagration 
which  they  will  set  ablaze  if  the  Allies  do  not  crush 
Prussian  militarism.  William  II.  and  his  Panger- 
mans  want,  at  all  costs,  to  carry  out  the  scheme 
known  as  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf" 
because  they  know  very  well  that  the  completion  of 
that    scheme,     as    we  shall    see    presently,     would 


94        PANGERMAN   PLOT    UNMASKED 

suffice  to  provide  them  with  all  the  means  of  after- 
wards accomplishing  in  its  entirety  their  programme 
of  universal  domination. 


IV. 

The  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  provides  that  the  re- 
sults of  the  "Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  scheme 
should  be  made  the  most  of  even  in  the  furthest 
points  of  the  Far  East.  Facts  to  hand  and  well- 
known  Pangerman  programmes  enable  us  to  form 
an  idea  of  what  help  Germany  meant  to  find  in 
Asia  during  the  war,  and  what  profit  would  have 
accrued  to  her  afterwards  from  the  said  scheme,  if 
she  had  succeeded  in  finally  carrying  it  out. 

William  II.  tried  to  play  the  Panislamic  card, 
which  is  one  of  the  leading  trumps  of  the  Pangerman 
game.  In  a  word,  the  object  was  to  stir  up  a 
Panislamic  movement,  both  political  and  military, 
which  would  help  Germany  to  vanquish  the  Entente 
powers,  since  these  hold  among  their  possessions 
numerous  Moslem  subjects:  France,  particularly 
in  Tunis,  Algiers  and  Morocco;  Italy  in  Libya; 
Russia  in  the  Crimea  and  in  the  Caucasus,  in  the 
region  of  Kazan,  in  Central  Aisa  and  in  Siberia; 
England  in  Egypt,  in  India,  in  Burma,  in  the 
Straits  Settlements  and  in  the  greater  part  of  her 
African  Colonies. 

As  Panislamism  is  ostensibly  founded  on  the 
restoration  and  considerable  extension  of  the 
influence  and  powers  of  the  Sultan  of  Constanti- 
nople, Commander  of  the  Faithful,  it  could  not  fail 
to  flatter  deeply  the  neo-nationalism  of  the  Turks, 
which  has  manifested  itself  particularly  since  the 
failure  of  the  Allies  at  the  Dardanelles.  The  result 
is  that,  thanks  to  Panislamism,  the  Kaiser's  inter- 
ests have  been  well  served  by  the  Sultan's  Moslem 
subjects;     a    clever   propaganda    has   dazzled    their 


THE   ''DRAWN   GAME" 


95 


eyes  with  a  prospect  of  the  restoration  of  a  great 
empire,  even  greater  than  in  days  of  old. 

The  Panislamic  movement,  minutely  and  long 
prepared  during  peace  by  Germany,  was  started  by 
her  as  soon  as  hostilities  began.  On  the  advice  of 
Berlin,  the  Sultan  proclaimed,  as  early  as  the  end 
of  1914,  the  Jehad  or  Holy  War.  No  doubt  the 
Moslem  insurrection  has  not  become  general,  but 
the  Islamic  agitation  has  nevertheless  yielded 
local  results,  which  will  be  better  understood  after 
the   war,   and  which  have   hampered   the  Allies  in 


ASIATIC  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  ACCOMPLISHMENT  OF  THE 
SCHEME  "FROM  HAMBURG  TO  THE  PERSIAN  GULF." 

India,  in  Egypt,  in  Libya  and  in  the  French  posses- 
sions of  North  Africa.  Particularly  in  April,  1915, 
an  insurrection  of  British  Indian  troops  at  Singa- 
pore very  nearly  succeeded.  About  the  same  time 
in  Siam,  numerous  German  officers,  with  the  assis- 
tance of  Indian  and  Burmese  revolutionaries,  had 
begun  to  muster  a  small  army  of  16,000  men, 
who,  after  being  armed,  were  to  attack  British 
Burma.  This  Islamic  agitation  was  threatening 
to  assume  serious  proportions,  when  the  success  of 
the  Russians  in  Armenia  and  in  Persia  fortun- 
ately checked  it  by  striking  a  heavy  blow  at  the 
prestige  of  the  Sultan,  the  Commander  of  the 
Faithful. 


96        PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

Nevertheless,  what  Berlin  has  already  attempted 
to  achieve  with  the  help  of  Islam,  should  serve  the 
Allies  as  a  strong  warning  of  what  Germany  would 
certainly  do  in  time  to  come,  if  the  future  peace  left 
her  the  necessary  means.  As  soon  as  the  Turco- 
German  junction  had  been  effected  across  Serbia  in 
October,  191 5,  the  Panislamic  policy  of  the  Kaiser 
assumed  a  more  decided  form.  At  the  behest  of 
the  Kaiser,  his  familiar  spirit  at  Constantinople, 
Enver  Pacha,  who  then  was  all-powerful,  mobi- 
lized the  whole  of  such  of  his  Ottoman  subjects  as 
were  able  to  carry  the  arms  provided  for  them, 
which  only  at  the  beginning  of  1916  began  to  pour  in 
from  the  Central  Empires,  after  communications  had 
been  established  across  invaded  Serbia.  At  the 
same  time,  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Armenians 
were  systematically  massacred,  in  order  to  eliminate 
a  non-Moslem  population,  which  thwarted  the 
Turco-German  plans  for  the  future.  As  to  the 
military  and  Panislamic  activity  of  the  Turks, 
directed  by  the  Germans,  it  has  endeavoured  to 
radiate  from  Constantinople  in  many  directions 
towards  Egypt,  the  Caucasus,  Persia,  Central- 
Russian  Asia,  Afghanistan  and  India. 

After  the  war,  if  by  our  hypothesis,  peace  were 
made  on  the  basis  of  a  "  Drawn  Game,"  that  is  to  say, 
if  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf" 
were  carried  out,  all  these  other  plans  would  be 
taken  up  again.  How  would  the  Turks  free  them- 
selves from  the  German  clutches?  Their  financial 
position  binds  them  entirely  to  Germany.  Such 
large  personal  advantages  as  the  Kaiser's  agents 
would  inevitably  offer  to  all  Turks  whose  help 
would  be  considered  useful,  would  suffice  to  ensure 
Berlin's  predominance  in  the  Sultan's  Empire,  that 
classical  land  of  backsheesh  (see  map,  p.  95). 

Now,  there  are  in  Persia,  in  the  Azerbijan,  about 
40o,oc»o  men  who  would  make  quite  useful  soldiers, 


THE    "DRAWN    GAME"  97 

ana  who  would  provide  what  is  necessary  for  an 
offensive  against  Russia;  in  Afghanistan  500,000 
first  class  combatants  would  be  found.  Once 
armed  they  could  be  let  loose  in  Northern  India, 
which  contains  about  50  million  Moslems.  These, 
so  far,  have  collectively  remained  loyal  to  Great 
Britain,  but  their  feelings  might  be  subject  to  a 
change  if,  as  a  fact,  Germany  appeared  to  be 
victorious  by  remaining  mistress  of  the  route  from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Hence  we  conclude 
that  very  soon  after  a  peace  negotiated  on  such  a 
basis,  the  English  and  the  Russians  might  have  to 
face  very  grave  difficulties. 

That  is  not  all;  German  propaganda  has  ex- 
tended to  the  whole  of  China  by  various  means. 
First  of  all  the  20  to  30  million  Moslems  who  dwell 
in  the  Celestial  Empire,  have  been  worked  up  by 
Turco-German  agents  in  the  same  way  as  the 
Moslem  population  in  other  Islamic  regions.  But 
as  the  Chinese  Moslems  are  geographically  not  well 
grouped  to  form  a  sufficiently  powerful  basis  for  the 
German  agitation,  the  latter  has  fastened  on  the 
vital  and  motor  organs  of  China.  The  German 
agents  have  bought  in  China,  as  elsewhere,  all  the 
newspapers  which  could  be  utilized  for  their  object, 
particularly  the  Peking  Post,  written  in  English, 
and  the  Chinese  review,  Hsie-Ho-Pao.  They  have 
also  made  use  of  the  Ostasiatische  Lloyd,  which 
was  published  at  Tien-Tsin  before  the  war.  Since 
its  outbreak  they  have  founded  the  German  China  ^ 
Gazette.  All  these  organs  have  propagated  every- 
where in  the  Celestial  Empire  the  doctrine  of 
German  invincibility.  Thanks  to  this,  says  the 
Frankfurter  Zeitung,  ''every  coolie  knows  by  now 
that  Germany  is  victorious." 

For  the  moment  the  policy  which  Germany 
pursues  in  China  consists  in  stirring  up  everywhere 
trouble  and  unrest.     In  Northern  China  it  upholds 


98        PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

the  President  Yuan-Shi-Kai.*  In  his  set  the  Ger- 
mans have  gained  numerous  followers.  Thanks  to 
their  influence,  German  officers  already  occupy 
very  important  posts  in  the  Chinese  army.  But  in 
Southern  China,  Germany  is  rousing  the  popula- 
tions against  the  authority  of  Yuan-Shi-Kai.  The 
aim  of  Berlin  in  this  apparent  contradictory  policy, 
is  to  create  such  a  position  in  China  that  it  will 
engross  the  attention  of  Japan,  and  prevent  her 
from  intervening  with  her  troops  in  Europe;  such 
an  intervention  has  been  already  contemplated 
and  would  be  still  possible. 

The  present  Berlin  policy  in  the  Celestial  Empire 
has  also  for  its  object  to  prepare  the  German  policy  of 
the  future  in  the  Far  East.  When  once  peace  is 
concluded,  on  the  basis  on  which  she  counts, 
Germany  would  pursue  in  China  exactly  the  same 
policy  which  she  intends  to  pursue  in  Turkey. 
Then  Berlin  will  say  to  the  Chinese,  as  she  now  says 
to  the  Turks,  "See,  we  are  bold  financiers,  enter- 
prising manufacturers,  energetic  business  men.  We 
will  help  you  to  turn  your  country  to  account. 
We  shall  procure  for  you  the  experts  whom  you 
need.  We  will  give  you  the  means  of  defending 
yourselves  against  your  neighbours.  We,  who  are 
the  finest  soldiers  in  the  world,  will  bring  up  to  a 
proper  standard  your  endless  and  magnificent 
military  forces,  now  in  embryo.  With  your  300 
millions  of  inhabitants  you  can  be  the  absolute 
rulers  of  all  Asia.  We  will,  therefore,  build  up  for 
you  a  formidable  army  and  a  very  powerful  navy." 

It  is  easy  to  perceive  what  is  hidden  behind  this 
programme,  with  its  obvious  attraction  for  the 
Chinese.  In  reality,  it  is  a  preparation  for  the 
seizure    by    Germany    of   part   of    China,    and    her 

*  This  passage  was  written  before  Yuan-Shi-Kai's  death.    Trans- 
lator's Note. 


THE   ''DRAWN    GAME"  99 

economic  exploitation  under  exactly  the  same  con- 
ditions and  by  the  same  measures  as  those  already 
employed  in  Turkey.  Moreover,  this  policy  is  a 
signal  vengeance  which  Germany  means  to  wreak  in 
the  future  on  Japan  after  the  victory  of  which  she 
thinks  herself  assured.  No  doubt,  in  order  to  break 
the  union  of  her  adversaries,  Berlin  has  already 
hinted  to  Tokio  the  idea  of  a  separate  peace,  but 
that  is  merely  a  piece  of  tactics  exacted  by  the  need 
of  the  moment. 

Never  would  a  Great  Germany,  mistress  of  the 
route  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  and 
exercising  a  predominant  influence  in  China,  forgive 
Japan  for  having  driven  her  out  of  Kiao-Chau. 
Now,  if  and  when  an  immense  Chinese  army 
shall  have  been  created,  under  the  direction  of 
German  ofificers,  Japan,  in  spite  of  the  bravery  of 
her  soldiers,  would  at  once  be  unable  to  avoid  the 
consequences  of  the  intolerable  situation  in  which 
she  would  be  placed  through  the  relative  smallness 
of  her  population  (70  milHons,  with  her  colonies, 
against  300  millions  of  Chinese).  Japan  is,  there- 
fore, directly  aimed  at  by  the  scheme  of  domination 
from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  which  really 
endangers  her  future. 

Finally,  we  can  see  that  thanks  to  a  combination 
of  Panislamism  and  a  Chinophile  policy,  at  least 
one  that  is  outwardly  so,  the  achievement  of  the 
scheme  of  domination  from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  would  assure  to  Germany  the  means 
not  only  of  dominating  Europe,  but  also  of  exercis- 
ing a  preponderant  influence  over  the  whole  of  Asia. 
After  having  obtained  for  herself  in  Europe  the 
possibility  of  drawing  exclusive  profit  from  strategic 
positions  of  inestimable  value,  such  as  the  shores  of 
the  Adriatic,  the  A^.geim,  and  the  Dardanelles, 
Germany  would  be  mistress,  by  mere  force  of 
circumstances,  of  the  Sue/.  Canal  and  would  com- 


loo      PANGERMAN   PLOT    UNMASKED 

mand  besides  numerous  vantage  points  on  the 
Chinese  coasts.  Thus  the  defeat  of  the  "Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf"  project  is  a  vital  question  not 
only  for  France,  England,  Russia,  and  Italy,  but 
also  for  Japan. 

V. 

In  order  to  demonstrate  the  really  extraordinary 
importance  of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,"  we  have  still  to  show  how  its  achieve- 
ment would  not  only  make  Germany  mistress  in 
Europe  and  preponderant  in  Asia,  but  would  carry 
with  it  the  accomplishment  of  the  Pangerman 
plan  in  its  world-wide  form.  The  world-wide 
elements  of  this  plan,  graphically  shown  on  the  map 
herewith,  have  been  set  forth  in  the  book  of  Otto 
Richard  Tannenberg,  The  Greater  Germany,  the 
Work  of  the  20th  Century^  which  appeared  at 
Leipsic  in  191 1.  As  this  book,  which  hearing  dale 
1911,  contains  the  exact  programme  of  the  seizures 
to  be  effected  in  Europe  and  Turkey,  nine-tenths 
of  which  the  German  General  Staff  has  already 
carried  out  to  the  letter,  the  exceptional  importance 
of  Tannenberg's  book  is  indisputable.  It  is  demon- 
strated, in  fact,  that  the  annexations  and  seizures 
which  he  advocated  in  191 1  correspond  as  com- 
pletely as  possible  with  the  execrable  ambitions  of 
the  government  of  Berlin. 

As  for  the  territorial  acquisitions  which  Tannen- 
berg advocates  in  Asia,  in  Africa,  in  Oceania,  and 
in  America,  they  would  be  the  perfectly  logical 
consequences  of  the  accomplishment  of  the  "Ham- 
burg to  the  Persian  Gulf"  project.  If  that  project 
became  a  reality,  it  would  be  because  the  European 
Allies,  through  their  blunders  in  the  management  of 
the  war,  would  have  had  to  forego  the  notion  of 

*  A  French  translation  of  this  work,  by  M.  Maurice  Millioud,  of 
Lausanne,  has  been  published  by  the  firm  of  Payot. 


I02      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

beating  Germany  and  to  leave  the  German  General 
Staff  to  command  an  army  of  from  15  to  21 
millions  of  men  (see  p.  91).  Therefore,  it  is 
obvious  that  on  this  hypothesis  the  Allied  peoples, 
after  a  treacherous  peace,  morally  and  financially 
exhausted,  having  to  face  the  formidable  armies  of 
Pangermany,  would  be  unable  to  oppose  the 
accomplishment  of  those  colonial  schemes,  which 
the  success  of  the  ''Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf"  plan  would  afford  to  Great  Germany  the 
means  of  carrying  out,  since,  always  on  the 
assumption  in  question,  they  would  have  given 
way  on  an  issue  much  more  vital  for  them — that  of 
the  independence  of  Europe. 

Once  grant  this  supposition,  and  we  shall  be  con- 
vinced that  Tannenberg's  world-wide  plan  of  Pan- 
german  annexations  is  quite  stripped  of  that 
chimerical  character  which  at  first  sight  we  might 
be  disposed  to  ascribe  to  it. 

Besides,  we  must  add  that  the  programme,  which 
is  fully  described  below,  was  drawn  up  by  Tannen- 
berg  on  the  supposition,  on  which  the  Berlin 
Government  also  reckoned,  that  England  would 
not  take  part  in  the  war.  In  order  to  purchase  her 
neutrality,  Tannenberg  advocated  dividing  the 
colonies  of  the  other  European  powers  between 
London  and  Berlin.  But  now  that  England  has 
thrown  herself  into  the  struggle,  it  is  clear  that, 
assuming  Germany  to  be  victorious,  she  would 
take  possession  also  of  those  colonies  which 
Tannenberg  proposed  to  assign  to  Great  Britain, 
since  Britain  would  be  incapable  of  resisting.  It 
follows  that  the  world-wide  acquisitions  of  Pan- 
germany, sketched  in  the  plan  of  191 1  and  summar- 
ized below,  are  in  fact  less  than  Germany  would  be 
able  to  effect,  since  having  presumably  accom- 
plished the  scheme  of  domination  "from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  no  organized  force  on  earth 


THE    ''DRAWN    GAME"  103 

would  be  powerful  enough  to  curb  the  boundless 
ambition  of  Berlin. 

We  have  proved  above  that  if  the  Allies  allowed 
Germany  to  secure  her  hold  on  Austria-Hungary, 
the  predominant  and  exclusive  influence  of  Berlin 
over  all  the  Balkans  and  Turkey  would  be  inevitable. 
Tannenberg  {op.  cit.,  p.  323)  explains  that  finally 
Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Mesopotamia,  Palestine, 
Western  Persia,  and  the  larger  part  of  Arabia 
would  pass  under  the  absolute  protectorate  of  the 
German  Empire,  making  a  total  of,  say,  3,200,000 
square  kilometres  and  16,500,000  inhabitants. 

Once  masters  of  the  coasts  of  the  Adriatic,  the 
^gean,  the  Dardanelles,  and  Aden,  helped  by  the 
Panislamic  propaganda,  the  Turco-German  seizure 
of  Egypt,  and  therefore  of  the  Suez  Canal,  would 
necessarily  follow.  Germany,  if  she  commanded 
these  essential  strategical  points,  would  then 
obviously  be  able  to  retake  her  colonies  in  Africa 


and  Oceania. 

Square 

Native 

Kilometres. 

Population. 

Togo 

. . 

87,000 

1,003,000 

Kameroon 

•  •           • . 

790,000 

2,540,000 

South-West  Africa 

835,000 

87,000 

Eastern  Africa 

995,000 

7,510,000 

Kaiser    Wilhelm    Land, 

Bismarck 

Archipelago,      Caroline 

Islands, 

Marshall   Islands,   the 

Marianes, 

Samoa    . . 

245,000 
2,952,000 

647,000 

Making  a  total  of 

11,787,000 

Always  on  the  assumption  which  we  have  made, 
the  Allies,  having  given  way  in  Europe,  could  not 
prevent  Great- Germany  from  snatching,  according 
to  Tannenberg's  programme,  the  Belgian,  Portu- 
guese, and  Dutch  Colonies,  namely: 

Square  Native 

Kilometres.  Population. 

Belgian  Congo        ..  ..  ..         2,365,000  15,000,000 

Portuguese  Angola  ..  ..         1,270,000  4,200,000 

Dutch  East  Indies  . .  . .         2,045,000  38,106,000 

Total      . .  . .        5,680,000  57,306,000 


I04      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

Next  would  come  the  turn  of  those  French 
colonies,  the  cession  of  which  to  Great  Germany 
was  foreshadowed  by  Tannenberg,  op.  ciL,  p.  313. 


Square 

Native 

Kilometres. 

Population. 

Morocco    . . 

416,000 

3,000,000 

French  Congo 

1,439,000 

9,800,000 

Madagascar 

585,000 

3,232,000 

Mayotta  and  the  Comoros 

Islands 

2,000 

97,000 

Reunion 

2,000 

173,000 

Obok      and      dependencies 

(East 

Africa)    . . 

120,000 

208,000 

Indo-China 

803,000 

16,990,000 

French  Islands  of  Oceania  .  . 

24,000 

88,000 

Making  a  total  of 

3,391,000 

33,588,000 

The  combination  of  Panislamism  and  the  so-called 
Chinophile  movement  would  prepare  for  the  Ger- 
man seizures  in  Asia.  As  we  have  seen  (p.  99),  the 
Berlin  plan  consists  first  in  arming  China  powerfully 
enough  under  the  orders  of  German  officers,  to  expel 
the  Japanese  from  Kiao-Chau  and  from  the  province 
of  Shantung.  Germany  would  thus  inflict  a  first 
and  striking  vengeance  on  the  Empire  of  the  Rising 
Sun.  But  that  would  not  be  all.  The  policy 
which  Berlin  foreshadows  with  regard  to  China  is 
identical  with  the  one  which  it  is  now  pursuing  in 
Turkey.  If  Germany  armed  China,  it  would  be 
under  conditions  such  that  the  Celestial  Empire 
would  have  to  submit  to  the  strict  influence  of 
Pangermany.  Tannenberg  (op.  cit.,  p.  321)  tells 
us  that  the  outcome  of  these  tactics  would  be  the 
establishment  of  a  vast  zone  of  special  German 
influence  on  the  whole  lower  course  of  the  Yang- 
tse-Kiang  and  the  Hoangho,  that  is  to  say,  over 
that  vast  portion  of  China  which  forms  the  hinter- 
land of  Kiao-Chau,  making  a  total  of  about  750,000 
square  kilometres  and  50  millions  of  inhabitants. 

Tannenberg  finally  gives  an  exact  enumeration 
of  the  various   German   protectorates  which  would 


THE   ''DRAWN    GAME'' 


105 


be  established  in  the  southern  part  of  South 
America,  where  dwell  many  German  colonists, 
whose  aggressive  tendencies  are  already  plain 
enough.  "Germany,"  says  Tannenberg  literally, 
"takes  under  her  protection  the  republics  of 
Argentina,  Uruguay,  and  Paraguay,  the  southern 
third  of  Bolivia,  so  far  as  it  belongs  to  the  basin  of 
the  Rio  de  la  Plata,  together  with  that  part  of 
southern  Brazil,  in  which  German  culture  is 
dominant"  {op.  cit.,  p.  321). 


Square 

Kilometres. 

Population 

Argentina 

2,950,000 

7,091,000 

Chili           

757,000 

3,415,000 

Uruguay     . . 

187,000 

1,225,00a 

Paraguay  . . 

253,000 

800,000 

J^Bolivia   . . 

500,000 

666, ooc- 

^'s  Brazil 

1,700,000 

5,ooo,cof.i 

Making  a  total  of 

6,347,000 

i8,i97,o-.'o 

"German  South  America,"  concludes  Tannen- 
berg, "will  provide  for  us  in  the  temperate  zone  a 
colonial  region  where  our  emigrants  will  be  able  to 
settle  as  farmers.  Chili  and  Argentina  will  pre- 
serve their  language  and  their  autonomy.  But  we 
shall  require  that  in  the  schools  German  shall  be 
taught  as  a  second  language.  Southern  Brazil, 
Paraguay,  and  Uruguay  are  countries  of  German 
culture.  German  will  there  be  the  national  tongue" 
(op.  cit.,  p.  337). 

Even  during  the  war,  Germany  has  laid  the  train 
for  some  of  these  explosions.  The  Chicago  Tribune 
has  learned  that  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs 
for  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  possesses  the 
proofs  of  German  intrigues  carried  on  in  the 
American  hemisphere  in  defiance  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine  (Le  Temps,  i6th  February,  1916).  These 
official  Pangerman  machinations,  proved  up  to  the 
hilt  and  entirely  in  harmony  with  Tannenberg's 
American     plan     of     campaign,     demonstrate     the 


io6      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

identity    of    his    colonial    views    with    those    of    the 
government  of  Berlin. 

To  sum  up,  the  result  of  the  Pangerman  pro- 
gramme for  countries  outside  of  Europe  would  be 
to  assure  to  Germany,  under  the  form  of  colonies, 
protectorates,  or  zones  of  special  influence: 


Square 

Kilometres. 

Population. 

In  Asia 

•  •           •  • 

..      4,753,000 

83,490,000 

In  Africa 

•  •           •  • 

8,906,000 

46,850,000 

In  Oceania  . . 

•  •           >  • 

2,314,000 

38,841,000 

In  America 

I  total  of 

6,347,000 

18,197,000 

Making  i 

. .     22,320,000 

187,378,000 

Germany,  which  occupied  or  controlled,  at  the 
beginning  of  1916,  in  Europe,  3,576,237  square 
kilometres,  including  the  Empire,  and  more  than 
160  millions  of  inhabitants,  would  then  have  a 
universal  domain  of  influence  reaching  over 
25,896,237  square  kilometres  and  347  millions  of 
inhabitants.  This  figure  includes  at  the  utmost  90 
millions  of  Germans;  therefore,  these  will  exercise 
their  supremacy  over  257  millions  of  non-Germans. 

It  must  be  clearly  understood  also  that  the 
enormous  possessions  of  Pangermany  in  both 
hemispheres  would  be  thoroughly  under  the  domina- 
tion of  Berlin;  indeed,  a  glance  at  the  map  (p.  loi) 
will  show  that  the  universal  Pangerman  plan  aims 
at  seizing  all  the  essential  strategic  points  which 
command  the  seas  of  the  world,  especially,  in 
addition  to  those  already  mentioned,  the  Straits  of 
Gibraltar  from  the  side  of  Morocco,  Cape  Horn, 
Madagascar,  and  all  the  naval  bases  of  Oceania. 

To  sum  up,  the  complete  Pangerman  plan  aims 
at  procuring  for  Germany  all  the  means  of  domina- 
tion by  land  and  sea,  which  would  enable  Pan- 
germany to  hold  the  entire  world  in  the  dreadful 
hug  of  Prussian  militarism  screwed  up  to  its  highest 
degree  of  power. 


THE   ''DRAWN    GAME"  107 

Not  for  a  moment  do  the  Pangermans  pause 
to  reflect  how  criminal  is  this  programme  of  universal 
slavery.  "War,"  says  Tannenberg,  with  his  mon- 
strous cynicism,  "must  leave  nothing  to  the 
vanquished  but  their  eyes  to  weep  with.  Modesty 
on  our  part  would  be  purely  madness"  {op.  ciL,  p. 
304).  Now,  it  is  a  fundamental  truth,  of  which  I 
should  like  to  convince  my  readers,  that  the 
universal  Pangerman  plan  is  solely  and  wholly 
based  on  the  achievement  of  the  scheme  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  which  forms  its 
backbone.  If  this  is  broken,  the  whole  of  the 
Pangerman  plan  falls  to  the  ground,  and  the 
projects  of  Prussian  domination  are  destroyed  for 
ever.  The  principal  problem  which  the  Allies  have 
to  solve,  if  they  wish  to  ensure  their  liberty  and  that 
of  the  whole  world,  is  to  make  impossible  the 
achievement  of  the  plan  "from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf." 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE    CRUCIAL    POINT    OF    THE    WHOLE    PROBLEM. 

I.     The    obligation    which    the    threat    of    the    scheme    "from 

Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  imposes  on  the  Allies. 
II.     The  capital  importance  of  the  question  of  Austria-Hungary. 
III.     All  the  racial  elements  necessary  for  the  destruction  of  the 
Pangerman  plan  exist  in  Central  Europe. 


Now  that  they  have  laid  their  hands  on  nine- 
tenths  of  the  territories  which  they  coveted  (see 
p.  63),  the  Germans  will  only  give  in  at  the  last 
extremity.  Maximilian  Harden  has  peremptorily 
declared:  "Every  means  will  be  enthusiastically 
employed  against  her  enemies  by  the  German 
people.  We  will  go  back  to  the  times  of  savagery 
when  man  was  a  wolf  for  his  fellow  man"  (quoted 
by  Le  Temps,  9th  February,  1916).  In  face  of  this 
firm  resolution  of  the  Germans  to  achieve  at  all 
costs  the  plan  of  universal  domination,  a  plan  of 
which  the  ''Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  project 
is  the  necessary  and  sufficient  backbone,  the  real 
destruction  of  Prussian  militarism  becomes  more 
than  ever  a  duty.  Only  this  result  can  repay  the 
sacrifices  of  the  admirable  "Tommies"  of  the 
Allied  armies.  If  they  are  determined  to  hold  on 
as  long  as  necessary,  it  is  not  to  cover  themselves 
with  military  glory;  it  is  to  acquire  the  certainty 
"that  it  shall  not  begin  again,  that  their  children 
shall  not  know  horrors  like  those  of  the  hellish 
struggle  initiated  by  Prussianized  Germany." 

The  AlHes  will  certainly  issue  as  conquerors  from 
this  dreadful  war,  but  on  condition  that  in  future 

108 


THE    CRUCIAL    POINT  109 

the  struggle  should  be  directed  by  the  lessons  of 
experience.  These  essential  lessons  are  the  out- 
come of  the  geographical,  ethnographical,  economic, 
and  strategical  elements  which  constitute  the 
Pangerman  plan  of  191 1,  temporarily  accomplished. 
Now,  these  lessons  of  experience  show  that  the 
Allies  could  not  possibly  be  content  with  a  half- 
and-half  victory;  a  complete  victory  alone  can 
guarantee  them  against  any  aggressive  revival,  after 
peace,  of  Prussian  militarism. 

The  following  considerations  appear  strongly  to 
justify  this  opinion: 

"If  in  France,"  declares  Harden,  "they  think 
that  the  re-establishment  of  peace  can  only  be  made 
possible  by  the  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and 
if  necessity  should  oblige  us  to  sign  such  a  peace, 
the  70  millions  of  Germans  would  very  soon  tear 
that  peace  to  tatters"  (quoted  by  Le  Temps,  9th 
February,  191 6).  Is  there  a  single  living  French- 
man of  sense  who  would  be  willing  to  recover 
Alsace-Lorraine  under  such  conditions  that  it 
would  be  necessary  afterwards  to  make  incessant 
and  exhausting  military  efforts  in  order  to  keep  the 
restored  provinces?  Certainly  not.  The  restora- 
tion of  Alsace-Lorraine  will  only  become  of  value 
for  France  when  the  annihilation  of  Prussian 
militarism  shall  guarantee  her  a  legitimate  and 
peaceful  possession  of  the  territories  in  question. 
Now,  as  I  think  I  have  proved,  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  reckon  on  this  security  if  France  allowed 
Berlin  to  carry  out  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  which  would  furnish  Germany 
with  superabundant  means  to  retake  Alsace- 
Lorraine  after  a  short  respite. 

The  imperious  necessity  of  avoiding  financial 
ruin  further  forces  the  Allies  to  seek  a  complete 
victory.  Indeed,  such  a  victory  alone  will  enable 
them  to  escape  the  most  frightful  impoverishment, 


no  PANGERMAN  PLOT  UNMASKED 

which  otherwise  threatens  the  Allied  States  and 
their  citizens.  The  fabulous  expenses  which  the 
present  war  necessitates  distinguish  it,  financially 
speaking,  by  a  vast  gulf  from  all  the  wars  that  have 
gone  before. 

After  1870,  France  was  able  very  quickly  to 
recover  her  position,  and  in  spite  of  the  misfortunes 
of  the  country,  individuals  were  able,  on  the 
morrow  of  the  peace,  to  promote  the  prosperity 
of  their  business.  But  after  the  present  war,  if  the 
Allies  did  not  win  a  complete  victory,  our  States, 
like  our  individuals  (see  p.  88),  would  be  faced  by 
almost  inextricable  pecuniary  difficulties.  The 
endless  economic  consequences  resulting  from  crush- 
ing taxes,  which  could  not  be  regularly  and  perma- 
nently collected,  would  be  such  that  the  States  and 
most  individuals  in  the  Allied  countries  would  see 
themselves  reduced  to  impotence  and  therefore  to 
poverty.  This,  however,  is  truly  the  situation  with 
which  the  Allies  would  be  confronted  if  Germany 
were  to  achieve  her  plan  of  domination  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  since  that  solution 
would  enable  her  to  retain  her  enormous  spoils  of 
war  and  to  lay  hands  on  considerable  sources  of 
wealth  (see  p.  85). 

Now,  would  it  not  be  a  monstrous  iniquity  that 
the  people  of  France,  England,  Russia,  and  Italy 
should  be  reduced  for  tens  of  years  to  terrible 
poverty  because  it  suited  the  execrable  ambition  of 
the    Hohenzollerns    to    reduce    Europe    to    slavery? 

Only  a  complete  victory  can  save  the  Allied 
countries  from  financial  ruin,  because,  no  matter 
what  some  people  say,  Germany  will  be  able  to  pay 
the  cost  of  the  struggle  she  has  initiated.  As  she  is 
responsible  for  the  war,  Germany  already  owes  to  the 
united  Allies  a  colossal  sum  which  can  be  estimated 
roundly  at  between  250  and  300  milliards  of  francs. 
But  if  the  credit  of  the  German  Empire  is  doomed  to 


THE    CRUCIAL   POINT  iii 

disappear  on  the  day  of  her  defeat,  the  material 
riches  of  Germany,  which  are  very  considerable,  will 
continue.  They  represent  much  more  than  300 
milliards  of  francs.  Of  course  Germany  will  only 
be  able  to  pay  her  fabulous  debt  very  gradually. 
But  when  means  for  collecting  the  German  revenues 
shall  have  been  systematically  and  leisurely  studied 
by  the  conquering  Allies,  when  these  collections  of 
revenue  shall  have  become  assured,  of  course  not 
by  written  German  promises,  worthless  scraps  of 
paper,  but  by  real  guarantees  in  harmony  with 
those  precedents  of  history,  which  the  government 
of  Berlin  strongly  contributed  to  establish  in  1870, 
Germany  will  be  perfectly  able  to  hand  to  each  of 
the  great  conquering  Allies  about  two  milliards  of 
francs  a  year.  This  annuity,  thanks  to  modern 
financial  combinations,  will  be  sufl&cient  to  allow 
each  Allied  state  to  raise  annual  loans  at  relatively 
low  rates  and  therefore  easily  procurable;  and 
these  will  permit  each  State  to  spare  its  citizens  the 
burden  of  taxes  which  would  be  not  only  crushing 
but  fatal,  and  which  would  be  inevitable  if  the 
country  had  to  relinquish  the  hope  of  being  re- 
couped for  its  war  expenses  by  Germany. 

Now,  a  truly  complete  victory  like  this,  which  is 
indispensable  from  so  many  points  of  view  to  the 
Allies,  is  perfectly  possible  in  spite  of  the  faults 
committed  by  the  Allies,  which  alone  have  delayed 
it. 

A  line  of  argument  will  set  this  possibility  in  a 
proper  light.  Harden  himself  has  been  constrained, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  to  face  the  hypothesis  of  a 
cession  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France.  It  is  obvious 
that  when  they  have  come  to  that  pitch  at  Berlin, 
it  will  mean  that  Germany  at  bay,  on  the  brink  of 
absolute  disaster,  will  try  to  negotiate  with  the 
Allies  in  order  to  save  her  plan  of  domination 
"from     Hamburg     to     the     Persian     Gulf."     This 


112      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

would  enable  her,  after  a  short  respite,  to  recover 
Alsace-Lorraine  from  France,  as  Harden  also 
indicates.  Therefore,  the  effort  needed  at  the 
present  moment,  if  the  Allies  wish  to  secure  a 
complete  instead  of  a  doubtful  victory,  which  in 
reality  would  mean  for  them  a  catastrophe,  would 
be  comparatively  slight.  That  effort  would  prob- 
ably only  represent  the  hundredth  part  of  all 
those  already  made  by  the  Allies.  We  should  be 
mad  or  criminal  not  to  make  it,  because  it  is  that 
last  effort  which  will  put  an  end  to  the  horrible 
nightmare  conjured  up  all  over  the  world  by 
Prussian  militarism. 


In  order  to  make  sure  of  this  complete  victory, 
we  need  only  draw  the  appropriate  lessen  from  the 
mistakes  that  have  been  made.  As  M.  Briand  said 
in  Rome,  the  solidarity  of  the  Allies  should  be 
closer  than  ever.  "They  ought  to  pool  all  their 
resources,  all  their  energies,  all  their  vital  forces." 
But  that  co-ordination  of  the  efforts  of  the  Allies, 
which  is  called  for  on  every  side,  would  be  greatly 
facilitated,  if  the  common  objective  of  the  common 
action  of  all  the  Allies  were  thenceforth  clearly 
defined  in  its  geographical,  military,  and  political 
aspects. 

The  German  aggression  took  the  Allies  by  sur- 
prise, and  their  first  duty  was  to  resist  it.  After- 
wards, through  the  mere  force  of  circumstances,  the 
operations  of  each  of  them  were  directed  mainly  to 
the  particular  objects  which  each  had  in  view. 
England  and  France  have  reasons  of  honour  and  of 
interest  for  defending  the  absolute  independence  of 
Belgium.  France  must  recover  its  invaded  depart- 
ments and  liberate  Alsace-Lorraine.  Russia  must 
not  only  reconquer  its  frontiers  on  the  West,  but 
free  the  whole  of  Poland,  to  which  she  has  promised 


THE    CRUCIAL    POINT 


113 


autonomy.  The  empire  of  the  Tsars  must  also  put 
an  end,  once  for  all,  to  the  Turco-German  menace 
on  the  south  of  the  Caucasus.  Italy  must  recover 
her  lost  lands — Italia  irredenta — from  the  clutch  of 
the  Hapsburgs.  But  all  these  particular  objects, 
however  legitimate  and  necessary,  have  long  pre- 
vented the  Allies  from  seeing  the  war  in  its  European 
dimensions,  and  have  therefore  diverted  their 
attention  from  what,   alike  from  the  geographical, 


THE  CRUCIAL  POINT  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PROBLEM. 


the  military,  and  the  political  point  of  view,  should 
be  the  common  objective  of  all  their  efforts,  an 
objective  of  supreme  importance,  since  its  attain- 
ment would  deliver  them  at  once  from  the  menace 
of  the  ''Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  project, 
which  threatens  all  the  Allies  alike;  and  by  striking 
a  decisive  blow  at  Prussian  militarism  it  would 
assure  the  accomplishment  and  the  permanence  of 
the  practical  results  aimed  at  by  each  of  the  Allies 
individually. 


114       PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

Now  this  common  objective,  this  geographical, 
military  and  political  crux  of  all  the  problems 
which  the  Allies  have  to  solve,  is  represented  by 
Austria-Hungary.  On  that  subject  the  diplo- 
macy of  the  Allies,  thanks  again  to  M.  Briand  and 
his  colleagues,  appears  to  have  entered  on  the 
right  path.  The  Matin  of  4th  February,  1916, 
reported  the  reception  by  M.  Briand  of  Professor 
Masaryk,  one  of  the  most  highly  esteemed  leaders 
of  Bohemia.  In  reference  to  this  meeting  the 
Matin  added  the  following  significant  words,  which 
deserve  to  be  borne  in  mind:  "M.  Briand  en- 
couraged M.  Masaryk  to  persevere  in  his  propa- 
ganda, and  expressed  to  him  his  good  wishes  and 
his  sympathy  with  the  legitimate  claims  of  the 
Czech-Slovak  people."  But  Bohemia  is  the  corner- 
stone of  that  group  of  non-German  peoples  included 
in  Austria-Hungary,  whose  independence  is  one  of 
the  conditions  indispensable  to  the  destruction  of 
Prussian  militarism.  Therefore  public  opinion  in 
the  Allied  countries  should  henceforth  clearly 
understand  the  close  relation  which,  as  I  have 
shown  above,  exists  between  the  little  understood 
question  of  Austria-Hungary  and  the  end  of  the 
Pangerman  nightmare.  It  will  then  have  a  fresh 
and  extremely  powerful  reason  for  the  conviction, 
that  the  complete  victory,  which  the  Pangerman 
plan  renders  indispensable  for  the  Allies,  cannot  fail 
to  be  theirs,  provided  they  set  their  heart  on  it 
and  avoid  further  mistakes. 

II. 

In  Austria-Hungary  lies  the  crucial  point  of  the 
European  and  even  of  the  world-wide  problem 
raised  by  the  German  aggression,  because: 

I.  Austria-Hungary  has  entered  into  the  struggle 
in  very  peculiar  circumstances.  This  State  is  not 
an  enemy  of  the  Allies,  except  at  the  bidding  of  the 


THE    CRUCIAL    POINT  115 

Hapsburg  dynasty,  which,  by  yielding  to  the  in- 
junctions of  Berlin,  has  betrayed  its  own  peoples. 
In  fact,  Francis  Joseph  declared  war  without  even 
daring  to  consult  his  parliament,  for  he  knew  very 
well  that  nearly  three-fourths  of  his  subjects, 
sympathizing  with  Russia,  France,  and  England, 
and  being  definitely  hostile  to  Germany,  would  have 
opposed,  by  the  voice  of  their  representatives,  any 
sanguinary  conflict  destined  to  turn  to  the  advant- 
age of  Germanism. 

2.  It  is  manifest  that  Germany  cannot  maintain 
a  war  against  Europe  except  with  the  help  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  soldiers,  whom  she  has 
dexterously  contrived  to  enlist  in  her  cause,  and  of 
whom  the  vast  majority  only  fight  because  they  are 
forced  to  do  so  by  the  brutal  German  Stafif  Officers 
who  command  them. 

3.  It  is  clear  that  after  the  peace,  if  Germany 
were  to  evacuate  all  the  territories  she  now  occu- 
pies in  the  East  and  the  West,  to  restore  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France,  and  yet  to  keep  her  hold,  more 
or  less  disguised,  on  Austria-Hungary,  Berlin 
would  possess  all  the  means  for  retaking,  after  a 
short  delay,  Alsace-Lorraine  from  France,  since, 
as  we  saw  in  the  foregoing  chapter,  the  German 
hold  on  Austria-Hungary  inevitably  implies  the 
accomplishment  of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to 
the  Persian  Gulf." 

4.  From  this  last  consideration  it  follows  that 
if  after  the  peace  Germany  were  to  retain  her  dis- 
guised hold  on  Austria-Hungary,  the  solemn  promise 
given  by  France,  England,  and  Russia,  to  re- 
establish Serbia  in  its  independence  and  its  in- 
tegrity, would  be  practically  incapable  of  fulfilment. 

5.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  freedom  from  German 
control  of  at  least  the  majority  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  territories  were  assured  after  the  peace, 
this  would  absolutely  prevent  for  the  future  any 


ii6      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

aggressive  revival  of  Prussian  militarism.  For  by 
the  very  fact  of  that  independence  the  General 
Staff  of  Berlin  would  be  deprived  of  troops  which 
are  indispensable  to  the  forcible  execution  of  the 
Pangerman  projects. 

6.  A  glance  at  the  map  (p.  113)  will  show  that 
in  virtue  of  their  geographical  situation  nothing  but 
the  freedom  of  the  majority  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
territories  from  German  control  could  enable  the 
Allies  to  keep  their  promises  to  Serbia,  and,  by 
definitely  breaking  the  backbone  of  the  Pangerman 
plan,  to  prevent  the  immense  danger  of  the  "Ham- 
burg to  the  Persian  Gulf"  plan,  the  accomplish- 
ment of  which  all  the  Allies,  without  any  exception 
(France,  England,  Russia,  Italy,  Japan,  Belgium, 
Serbia,  Montenegro)  have  a  really  vital  interest  to 
prevent.  But,  as  we  shall  see  at  the  end  of  the 
volume,  their  interest  in  this  matter  is  also  the 
interest  of  the  whole  civilized  world. 

The  fact  that  public  opinion  in  the  Allied  coun- 
tries is  not  yet  fully  alive  to  the  capital,  the  essential 
importance  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  question  for 
the  issue  of  the  war  and  the  future  of  Europe,  is  due 
to  a  variety  of  causes  which  must  be  enumerated. 

In  the  first  place,  the  question  of  Austria-Hungary, 
an  empire  composed  of  very  complex  racial  and 
social  elements,  is  undoubtedly  very  difficult  to 
grasp. 

In  the  next  place,  the  lamentable  want  of  interest 
in  foreign  affairs,  which  before  the  war  prevailed 
in  the  Allied  countries,  is  responsible  for  the 
extreme  inaccuracy  of  those  current  beliefs  on  the 
subject,  which  the  German  press  agents  have 
successfully  palmed  off  on  the  newspapers  of  the 
present  Allies. 

As  a  result,  many  people  in  these  countries, 
especially  in  England,  still  imagine  that  Austria- 
Hungary,  with  a  population  of  fifty  millions,  is  a 


THE   CRUCIAL   POINT  117 

country  mainly  German,  which  is  a  radically  false 
idea.  This  serious  mistake  is  sometimes  made,  to 
my  knowledge,  even  by  men  occupying  very 
important  posts. 

Evidently  a  large  part  of  the  public  is  no  longer 
quite  so  ignorant  as  that.  Nevertheless,  even  for 
them  the  Austro-Hungarian  question  is  still  full  of 
obscurities.  Need  we  wonder  at  it?  The  official 
diplomatists  themselves  in  general,  whatever  their 
personal  intelligence,  have  been  able  to  acquire  but 
a  very  superficial  insight  into  the  internal  affairs  of 
the  Hapsburg  empire.  The  reasons  for  the 
deficiency  have  been  already  set  forth  (Chapter  I., 
§  3);  they  include  the  old-fashioned  means  of 
observation  and  information  which  the  diplomatists 
have  been  constrained  to  employ. 

Finally,  the  learned  men  who  have  studied 
Austria-Hungary  only  as  historians,  that  is  to  say, 
as  foreigners  and  in  books,  whatever  their  qualifica- 
tions, have  not  been  able  to  acquaint  themselves 
with  the  exact  internal  condition  of  the  country, 
which  has  been  completely  transformed,  especially 
within  the  last  ten  years.  But  it  is  just  this  present 
condition  which  it  is  important,  and  alone  important, 
to  comprehend. 

This  want  of  clear  notions  on  the  Hapsburg 
empire  involves  a  very  great  danger  for  the  Allies. 
It  has  contributed  largely  to  the  very  grave  mis- 
takes which  they  have  made  in  the  general  conduct 
of  the  war.  An  end  must  be  put  to  this  ignorance. 
In  regard  to  Austria-Hungary  the  Allies  must  on  no 
account  continue  to  commit  such  a  series  of  blunders 
as  those  which  made  up  their  policy  towards  the 
Balkans.  Their  punishment  for  such  repeated  mis- 
takes would  be  even  more  severe  than  it  has  been. 

The  only  way  of  avoiding  these  mistakes  is  to 
listen  to  the  opinions  of  the  few  men,  citizens  of  the 
Allied  states,  who  in  recent  years,  in  virtue  of  their 


it8      PANGERMAN    plot    UNMASKED 

thorough-going  studies  and  of  their  extensive  travels 
in  the  whole  of  Austria-Hungary,  have  been  able 
to  acquire  a  really  exact  and  general  knowledge  of 
the  facts  as  they  arc  at  present. 

Those  who  possess  these  qualifications  are  far 
from  numerous.  I  will  mention  first  two  Russians: 
M.  de  Wesselitsky,  correspondent  of  the  Novoe 
Vremya  in  London,  who  knows  not  only  Austria- 
Hungary,  but  all  Europe,  and  has  very  profound 
views;  and  M.  Briantchaninoff,  of  Petrograd.  I 
know  that  in  official  circles  the  ideas  of  the  latter 
gentleman  are  deemed  too  violent  or  extreme,  but 
he  is  one  of  the  few  Russians  who  have  travelled 
much  for  the  purpose  of  acquainting  themselves 
with  foreign  affairs.  A  very  intelligent  Liberal  and 
a  clearsighted  man,  he  has  for  a  very  long  time 
advocated  the  concession  by  Russia  of  the  largest 
and  the  most  genuine  autonomy  to  Poland.  His 
opinion  with  regard  to  Austria-Hungary,  which  he 
has  often  visited,  deserves  to  be  listened  to. 

Two  Englishmen  in  particular  possess  an  excellent 
knowledge  of  the  Hapsburg  empire:  Mr.  Wickham 
Steed,  foreign  editor  of  The  Times,  who  was  for  ten 
years  the  remarkable  correspondent  of  that  power- 
ful organ  at  Vienna;  Mr.  Seton- Watson,  who,  under 
the  name  of  Scotus  Viator,  has  published,  within  the 
last  ten  years,  the  results  of  his  manifold  inquiries 
in  works  of  the  highest  value  dealing  with  the 
nationalities  subject  to  the  German-Magyar  yoke. 

In  France  we  find  M.  Louis  Leger,  Member  of  the 
Institute,*  who  for  fifty-one  years  past,  has  devoted 
special  study  to  all  the  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  knows  them  thoroughly.  Further,  M.  Ernest 
Denis,  professor  at  the  Sorbonne,  has  written  a 
remarkable  history  of  Bohemia.  In  studying  on 
the  spot  for  the  purpose  of  writing  this  book,  he  has 

*  He    has    published    an    excellent    pamphlet    with    the    significant 
title,  The  Liquidation  of  Austria-Hungary.     Felix  Alcan,  Paris. 


THE    CRUCIAL   POINT  119 

acquired  a  very  full  knowledge  of  the  Czech  nation, 
which  by  its  geographical  position  in  Bohemia  and 
Moravia,  forms  the  indispensable  basis  of  every 
reconstitution  of  Austria-Hungary  in  a  modern 
form.  Finally,  may  I  be  allowed  to  cite  myself,  since 
for  twenty-two  years,  by  a  series  of  manifold 
inquiries  on  the  spot,  I  have  endeavoured  to  under- 
stand in  their  detail  the  very  complex  problems 
which  form  the  Austro-Hungarian  question  ? 

Now,  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  these  men,  who 
have  thoroughly  studied  Austria-Hungary,  and 
whom  therefore  we  ought  to  trust,  are  agreed  on  the 
general  lines  of  the  policy  which  the  Allies  should 
pursue  in  regard  to  the  Hapsburg  monarchy.  I 
think  that  I  am  not  mistaken  when  I  say  that  the 
opinions  which  I  am  about  to  express  are  on  the 
whole  in  harmony  with  the  views  of  these  gentlemen. 

Let  us  first  understand  that  those  who  still  up- 
hold the  doctrine  of  the  maintenance  of  Austria- 
Hungary  as  she  is,  that  is,  in  subjection  to  the 
Hapsburg  dynasty,  are  at  least  twenty  years  behind 
their  time.  To  adopt  this  solution  would  be  to 
play  the  German  game;  for  it  is  practically  im- 
possible to  separate  the  Hapsburgs  from  the 
Hohenzollerns.  It  would  establish  the  Germanic 
yoke  on  the  Slav  and  Latin  subjects  of  the  Hapsburgs, 
thus  facilitating  the  accomplishment  of  the  scheme 
"from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf." 

Finally,  the  Hapsburg  dynasty  has  given  too 
many  proofs  of  its  incapacity,  its  duplicity,  and  its 
submissiveness  to  the  suggestions  of  Berlin,  to  allow 
us  to  consider  seriously  its  maintenance  at  the  head 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  peoples. 

In  no  way  must  the  Allies  be  dupes  of  the  comedy 
which  the  Pangermans  of  Berlin,  Vienna,  and 
Budapest  are  getting  up  now  in  order  to  profit  iDy  the 
ignorance  of  the  Allies  as  to  Austro-Hungarian  facts. 

All    the    measures     tending    to     force    Austria- 


I20      PANGERIMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

Hungar}'  into  the  German  Zollverein,  which  would 
make  its  political  absorption  inevitable,  must  be 
looked  upon  as  a  farce,  a  simple  act  of  criminal 
violence  done  to  the  wishes  of  the  immense  majority 
of  the  populations  in  the  Hapsburg  monarchy.  So 
true  is  this,  that  certain  Magyar  noblemen,  who  up 
to  the  present  have  been  decided  allies  of  Berlin,  are 
already  uttering  protests  against  the  Prussian  yoke, 
understanding  at  last  that  it  is  to  be  imposed  upon 
them.  Count  Theodore  Batthyany,  vice-president 
of  the  Independent  Left  of  the  Hungarian  Chamber, 
declared  at  the  end  of  March,  1916:  "It  is  often 
said  among  us  that  the  future  Customs-Union 
would  create  in  our  country  better  economical 
conditions.  This  is  much  more  true  for  Germany, 
who  will  hold  both  the  reins  and  the  whip  in  the 
combination.  .  .  .  Besides  the  Germans  make  no 
secret  of  it  that  in  the  proposed  compact  there  will 
be  other  agricultural  states  which  will  be  our  future 
competitors  (in  allusion  to  Turkey  and  the  Balkan 
States).  Certainly,  from  the  time  that  the  union 
is  concluded,  all  capital  will  come  to  us  from  Ger- 
many and  never  from  elsewhere.  The  Germans 
will  have  the  monopoly  of  capital  among  us,  and 
you  know  what  a  monopoly  is  and  what  it  costs. 
The  money  will  cost  us  dear"  {Le  Temps,  ist 
February,  1916). 

In  Austria,  M.  Nemetz,  President  of  the  Chamber 
of  Commerce  at  Prague,  declared:  "None  of  the 
arguments  adduced  in  favour  of  a  Customs-Union 
with  Germany  will  for  a  moment  bear  the  light  of 
criticism.  An  insuperable  obstacle  is  opposed  to 
an  intimate  Customs-Union  between  the  two 
empires:  their  interests  are  not  identical  but  on 
the  contrary  competitive"  (quoted  by  Le  Temps, 
9th  February,  1916). 

These  categorical  declarations  prove  what  resis- 
tance   the    Pangerman    manoeuvre    has    already    to 


THE    CRUCIAL    POINT  121 

encounter.  The  Allies  have  much  to  gain  from 
these  statements,  for  they  prove  the  reality  of  the 
deep  opposition  existing  between  the  interests  of 
Pangerman  Germany  and  those  of  the  majority  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  peoples. 

But  there  remains  an  essential  point  to  prove,  for 
it  gives  rise  to  special  anxiety  in  the  minds  of  that 
part  of  the  public  in  the  Allied  countries  which 
still  harps  on  the  false  idea  that  Austro-Hungary 
-S  a  specially  German  country.  This  section  of  the 
public  doubts  whether  the  application  of  the 
principle  of  nationalities,  which  the  Allies  demand, 
would  not  have  the  effect  of  necessarily  and  con- 
siderably increasing  Germany  by  incorporating  in 
it  the  Germans  of  the  Hapsburg  empire. 

It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  demonstrate  by 
means  of  figures  and  accurate  geographical  and 
ethnographical  arguments  that  this  fear  is  quite 
chimerical.  Austria-Hungary  contains  all  the  ele- 
ments of  a  new  State  which  can  be  constituted  on 
just  and  lasting  foundations,  and  under  such  condi- 
tions that  it  would  form  for  the  future  an  insur- 
mountable barrier  to  Pangermanism.  It  is  there, 
as  we  shall  see,  on  the  road  from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  in  Central  Europe,  and  nowhere  else 
that  we  shall  find  the  solution  of  the  problem  set  to 
the  world  by  the  hateful  ambition  of  the  Hohen- 
zollerns. 

III. 

Let  us  examine  in  figures  what  would  be  the 
result  in  Central  Europe  of  the  application  of  the 
principle  of  nationalities,  which  ought  to  form  the 
moral  base  of  the  Allies  for  the  reconstitution  of 
future  Europe.  The  French  Socialist  Congress  at 
the  end  of  1915,  in  my  opinion,  gave  an  excellent 
definition  of  the  principle  of  nationalities  as  we  see 
it  at  work  in  the  present  war.     The  manifesto  of 


122      PANGERMAX    PLOT   UNMASKED 

the  Congress  declared:  "No  durable  peace  unless 
the  small  martyrized  nations  are  restored  to  their 
political  and  economic  independence.  .  .  .  No  dur- 
able peace  unless  the  oppressed  populations  of 
Europe  have  restored  to  them  the  liberty  of  shaping 
their  own  destinies"  {VHu7nanite,  30th  December, 

1915)- 

As  nothing  in  this  world  is  absolute,  it  is  clear  that 

the  principle  of  nationalities  cannot  always  receive 
in  practice  a  complete  application.  In  order  to 
constitute  States  with  a  potentiality  of  life,  we  must 
take  into  account  not  only  the  nationalities  but  also 
the  strategical,  defensive,  historical,  and  economical 
needs  of  the  majority.  There  are  besides  countries 
like  Macedonia  and  like  certain  regions  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  where  the  nationalities  are  so  inter- 
mingled that  the  application  of  the  principle  of 
nationality  can  only  be  relative. 

On  the  other  hand,  sacrifices  must  sometimes  be 
made  at  the  cost  of  the  principle  of  nationalities 
for  the  sake  of  the  general  European  interest. 
Thus,  for  example,  France  cannot  think  of  incorpor- 
ating those  who  speak  French  in  Belgium  and 
Switzerland.  The  first  of  those  people  wish  to 
remain  Belgians  and  the  second  wish  to  remain 
Swiss.  Their  wish  must  be  all  the  more  respected 
since  the  maintenance  of  the  Belgian  state  and  of 
the  Swiss  state  is  necessary  to  the  balance  and  the 
peace  of  Europe.  There  are,  moreover,  other  parts 
of  the  continent  where  this  consideration  outweighs 
the  principle  of  nationalities. 

Having  given  these  explanations  and  made  these 
reservations,  let  us  see  what  would  be  obtained  in 
the  main  by  the  application  of  the  principle  of 
nationalities  to  the  German  empire.  In  virtue  of 
this  principle  the  Germans  ought  to  restore  liberty 
to  those  peoples  who  are  included  by  force  within 
their  boundaries,  that  is  to  say  about 


THE  CRUCIAL  POINT  123 

Inhabitants. 
Poles        . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .     5,000,000 

Inhabitants  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  ..  ..     1,500,000 

Danes       . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .        200,000 


Total  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .     6,700,000 

The  Germany  of  to-day,  which  numbered  68 
millions  of  inhabitants  in  1914,  including  the  non- 
Germans,  would  be  brought  down  to  about 
61,300,000,  in  round  figures,  61,000,000  of  genuine 
Germans. 

But  the  logical  application  of  the  principle  of 
nationalities  would  give  to  that  Germany  the 
liberty  of  absorbing  those  Germans  of  the  Hapsburg 
monarchy  who  on  historical,  strategical,  and 
geographical  grounds  can  be  legitimately  added  to 
Germany  after  its  reduction  from  68  to  61  millions 
of  inhabitants.     What  would  be  the  result? 

Let  us  look  back  to  p.  32  and  examine  the  map 
which  sums  up  the  ethnographical  situation  of 
Austria-Hungary.  On  this  map  the  Slav  and  Latin 
nationalities  subject  to  the  Hapsburgs,  named  in 
the  margin,  are  indicated  by  different  shadings. 
The  region  inhabited  by  Germans  and  that  in- 
habited by  the  Magyars  have  been  left  blank.  The 
two  last  ethnographic  groups  are  separated  by  a 
dotted  line.  This  map  only  gives  a  very  imperfect 
idea  of  the  ethnographic  facts,  because  it  is  drawn 
from  ethnographic  documents  which  are  German 
and  Magyar,  and  which  are  purposely  falsified.  In 
reality  the  Slav  regions  are  a  good  deal  more  exten- 
sive than  is  indicated  by  the  blank  zones  (Germans 
and  Magyars).  This  is  particularly  true  in  the 
blank  zone  to  the  north  and  north-west  of  the 
purely  Czech  region. 

Vienna,  which,  however,  is  in  the  centre  of  a 
perfectly  blank  zone,  is  by  no  means,  as  is  generally 
believed,  a  purely  German  city.  Her  population 
is  Slav  to  the  amount  of  about  one-third  (Poles  and 


124      PAXGERMAX    PLOT    UXMASKED 

c'.si)eciall3-  Czechs).  This  fact,  which  is  certain,  is 
yet  not  recognized  by  any  official  Austrian  statistics, 
because  these  are  drawn  up  by  German  function- 
aries who  have  orders  to  falsify  them.  Their 
principal  mode  of  garbling  the  figures  is  as  follows: 

In  the  whole  of  Austria  every  Slav  or  Latin,  who 
merely  knows  a  few  words  of  German,  is  styled, 
much  against  his  own  will,  a  German.  Now,  all 
the  Slavs  who  live  in  Vienna  know  a  few  words  of 
German.  This  allows  the  German  statisticians  of 
the  Austrian  Government  to  conclude  that  there 
are  no  Slavs  in  Vienna,  and  to  set  down  the  number 
of  the  Slavs  in  all  the  rest  of  Austria  at  a  figure  con- 
siderably below  the  truth. 

In  Hungary  the  statistics  are  garbled  with  the 
same  effrontery  by  the  functionaries  of  the  Buda- 
pest government  in  favour  of  the  Magyar  element. 

The  following,  however,  are  the  results  given  for 
the  whole  of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  by  the  official 
Germano-Magyar  statistics  in  the  census  of  1910: 

Round  figures  in  tens 
Austria.  of  thousands. 

•  ■  9,950,000 
. .  6,440,000 
. .     4,970,000 

•  •     3,520,000 
1,260,000 

790,000 
770,000 
280,000 


Germans    . . 

Czechs 

Poles 

Ruthenians 

Slovenes     .  . 

Serbo-Croatians 

Italians 

Roumanians 

Total  . . 

Magyars     . . 

Roumanians 

Serbo-Croatians 

Germans    . . 

Slovaks 

Ruthenians 


Hungary 


27,980,000 

10,050,000 
2,950,000 
2,940,000 
2,040,000 
1,970,000 
480,000 


Total  . .            .  .            .  .            . .            . .  . .  20,430,000 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
Serbo-Croatians     (orthodox,    or    Moslems    of  Ser- 
bian origin)         . .            . .            . .            . .  .  .     2,000,000 


THE    CRUCIAL   POINT  125 

According  to  these  figures  there  are  12  millions  of 
Germans  in  the  Hapsburg  empire,  but  we  shall  see 
that  not  nearly  all  these  12  millions  of  Germans 
could  be  united  to  Germany.     In  fact: 

1.  As  the  table  shows,  rather  more  than  two 
millions  of  Germans  are  in  Hungary,  where  they  are 
scattered  in  small  groups  among  the  other  nationali- 
ties. They  could  not  therefore  be  united  to 
Germany. 

2.  Out  of  the  10  millions,  roughly  speaking,  of 
Germans  in  Austria,  those  of  Bohemia,  to  the  north 
and  north-west  of  the  purely  Czech  zone,  could  not 
be  united  to  Germany,  because  in  that  zone  they 
are  mixed  up  with  numerous  Czechs,  and  because 
the  dotted  line,  which  on  the  map  (p.  68)  separates 
Bohemia  from  the  German  empire  of  to-day,  repre- 
sents the  historical  and  strategical  boundaries  of  the 
kingdom  of  Bohemia.  Now  it  would  be  impossible 
without  these  boundaries  to  assure  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  Czecho-Slovaks.  Clearly  we  could 
not  think  of  sacrificing  nearly  9  millions  of  Czecho- 
slovaks to  I  million  of  Germans  in  Bohemia, 
especially  as  these  same  Germans  simply  squatted  in 
the  country  long  ago  by  sheer  violence  and  fraud. 

3.  By  this  fact  the  10  millions  of  Germans,  who 
might  seem  to  be  eligible  for  incorporation  in 
Germany,  are  reduced  to  about  9  millions.  These 
form  on  the  map  the  blank  group  which  stretches 
from  Switzerland  to  the  dotted  line  which  marks 
the  Magyar  ethnographical  boundary.  But  there 
are  serious  reasons  for  thinking  that  were  a  thorough 
investigation  made  of  the  ethnographical  facts,  that 
is  to  say,  of  the  mixture  of  Slavs  and  Germans  to  the 
east  of  this  group,  and  consequently  between  the 
purely  Czech  group  to  the  north  of  Vienna  and  the 
purely  Slovene  group  to  the  south  of  Vienna,  the 
result  of  such  an  investigation  would  be  to  show 
that   this   German  group   could   not  in  its  entirety 


126      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

be  united  to  Germany.  As  it  would  be  out  of  the 
question  here  to  enter  into  these  very  difficult 
ethnographical  details,  we  shall,  under  all  possible 
reserve,  and  purely  for  the  convenience  of  demon- 
stration, make  the  supposition  that  the  whole  of 
this  German  group  should  be  united  to  Germany. 
But  from  these  9  millions  of  Germans  we  should 
certainly  still  have  to  subtract  the  Slavs  who  are 
included  in  this  figure  through  the  systematic 
garbling  of  the  Austrian  statistics.  The  typical 
example  of  the  city  of  Vienna,  cited  above,  proves 
this  necessity.  As  this  deception  is  practised  on  an 
enormous  scale  at  the  expense  of  the  Slavs,  we  may 
allow  that  the  true  number  of  Germans  in  this  part 
of  Austria  who  could  be  geographically  incorporated 
in  Germany,  amounts  to  not  more  than  7  or  8 
millions.  Let  us  take  this  last  figure.  If  these  8 
millions  of  Germans  were  incorporated  in  Germany, 
then  Germany  of  to-day,  reduced  for  the  reasons 
indicated  on  p.  123  to  61  millions,  would  be  en- 
larged, at  the  expense  of  Austria,  by  8  millions  of 
inhabitants.  She  would  then  have  a  total  of  69 
millions  of  inhabitants. 

Therefore,  as  the  present  German  empire  had  in 
1914  a  population  of  68  millions  of  inhabitants,  we 
see  that  the  application  of  the  principle  of  nationali- 
ties would  allow  Germany  to  gain  on  the  south- 
west just  about  the  equivalent  of  what  the  same 
principle  would  take  from  her  on  the  circumference 
of  the  existing  empire. 

Would  a  Germany  of  69  or  70  millions  of  genuine 
Germans  be  really  dangerous  for  Europe?  I  do 
not  think  so,  for,  as  we  shall  see,  the  application 
of  the  principle  of  nationalities  would  have  the 
effect  of  withdrawing  totally  from  the  influence  of 
Berlin's  Pangermanism  all  the  rest  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Austria-Hungary. 

In  fact,  if  out  of  the  50  millions  of  inhabitants  in 


THE    CRUCIAL   POINT  127 

Austria-Hungary  of  to-day  about  8  millions  joined 
Germany,  42  millions  of  Austro-Hungarian  subjects 
would  remain.     Of  this  number: 

Five  millions  of  Poles  would  join  Poland; 

Four  millions  of  Ruthenians  would  join  Russia; 

Three  millions  of  Roumanians  would  join 
Roumania; 

One  million  of  Italians  would  join  Italy; 

Making  a  total  of  13  millions  of  inhabitants. 

There  would  therefore  remain  a  compact  group 
composed  of  29  millions  of  inhabitants,  made  up  of 
Czech-Slovaks,  Magyars,  and  Germans,  these  last 
diluted  in  the  solid  mass  of  Magyars  and  Serbo- 
Croatians.  As  the  Magyars  and  Serbo-Croatians 
wish  to  unite  with  the  5  million  Serbians  of 
Serbia,  we  thus  deduce  the  presence  in  Central 
Europe  of  a  mass  of  34  million  inhabitants,  con- 
taining an  infinitesimal  proportion  of  Germans 
and  so  situated  geographically  that  they  could 
perfectly  form  United  States,  in  which  the  rights 
of  each  nationality  and  the  form  of  government  of 
each  State  would  be  respected,  and  which,  neverthe- 
less, would  constitute  an  economic  territory  exten- 
sive enough  to  correspond  to  modern  needs. 

The  obstacle  to  the  creation  of  such  United 
States  might  seem  to  be  the  reluctance  of  the 
Magyars,  who  at  present  play  the  German  game,  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  the  neighbouring 
nationalities.  This  objection  disappears  when  we 
know  what  is  unfortunately  known  to  none  but  a 
small  number  of  experts.  Out  of  the  10  millions  of 
Magyars,  there  are  about  9  millions  of  poor  labourers, 
almost  all  agricultural,  cynically  exploited  by  the 
Magyar  nobility,  who  possess  nearly  all  the  land. 
Now  it  is  these  nobles,  owners  of  enormous  landed 
estates,  who,  with  the  Magyar  functionaries  whom 
they  nominate,  are  Prussophile,  and  not  even  all  of 
them  are   that.     It  must  also   be  known   that   the 


128      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

9  millions  of  Magyar  proletariat  are  not  so  much  as 
represented  in  the  parliament  at  Budapest,  for 
elections  in  Hungary  are  neither  more  nor  less  than 
barefaced  swindles  practised  for  the  benefit  of  the 
million  Magyars  who  sweat  their  poor  compatriots. 
Now  these  9  millions  of  unhappy  peasants  by  no 
means  love  the  Prussians.  More  than  that,  they 
are  quite  ready  to  fraternize  with  the  other  dem- 
ocratic masses  represented  by  the  nationalities 
which  surround  them.  Therefore,  on  the  day  when 
the  true  Magyar  people  shall  be  delivered  from  the 
feudal  nobility  who  oppress  them,  and  shall  become 
in  their  turn  masters  of  their  own  destinies,  they  will 
certainly  not  stand  out  against  the  creation  of  the 
United  States  here  adumbrated.  I  am  quite  sure 
of  the  popular  feeling  on  this  subject,  for  on  my  last 
visits  to  Budapest  I  was  able  to  put  myself  in 
communication  with  the  leaders  of  the  Magyar 
democratic  organizations.  It  was  thus  that  I 
learned  that  even  before  the  war  they  had  been 
trying  to  find  a  basis  for  a  mutual  understanding 
with  the  other  Slav  nationalities  of  Hungary.  So 
strong  indeed  was  this  tendency  that  it  furnished 
the  nefarious  Count  Tisza  with  a  motive  for  declar- 
ing war  in  order  to  elude  the  democratic  movement, 
which  threatened  the  privileges  of  the  Magyar 
nobility,  of  which  he  is  one  of  the  leaders. 

In  short,  we  may  conclude  that  there  is  in 
Austria-Hungary  and  in  Serbia  a  mass  of  34 
millions  of  inhabitants,  who  are  practically  free 
from  Germanic  elements  and  could  form  in  Central 
Europe  a  confederacy  of  United  States  that  might 
in  time  develop  into  the  United  States  of  Europe. 

Thus  there  undoubtedly  exist  all  the  ethno- 
graphical elements  which  could  render  possible  the 
erection  in  Central  Europe  of  a  very  powerful 
triple  barrier  against  every  aggressive  revival  of 
Pangermanism    (see   p.    43).     The   erection    of    this 


THE    CRUCIAL   POINT  129 

barrier  would  form  the  solution  of  the  great  problem 
set  us  by  the  Pangerman  peril.  It  would  free  for 
ever  numerous  nationalities  from  the  Prussian 
yoke.  It  would  coincide  not  only  with  the  interests 
of  all  the  Allies,  but  also  with  those  of  the  whole 
world.  For  as  I  hope  to  prove  in  Chapter  IX,  the 
inhabitants  of  both  South  and  North  America 
would  be  not  less  vitally  affected  than  the  European 
Allies  and  Japan  by  the  achievement  of  the  scheme 
"from  Hamburg   to   the  Persian   Gulf." 

Therefore,  the  necessary  but  sufficient  backbone 
of  the  Pangerman  plan,  as  represented  by  the 
formula  ''Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  can  be 
certainly  destroyed  in  Central  Europe  and  there 
only.  The  net  result  is  that  the  question  of  Austria- 
Hungary  constitutes  the  crucial  point  of  a  problem 
which  is  not  only  European  but  universal,  set  to  all 
the  civilized  States  by  the  war  which  Prussianized 
Germany  has  initiated  and  by  the  execrable 
ambition  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 

The  question  of  Austria-Hungary  has  besides  an 
aspect  of  social  and  universal  interest,  which  the 
Liberals  and  Socialists  of  Allied  or  neutral  countries 
have  not  yet  perhaps  sufficiently  contemplated. 
The  supremacy  of  Germany  over  Austria-Hungary 
would  have,  in  fact,  a  social  consequence  of  infinite 
importance:  a  new  lease  of  crushing  and  strength- 
ened power  would  be  ensured  to  the  German- 
Austrian  aristocracy,  to  the  Magyar  aristocracy  of 
Hungary,  to  the  German  aristocracy  of  the  German 
empire,  and  above  all  to  the  execrable  Prussian 
Junkers,  who  are  principally  responsible  for  the 
war.  This  great  and  insolent  triumph  of  the 
Junker  spirit,  supported  by  the  means  of  universal 
domination  which  would  be  put  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Berlin  government  as  a  consequence  of  the 
accomplishment  of  the  scheme  ''from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  would  have  a  disastrous  after- 


I30       PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

effect  by  repressing  those  democratic  and  liberal 
movements,  which  are  at  present  developing 
legitimately  and  necessarily,  not  only  in  the  Allied 
countries  but  in  the  whole  world.  Finally,  it  would 
entail  fresh  revolutionary  crises,  causing  disturb- 
ances which  it  is  of  serious  interest  to  avoid,  lest 
ideas  of  social  justice  should  lose  the  vantage  ground 
of  liberty  which  they  have  so  painfully  conquered. 
These  considerations,  therefore,  lead  us  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  final  liberation  of  all  the  Latin 
and  Slav  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  from  the 
German  yoke  is  a  matter  of  universal  social  interest. 
In  fact,  it  constitutes  an  essential  condition  of  the 
progress  of  liberal  ideas,  of  the  pacific  development 
and  organization  of  democracy  in  the  whole  world. 


CHAPTER  VIL 

THE  BALKANS  AND  THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN. 

I.     The  connexion  between  the  Pangerman  plan  and  the  plan 

of  Bulgarian  supremacy. 
II.     Greece  and  the  Pangerman  ambitions. 
^11.     Roumania  and  the  Pangerman  plan. 

fn  virtue  of  the  geographical  position  which  they 
occupy  in  the  zone  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf,"  the  Balkan  States  are  of  extreme  importance 
for  the  making  or  the  marring  of  the  whole  Pan- 
german plan.  Moreover,  events  have  proved  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  most  sceptical  the  influence 
which  these  States  exert  on  the  issue  of  the  struggle. 
Public  opinion,  therefore,  both  in  Allied  and  neutral 
countries,  should  note  very  clearly  the  intimate 
relation  which  exists  between  the  Balkan  factors 
and  the  universal  Pangerman  plan. 

I  can  here  touch  only  on  the  fundamental  Balkan 
factors,  those  that  have  a  durable  and  permanent 
character,  not  on  the  attitude  of  certain  governments 
in  the  Eastern  peninsula.  That  attitude  for  the  last 
year  has  been  singularly  vacillating.  It  shifts,  in 
fact,  under  the  action  of  those  parasitic  German 
influences  which,  through  the  dynastic  ties  of  the 
reigning  families,  backed  by  the  threats  of  Berlin, 
sway  these  governments  in  opposition  to  the 
national  interests  which  it  is  their  bounden  duty  to 
defend.  Moreover,  simple  justice  compels  us  to 
acknowledge,  that  the  diplomatic  mistakes  made 
by  the  Allies,  especially  in  1915,  in  consequence  of 
their  imperfect  acquaintance  with  Balkan  facts, 
has  been  singularly  favourable  to  tht  success  of  the 
German  influences. 

131 


132      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

Thus,  for  example,  at  Athens,  the  present 
Cabinet,  formed  after  the  arbitrary  dissolution  of 
the  Greek  parliament,  and  therefore  destitute  of  all 
constitutional  authority,  has  been  instigated  by 
King  Constantine,  brother-in-law  of  the  Emperor 
William  II.,  to  persevere  in  a  policy  which  all 
influential  Greeks  who  are  free  to  speak  their  minds 
regard  as  disastrous  to  the  true  interests  of  Hellen- 
ism. Similarly  at  Bukarest  the  attitude  of  the 
Bratiano  cabinet  is  subjected  by  eminent  Rou- 
manians to  searching  criticism.  Thus  La 
Rotima7iie,  the  organ  of  M.  Take  Jonescu,  speaking 
of  the  commercial  agreement  between  Germany  and 
Roumania,  has  recently  said:  "This  agreement 
makes  Roumania  the  dupe  of  Germany"  *  (see  Le 
Journal,  20th  April,  191 6).  The  final  decision  of 
certain  Balkan  governments  is,  therefore,  for  the 
moment  still  in  suspense,  but  whatever  it  may  be, 
each  of  the  Balkan  peoples  would  infallibly  see  its 
future  interests  thwarted  or  menaced  by  the  triumph 
of  the  Pangerman  plan.  It  is  important  to  clear 
up  these  prospects.  So  far  as  Montenegro  and 
Serbia  are  concerned,  any  discussion  would  be 
superfluous,  so  evident  is  it  that  a  German  victory 
would  mean  for  these  two  States  their  definite  and 
final  disappearance. 

I. 

It  is  otherwise  with  Bulgaria.  Indeed,  the  key 
of  the  whole  Balkan  situation  lies  in  the  plan  of  a 
Bulgarian  supremacy,  which,  as  we  shall  see,  is 
closely  bound  up,  at  least  in  principle,  with  the 
Pangerman  plan. 

It  was  said  long  ago  that  the  Bulgarians  are  the 
Prussians  of  the  East.     Now  it  is  just  their  fixed 

*  Since   this   was  said,   Roumania  has  joined   the   Entente  Powers 
in  the  war.     Translator's  Note. 


THE    BALKANS 


133 


idea  of  achieving  at  any  cost  their  dream  of  dominat- 
ing the  Balkans  which  has  led  the  Bulgarians  to 
throw  in  their  lot  with  Berlin,  without  perceiving 
that,  though  they  might  benefit  by  the  first  phase 
of  this  combination,  they  would  finally  fall  victims 
to  Pangermanism. 

The     pretensions     of     Bulgaria     to     supremacy, 
though    even    less    has    been    known    about    them 


c-T-T^  Parties  deja  dehvrees  par 
^-^  lei  Bulgares 

Parties  non  deli  vreespar 
les  Bulgares 


GREAT  BULGARIA. 

than  about  the  Pangerman  plan,  are  nevertheless 
relatively  old,  as  is  conclusively  proved  by  the 
following  facts: 

The  map  printed  above  is  a  document  of  the 
highest  importance,  for  it  enables  us  to  detect  the 
real  policy,  first  of  Bulgaria,  and  next  of  the  other 
Balkan  States.  This  map  is  an  exact  translation 
and  reproduction  of  the  map  which  is  to  be  found 


134      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

on  p.  56  of  the  historical  part  of  a  book  published  in 
Bulgarian  at  Sofia  and  called:  The  Soldier^ s  Com- 
panion, Manual  for  the  Soldiers  of  all  arms.  This  is 
an  official  work  of  propaganda  in  the  army,  and 
therefore  in  the  whole  Bulgarian  people,  since 
all  Bulgarians  go  through  the  ranks;  and  it 
was  published  in  obedience  to  order  No.  76  of 
March  14th,  1907,  issued  by  the  Bulgarian  Ministry 
of  War,  approved  and  authorized  by  the  Chief  of 
the  Headquarters  Staff  of  the  Bulgarian  army. 
This  manual  has  been  recommended  by  the  Bul- 
garian Ministry  of  War,  in  circular  No.  28  of  March 
2ist,  1907.  Hence  we  are  confronted  with  an  offi- 
cial Bulgarian  book  dating  from  1907,  which  proves 
very  clearly  beyond  the  possibility  of  dispute  the 
ideas  which  have  been  systematically  instilled  into 
the  whole  Bulgarian  people  for  at  least  nine  years. 

In  this  map,  entitled  Great  Bulgaria,  which  is 
coloured  in  the  eighth  edition  of  the  Bulgarian 
original,  the  part  said  to  be  "already  set  free  by 
the  Bulgarians"  is  coloured  pink  (represented  by 
large  hatchings  on  our  map),  and  the  parts  said  to 
be  "not  set  free  by  the  Bulgarians"  are  coloured 
red  (represented  by  closer  hatchings  on  our  map). 
This  official  Bulgarian  document  helps  us  to  under- 
stand, both  what  happened  in  the  Balkan  wars, 
and  the  conduct  of  the  government  of  Sofia  during 
the   European  war. 

In  fact,  when  in  191 2  the  Bulgarians  entered  into 
an  alliance  with  the  Greeks  and  Serbians  against 
Turkey,  they  were  not  even  then  true  to  their 
Allies.  At  that  time  they  had  a  very  low  opinion 
of  the  Greeks  and  Serbians  as  soldiers.  But  they 
thought  it  very  expedient  to  employ  the  forces  of 
these  nations  against  the  principal  enemy,  Turkey, 
intending  afterwards  to  settle  accounts  with  their 
temporary  allies  by  means  of  the  increase  of  power 
which    they    expected    to    gain    at    the    expense    of 


THE   BALKANS  135 

Turkey.  As  these  intentions  were  suspected  at 
Belgrade  and  Athens,  it  may  easily  be  conceived 
that  from  the  very  beginning  of  their  joint  action 
the  Greek  and  Serbian  governments  did  not  repose 
full  confidence  in  that  of  Sofia.  The  distrust  of  the 
Greeks  and  Serbians  was,  moreover,  thoroughly 
aroused  when  King  Ferdinand,  before  he  allowed 
his  troops  to  hurl  themselves  against  the  lines 
of  Chataldja,  disclosed  his  claim  to  enter  Con- 
stantinople, with  the  evident  intention  of  staying 
there  if  he  could. 

Given  the  Bulgarian  claims  in  the  west,  which  are 
set  forth  in  our  map,  we  can  further  explain  why 
in  1913  the  Bulgarians,  whose  character  is  hard 
and  unyielding,  refused  all  compromise  when 
the  Serbians,  excluded  by  Europe  from  the  Adriatic, 
demanded  from  the  Bulgarians  an  equitable  com- 
pensation to  the  south  of  Uskub. 

Moreover,  always  instigated  by  their  desire  of 
supremacy,  and  stirred  up  by  Vienna  and  Berlin, 
the  Bulgarians  thought  that  the  moment  had  come 
to  annihilate  the  Serbians  and  Greeks.  So  they  made 
the  sudden  attack  of  June  17-30,  1913,  on  their 
former  allies.  But  the  wary  Serbians  and  Greeks 
were  ready  for  the  encounter.  Roumania,  as  little 
inclined  to  tolerate  Bulgarian  supremacy  as  Greece 
or  Serbia,  marched  her  troops  to  within  ten  kilo- 
metres of  Sofia.  The  Bulgarians  were  crushed  by 
the  Serbians  at  Bregalnitza,  and  were  compelled  to 
sign,  on  August  loth,  1913,  the  treaty  of  Bukarest. 
But  from  that  moment,  animated  by  a  boundless 
hatred  of  their  conquerors,  they  had  but  one  desire, 
and  that  was  to  take  vengeance  on  the  victors,  one 
after  the  other,  and  above  all  to  destroy  the  treaty 
of    Bukarest   at    the    first    favourable    opportunity. 

Hence 

1°.  The  treaties  made  by  Sofia  with  Berlin 
and     Constantinople,     before    April,     1914,     as  M. 


136      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

Radoslavoff  has  disclosed  (see  Ilavas,  quoted  by 
Le  Petit  Parisien,  26th  March,  19 16,  and  Le  Temps, 
loth  April,  1916). 

2°.  Bulgaria's  participation  in  the  European 
war  on  the  side  of  Germany,  whose  plans  for  the 
future,  like  the  Bulgarian  ambitions,  were  threatened 
by  the  consequence  of  the  treaty  of  Bukarest  {see 
Chapter  II,  §  i). 

9 

An  examination  of  the  Bulgarian  map,  which 
serves  us  as  a  document,  proves  that  the  Bulgarian 
pretentions  to  supremacy,  like  those  of  Panger- 
manism,  aim  at  absorbing,  regardless  of  language 
or  race,  the  regions  whose  possession  is  deemed 
useful  to  Bulgaria.  Thus  the  rapacious  doctrine 
of  the  Bulgarians  is  absolutely  identical  with 
that  of  the  Prussians.  This  identity  has 
facihtated  the  understanding  between  the  two 
peoples.  In  fact,  the  Great  Bulgaria  of  our  ofhcial 
document  of  1907  (see  the  map  on  p.  133)  includes 
the  following:  the  Roumanian  Dobrudja  as  far  as 
Galatz  and  Suhna,  on  which  clearly  the  Bulgarians 
can  lay  no  justifiable  claim;  the  shores  of  the 
^gean  Sea;  the  territory  from  Serres  to  Gumuld- 
jina,  where  the  Greek  element  is  dominant;  the 
region  of  Nisch,  which  is  Serbian;  the  region  of 
Prizrend,  which  had  been  recognized  as  Serbian  by 
the  Bulgarians  themselves  in  their  treaty  of 
alhance  with  the  Serbians  in  191 2.  As  to  the  region 
of  Uskub  as  far  as  Lake  Ochrida,  near  Albania,  the 
Bulgarians  in  their  treaty  with  the  Serbians 
admitted  it  to  be  disputable.  Its  allotment  was  to 
be  referred  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Emperor  of 
Russia,  which  the  Bulgarians  never  seriously 
desired,  and  to  which  they  opposed  a  soHd 
obstacle  by  their  attack  on   the  Serbians  in  June, 


THE   BALKANS 


137 


1913.  Lastly,  the  region  south  of  Uskub,  that  is, 
the  portion  of  Macedonia  which  forms  the  south 
of  the  present  Serbia,  requires  a  detailed  exposi- 
tion by  itself.  This  is  essential,  for  concerning 
Serbian  Macedonia  many  misconceptions  have 
been  propagated  by  the  Allied  Press  and  have 
been  the  source  of  the  mistakes  committed  by 
the  Allies  in  the  Balkans  in  191 5.  It  is  therefore 
absolutely  necessary  to  correct  these  misconcep- 
tions, if  the  AlHes  would  avoid  falling  into  fresh 
mistakes  in  the  Balkans,  for  which  they  would 
again  have  to  pay  a  heavy  price. 


\  ^  oKustencfil 

I     ^^ 

Slip  ^  ^Ji 


LASERBIE  MACEDONIENNE 


SERBIAN  MACEDONIA. 

In  short,  to  look  the  difficulties  clearly  in  the  face, 
we  must  answer  the  question.  Is  the  south  of  Serbia 
Bulgarian?  (see  the  map,  above). 

The  territory  in  the  south  of  Serbia  on  which 
divergent  opinions  have  been  expressed  is  repre- 
sented with  tolerable  exactness: 

1°.  By  a  triangle  of  which  the  apex  lies  a  little 
to  the  north  of  Veles,  and  of  which  the  other  angles 


138      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

are  formed  by  Guevgheli  on  the  east  and  Lake 
Ochrida  on  the  west. 

2°.  By  a  strip  of  territory  which  lies  to  the  east 
of  this  triangle,  and  which,  between  the  left  bank 
of  the  Vardar  and  Bulgaria,  contains  the  regions  of 
Kotchana,  Stip,  and  Stroutmitza-gare.  The  Bul- 
garians contend  that  all  the  territory  formed  by 
this  triangle  and  this  lateral  strip  is  incontestably 
Bulgarian;  last  year  some  Allied  writers  supported 
this  contention.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  said,  the 
treaty  of  San  Stefano  (1878)  assigned  to  Bulgaria 
what  is  now  the  south  of  Serbia.  They  forgot  that 
in  1878  the  ethnographic  study  of  the  Ottoman 
empire  had  not  yet  begun,  and  that  at  that  time  the 
Russians  and  the  English  were  both  inclined,  for 
different  reasons,  to  consider  almost  all  the  inhabi- 
tants of  European  Turkey  as  Bulgarians,  without 
inquiry  or  distinction.  The  Russians,  who  then 
aimed  at  establishing  themselves  ultimately  in  the 
Balkans,  were  impelled  by  this  aim  to  regard  the 
Bulgarians  as  extremely  numerous.  As  for  the 
English,  burning  with  indignation  at  the  "Bul- 
garian atrocities"  of  Gladstone,  they  very  gener- 
ously thought  of  nothing  but  liberating  from  the 
Turkish  yoke  as  many  Christians  as  possible,  and 
these  in  Macedonia  were  labelled  indiscriminately 
Bulgarians. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  it  was  only  after  the  treaty  of 
San  Stefano  that  the  ethnographical  study  of 
Macedonia  was  taken  up  in  earnest.  Moreover,  it  is 
proper  to  add  that  most  of  the  writers  who  have 
discussed  the  subject  have  drawn  their  information, 
not  from  inquiries  on  the  spot,  but  from  Belgrade, 
Athens  and  Sofia.  In  these  three  centres  they 
were  supplied  with  minute  statistics,  very  well 
printed,  and  to  all  appearance  perfectly  convinc- 
ing, but  which  laboured  under  the  serious  dis- 
advantage that  they  flatly  contradicted  each  other. 


THE   BALKANS  139 

For  my  own  part,  I  acknowledged  that  I  was  not 
able  to  arrive  at  a  comparatively  clear  idea  of  the 
complicated  ethnography  of  this  part  of  Macedonia 
till  I  had  carried  out  my  inquiries  of  1914,  not  as 
before  in  the  Balkan  capitals,  but  on  the  spot,  at 
Uskub,  at  Prizrend,  at  Prichtina,  at  Monastir,  at 
Ochrida,  and  at  Strouga. 

This  inquiry,  conducted  six  months  before  the 
war,  led  me  to  the  following  conclusions.  Serbian 
Macedonia  contains  two  quite  distinct  groups  of 
population. 

1°.  The  one  is  formed  of  Turks,  Albanians, 
Kutzo-Wallachians  or  Roumanians,  Greeks,  Jews, 
and  Gipsies,  who  are  scattered  all  over  the  country. 

2°.  The  second  group  is  composed  of  the  Mace- 
donian Slavs. 

In  the  absence  of  trustworthy  statistics  it  is 
impossible  to  say  which  of  these  two  groups  is 
numerically  the  stronger.  Thus,  at  Uskub,  the 
Turks  and  the  Jews  alone  were  reckoned  as  numer- 
ous as  the  exarchists,  that  is  to  say,  as  those  who, 
attending  the  churches  and  schools  of  the  Bul- 
garian exarchate,  were  considered  to  be  Bulgarians. 

But  what  is  quite  certain  is  that  the  Serbs  and 
the  Bulgarians  are  found  in  the  second  group  of  the 
population,  that  of  the  Macedonian  Slavs.  Now 
this  group  itself  comprises  four  sections,  namely, 
native  Serbs,  native  Bulgarians,  "floating"  Serbs, 
and  '^ floating"  Bulgarians.  The  two  "floating" 
sections  seem  to  be  more  numerous  than  the  two 
native  sections.  This  singular  expression,  "float- 
ing," is  justified  by  the  following  explanation.  In 
1870  the  Bulgarians  of  Macedonia,  then  Ottoman 
subjects,  obtained  from  the  Sultan  leave  to  be 
considered,  from  the  religious  point  of  view,  not  as 
before  members  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Church, 
but  as  members  of  a  separate  and  autonomous 
church,  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate,  of  which  the  seat 


I40      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

was  fixed  at  Constantinople.  The  Bulgarians  of 
Bulgaria,  who  also  joined  the  new  church,  took 
advantage  of  the  condition  of  things  which  resulted 
from  this  creation  to  organize  in  Macedonia  a  propa- 
ganda nominally  religious  but  really  pohtical,  being 
designed  to  gain  over  to  the  Bulgarian  nation 
as  many  Macedonian  Slavs  as  possible;  and  this 
propaganda  was  directed  and  actively  assisted  by 
the  Bulgarian  Exarch,  IMgr.  Joseph,  who  resided  in 
Constantinople  and  was  an  Ottoman  subject.  In 
those  days  the  Macedonian  Slavs  were  very  poor 
peasants,  who  had  been  oppressed  by  the  Turks  for 
centuries,  and  the  greater  number  of  them  did  not 
care  a  straw  whether  they  belonged  to  one  nationality 
or  to  another.  The  propaganda  of  the  Bulgarian 
Exarchate  in  Macedonia  came  into  conflict 
with  the  Greek  propaganda,  and  a  little  later 
with  the  Serbian  propaganda,  which  two  pro- 
pagandas, the  one  directed  from  Athens  and 
the  other  from  Belgrade,  had  one  and  the  same 
object.  All  three  propagandas  together  employed 
in  Macedonia  the  most  diverse  means — money, 
schools,  and  terrorism — to  win  over  the  Mace- 
donian Slavs,  who  were  still  hesitating,  to  the 
national  Bulgarian  cause,  to  the  national  Greek 
cause,  and  to  the  national  Serbian  cause. 

These  various  propagandas  very  often  led  to 
extraordinary  results,  which  proved  the  artificial 
character  of  the  movements.  For  example,  before 
the  European  war  you  might  find  in  many  Mace- 
donian villages  families  of  three  blood  brothers,  of 
whom  one  would  say  he  was  a  Greek,  the  second 
would  solemnly  affirm  that  he  was  a  Serb,  and  the 
third  would  swear  he  was  a  Bulgarian.  Frequently, 
under  the  influence  of  the  forcible  arguments  applied 
to  them,  their  national  convictions  would  undergo 
a  sudden  and  radical  change,  so  that  the  man  who 
yesterday  was  a  Serb,  to-day  would  give  himself  out 


THE    BALKANS  141 

as  a  Bulgarian,  or  contrariwise.  It  is  to  persons 
whose  nationality  is  of  this  unstable  and  erratic 
character  that  the  adjective  "floating"  is  appro- 
priately applied.  At  the  same  time  there  is  no 
question  that  the  Serbian  propaganda,  having 
started  business  in  Macedonia  about  fifteen  years 
later  than  its  Bulgarian  rival,  had  gathered  into  the 
fold  fewer  of  those  "floating"  sheep,  who  were  still 
sitting  on  the  nationalist  fence,  not  yet  having  made 
up  their  minds  whether  to  come  down  on  the  Serbian 
or  the  Macedonian  side.  The  two  elements  which 
compose  the  Bulgarian  group  in  Macedonia,  namely, 
the  genuine  Bulgarians  and  the  "floating"  Bul- 
garians, have,  besides,  a  geographical  distribution 
which  is  comparatively  definite.  Though  mixed  up 
with  Turkish  elements,  the  inhabitants  of  the  region 
of  Kotchana  and  Istip  (Stip  in  Serbian),  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Vardar  and  on  the  Bulgarian 
boundary  (see  the  map  on  p.  137)  are  for  the  most 
part  indisputably  genuine  Bulgarians.  If  at  the 
time  of  the  treaty  of  Bukarest  the  Serbians  claimed 
these  mountainous  regions,  they  did  so  for  strategi- 
cal reasons,  in  order  to  ensure  the  defence  of  the 
railway,  which,  passing  through  the  valley  of  the 
Vardar,  connects  Belgrade,  Nisch,  and  Uskub  with 
Salonika,  and  is  therefore  of  vital  importance  for 
Serbia.  The  present  war  has  proved  that  this 
point  of  view  was  not  without  justification. 

On  the  other  hand,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Vardar,  and  therefore  in  the  greater  part  of  Serbian 
Macedonia,  the  Bulgarian  elements,  whether  genuine 
or  "floating,"  are  more  or  less  scattered  among  all 
the  other  racial  elements.  Undoubtedly  there  are 
to  the  west  of  the  Vardar  some  Bulgarians  whose 
descent  is  very  ancient  and  beyond  dispute.  A 
certain  number,  who  have  emigrated  from  these 
regions,  exercise  a  predominant  political  influence 
even   in    Bulgaria.      Thus    General    Boyadjeff   was 


142      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

born  at  Ochrida,  and  M.  GenadiefT  was  born  at 
Monastir.  But  these  Bulgarians  by  descent  are 
certainly  a  minority  in  the  whole  population  of 
Macedonia.  For  example,  at  Monastir,  in  1914,  out 
of  60,000  inhabitants  about  a  third  were  Bul- 
garians. It  is  true  that  round  about  Monastir  and 
Uskub  you  might  find  villages  inhabited  almost 
entirely  by  Bulgarians,  but  beside  these  villages 
were  others  formed  of  different  Macedonian  nation- 
alities  (Serbs,   Roumanians,   etc.). 

As  for  the  ''floating"  Bulgarians,  after  a  Serbian 
occupation  which  had  lasted  only  five  months  since 
the  treaty  of  Bukarest,  many  of  them  already  pro- 
claimed themselves  Serbs.  For  example,  the 
Serbian  mayor  of  the  little  town  of  Strouga  had 
been  in  Turkish  times  the  pillar  of  the  Bulgarian 
propaganda  in  the  district  of  Strouga.  Similar 
cases  were  very  numerous.  The  Bulgarians  of 
Sofia,  unable  to  deny  this  wholesale  transformation 
into  Serbians  of  quondam  Bulgarians  who  had  been 
raked  into  the  fold  by  the  propaganda  of  the 
Exarchate,  gave  out  that  this  sudden  conversion 
was  the  effect  of  that  reign  of  terror  which,  accord- 
ing to  them,  the  Serbians  resorted  to  for  the  purpose 
of  establishing  their  dominion  in  Macedonia.  The 
allegation  seems  to  me  untenable.  I  traversed 
most  of  the  roads  of  Serbian  Macedonia  in  the 
winter  (January,  1914),  accompanied  only  by  one 
or  two  persons.  I  very  often  met  Serbian  soldiers, 
who  came  from  the  garrisons  on  the  Albanian 
frontier  and  were  going  on  furlough  to  Northern 
Serbia.  Now  these  soldiers  were  travelling  singly 
or  in  groups  of  two  or  three.  With  nothing  but  a 
walking-stick  in  their  hand  they  were  making  their 
way  over  the  60  or  70  kilometres  which  separated 
them  from  the  nearest  railway.  If  the  country  had 
really  been  inhabited  by  convinced  Bulgarians  who 
detested  the  Serbians,  is  it  not  evident  that  there 


THE   BALKANS  143 

would  have  been  attacks  on  these  isolated  and 
defenceless  Serbian  soldiers?  But  there  were  no 
such  attacks,  and  from  personal  observation  I  can 
afi&rm  that  the  most  complete  tranquillity  prevailed 
in  Serbian  Macedonia,  which  in  the  days  of  the 
TuYks  had  been  the  scene  of  incessant  murders; 
and  these  murders  were  generally  brought  about 
by  the  terrorist  means  employed  by  the  Bulgarian 
propaganda. 

What  is  certain  is,  that  at  the  beginning  of  19 14 
the  ''floating"  Bulgarians,  who  were  in  fact  the 
more  numerous,  acquiesced  without  resistance  in 
the  Serbian  rule  and  called  themselves  Serbians. 
The  Bulgarian  Exarch,  Mgr.  Joseph,  who  had 
organized  and  directed  the  Bulgarian  propaganda 
since  1870,  was  not  at  all  surprised  at  this  result. 
He  acknowledged  to  me  at  Sofia,  in  February,  1914, 
that  the  Bulgarian  game  was  up  in  the  south  of 
Macedonia,  and  that  in  a  short  time  most  of  the 
adherents  whom  he  had  enlisted  in  former  days 
would  prove  themselves  very  good  Serbians.  In- 
deed, he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  it,  for  he  had 
been  opposed  to  the  attack  of  June,  1913,  on  the 
Serbians  and  the  Greeks,  and  he  thought  that 
Bulgaria  should  accept  a  situation  for  which  she 
herself  was  responsible,  and  of  which  she  must 
bear  the  consequences. 

For  these  manifold  reasons  it  is  impossible  to  say 
that  the  south  of  Macedonia  is  Bulgarian.  But  the 
Bulgarian  people  of  Bulgaria  has  been  completely 
intoxicated  by  the  intense  propaganda  which  has 
been  organized,  especially  during  the  last  thirty 
years,  in  Bulgaria  itself  by  Bulgarians  who  are 
natives  of  Ottoman  Macedonia.  These  men,  most 
of  them  very  energetic,  have  in  reality  engrossed  all 
the  important  posts,  military,  political,  and  adminis- 
trative, in  Bulgaria.  So  well  have  they  done  the 
business  of  propaganda  that  the  lowest  Bulgarian 


144      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

peasant  of  Bulgaria  believes  in  his  heart  and  soul 
that  all  Serbian  Macedonia  is  Bulgarian.  It  is  easy 
to  understand  how  German  policy  at  Sofia  has  been 
able  to  turn  this  state  of  mind  to  account  for  the 
purpose  of  hurrying  the  Bulgarian  people  into  the 
war  on  the  side  of  Pangermanism. 

To  recapitulate,  the  south  of  Macedonia  is  really 
Macedonia,  that  is  to  say,  it  is  a  territory  inhabited 
by  motley  peoples,  who  are  almost  everywhere 
jumbled  up  together.  The  Bulgarians  who  live  there 
cannot  therefore  rightfully  claim  that  the  treaty  of 
Bukarest  violated  the  principle  of  nationalities  to 
their  detriment  by  assigning  South- Western  Mace- 
donia to  Serbia.  In  fact,  just  because  it  is  Mace- 
donia, that  is,  an  extraordinary  jumble  of  hetero- 
geneous peoples,  the  principle  of  nationalities 
cannot  possibly  be  applied  to  JNIacedonia.  In 
strict  justice,  the  destiny  of  this  peculiar  country 
should  be  settled  simply  and  solely  with  reference 
to  the  general  strategical  and  economic  needs  of  the 
surrounding  States.  Now  if  there  are  Bulgarians 
in  Macedonia  there  are  also  Serbians,  and  neither 
strategically  nor  economically  is  the  south  of  Mace- 
donia necessary  to  Bulgaria.  On  the  other  hand, 
Serbia  has  a  really  vital  interest,  both  economic  and 
defensive,  in  maintaining  a  direct  geographical 
contact  with  Greece,  in  order  to  have  by  means  of 
Salonika  that  access  to  the  yEgean  Sea  which  is  for 
her  indispensable. 


What  proves,  moreover,  in  ample  measure  that 
the  exorbitant  Bulgarian  pretensions  are  not 
founded  on  a  racial  basis  is  that  at  present  the 
ambitions  of  the  government  of  Sofia  considerably 
exceed  even  the  extreme  limits  of  the  map  which 
serves  us  as  a  document  (see  p.  133).  Indeed,  not 
only    does    Bulgaria    desire    to    keep    the    region    of 


THE   BALKANS  145 

Nisch,  but  she  aims  at  expanding  as  far  as  Hungary, 
which  in  her  turn  also  wishes  to  encroach  on  Serbia. 
In  February,  191 6,  Mr.  Take  Jonescu  declared  at 
Bukarest  that  he  had  it  from  a  sure  source  that 
Germany  had  just  promised  to  Bulgaria  the 
possession  of  Salonika  and  the  Roumanian 
Dobrudja  as  far  as  Sulina  (see  Le  Matin,  25th 
February,  1916),  that  is,  exactly  that  part  of  the 
Roumanian  Dobrudja  which,  according  to  our 
documentary  map  the  Bulgarians  have  coveted  ever 
since  1907  at  least.  As  to  King  Ferdinand,  he 
wishes  to  obtain  for  his  son  the  whole  of  central 
Albania,  which  would  allow  Bulgaria  under  colour 
of  an  eventual  arrangement,  more  or  less  forced  on 
a  few  Albanian  tribes,  to  spread  from  the  Black 
Sea  to  the  Adriatic — an  old  plan  familiar  to  all  who 
are  versed  in  the  ambitions  of  the  Coburg  prince  at 
Sofia.  It  is,  moreover,  probable,  so  far  as  Albania 
and  the  Roumanian  Dobrudja  are  concerned,  that 
the  Berlin  government  will  curb  the  Bulgarian 
ambitions  in  order  not  to  hurt  the  feelings  of 
Vienna,  and  to  prolong  the  neutrality  of  Roumania 
by  nursing  the  illusions  of  the  Bratiano  cabinet. 
There  will  be  plenty  of  time  afterwards  to  punish 
Roumania  for  hesitating  to  submit  to  the  German 
yoke,  when  the  hour  for  freeing  herself  from  it 
shall  have  passed  for  ever. 

The  secret  treaty,  the  negotiations  for  which 
between  the  Kaiser  and  the  Tsar  Ferdinand  were 
revealed  by  Le  Temps  of  29th  February,  191 6, 
would  ensure  to  Ferdinand  the  means  of  ulti- 
mately putting  the  last  touches  to  his  plan  of 
Bulgarian  supremacy.  But  this  treaty,  linking  the 
fate  of  Bulgaria  to  that  of  Germany  in  a  military, 
economic,  and  political  aspect,  would  involve  the 
inclusion  of  Bulgaria  in  the  Germanic  Confederation. 
Therefore,  finally,  always  in  pursuance  of  the  plan  of 
191 1,  Bulgaria  would  serve  as  a  broad  bridge  between 


146      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

the  Germanic  Confederation  of  Central  Europe  and 
Prussianized  Turkey. 

This  recent  revelation  completes  the  demon- 
stration of  the  mode  and  form  in  which  the  plan 
of  Bulgarian  supremacy  is  closely  bound  up  with 
the  Pangerman  plan  of  world-wide  domination. 


II. 

The  evidence  of  the  facts  as  they  now  stand 
appears  to  be  bringing  the  Greeks  to  recognize, 
that  if  the  Allies  have  committed  faults  in  the 
Balkans — through  excess  of  candour,  miscon- 
ception of  the  mental  factors,  and  with  the  best 
intentions  in  the  world — the  government  of  Athens 
has  been  equally  deceived  as  to  the  surest  means 
of  safeguarding  Hellenic  interests. 

According  to  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Serbia 
of  i6-29th  June,  1913,  Greece  was  bound  to  come  to 
the  help  of  her  ally,  in  case  the  latter  were  attacked 
by  any  third  power.  This  article  was  clear.  It  is 
needless  to  harp  on  the  point,  for  even  without  a 
treaty,  it  was  a  vital  necessity  for  Greece  not  to 
let  the  Bulgarians  upset  the  balance  of  power,  to 
her  detriment,  in  the  Balkans  and  intrude  them- 
selves between  her  and  Serbia.  That  necessity 
imperiously  required  the  government  of  Athens 
not  to  suffer  Serbia  to  be  crushed.  Now,  as  we 
know,  the  allied  armies  under  General  Sarrail  at 
the  end  of  191 5  very  nearly  effected  a  junction  with 
the  troops  of  the  Voivode  Putnik.  It  is,  therefore, 
manifest  that  if,  on  the  landing  of  the  Allies  at 
Salonika,  Greece  had  joined  her  efforts  to  theirs, 
Serbia  would  have  been  saved.  That  is  a  truth 
which  M.  Venizelos  and  a  great  part  of  Greek  public 
opinion  well  understood,  but  King  Constantine 
would  not  admit  it.  History  will  prove  whether 
in  this  grave  crisis  of  his  country  his  relationship  of 


THE    BALKANS 


147 


brother-in-law  to  the  Kaiser  did  not  greatly  preju- 
dice the  judgment  of  the  King  of  Greece.  What  is 
certain  is,  that  no  rational  explanation  has  yet  been 
given  of  King  Constantine's  conduct,  and  that  his 
policy  has  elicited  the  protests  of  Greek  colonies  in 
foreign  countries,  which,  being  free  to  speak, 
declared,  in  an  appeal  drawn  up  by  their  congresses 
in  February,  1916: 

"While  we  nurse  a  meaningless  neutrality  which 
provokes  derision,  we  run  the  risk,  not  only  of 
failing    to    achieve    the    aspirations    bequeathed    to 


GREECE  AFTER  THE  TREATY  OF  BUKAREST. 

us  by  our  fathers,  but  also  of  losing  our  independ- 
ence" (quoted  by  Le  Temps,  26th  February,  1916). 

The  vehemence  of  these  protests  is  intelligible,  for 
just  in  virtue  of  the  policy  which  for  some  months 
the  government  of  Athens  has  pursued,  Greece  is 
now  confronted  by  vital  problems  which  she  must 
absolutely  solve  without  delay,  if  she  would  ensure 
her  future. 

The  annexed  map,  which  represents  the  state  of 
Greece  before  and  after  the  war,  will  render  intelli- 


148      TANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

gible  the  essential  interests  which  Greece  has  to 
defend. 

Greece  has  always  taken  deeply  to  heart  the 
many  Greeks  living  in  the  East  outside  her  bound- 
aries. She  would  either  incorporate  them  or  at 
least  ensure  them  a  tolerable  existence. 

These  Greeks  are  to  be  found  in  the  ethnographi- 
cal regions  indicated  by  cross  hatchings  on  the  map, 
which  I  have  copied  exactly  from  the  map  No.  2  in 
the  Pangerman  Atlas  of  Paul  Langhans,  published 
at  Gotha  by  Justus  Perthes  in  1900.  Thus  the 
Pangermans  themselves  recognize  the  presence  of 
many  Greeks  in  the  south  of  Albania  and  especially 
in  Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  No  doubt,  since  the 
Balkan  wars  the  density  of  the  Greeks  in  the 
Hellenic  regions  of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  has  under- 
gone serious  modifications.  Many  of  these  Greeks 
have  been  massacred  either  by  the  Turks  or  by  the 
Bulgarians.  Under  the  pressure  of  these  Turko- 
Bulgarian  persecutions  about  500,000  Greeks 
have  been  obliged,  since  1912,  to  take  refuge  in 
Greece.  But  the  Greeks  who  have  sources  of  exact 
information  estimate  that  there  still  remain  about 
200,000  Greeks  on  the  ^gean  coasts  of  new  Bul- 
garia, and  2,300,000  in  the  Ottoman  empire.  It  is 
clear  that  if  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  by  the  help  of 
Germany,  were  finally  victorious,  these  2,500,000 
Greeks  would  be  lost  once  and  for  all  to  Greece. 
Therefore,  if  the  government  of  Athens  would  save 
the  Greeks,  it  has  a  primary  and  fundamental 
reason  for  speedily  withstanding  the  progress  of  the 
Bulgarians  as  well  as  of  the  Turks.  In  point  of  fact 
the  Ottoman  Greeks  are  actually  harassed  most 
systematically  by  the  fanatical  young  Turks.  On 
the  other  hand  the  Russian  successes  in  Armenia 
make  a  profound  impression  on  public  opinion  at 
Athens,  if  not  on  the  government  of  King  Constan- 
tine.     The  Greeks  of  Greece  are  too  well  acquainted 


THE   BALKANS  •  149 

with  the  decadence  of  the  Ottoman  empire  not  to 
know  that  its  days  arc  numbered.  The  majority 
of  Greeks  understand  that  the  moment  is  approach- 
ing when,  by  joining  the  Allies,  the  adversaries  of 
Turkey,  Greece  should  secure  for  herself  a  voice 
in  their  councils,  in  order  that,  when  peace  is  con- 
cluded, she  may  be  able  to  shape  the  destinies  of  the 
Greeks  of  Turkey  in  conformity  with  Greek  interests. 
This  is  all  the  more  necessary  because  these  Greeks 
of  Turkey,  as  the  map  shows,  are  in  the  peculiar 
position  of  being  dispersed  in  small  groups  over  the 
Ottoman  coasts,  without  anywhere  forming  an 
aggregate  large  enough  to  confer  the  right  of  being 
treated  as  a  definite  part  of  the  Ottoman  empire. 

With  regard  to  Bulgaria,  the  interest  of  Greece  is 
twofold.  It  consists,  in  the  first  place,  in  prevent- 
ing, as  speedily  as  possible,  a  continuation  of  those 
systematic  persecutions,  deportations,  outrages  and 
robberies  of  which  the  Greeks  of  Turkey  and  of  the 
invaded  regions  of  Serbia  are  at  present  the  victims. 
But,  above  all,  Greece  has  a  really  vital  interest  in 
preventing  the  government  of  Sofia  from  carrying 
out  its  plan  of  supremacy  in  the  Balkans  (see  the  map 
on  p.  133).  It  is  well  known  at  Athens  that  the 
Bulgarians  covet  Salonika,  and  that  if,  even  without 
including  that  city,  Great  Bulgaria  extended  to 
Albania,  Greece  would  thereby  be  cut  off  from  the 
north  of  Europe  by  a  rancorous  and  implacable 
neighbour,  and  would  thus  find  herself  in  an  un- 
tenable position,  alike  from  the  military  and  the 
economic  point  of  view.  It  is  this  serious  danger 
that  is  emphasized  by  the  organs  of  M.  Venizelos, 
who  since  1909  has  been  truly  the  saviour  of  Greece. 
As  this  conviction  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  heart  of 
almost  all  Greeks,  who  view  with  irreconcilable 
aversion  the  Bulgarians  as  their  hereditary  enemies, 
it  constitutes  a  mental  factor  which,  more  than  any 
other  motive,   will  at  last,  in   all  probability,  open 


I50       PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

the  eyes  of  Greece  to  the  danger  which  she  incurs 
through  the  alliance  of  the  Bulgarians  and  the 
Germans. 

But  though  the  Pangcrman  plan  in  itself  threatens 
the  interests  of  Greece  most  directly,  we  must 
recognize  that  this  truth  has  not  yet  been  sufficiently 
apprehended  by  Greek  public  opinion.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  manifest  that  Great  Germany's  ultimate 
aim  is  to  rule  at  Salonika,  perhaps  not  at  first 
directly,  but  at  all  events  through  the  agency  of  the 
Prussianized  Bulgarians.  But  the  great  railway 
which,  starting  from  Vienna,  goes  by  Belgrade, 
Nisch,  Uskub,  and  Salonika,  now  ends  at  the 
Piraeus,  since,  quite  lately,  the  junction  has  been 
effected  by  the  continuation  of  the  Greek  line  of 
Larissa  from  Papapouli  to  Guida,  a  station  on  the 
trunk  line  from  Salonika  to  Monastir.  In  conse- 
quence of  this  junction  line,  96  kilometres  long,  a 
great  Continental  railway  has  just  been  completed, 
which,  after  peace  has  been  concluded,  will  have  a 
considerable  economic  importance  for  Greece  and 
even  for  the  whole  of  Europe.  In  fact,  the  distance 
of  Marseilles  from  Alexandria  is  1,404  sea  miles,  that 
of  Brindisi  from  Alexandria  is  836,  and  that  of 
the  Piraeus  from  Alexandria  is  only  514.  Supposing, 
then,  that  the  average  speed  of  the  mail  steamers  is 
15  miles  an  hour,  we  infer  that  the  voyage  to 
Alexandria  takes  about  93  hours  from  Marseilles, 
55  from  Brindisi,  and  only  34  from  the  Piraeus.  The 
new  railway  will  therefore  be  greatly  preferable,  not 
only  for  travellers,  but  for  perishable  goods  and  for 
the  post.  Hence  it  is  indisputable  that,  after  the 
peace,  part  of  the  sea  traffic  of  Europe  will  be  trans- 
ferred from  Marseilles  and  the  Italian  ports  to  the 
Piraeus.  From  this  transference  of  economic  ac- 
tivity certain  and  important  profits  will  accrue  to 
Greece,  to  say  nothing  of  the  considerable  portion 
of  the  wealthy  classes  of  the  Continent,  who  spend 


THE   BALKANS  151 

some  months  of  every  year  in  Egypt,  and  who  will 
then  stop  at  Athens  before  embarking  and  make 
tours  to  the  classical  ruins,  leaving  behind  them, 
as  tourists  do,  quite  appreciable  sums  of  money, 
which  will  be  a  clear  gain  to  the  country.  If  Serbia 
is  re-established,  Greece  is  certain  to  draw  all  the 
profits  from  this  new  situation.  On  the  contrary, 
were  the  Pangerman  designs  in  the  Balkans  to 
succeed,  it  would  be  Great  Germany  that  would 
secure  for  herself  all  the  advantages  to  be  got  from 
the  great  new  trunk  railway  through  the  Balkans, 
the  control  of  which  she  covets  as  usual.  But  it  is 
clear  that  if  Germany  triumphed,  nothing  could 
prevent  her  from  stretching  her  economic  tentacles 
over  Salonika,  the  Piraeus,  and  the  whole  of  Greece, 
so  that  in  this  form  also  the  independence  of 
Greece  would  be  doomed. 

Consequently,  the  Pangerman  plan  threatens  all 
the  vital  interests  of  Greece,  since  its  success  would 
necessarily  entail  for  that  country  an  economic 
invasion,  the  ruin  of  Hellenism,  and  Bulgarian 
supremacy  in  the  Balkans.  On  the  contrary, 
nothing  but  a  victory  of  the  Entente  powers  can 
save  Greece  from  these  dangers.  Greek  public 
opinion  understands  this  better  and  better.  More- 
over, in  a  letter  published  by  Le  Temps  of  20th 
February,  191 6,  Prince  Nicolas  of  Greece,  the  able 
diplomat  of  the  royal  family,  plainly  proposed  to 
clear  up  loyally  the  misunderstandings  that  exist 
between  the  government  of  Athens  and  the  Entente. 
In  this  letter  the  following  declarations  are  particu- 
larly memorable,  because  coming  from  the  brother 
of  the  King  of  Greece,  they  have  a  bearing  which  is 
sufficiently  obvious.  "There  are  only  two  currents 
in  Greece:  the  one  impels  Greece  to  throw  herself 
into  the  struggle  on  the  side  of  the  Entente,  the 
other  favours  neutrality.  But  nobody  has  ever 
uttered  the  thought  that  in  this  war  we  should  have 


152      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

taken  part  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers. 
Greece  has  remained  neutral.  She  has  never 
declared  that  nothing  could  induce  her  to  abandon 
her  neutrality." 

On  March  gth,  the  Patris  of  Athens  published  an 
article  of  General  Danglis,  formerly  Minister  of  War 
in  the  Venizelos  Cabinet,  which  concluded  thus: 
"Greece  ought  without  delay  to  proceed  to  the 
revision  of  all  the  classes  of  her  army  capable  of 
being  called  up  for  service;  for  without  any  doubt 
Greece  will  be  obliged  to  employ  her  forces  during 
the  present  war"  (see  Le  Temps,  loth  March,  1916). 

III. 

The  serious  consequence  which  Germany's 
alliance  with  Bulgaria  would  entail  on  Roumania, 
must  ultimately  oblige  that  country,  despite  the 
temporizing  attitude  of  its  government,  to  defend 
its  vital  interests.  These  interests  now  stand  out 
more  and  more  clearly.  In  the  first  place  it  is 
certain  that  the  plan  of  Bulgarian  supremacy  in 
the  Balkans  (see  p.  133)  is  as  little  acceptable  to 
the  Roumanians  as  to  the  Greeks.  The  frontier 
incidents,  which  have  multiplied  lately,  between 
the  Bulgarians  and  the  Roumanians  are  manifest 
symptoms  of  the  mutual  and  irreconcilable  dislike 
of  the  two  peoples.  Besides,  the  Roumanians  have 
been  specially  alarmed  by  what  has  happened  in  the 
part  of  the  Dobrudja  which  Bulgaria  was  compelled 
to  cede  to  Roumania  in  19 13  (indicated  by  crossed 
hatchings  on  the  subjoined  map).  The  syndicates 
of  Bulgarian  peasants  in  this  region  have  plainly 
shown  their  separatist  tendencies.  Further,  it  has 
lately  been  discovered  that  in  the  New  Dobrudja, 
the  Bulgarian  system  of  espionage  has  been  worked, 
under  colour  of  archa:;ological  excursions,  by 
Germans,     who     afterwards     transmitted     to     the 


THE    BALKANS 


153 


Bulgarian  military  authorities  photographs  and 
plans  of  great  importance.  Lastly,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  19 16  Mr.  Take  Jonescu  made  known  at 
Bukarest  that  Germany  had  promised  to  Bulgaria, 
at  the  expense  of  Roumania,  not  only  the  territory 
which  Bulgaria  had  lost  in  1913,  but  also  the 
Roumanian  Dobrudja  as  far  as  Galatz  and  Sulina. 
Since  then  Berlin  has  been  obliged  to  throw  a  sop 


GREAT  ROUMANIA. 


to  Roumania  by  assuring  Bukarest  that  Germany 
will  put  a  curb  on  Bulgarian  ambition.  But  this 
promise,  a  sort  of  blackmail  extorted  by  the  needs 
of  the  moment,  forms  but  a  very  precarious  guaran- 
tee for  the  Roumanians.  They  feel  themselves 
threatened  by  Bulgarian  ambitions,  and  there  seems 
little  reason  to  doubt  that  as  soon  as  circumstances 


154      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

shall  appear  favourable,  Roumania  will  make  an 
end  of  the  Bulgarian  peril,  as  "she  ought  to 
have  done  in  1913,"  if  the  Roumanian  Government 
does  not  allow  itself  to  be  "hypnotized"  by  that 
of  Berlin,  to  use  the  language  of  the  Universal, 
the  official  connection  of  which  with  the  military 
authorities  at  Bukarest  is  well  known  (quoted  by 
Le  Temps,  19th  March,  1916). 

On  the  other  hand  the  national  policy  of  Rou- 
mania is  influenced  in  the  highest  degree  by  the  two 
questions  of  Bessarabia  and  Transylvania.  As 
the  map  on  the  opposite  page  shows,  Roumania 
irredenta  is  composed  of  two  great  racial  and  terri- 
torial elements:  about  1,000,000  Roumanians  live 
in  Russian  Bessarabia,  but  3,700,000  Roumanians 
inhabit  Transylvania  and  Bukovina,  that  is  to  say, 
vast  regions  of  Hungary  and  Austria.  The  Rou- 
manian ideal,  in  its  entirety,  would  evidently  be  to 
incorporate  at  the  same  time  the  Roumanian 
brothers  of  the  East  and  the  West,  but  as  the  ideal 
is  not  practicable,  a  choice  must  be  made.  The 
partisans  of  Germany  at  Bukarest,  led  by  M. 
Carp  and  Marghiloman,  maintain  that  Roumania 
should  elect  for  Bessarabia  and  therefore  march 
against  Russia.  To  this  the  practical  politicians 
of  Bukarest  reply:  "We  should  certainly  be  glad 
to  incorporate  the  Roumanians  of  Bessarabia  also, 
but  that  policy  would  only  be  possible  if  Russia 
were  completely  destroyed  by  Germany,  which 
has  not  been  done  and  cannot  be  done,  for  the  facts 
so  far  prove  that  Russia  could  not  be  decisively 
beaten.  Therefore  Roumania  cannot  be  such  a 
fool  as  to  incur  the  permanent  hostility  of  the  enor- 
mous empire  of  the  Tzar.  Moreover,  in  order  to 
incorporate  the  1,000,000  Roumanians  of  Bess- 
arabia, we  must  abandon  the  3,700,000  Rou- 
manians of  Transylvania,  besides  accepting  into 
the  bargain  the  supremacy  of  the  Bulgarians  in  the 


THE   BALKANS  155 

Balkans,  since  they  are  the  allies  of  the  Central 
Empires." 

Such  are  the  essential  arguments  which  incline 
Roumanian  opinion  to  make  a  decided  choice  for  the 
acquisition  of  Transylvania.  In  order  that  the  re- 
lations between  Russia  and  Roumania  should 
become  cordial  enough  to  permit  of  an  alliance 
between  St.  Petersburg  and  Bukarest  it  remains, 
perhaps,  for  Russia  to  reassure  Roumania  with 
regard  to  the  control  of  the  Straits.  It  is  certainly 
well  understood  at  Bukarest  that  after  the 
enormous  sacrifices  which  she  has  made  Russia 
cannot  consent  to  remain  bottled  up  by  the  Turks 
in  the  Black  Sea,  and  that  after  the  peace  she  must 
hold  a  preponderant  position  at  Constantinople. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  interest  of  all  Europe 
and  of  Russia  herself  that  she  should  ensure  for  the 
future  a  large  amount  of  liberty  in  the  control  of  the 
Straits.  I  cannot  see,  therefore,  why  Bukarest  and 
Petrograd  should  not  come  to  an  understanding  on 
this  important  subject. 

In  order  to  prevent,  or  at  least  retard,  the  inter- 
vention of  Roumania,  of  which  Berlin  is  much 
afraid,  the  Kaiser's  diplomacy  is  putting  pressure 
on  Vienna  and  on  Budapest  in  order  to  obtain 
"large  concessions"  in  favour  of  the  Roumanians 
of  Transylvania  and  Bukovina.  But  at  Bukarest 
people  know  by  experience  the  value  to  be  attached 
to  the  promises  of  Vienna,  and  especially  to  those  of 
the  Magyar  nobility.  Besides,  as  Roumania  desires 
the  annexation,  pure  and  simple,  of  Transylvania 
and  of  the  Roumanian  region  of  Bukovina,  she 
could  not  be  content  with  mere  concessions.  So 
the  offers  of  the  Central  Empires  at  Bukarest  have 
little  chance  of  being  seriously  considered. 

They  will  have  still  less,  if  the  Roumanians  yield 
to  the  force  of  evidence  by  recognizing,  that  even 
if   the   Pangerman   plan    were    to   provide   for   the 


156      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

cession  of  Transylvania  to  Roumania,  at  the 
expense  of  Hungary,  that  plan  would  still  threaten 
their  independence  in  the  most  direct  and  indisput- 
able manner.  In  her  attempt  to  win  Roumania  to 
her  side,  Berlin  has  promised  to  give  Bessarabia, 
with  Odessa,  to  Roumania  at  the  expense  of  Russia. 
In  order  to  appreciate  the  character  and  the  sin- 
cerity of  this  ofTer,  the  Roumanians  need  only  refer 
to  the  pamphlet  long  ago  circulated  by  the  All- 
deutscher  Verband,  which  sets  forth  the  fundamental 
plan  of  1894,  and  which  I  have  often  quoted.  It 
bears  the  title,  Great  Germany  and  Central  Europe 
in  1950.  On  p.  36  that  work  defines  as  follows  the 
fate  which  Pangermanism  has  in  store  for  Roumania 
on  the  East.  "In  the  case  of  a  victorious  war 
against  Russia,  Roumania  might  get  Upper  Bess- 
arabia as  far  as  the  Dniester.  Austria  would  annex 
Lower  Bessarabia  in  the  form  of  a  Margraviate  of 
Bessarabia,  and  by  means  of  the  German  colonies, 
which  already  exist,  she  would  transform  it  into  a 
purely  German  region.  The  boundaries  of  this 
Austro-German  Margraviate  of  Bessarabia  would 
include  the  cities  of  Odessa,  Bender,  Borodino, 
Formosa,  Beni,  Ismail,  and  the  mouths  of  the 
Danube  at  Sulina.  A  reciprocal  exchange  of 
populations  with  the  neighbouring  countries  would 
easily  ensure  the  exclusively  German  colonization 
of  this  Margraviate.  German  ships  of  war  would 
mount  guard  at  the  mouth  of  the  German  Danube." 
This  fundamental  plan,  which  dates  from  twenty- 
one  years  ago,  w^ould  now  be  completed,  as  we  saw 
(p.  133)  by  the  ultimate  establishment  in  the  Rou- 
manian Dobrudja  of  the  Bulgarians,  w^ho  would 
thus  be  in  direct  contact  with  the  new  Margraviate 
of  Prussianized  Austria. 

Hence,  supposing  the  Germans  were  victorious, 
the  Roumanians,  who  have  been  much  alarmed  by 
the  idea  of  seeing   the   Russians  installed   at   Con- 


THE     BALKANS  157 

stantinople,  would  be  confronted  by  the  danger  uf 
being  soon  entirely  cut  off  from  both  the  Black  Sea 
and  from  the  Mediterranean.  The  Bulgariaxis 
would  take  possession  of  the  Roumanian  Dobrudja, 
the  Germans  would  remain  at  Constantinople  and 
the  Dardanelles,  where  they  are  already,  and  besides 
they  would  be  dominant  at  Odessa  and  the  mouths 
of  the  Danube,  according  to  the  plan  drawn  up,  as 
far  back  as  1844,  by  the  future  Marshal  Moltke 
{see  p.  4).  The  authority  of  that  name  may 
satisfy  the  Roumanians  that  the  scheme  is  no  mere 
fantasy. 

Moreover,  it  is  plain  enough  that  were  Roumania 
once  encircled,  she  could  no  longer  dream  of  creat- 
ing, as  she  so  ardently  desires  to  do,  a  national 
industry,  since  she  would  be  no  more  than  an 
economic  territory  reduced  to  impotence,  a  mere 
dumping-ground   for   goods   made   in    Pangermany. 

To  sum  up,  we  see  that  this  is  really  a  question  of 
life  or  death  for  Roumania.  A  Prussian  victory, 
in  fact,  would  imperil  her  national  independence  in 
the  most  direct  and  indubitable  manner.  It 
appears  that  the  general  opinion  in  Roumania  is 
alive  to  the  danger  and  to  the  necessity  of  Rou- 
manian intervention  in  the  conflict.  It  remains 
to  be  seen  whether  German  influences  at  Bukarest 
will  be  adroit  enough  and  powerful  enough  to 
delude  the  Roumanian  authorities  into  shilly- 
shallying till  the  decisive  hour  shall  have  come  and 
gone. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

GERMAN  MANOEUVRES  TO  PLAY  THE  ALLIES  THE  TRICK 
OF  THE  "drawn  GAME,"  THAT  IS,  TO  SECURE  THE 
ACCOMPLISHMENT  OF  THE  "HAMBURG  TO  THE  PERSIAN 
gulf"  SCHEME  AS  THE  MINIMUM  RESULT  OF  THE  WAR. 

I.     The  exceptional  importance  of   the  economic   union   of   the 
Central  Empires,  and  the  danger  for  the  Allies  of  establish- 
ing   a    connexion    between    that    union     and    their    own 
economic  measures  after  the  war. 
II.     Reasons  for  the  Turco-German  dodge  of  making  a  separate 

peace  between  the  Ottoman  empire  and  the  Allies. 
III.     Why  a  separate  and  premature  peace  with  Bulgaria  would 
play  the  Pangerman  game. 

At  the  moment  when  this  book  is  published,  the 
Germans  have  certainly  not  renounced  the  hope  of 
keeping  and  establishing  a  definite  claim  to  the 
territories  which  they  actually  occupy  on  the  West 
and  on  the  East;  but  with  their  usual  foresight  they 
nevertheless  contemplate  the  possibility  of  their 
having  to  consent  to  evacuate  on  the  West,  let  us 
say,  90,478  square  kilometres,  and  on  the  East 
260,000  square  kilometres,  in  order  to  preserve 
almost  entire  the  principal  part  of  the  Pangerman 
acquisitions,  that  is  to  say,  the  gains  made,  directly 
or  indirectly,  to  the  South  and  South-east,  namely, 
Austria-Hungary  (676,616  square  kilometres),  the 
Balkans  (215,585  square  kilometres),  Turkey  (about 
1,792,000  square  kilometres).  Total,  2,684,201 
square  kilometres. 

To  maintain  its  dominion  over  these  territories, 
the  government  of  Berlin  is  from  now  onward 
directing  its  energies  to  three  sorts  of  manoeuvres, 
all  ve;y  astute,  and  very  well  co-ordinated,  though 

i5« 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  159 

they  wear  different  aspects,  each  corresponding  to 
each  of  the  three  territorial  stages  essential  to 
the  achievement  of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf."  These  three  stages  are 
Austria-Hungary,  Turkey,  and  Bulgaria,  which  last 
forms  the  bridge  between  the  two  other  stages. 


As  regards  Austria-Hungary  the  Berlin  pro- 
gramme may  be  summed  up  as  follows:  to  take 
advantage  of  the  occupation  of  the  territories  of  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy  by  the  troops  of  William  II.  in 
order  to  impose,  by  all  possible  means,  both  on  Hun- 
gary and  on  Austria,  a  series  of  measures  called  an 
economic  union  with  Germany,  which  would  leave 
Austria-Hungary  an  appearance  of  independence 
sufficient  to  throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  the  Allies,  while 
at  the  same  time  it  would  in  fact  subject  thai  empire 
absolutely  to  the  will  of  Berlin. 

So  far,  these  tactics  have  not  succeeded  in  put- 
ting on  a  semblance  of  legality.  •  Since  the  out- 
break of  war,  the  Pangermans  of  Vienna  have  not 
even  dared  to  summon  the  Austrian  parliament, 
knowing  very  well  that  the  Slav  and  Latin  deputies 
would  protest  most  vehemently  against  the  sub- 
jection of  their  respective  countries  to  the  German 
empire.  At  present  the  Germans  of  Vienna,  while 
they  terrorize  the  Austrian  Slavs  and  try  to  per- 
suade them  that  the  Allies  have  forsaken  them, 
are  striving  to  prepare  a  meeting  of  the  Reichsrath 
which  might  seem  to  sanction  all  that  has  been 
done.  But  the  reader  will  understand  that  it  is 
no  easy  matter  to  get  up  this  farce,  when  he  learns 
that  even  the  Magyars,  who  have  linked  themselves 
closely  to  Germany,  are  beginning  to  resist,  now  that 
Berlin  is  forced  to  disclose  those  measures  of  en- 
slavement,   i)f  which  Hungary  must  feel  the  effects, 


i6o      PANGERMAN    TLOT    UNMASKED 

like  the  other  States  destined  to  pass  under  the 
Pangerman  yoke.  It  is  said  that  William  II. 's 
great  Magyar  accomplice,  Count  Tisza  himself,  is 
protesting.  At  all  events  in  the  Pesti  Hirlap  of 
Budapest,  of  12th  April,  1916,  we  are  assured  that 
his  friend,  the  Senator  Eugene  Rakosky,  has  just 
published  the  following  lines,  which  are  particularly 
significant: 

"All  this  Central  European  ferment  will  have  no 
other  result  than  compelling  the  Hungarians  to 
pull  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  lire  for  the  Germans. 
They  want  us  to  make  high  roads  for  the  Germans  to 
the  East.  All  these  Central  European  alliances 
and  unions  mean  nothing  but  that  we  are  expected 
to  sell  our  national  soul  and  pass  under  the  German 
yoke"   (quoted  by  Le  Temps,   19th  April,   1916). 

But  the  Allies  should  have  no  illusion  on  this  head. 
The  most  vehement  protests  of  the  Magyars  will  be 
of  no  avail.  The  Germans  are  in  occupation  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  they  have  the  power.  They 
may  disguise  their  enslavement  of  this  vast  empire 
under  various  formulas,  such  as  extension  of  the 
Zollverein,  economic  union  of  the  Central  Empires, 
unification  of  the  commercial  laws  of  Austria  and 
Germany,  etc.;  or  they  may  even,  as  a  subterfuge, 
to  lull  the  fears  of  the  Allies  to  sleep,  give  up  the  use 
of  any  positive  formula,  the  final  result  will  always 
be  the  same,  the  political  seizure  by  Germany  of 
*he  Hapsburg  Monarchy  cloaked  under  the  decent 
pretext  of  economic  measures. 

To  this  object  the  Germans  cling  above  every- 
thing else,  because  it  has  been  the  basis  of  the  whole 
Pangerman  plan  since  1895,  and  the  indispensable 
condition  of  achieving  the  scheme  ''from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  as  the  reader  will  find  ex- 
plained, with  the  reasons  in  full,  in  my  book 
})ublished  fifteen  years  ago,  L' Europe  et  la  Question 
d'AulricJie  au  seiiil  du  XX'  siecle;    they  cling  to  it, 


GERMAN    MANOEUVRES  i6i 

too,  because  Germany  has  made  war  for  the 
very  purpose  of  effecting  at  least  this  seizure  of 
Austria-Hungary,  which  is  absolutely  indispensable 
to  the  plans  of  William  II. 

Nothing  but  the  complete  victory  of  the  Allies 
can  compel  Berlin  to  renounce  this  plan  of  domina- 
tion and  liberate  the  non-German  peoples  of  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy.  Meantime  the  Germans  are 
taking  all  possible  precautions  against  such  an 
event.  We  have  seen  (p.  93)  how  already,  under 
their  pressure,  the  Magyars  are  concerting  with  them 
the  economic  measures  to  be  taken  in  view  of  that 
future  war,  which  is  to  complete  the  results  of  a 
peace  which  Berlin  already  thinks  bound  to  be 
"imperfect."  Accordingly,  the  Allies  cannot  have 
the  faintest  doubt  as  to  the  new  war  which  as  sure 
as  fate  will  follow,  sooner  or  later,  from  the  economic 
and  necessarily  political  union  of  the  Central 
Empires.  In  Chapter  V  we  saw  that  the  certain 
consequence  of  this  economic  union  would  be: 

1°.  To  secure  to  Germany  the  spoils  of  war  and 
a  trade  monopoly  over  nearly  3  millions  of  square 
kilometres  containing  wealth  untold. 

2°.  On  the  contrary,  to  leave  the  Allies  to  pay 
all  their  expenses  in  the  war,  which  is  equivalent 
to  condemning  their  peoples  to  ruin. 

3°.  To  make  Prussian  militarism  more  powerful 
than  ever,  since,  radiating  from  the  block  of  Central 
Europe,  it  could  command  an  army  of  from  15  to  21 
millions  of  soldiers. 

4°.  To  give  Germany  the  supremacy  over  the 
majority  of  essential  strategic  points  on  land  and 
sea,  which  would  provide  Berlin  with  all  the  means 
for  executing  gradually  and  completely  its  plan  of 
world-wide  domination. 

But  it  seems  that  these  formidable  consequences, 
which  flow  from  the  seizure  of  Austria-Hungary  by 
Germany,  have  not  yet  been  sufficiently  understood 


i62      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

in  the  Allied  countries.  That  is  the  conclusion 
indicated  by  the  following  opinions  which  have 
been  published  in  some  French  and  English  news- 
papers: ''The  declarations  of  Mr.  Runciman, 
President  of  the  Board  of  Trade  in  the  United 
Kingdom,"  says  Le  Temps  of  25th  March,  1916, 
"prove  that  Great  Britain  is  resolved  to  work 
without  delay  for  the  formation  of  an  economic 
alliance  against  the  powers  of  Central  Europe." 

Mr.  Hughes,  Prime  Minister  of  Australia,  in  an 
address  at  the  Carlton  Club,  gave  his  hearers  to 
understand  that  the  German  Empire  must  not  be 
allowed  to  hope  to  reduce  other  countries  to  a  state 
of  commercial  dependence  upon  it  (see  Le  Temps, 
23rd  March,  1916).  In  consequence  of  these 
declarations  an  idea  was  formed  of  an  economic 
understanding  between  the  Allies  in  order,  accord- 
ing to  Le  Petit  Parisien,  "to  make  an  effective  reply 
to  the  project  of  a  Central  Europe  conceived  by  our 
enemies." 

M.  Jules  Siegfried,  in  a  letter  to  the  Temps,  3rd 
April,  1916,  affirmed,  with  reference  to  this: 
"Germany,  aware  of  the  danger,  is  seeking  to  form 
a  Customs-union  with  Austria,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey.  It  is  therefore  necessary  for  us  to  guard 
against  this  danger."  Mr.  Hewins,  chairman  of  the 
Business  Committee  of  the  House  of  Commons, 
stated  at  London  on  April  6th:  "But  France  and 
England,  after  their  victory,  will  possess  a  pre- 
ponderance over  the  Austro- German  union  which 
will  enable  them  to  dictate  their  tariffs,  etc." 
(see  L'Echo  de  Paris,  7th  April,  1916).  M.  Edmond 
Thery,  in  Le  Matin  of  13th  April,  1916,  discussing 
the  same  problem,  concluded:  "If,  therefore,  the 
Allied  nations  will  erect  simultaneously  and  under 
identical  conditions  a  powerful  Customs  barrier 
between  their  respective  home  markets  and  the 
products  of  Germany  and  her  accomplices,  this  of 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  163 

itself  will  suffice  to  strike  a  mortal  blow  at  German 
industry,  commerce,  and  credit." 

These  declarations  are  amazing.  How  can  the 
economic  problem  to  be  solved  by  the  Allies  be 
placed,  even  through  an  obvious  ''inadvertence," 
on  a  basis  so  manifestly  inaccurate?  How,  in 
fact,  can  we  voluntarily  admit  the  least  connection 
between  the  economic  conference  of  the  Allies  and 
the  economic  union  of  the  Central  empires,  since 
that  union  is  clearly  in  flagrant  contradiction  with 
the  general  object  of  the  war,  which  nevertheless, 
the  Allies  are  perfectly  at  one  in  pursuing?  In 
fact,  to  keep  repeating  that  the  Allies  must  form 
an  economic  alliance  of  the  Allies  to  compete  after 
the  war  against  the  economic  union  of  Central 
Europe,  and  to  prevent  the  German  Empire  from 
reducing  other  countries  besides  Austria-Hungary 
to  a  commercial  dependence  on  itself,  this  is,  in 
strict  logic,  to  assume  that  the  Allies  agree  to  let 
Prussianized  Germany  lay  hands  on  the  50  million 
inhabitants  of  Austria-Hungary,  which  would 
secure  for  Berlin  the  means  of  carrying  out  her 
scheme  of  domination  "from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf."  But  it  is  clear  that  this  result  is 
radically  incompatible  with  the  higher  ideal  aim  of 
the  war  which  the  Allies  propose  as  their  goal, 
the  aim  which  their  governments  incessantly  pro- 
claim, that  is,  the  destruction  of  Prussian  militar- 
ism. 

There  has  therefore  unquestionably  been  a  mis- 
take on  the  part  of  some  French  and  English 
authorities,  who  are  in  other  respects  well  qualified, 
in  the  way  they  have  put  the  question  and  in  the 
association  of  their  ideas.  This  mistake  is  doubt- 
less explained  by  the  fact  that  in  England  loose 
ideas  are  still  prevalent  as  to  the  Pangerman  plan 
and  Austria-Hungary.  Many  people  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Channel  still  imagine  that  the  majority 


164      PANGERMAN    PLOT   UNMASKED 

of  the  population  of  that  Empire  is  German,  whereas 
on  the  principle  of  nationalities,  Germany  could  at 
most  incorporate  7  or  8  millions  of  Germans  at 
present  subjects  of  the  Hapsburg  (see  p.  126). 
These  loose  ideas  prevalent  in  England  are  very 
difficult  to  eradicate.  It  is  these  ideas  which  are  at 
the  root  of  the  mistakes  made  by  our  British  Allies 
in  regard  to  the  Balkans  and  Salonika,  whereas,  on 
account  of  Egypt  and  India,  England  was  more 
interested  than  all  the  other  Allies  in  the  rapid 
execution  of  that  expedition. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  as  the  Allies  cannot  indulge 
in  the  sanguinary  luxury  of  fresh  serious  blunders, 
it  is  necessary  to  show  why  the  project  of  an  eco- 
nomic understanding  between  the  Allies  should  be 
absolutely  independent  of  the  Berlin  project  of  a 
Central  European  Union. 

In  point  of  fact,  if  this  separation  is  not  clearly 
effected,  it  will  entail  the  following  baneful  conse- 
quences, which  will  delay  still  further  the  victory  to 
gain  which  the  Allied  peoples  are  making  such 
gigantic  sacrifices. 

1°.  To  allow  it  to  be  understood  in  the  news- 
papers of  the  Allies,  even  by  inadvertence,  that  the 
Allies  could  possibly  admit  of  the  economic  union 
which  Germany  intends  to  force  on  Austria- 
Hungary,  would  be  to  furnish  the  German  news- 
papers with  a  cordial  for  reviving  the  fainting 
spirits  of  the  German  nation;  for  in  that  case  the 
German  journalists  would  point  out  to  their  people 
that  they  can  still  count  on  carrying  out  the  main 
part  of  the  Pangerman  plan,  which  they  regard  as 
the  essential  object  of  the  war. 

2°.  The  German  scheme  of  capturing  Austria- 
Hungary  in  an  economical  net  is  radically  incom- 
patible with  the  pledges  which  the  Allies  have  given 
to  Serbia.  In  his  toast  to  the  Prince  of  Serbia, 
M.    Poincare   declared:     "Acting   with   the   Serbian 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  165 

army,  the  Allies  will  liberate  the  Serbian  territory, 
will  re-establish  the  independence  and  the 
sovereignty  of  your  noble  country  on  a  solid  founda- 
tion, and  will  vindicate  the  rights  which  have  been 
infringed"  (see  Le  Temps,  23rd  March,  1916). 
Now  a  mere  glance  at  the  map  (p.  79)  suffices  to 
show  that  the  capture  of  Austria-Hungary  by 
Germany  would  render  the  fulfilment  of  that 
solemn  promise  impossible.  Once  in  contact  with 
the  Balkans,  Germany  would  be  the  mistress  of 
these  countries,  and  for  Serbia  that  would  be  a 
sentence  of  death. 

3°.  To  allow  it  to  be  supposed  that  the  project 
of  an  economic  union  between  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  could  be  even  contemplated  by 
the  Allies,  would  be  to  give  over  to  an  agony  of 
despair  the  28  million  Slav  and  Latin  subjects  of  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy,  who  look  to  the  Allies  as  their 
deliverers,  and  who,  just  because  of  their  sympathies 
with  the  Allied  cause,  are  subjected  to  the  most 
atrocious  persecution.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  German  press  would  catch  at  any  ambiguous 
phrases  in  the  utterances  of  the  Allied  press  about 
the  "economic  union"  of  Central  Europe  in  order 
to  persuade  these  poor  wretches  that  the  Allies 
have  forsaken  them  for  good  and  all,  and  that  there 
is  nothing  left  for  them,  but  to  bow  their  neck  to 
the  German-Magyar  yoke.  But  it  is  manifestly 
the  political  and  military  interest  of  the  Allies  at 
the  moment  to  let  the  Slavs  and  Latins  of  Austria- 
Hungary  know  at  once  that  they  may  rely  on  the 
Allies,  and  that  the  victory  of  the  Allied  cause 
would  mean  the  end  of  their  own  serfdom.  To 
attain  that  result  of  the  war  is  unquestionably  a 
moral  duty  for  the  Allies;  but  more  than  that  it  is 
in  strict  conformity  with  their  own  future  interest, 
for  the  independence  of  28  million  Slavs  and  Latins 
of  Austria-Hungary   is   absolutely  indispensable   to 


i66      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

the  establishment  of  a  new  and  lasting  Europe, 
founded  on  the  principle  of  nationalities,  and 
capable  of  forming  at  the  same  time  in  Central 
Europe  a  barrier,  which  Pangermanism  in  arms  will 
for  the  future  be  powerless  to  overleap. 

4°.  Every  mistake,  or  appearance  of  a  mistake, 
as  to  the  treatment  which  the  Western  Allies  intend 
to  mete  out  to  Austria-Hungary  would  excite  the 
liveliest  protests  among  our  Russian  Allies.  As" 
M.  MilioukofT  well  said  in  a  speech  to  the  Duma: 
"When  we  have  wound  up  bankrupt  Turkey,  as 
we  are  now  doing,  it  will  be  necessary  to  wind  up 
another  bankrupt  concern,  and  that  is  Austria- 
Hungary.  We  are  certain  that  the  numerous 
nationalities  which  form  part  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
will  receive  their  liberty  at  the  hands  of  Russia" 
(quoted  by  Le  Temps,  27th  March,  1916).  But  the 
point  of  view  set  forth  by  M.  Milioukoff,  which  is 
that  of  everybody  who  really  knows  Austria- 
Hungary  (see  p.  118),  must  be  shared  by  all  the 
Allies,  since  they  intend  to  destroy  Prussian 
militarism  and  clearly  do  not  wage  the  most  fright- 
ful of  all  wars  for  the  purpose  of  seeing  militant 
Prussia  emerge  from  the  struggle  infinitely  more 
powerful  than  she  entered  into  it. 

These  many  and  forcible  reasons  make  it  clear 
how  necessary  it  is  that  there  should  be  no  possible 
ambiguity  in  the  Allied  press  as  to  the  economic 
conference  of  the  Allies.  It  is  all  very  well  for  the 
conference  to  look  ahead  to  the  time  when  peace 
shall  have  been  concluded,  to  take  "concerted 
measures  to  counteract  the  dirty  tricks  by  which 
Germany  has  compassed  the  destruction  of  her 
rivals,"  to  forestall  fresh  German  depredations,  in 
time  of  peace,  on  the  financial  establishments  of  the 
Allies,  to  prevent  the  Germans  from  manipulating 
the  Custom-house  tariffs,  with  all  their  usual 
dexterity,    and    so    forth.     This    is    all    very    well; 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  167 

nothing  better;  but  on  no  account  let  there  be, 
even  in  appearance,  the  least  connexion  between 
these  theoretical  measures  of  the  Allies  and  the 
pretensions  of  Berlin  to  establish  the  economic 
union  of  Central  Europe.  Besides,  as  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  has  said,  with  his  robust  good  sense: 
"Before  discussing  the  commercial  system  to  be 
adopted  after  the  war,  we  must  first  win  the 
war.  Everything  depends  on  that"  (quoted  by 
Le  Temps,  25th  March).  But  the  war  will  not  be 
really  won  till  every  revival  of  aggressive  Pan- 
germanism  shall  have  been  rendered  impossible; 
and  this  implies  nothing  less  than  the  most  energetic 
opposition  to  Germany's  attempt  to  capture  the 
majority  of  the  countries  which  actually  compose 
the  empire  of  the  Hapsburgs. 

II. 

A  cunning  manoeuvre  for  saving  the  future  of 
Pangermanism  and  of  Enver  Pasha's  gang  in 
Turkey  has  already  been  broached  by  the  Germans. 
As  it  will  certainly  be  attempted  again,  should  it 
be  in  the  interest  of  Berlin  to  push  it  through  (and 
everything  points  that  way),  it  becomes  necessary 
to  unmask  it  completely  beforehand.  In  February, 
1916,  numerous  Turkish  agents,  installed  in  Switzer- 
land and  apparently  working  through  spies  in  the 
Allied  countries,  began  to  set  afloat  a  rumour  that 
Turkey  was  ready  to  conclude  a  separate  peace. 
Enver  Pasha  had  been  assassinated  (which  of  course 
was  a  lie),  and  so  forth.  The  aim  of  this  manoeuvre 
was  to  secure  in  the  Allied  countries  the  assistance 
of  those  incorrigible  fools,  armed  with  the  panoply 
of  crass  ignorance  on  the  affairs  of  the  East,  who 
nevertheless  are  not  always  without  influence  on 
men  at  the  head  of  affairs.  If  I  am  rightly  in- 
formed, this  clever  dodge  of  the  Turkish  agents  did 
really  succeed  for  a  time  in  enlisting  some  of  the 


i68       PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

fools  I  speak  of.  In  the  opinion  of  these  gentry  the 
conclusion  of  a  separate  peace  with  Turkey  would 
have  been  a  very  good  move,  since  it  would  have 
deprived  Germany  of  the  help  of  her  Ottoman  ally, 
etc.  These  are  very  dangerous  illusions,  and  it  is 
necessary  to  show  how  and  why  this  measure  would 
play  the  game  of  Berlin  and  gravely  imperil  the 
victory  of  the  Allies. 

The  Turks,  greatly  alarmed  by  the  Russian 
successes  in  Armenia,  see  at  the  same  time  their 
dream  of  a  Panislamic  movement  fading  away. 
They  are  obliged  to  acknowledge  to  themselves  that 
the  Germans  are  cynically  using  them  for  their  own 
selfish  ends,  are  driving  them  along  the  road  to 
famine  by  making  a  clean  sweep  of  all  their  food 
supplies,  and  are  sending  them  to  slaughter  for  the 
higher  interests  of  Pangermany.  But  while  the 
mass  of  the  Turks  may  very  well  feel  their  anger 
beginning  to  rise  against  the  Germans,  they  are 
completely  in  the  hands  of  the  Young-Turk  ring- 
leaders, who  in  their  turn  are  bound  over,  hand  and 
foot,  to  the  Germans;  and  more  and  more  the 
Germans  are  masters  of  the  organs  of  administra- 
tion and  government  in  Turkey.  Therefore  there 
is  no  counting  on  an  effective  revolt  of  the  Turkish 
population,  who  moreover  are  entirely  destitute  of 
the  spirit  of  organization.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Germans  are  far-seeing  people  and  perfectly  under- 
stand that  Turkey  is  hastening  towards  a  catas- 
trophe. But  to  bring  about  a  separate  peace  between 
Turkey  and  the  Allies  would  be  equivalent  to  inducing 
the  Allies  to  recognize  the  permanence  of  tJie  Ottoman 
empire;  it  would  thus  save  that  empire  from  disaster, 
and  leave  the  door  open  for  Berlin  to  re-open  its  old 
intrigues  after  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  on  the  basis 
of  the  ^^ drawn  game''  (see  chap.  V). 

On  the  contrary,  if  the  question  of  the  Ottoman 
East  is  logically   settled   once   for   all,    all   hope   of 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  169 

carrying  out  at  a  later  time  the  Pangerman  dream 
''from  Constantinople  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  is 
finally  shattered.  Moreover,  a  separate  peace 
would  also  serve  the  turn  of  the  Young-Turk  ring- 
leaders, for  clearly  nothing  else  could  enable  them 
to  keep  their  hold  on  the  reins  of  power,  or  could 
save  them  from  being  massacred  by  their  fellow 
countrymen  the  day  that  the  Ottoman  crash  comes. 
We  see  therefore  why  the  rumours  of  a  separate 
peace  between  Turkey  and  the  Allies,  which  have 
been  circulated  and  afterwards  denied,  only  to  be 
started  again,  at  some  other  time,  are  really  a 
Turko-German  manoeuvre.  Besides,  the  Arabian 
journal  Al-Mokattan  of  Cairo  (22nd  April,  1916) 
has  remarked  that  "a  separate  peace  with  Turkey 
would  cause  Germany  no  uneasiness,  since  the 
retirement  of  Turkey  from  the  arena  would  relieve 
Germany  from  the  need  of  helping  the  Turks,  as  she 
does  at  present."  Finally,  the  Vossische  Zeitung 
has  confessed  that  "a  separate  peace  between 
Turkey  and  the  enemies  of  Germany  would  in  no 
way  prejudice  Austro-German  interests"  (quoted 
by  Le  Journal  de  Geneve,  25th  April,  19 16). 

However,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  leaders 
of  the  Entente  will  allow  themselves  to  be  caught 
in  the  Turko-German  trap.  The  Eastern  question 
is  a  regular  ulcer,  which  has  envenomed  European 
policy  for  a  hundred  years;  it  is  the  nightmare  of 
the  chanceries.  Every  attempt  to  reform  the 
Ottoman  empire  has  always  failed.  The  fact  is 
that  this  dry-rotten  State  has  only  been  bolstered 
up  by  the  mutual  rivalries  of  the  great  powers. 
Since  the  victory  of  the  Allies  is  bound  to  secure  for 
the  Old  World  a  very  long  period  of  peace,  that 
perennial  source  of  troubles  and  wars,  the  Turkish 
empire,  must  be  stopped  for  good.  Moreover, 
justice  in  its  broader  aspect  demands  the  same 
solution  of  the  problem. 


I70      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

In  Turkey,  as  elsewhere,  if  the  new  settlement  is 
to  be  endowed  with  a  potentiality  of  life,  the 
principle  of  nationalities  must  be  followed  as  far  as 
is  practicable.  Now,  out  of  the  20  million  inhabi- 
tants of  the  Ottoman  empire,  four  great  nationali- 
ties (see  the  accompanying  map)  account  for 
about  18  millions.  In  the  absence  of  statistics  on 
which  any  rehance  can  be  placed,  it  is  estimated  that 
there  are  in  Turkey  about: — 


CAUCASe 


I ::'  .  ill    Crecs 
I  ■     .'A     Turcs 
i  ■  ■  ■  1    Armeniena 
Arabes 


■■Ty^..  1  ^         •  Hamadan 


THE  NATIONALITIES  IN  TURKEY. 


Two  millions  of  Levantines,  of  Europeans,  of 
Jews,  and  of  miscellaneous  races. 

Two  millions  of  Greeks. 

Two  millions  of  Armenians. 

Eight  millions  of  Arabs. 

Six  millions  only  of  Turks. 

As  for  the  Greeks,  who  unfortunately  do  not  form 
a  coherent  body  (see  p.  147),  there  are  several 
solutions  to  be  considered,  with  a  view  to  giving 
them  a  fraction  of  the  Ottoman  empire,  if  they 
throw  themselves  into  the  struggle  in  the  Balkans 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  171 

on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  With  regard  to  the  Arabs, 
they  detest  the  Turks,  who  have  oppressed  them 
for  centuries.  The  liberation  of  the  Arabs  from  the 
Turkish  yoke  should  therefore  be  carried  out  so  far 
as  it  is  at  all  possible.  As  for  the  Armenians,  of 
whom  several  hundreds  of  thousands  have  just  been 
massacred  by  the  Turks,  it  is  clearly  impossible  to 
contemplate  the  continuance  of  the  remnant  of  this 
unhappy  people  under  the  iron  heel  of  Enver 
Pasha,  Talaat,  and  the  rest  of  that  gang.  With 
regard  to  the  six  millions,  or  thereabouts,  of  Turks, 
who  represent  less  than  the  third  of  the  population 
of  the  Ottoman  empire,  they  really  inhabit  only 
Anatolia,  that  is  to  say,  the  portion  of  the  Ottoman 
empire  included  between  the  Black  Sea  and  the 
Mediterranean.  Everywhere  else  the  Turks  are 
merely  hated  officials,  who,  ever  since  the  conquest 
by  the  Osmanli  Sultans,  have  cynically  sucked  dry 
the  other  populations  of  the  Ottoman  empire.  No 
doubt  the  Turkish  peasant  of  Anatolia,  when  he  is 
not  a  prey  to  one  of  those  paroxysms  of  religious 
fanaticism  which  seize  him  periodically,  is  generally 
a  good  fellow.  Very  sober  and  long-suffering  he 
makes  an  excellent  soldier,  but  the  mental  appara- 
tus of  your  Anatolian  Turk  is  several  centuries 
behind  the  time.  He  is  incapable  of  self-govern- 
ment in  our  modern  age.  It  is  true  that  there  are 
some  thousands  of  Turks  who  make  excellent 
employees  in  the  service  of  the  Ottoman  Debt,  but 
only  on  condition  of  their  being  constantly  super- 
vised and  directed  by  European  heads  of  depart- 
ments. Among  the  Turks  of  Constantinople  there 
is  not  a  single  group  offering  any  serious  guarantee 
for  the  guidance  of  the  Turkish  masses.  If  the 
Turkish  peasant  of  Anatolia  is  undoubtedly  endowed 
by  nature  with  some  sterling  qualities,  it  is  equally 
certain  that  the  Turks  of  Constantinople,  with  few 
exceptions,    are    corrupt    to    the    marrow    of    their 


172      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

bones.  In  these  circumstances  to  imagine  that  a 
really  independent  Turkish  empire  could  be  set  up 
is  to  nurse  an  absurd  chimera.  As  for  Constanti- 
nople, it  is  not  even  a  Turkish  city;  it  is  essentially 
cosmopolitan.  Its  1,200,000  inhabitants  consist 
of  Turks  (43  per  cent.),  Armenians  (18  per  cent.), 
Greeks  (17  per  cent.),  Jews  (16  per  cent.),  Euro- 
peans, Levantines,  and  miscellaneous  peoples  (6 
per  cent.). 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  plain  enough  that  this 
amazing  war  cannot  close  without  allowing  Russia 
to  acquire  a  predominant  position  at  Constanti- 
nople. Russia  certainly  did  not  want  the  war,  but 
she  has  been  compelled  to  wage  it  and  to  send 
millions  of  men  to  their  death,  while  she  has  had  to 
support  a  formidable  financial  burden.  For  these 
gigantic  sacrifices  Russia  must  receive  compensa- 
tion. The  toll  which  Russia  will  take  of  Poland  in 
return  for  the  autonomy  granted  to  her — a  toll 
which  is  both  just  and  conformable  to  the  common 
interest  of  the  Poles  as  well  as  of  the  Russians— 
evidently  cannot  repay  Russia  for  her  enormous 
sacrifices.  That  necessary  compensation,  there- 
fore, Russia  must  look  for  elsewhere.  Now  a  glance 
at  the  map,  combined  with  a  knowledge  of  the 
cosmopolitan  character  of  Constantinople,  will 
convince  anybody  that  Russia  cannot  continue  to  be 
bottled  up  in  the  Black  Sea.  While  it  is  necessary 
to  the  peace  of  the  new  Europe  that  the  control  of  the 
Straits  should  be  exercised  under  the  direction  of 
Russia  on  as  liberal  principles  as  possible,  it  is  no 
less  necessary  for  the  West  to  understand  that 
justice  demands  for  Russia  a  preponderant  position 
at  Constantinople,  even  though  the  Western  powers 
must  make  some  undoubted  sacrifices  to  secure 
that  object.  If  the  soldiers  of  the  Tsar  have  given 
proof  of  unparalleled  self-sacrifice,  if,  despite  some 
cruel  reverses,  they  display  an  inflexible  tenacity, 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  173 

it  is  because  they  are  stirred  by  two  motives — a 
hatred  of  the  Germans  who  have  poisoned  the 
Russian  bureaucracy,  and  the  ardent  wish  for  the 
fulfilment  of  that  hope  which  animates  the  poorest 
peasant  in  Russia,  the  hope  of  securing  for  Russia 
a  free  outlet  on  the  Mediterranean.  These  are  the 
feelings,  the  depth  and  power  of  which  M.  Milioukoff 
put  into  words  when  he  said  to  the  Duma:  ''We 
shall  not  end  the  war  without  securing  an  outlet  to 
the  open  sea.  The  annexation  of  the  Straits  will 
not  be  a  territorial  annexation,  for  vast  Russia  has 
no  need  of  new  territories,  but  she  cannot  prosper 
without  access  to  the  open  sea"  (see  Le  Journal  de 
Geneve,  28th  March,  1916).  But  in  spreading  the 
rumour  of  a  separate  peace  with  Turkey  the 
Germans  expect  to  derive  the  following  advantage 
from  the  manoeuvre.  They  reckon  that  some 
Allied  newspapers  in  the  West  will  receive  the  idea 
favourably.  The  Germans  would  immediately  take 
advantage  of  that  to  stir  up  in  Russia  a  violent  storm 
of  indignation  and  doubt  against  the  Western 
Allies.  The  example  of  191 5  ought  to  serve  the 
Allies  as  a  warning  against  any  imprudence  in  the 
press.  It  is  not  sufficiently  known  in  France  that 
last  year  the  Germans  traded  largely  on  the 
apparent  inactivity  of  the  French  troops,  at  the 
time  when  the  Russians  were  obliged  to  endure  their 
long  retreat  of  five  months.  That  inactivity  was 
certainly  not  the  effect  of  any  ill  will  of  the  French 
towards  their  Russian  allies;  it  was  the  consequence 
of  that  baneful  theory  of  the  Western  front  con- 
sidered as  the  principal  and  exclusive  theatre  of 
war,  a  theory  which  prevented  the  intervention  by 
way  of  Salonika,  at  a  time  when  it  might  still  have 
been  easily  effected,  between  May  and  July,  191 5. 
Nevertheless,  that  apparent  inactivity  has  been 
used  by  the  Germans  to  excite  discontent  in  Russia 
against  the  French,  and  their  efforts  have  not  been 


174      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

unsuccessful,  for  during  a  long  time  many  Russians 
were  much  annoyed  with  th(  French  for  an  in- 
activity which  seemed  to  them  inexplicable.  This  in- 
stance may  help  us  to  understand  what  a  disastrous 
effect  would  be  produced  in  Russia  by  the  news  that 
in  the  West  the  newspapers  or  influential  circles 
contemplate  as  possible  a  separate  peace  with 
Turkey  at  the  very  moment  when  the  Russian 
arms  are  more  and  more  successful  in  Armenia,  and 
when  these  successes  not  only  console  the  soldiers 
of  the  Tsar  for  their  former  reverses,  but  also 
render  the  Allies  a  substantial  service  by  draining 
the  Balkan  peninsula  of  Turkish  troops,  and  thus 
facilitating  the  Allied  offensive  from  Salonika 
Northward. 

Such  are  the  various  results  aimed  at  by  the 
astute  new  dodge  of  a  separate  peace  with  the 
Ottoman  empire.  Surely  it  is  only  necessary  to 
recognize  them  to  prevent  the  Allies  from  being 
caught  in  the  new  Turko-German  trap. 

III. 

Contemporaneously  with  the  rumour  of  a  separate 
peace  with  Turkey,  in  February,  1916,  a  suggestion 
was  mysteriously  made  to  the  Western  Allies  that 
the  Bulgarians  also  wished  to  treat  with  them.  The 
two  manoeuvres,  as  we  shall  see,  are  in  fact  closely 
connected.  If  the  Bulgarians  were  to  come  and 
say  to  the  Allies:  ''We  have  been  deceived, 
deluded  by  Berlin,  we  have  pursued  an  odious 
policy.  As  a  proof  of  our  good  faith  we  will  evacuate 
immediately  the  Serbian  territories  which  we  have 
invaded,  and  we  will  do  all  in  our  power  to  undo 
the  mischief  we  have  done.  Grant  us  peace  on 
these  terms";  in  that  case,  clearly  enough,  there 
would  be  some  reason  for  listening  to  Sofia.  But 
it  would  be  entirely  to  mistake  the  character  of  the 
Bulgarians  and  of  their  government  to  imagine  that 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  175 

they  could  even  dream  of  such  a  proposal.  What 
the  Bulgarians  would  like  well  enough  would  be  a 
peace  with  the  Allies,  which  should  allow  them  to 
retain  their  territorial  acquisitions,  the  permanent 
character  of  which  was  proclaimed  by  M.  Radoslavoff 
on  March  ist,  1916.  Such  a  settlement,  moreover, 
as  we  shall  see,  would  square  exactly  with  the 
interests  of  Sofia  and  Berlin. 

At  heart,  the  Bulgarians  would  be  very  glad  of 
peace,  since  a  continuation  of  the  war  can  hardly 
procure  for  them  any  accession  to  what  they  already 
hold.  On  the  other  hand,  the  offensive  of  the 
Allies  from  Salonika,  if  it  is  well  organized,  ought 
to  mete  out  to  the  Bulgarians  the  chastisement 
which  they  dread,  especially  since  the  check  to  the 
Germans  before  Verdun  and  the  Russian  successes 
in  Armenia.  The  Bulgarian  people  is  moreover 
deeply  discontented  at  the  heavy  losses  which  it  has 
already  sustained  by  the  sword  and  by  disease 
in  the  campaign  against  Serbia.  They  see  the  whole 
of  Bulgaria  in  the  hands  of  German  officers.  As  for 
the  Bulgarian  army,  it  is  in  a  very  unsatisfactory 
state,  which  has  already  led  to  local  mutinies  and 
many  desertions.  In  these  circumstances  Bulgaria 
would  evidently  on  all  accounts  do  a  good  piece  of 
business  if  she  were  to  make  a  separate  peace  with 
the  Allies.  It  must  be  clearly  understood  that  this 
Bulgarian  manoeuvre  is  not  openly  avowed  at 
Sofia;  it  is  only  carried  on  underhand,  and  prob- 
ably, for  the  reasons  we  shall  see,  with  the  con- 
nivance of  Berlin.  Nevertheless,  it  is  very  danger- 
ous, for,  it  must  be  said  in  the  interest  of  the  common 
Allied  cause  and  of  the  truth,  it  has  found  supporters 
in  the  Allied  countries  among  those  who  combine 
an  invincible  fatuity  with  ideas  on  the  Balkans 
which  are  forty  years  behind  the  time. 

There  are  also  some  Russians  who  still  imagine 
that  in  1915  the  Allied  diplomacy  made  a  mistake 
in  not  undoing  the  consequences  of  the   treaty  of 


176      TANGERMAN   PLOT    UNMASKED 

Bukarest;  whereas  in  point  of  fact  that  is  just  what 
has  been  done,  and  what,  as  we  saw  in  Chapter  II., 
§  I.,  constituted  the  fundamental  error  of  the  Allied 
policy  in  the  Balkans.  According  to  these  Russians 
the  treaty  of  Bukarest  should  have  been  set  aside  in 
order  to  restore  Bulgaria  to  the  limits  assigned  to 
it  by  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano.  This  is  the  point 
of  view  maintained  as  late  as  March,  1916,  by  M. 
Milioukoff  from  the  tribune  of  the  Duma.  I  have 
explained  (p.  138),  why  on  the  west  the  Bulgaria  of 
the  San  Stefano  treaty  by  no  means  corresponded 
to  the  racial  facts,  and  for  what  reasons  Macedonia, 
forming  the  south  of  Serbia,  is  very  far  from  being 
Bulgarian.  A  striking  proof  of  it  is  that  the 
Bulgarians  have  just  massacred  there  a  quantity 
of  Serbians.  With  regard  to  the  ethnography  of  the 
region  we  may  introduce  into  the  discussion  a  new 
argument,  as  original  perhaps  as  it  is  convincing. 
To  tell  the  truth  the  most  accurate  account  of  the 
ethnographic  position  of  Macedonia  is  that  which 
has  been  handed  down  to  us  for  generations  by  the 
Cooks — it  is  a  Macedoinc.  In  the  great  dictionary 
of  Larousse,  vol.  x,  p.  855,  edition  of  1873,  and 
therefore  anterior  by  five  years  to  the  treaty  of  San 
Stefano  (1878),  we  read:  " Macedoine  (Macedonia), 
a  dish  composed  of  a  great  number  of  different 
vegetables  or  fruits.  'This  word,'  says  Ch.  Nodier, 
'was  probably  first  applied  to  a  very  miscellaneous 
dish  in  allusion  to  the  incredible  medley  of  peoples 
on  whom  Philip  and  Alexander  imposed  the  laws  of 
Macedonia.'  " 

Now  these  various  peoples  are  the  Turks,  the 
Albanians,  the  Bulgarians,  the  Jews,  the  Rou- 
manians, and  the  Serbians,  who  inhabit  the  south 
of  Serbia.  Thus  the  ancient  tradition  handed  down 
by  the  cooks,  whose  impartiality  in  matters  of 
ethnography  will  not  be  disputed,  undoubtedly 
contradicts  the  theory  of  the  ethnographical  unity 


GERMAN    MANCEUVRES  177 

of  Bulgaria  mapped  out  by  the  treaty  of  San 
Stefano;  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  1878 
Russian  diplomacy  had  special  reasons,  which  no 
longer  exist,  for  treating  the  whole  of  that  Bulgaria 
as  exclusively  Bulgarian.  The  words  of  M. 
Milioukoff  prove  that  the  erroneous  ideas  of  1878 
still  linger  in  the  minds  of  some  Russians.  Happily 
among  the  vast  majority  of  our  Eastern  Allies  the 
logic  of  facts  has  dissipated  those  sentimental 
leanings  to  Bulgaria  which  were  once  so  strong. 
Indeed,  the  Bulgarians  themselves  have  powerfully 
assisted  the  Russians  to  arrive  at  a  juster  apprecia- 
tion of  the  true  situation.  At  the  end  of  19 15,  in 
the  first  effervescence  of  their  affection  for  Germany, 
the  newspapers  of  Sofia  announced  that  the 
Bulgarians  are  not  Slavs  but  Tartar-Mongols,  and 
that  this  racial  consideration,  added  to  all  the  rest, 
goes  to  show  that  along  with  the  Turks  and  the 
Magyars  they  should  form  the  "Turanian  block," 
which,  in  association  with  Germany,  will  master  and 
hold  down  the  Slavs  and  Latins  in  Europe.  Hence 
the  Bulgarian  dodge  of  a  separate  peace  with  the 
Allies  has  very  little  chance  of  being  seriously 
considered  in  Russia.  But  unfortunately  some  of 
those  same  Englishmen,  whose  erroneous  informa- 
tion greatly  contributed  to  the  Balkan  mistakes  of 
1915,  are  actually  supporting  it.  I  shall  only  refer 
here  to  Englishmen  who  have  no  official  position. 
Among  them  must  particularly  be  named  the 
brothers  Charles  and  Noel  Buxton,  who  have  long 
been  at  the  head  of  a  committee  which  is  called  the 
Balkan  Committee,  but  which  in  fact  has  always 
been  systematically  Bulgarophile.  Now  by  an 
odd  coincidence  the  brothers  Buxton  have  into 
the  bargain  Germanophile  leanings.  Lc  Temps 
of  January  loth,  191 6,  noticed  a  curious  book  of 
theirs  which  had  lately  appeared,  and  which  the 
journal    described    as    "pacificist    dreams."     These 


178      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

gentlemen  appear  to  advocate  a  premature  peace 
with  Berlin  as  well  as  with  Sofia,  a  policy  which 
is  characteristic  of  them.  Still  more  dangerous 
is  the  activity  of  some  underground  workers 
who  masquerade  as  correspondents  of  English 
newspapers  in  the  Balkans.  Amongst  them  are 
some  who,  holding  views  that  were  true  enough  in 
the  time  of  Gladstone  but  are  wrong  to-day, 
systematically  favour  the  Bulgarians.  Such  is 
their  prejudice  that  they  have  failed  to  see  the 
bearing  of  the  treaty  of  Bukarest,  and  did  not 
so  much  as  suspect  the  existence  of  the  treaties 
which  Bulgaria  concluded  with  Germany  and 
Turkey  i7i  the  spring  of  1914,  and  which  have 
just  been  disclosed  by  M.  Radoslavoff  (see  p.  154). 
These  correspondents,  in  virtue  of  the  undeserved 
credit  given  them  in  London,  contributed  in  large 
measure  to  delude  the  British  authorities  in  1915  as 
to  the  true  intentions  of  Bulgaria  down  to  the  mo- 
ment when  it  stepped  into  the  arena  at  the  side  of 
Germany.  From  this  grievous  error  has  resulted 
the  crushing  of  Serbia,  with  its  manifold  conse- 
quences. In  spite  of  these  plain  facts  staring  them 
in  the  face,  some  incorrigible  Englishmen  are  still 
unconvinced.  While  they  acknowledge  the  very 
great  difficulties  of  the  actual  situation  of  the 
Bulgarians,  they  nevertheless  arrive  at  this  para- 
doxical conclusion  that  the  Allies  should  make 
peace  with  the  Bulgarians  and  suffer  them  to 
retain  their  present  conquests. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  this  underhand  agitation 
lately  carried  on  in  London  by  a  few  but  very 
active  agents,  has  naturally  been  reprobated  by 
well-informed  British  opinion.  The  English  who 
in  April,  1916,  gave  so  warm  a  reception  to  the 
Prince  of  Serbia,  are  apprehensive  lest  a  new 
blunder  should  be  perpetrated  in  the  Balkans.  To 
prevent  that  contingency  a  question  was  put  in  the 


GERMAN    MANOiUVRES  179 

House  of  Commons  on  March  28th:  "A  member 
asked  for  an  assurance  that  Bulgaria  would  not  be 
admitted  to  a  separate  peace,  and  especially  that 
she  should  not  be  permitted  to  acquire  territories 
at  the  expense  of  the  peoples  who  have  fought  on 
the  side  of  the  Allies  during  the  war"  (see  VCEuvre, 
29th  March,  1916).  This  British  resolution  is  in 
harmony  with  the  interests,  moral  and  material, 
recent  and  future,  of  the  Allies. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  useless  to  reckon,  as  some 
misguided  people  have  done,  on  a  really  effective 
popular  Bulgarian  rising  against  the  government. 
Tsar  Ferdinand  has  always  done  just  what  he 
pleased  in  Bulgaria,  and  now  that  he  is  hand  in 
glove  with  Berlin,  the  Germans  will  furnish  him 
with  the  force  needed  to  keep  him  on  the  throne. 
As  for  the  Bulgarian  people,  they  are  no  doubt  the 
victims  of  the  present  situation,  but  so  they  will 
remain.  Unquestionably  they  possess  some  sterl- 
ing qualities.  They  are  industrious,  energetic, 
and  sober.  But  they  resemble  the  Prussians  in 
many  points,  as  the  new  German  minister  to  Sofia 
announced  recently  (see  Le  Temps,  i8th  March, 
1916).  In  fact  the  Bulgarian  people  has  the  keen 
eye  to  the  main  chance,  the  duplicity,  and  the 
domineering  spirit  of  the  Brandenburgs.  More- 
over, the  Bulgarian  people  is  the  prey  of  the 
Bulgarian  politicians,  who,  with  the  stubborn- 
ness of  mules  and  a  doggedness  of  which  it  is  im- 
possible to  convey  an  idea,  are  perfectly  irre- 
concilable on  the  question  of  Macedonia.  No 
doubt  the  most  astute  among  them  might  very 
well,  as  in  191 5,  pretend  to  negotiate  with  the 
Allies  for  the  purpose  of  delaying  the  attack  from 
the  side  of  Salonika,  of  which  Berlin  is  extremely 
afraid;  but  to  believe  it  possible  to  come  to  a 
sincere  and  durable  understanding  with  Bulgaria 
is  merely  to  nurse  the  most  pernicious  of  chimeras. 


i8o     PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

To  conclude  a  premature  peace  with  Bulgaria 
would  also  entail  on  the  Allies  other  fatal  conse- 
quences, which  it  is  easy  to  demonstrate.  A 
treaty  with  the  Bulgarians,  who  in  complicity  with 
the  Germans  have  just  massacred  systematically 
an  enormous  number  of  Serbians,  would  be  a 
manifest  act  of  treason  to  Serbia;  it  would  be  to 
treat  the  crimes  of  the  Bulgarians  as  if  they  actually 
conferred  rights  on  the  criminals.  Clearly  the 
public  opinion  of  the  Allied  nations  would  never 
tolerate  such  an  infamy.  Besides,  from  a  military 
point  of  view  the  calculation  would  be  wrong.  In 
order  to  avoid  giving  battle  to  350,000  Bulgarians, 
whose  forces  must  be  divided  between  the  Rou- 
manian front  and  the  Salonika  front,  the  Allies 
would  be  obliged,  in  the  first  place,  to  dispense  with 
the  assistance  of  150,000  Serbian  soldiers,  who 
obviously  would  refuse  to  march  the  day  that  the 
Allies  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  Bulgarians. 
Moreover,  an  understanding  with  Bulgaria  would 
have  the  effect,  at  once  political  and  military,  of 
undermining  the  favourable  disposition  of  the 
Greeks  and  Roumanians  towards  the  Entente. 
As  I  have  shown  in  Chapter  VII,  the  hatred  of  the 
Roumanians  and  the  Greeks  for  the  Bulgarians  is 
the  great  psychological  factor  in  the  Balkans. 

The  official  plan  of  Bulgarian  supremacy,  set 
forth  on  the  accompanying  map,  may  serve  to 
explain  that  hatred,  for  it  shows  that  Bulgarian 
ambition  encroaches  considerably  on  the  terri- 
tories of  all  her  neighbours.  It  now  even  extends 
by  way  of  Albania  to  the  Adriatic.  We  can  there- 
fore readily  understand  that  this  plan  of  Bulgarian 
supremacy  is  the  nightmare  of  the  Greeks  and  the 
Roumanians.  But  these  Bulgarians,  like  the 
Prussians,  because  of  the  similarity  of  their  charac- 
ters, will  never  renounce  their  programme  of 
dominion    until    they    shall    have    received    at    the 


GERMAN    MANOEUVRES 


i«i 


hands  of  the  Allies,  with  the  help  of  the  Greeks  and 
Roumanians,  the  sound  thrashing  which  they  have 
earned  a  hundred  times  over,  and  which  is  essential 
to  the  establishment  of  lasting  peace  in  the  Balkans. 
But  it  is  clear  that  if  negotiations  were  opened  for  a 
separate  peace  with  the  Bulgarians,  the  Greeks 
(250,000  men)  and  the  Roumanians  (600,000  men). 


Limite  du  Plan 
d'hegemonie  bulgare 


ENCROACHMENTS  PLANNED  BY  BULGARIA  ON 
NEIGHBOURING  STATES. 


seeing  their  interests  once  more  misunderstood  by 
the  Allies,  would  refuse  once  and  for  all  to  fight  on 
their  side. 

Finally,  a  separate  peace  which  left  Bulgaria  in 
possession  of  her  conquests,  would  enable  her  to 
build  and  buttress  the  bridge  which  is  to  join  the 
Central   Empires   to   Turkey.       That   is  just    what 


i82      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

Berlin  wants  in  order  to  execute  its  scheme  of 
domination  ''from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf." 
In  the  light  of  that  aim,  the  secret  attempts  of 
Bulgaria  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  are  seen  to 
be  the  Bulgaro-German  counterpart  of  the  Turko- 
German  manoeuvre  which  I  have  exposed  above  (see 
p.   167). 

Evidently  the  Allies  will  not  allow  themselves  to 
be  taken  in  by  these  clumsy  tricks.  The  lesson 
taught  by  the  faults  committed  in  the  Balkans  in 
191 5  is  so  plain  that  it  will  prevent  the  Allied  leaders 
from  perpetrating  any  fresh  blunder  on  a  large 
scale.  Moreover,  the  victory  of  the  Allies  cannot 
be  won,  and  a  lasting  peace  cannot  be  established 
in  Europe,  unless  the  German  dodge  of  the  "drawn 
game"  is  frustrated. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

THE  STILL  NEUTRAL  STATES  WHOSE  INDEPENDENCE 
WOULD  BE  DIRECTLY  THREATENED  BY  THE  ACHIEVE- 
MENT OF  THE  "HAMBURG  TO  THE  PERSIAN  GULF " 
SCHEME,  AND  THEREFORE  BY  GERMANY'S  CAPTURE 
OF   AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

I.  The  example  of  Portugal. 

II.  Holland. 

III.  Switzerland. 

IV.  The  States  of  South  America. 
V.  The  United  States. 

Almost  all  the  neutral  States,  though  as  yet  they 
are  hardly  aware  of  it,  have  a  vital  interest,  not  only 
in  compelling  Germany  to  abandon  her  conquests 
in  the  East  and  in  the  West,  but  also  in  preventing 
her  from  establishing  her  supremacy  over  Austria- 
Hungary  by  means  of  the  war.  This  latter  aim  is 
perfectly  logical,  since  the  German  supremacy  over 
Central  Europe  would  secure  for  the  government  of 
Berlin  formidable  means  of  domination  both  by 
land  and  sea  (see  p.  io6).  One  of  the  effects  of  the 
colossal  upheaval  in  the  mutual  relation  of  the 
forces  of  the  States  involved,  in  view  of  the  abnor- 
mal concentration  of  the  sources  of  power  in  Ger- 
man hands,  would  be  that  the  independence  of  the 
neutral  States  would  inevitably  be  gravely  im- 
perilled. In  this  chapter  we  shall  consider  the 
situation  of  countries  still  neutral,  which  would 
be  particularly  affected  by  the  achievement  of  the 
scheme  ''from,  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf." 

I. 

The  case  of  Portugal  is  typical,  because  here  we 
have  a  small  State  which,  in  the  opinion  of  many, 
seemed  for  a  long  time  as  if  it  could  keep  out  of  the 

183 


i84      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

conflict;  whereas  on  the  contrary  the  necessity  of 
defending  itself  against  the  German  schemes  for 
swallowing  it  up,  compelled  it  at  last  to  plunge  into 
the  war. 

Ever  since  the  opening  of  hostilities  in  Europe, 
Portugal  has  been  the  scene  of  German  intrigues 
carried  on  with  the  greatest  activity;  indeed,  even 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  European  conflagration 
the  train  had  been  laid  as  carefully  in  Portugal  as 
elsewhere.  Working  through  reactionary  centres, 
these  intrigues  ostensibly  aimed  at  the  restoration 
to  the  throne  of  Emmanuel  of  Saxe-Coburg  and 
Gotha-Braganga,  who  had  been  dethroned,  on 
October  5th,  19 10,  by  the  revolution  which  gave 
birth  to  the  Portuguese  Republic.  Atterwards,  on 
the  4th  of  September,  1913,  he  married  the  German 
princess  Augustine- Victoria,  of  Hohenzollern  Sig- 
maringen.  The  German  agents  also  brought 
influence  to  bear  on  certain  Portuguese  anarchists 
in  order,  by  every  possible  means,  to  stir  up  trouble 
in  the  country  which  had  been  marked  out  for  ruin 
by  the  Pangerman  plot  of  191 1.  We  have  seen 
(p.  103)  what  Portuguese  colonies  that  plot  had 
specially  in  view.  Now  in  191 2  the  government  of 
Berlin,  eagerly  and  astutely  plotting  its  European 
war  on  the  assumption  that  England  would  stand 
out  of  it,  and  that  she  might  be  lulled  into  acquie- 
scence by  the  bait  of  temporary  colonial  gains, 
availed  itself  of  the  official  negotiations  with  Lord 
Haldane  to  propose  to  the  English  Cabinet  that 
England  and  Germany  should  divide  the  Portuguese 
colonies  in  Africa  between  them. 

These  colonies  (the  Azores,  Madeira,  Cape  Verd, 
Princes  Island,  St.  Thomas,  Guinea,  Angola, 
Mozambique)  shown  on  the  accompanying  map, 
are  of  great  importance  to  Portugal.  With  their 
two  millions  of  square  kilometres,  and  their 
8,300,000  inhabitants,  they  are  the  still  important 


STILL  NEUTRAL    STATES 


i8i 


relics  of  the  once  magnificent  colonial  empire  of 
Portugal;  they  are  accordingly  an  essential  base 
for  Portuguese  commerce,  and  especially  for  a 
future  commercial  revival  of  Portugal,  which  the 
government  of  Lisbon  is  naturally  anxious  to 
promote. 


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PORTUGAL  AND  COLONIAL  PANGERMANISM. 


At  the  very  commencement  of  hostilities  in 
Europe,  the  Germans,  discounting  their  victory  in 
Europe,  invaded  Angola,  and  it  is  only  lately  that 
the  Portuguese  soldiers  succeeded  in  driving  them 


i86      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

out.  Thus  in  point  of  fact  a  state  of  war  has  long 
existed  between  Portugal  and  Germany,  and  it  is 
Germany  that  took  the  offensive.  Hence  from  the 
outset  the  Portuguese  government  has  had  many 
excellent  reasons  for  wishing  well  to  the  cause  of 
the  Allies;  and  Portugal  has  effectively  proved  her 
good  will  by  all  the  means  in  her  power. 

By  way  of  reprisals  for  the  incessant  German 
intrigues  in  Portugal  itself,  and  for  the  acts  of  war 
committed  on  her  colonial  territory  by  the  soldiers 
of  William  II.,  Portugal  at  last  seized  the  numerous 
German  vessels  which  had  been  interned  in  her  ports 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  European  conflagration. 

Germany  replied  in  March,  1915,  by  an  official 
declaration  of  war,  which  in  fact  did  nothing  but 
legalize  a  state  of  things  that  had  long  existed  in 
consequence  of  the  German  aggression  on  Angola. 

After  this  official  rupture  Portugal  perfectly 
understood  that,  if  she  wished  to  save  her  very 
existence,  she  must  range  herself  completely  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies.  On  March  25th,  1916,  the 
Portuguese  Minister  of  War  issued  an  order  to  the 
army,  in  which  he  said: 

*'No  one  who  has  followed  with  patriotic  anxiety 
the  acts  of  Germany  ever  since  the  conference  of 
Berlin  in  1885,  can  doubt  that  her  victory  would 
involve  the  loss  of  our  colonies,  perhaps  even  of  our 
nationality.  Therefore  we  must  all  impress  it 
clearly  on  our  minds,  that  the  battles  now  being 
fought  in  so  many  parts  of  the  world  touch  us  very 
closely;  that  this  war  is  our  war,  a  war  for  our 
liberty,  for  our  independence,  for  the  integrity  of  the 
territory  of  our  native  land,  and  that  we  should 
wage  it  wherever  our  forces  can  strike  the  heaviest 
blow  at  the  power  of  Germany.  The  hatred  of 
our  barbarous  foes,  the  Germans,  should  pervade 
every  heart,  and  that  it  may  strike  root  and  pene- 
trate into  the  army,  it  is  necessary  to  explain   to 


STILL   NEUTRAL   STATES  187 

the  soldiers  the  reasons  of  the  war,  to  enumerate 
the  injuries  that  have  been  done  us  by  the  Germans, 
and  to  set  forth  clearly  the  intentions  and  schemes 
which  Germany  cherishes  in  regard  to  small  nations, 
like  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Portugal." 

This  proclamation  of  the  Portuguese  Minister  of 
War  deserves  to  be  remembered,  for  it  accurately 
expresses  the  general  sentiments  which  will  be 
shared  more  and  more  by  States  still  neutral,  in 
proportion  as  they  understand  more  and  more 
clearly  that  their  future  independence  really  hangs 
on  the  total  defeat  of  Germany. 

II. 

The  following  words  give  a  summary  of  the  views 
and  the  tactics  adopted  by  the  Germans  with 
regard  to  the  Dutch  in  the  Pangerman  plan  of  1895. 

"When  our  brothers  of  the  Low  German  race 
shall  have  got  over  their  almost  childish  fright  at 
'annexation  by  the  Prussians,'  they  will  acknow- 
ledge that  the  admission  of  Holland  into  Great 
Germany  is  advantageous  to  both  parties.  More- 
over, in  the  bosom  of  Great  Germany,  the  Dutch 
would  be  able  to  preserve,  to  a  reasonable  extent, 
their  own  particular  characteristics. 

"The  Kingdom  of  the  Low  Countries,  on  entering 
into  not  only  the  German  Customs  Union  but  also 
the  Pangerman  Confederation,  with  the  retention 
of  all  its  rights,  will  cease  to  maintain  an  independ- 
ent fleet,  but  will  organize  an  independent  Army 
Corps,  with  privileges  like  those  of  Bavaria,  and 
also  a  colonial  army.  It  will  remain  in  possession 
of  its  colonies,  and  might  even  undertake  the 
administration  of  New  Guinea  and  of  all  the  German 
colonies  in  the  Pacific. 

"The  official  language  will  remain  Low  German 
(Dutch)  for  the  legislation  and  the  administration  in 
State,  School,  and  Church.     High  German  will  not 


i88      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

be  employed  except  in  matters  that  concern  the 
Confederation.  Besides  it  is  obvious  that  its  use 
will  spread  rapidly,  but  voluntarily,  in  commerce 
and  the  sciences. 


THE  NEUTRAL  STATES  OF  EUROPE  AND  PANGERMANISM. 

"If  the  Rhine  from  its  source  to  its  mouth 
becomes  a  truly  German  river,  it  will  then  be  the 
Low  German  (or  Dutch)  commercial  towns  and 
seaports  near  its  mouth,  which  will  chiefly  benefit 
thereby. 

''It  will  thus  be  seen  that  a  singularly  attractive 
prospect  for  the  economic  and  political  future  of  the 


STILL    NEUTRAL    STATES  189 

Low  Countries,  is  being  opened  up,  if  they  will  only 
consent  to  become  members  of  the  Pangerman 
Confederation.  God  grant  that  our  Low  German 
cousins  may  at  last  abandon  that  jealous  regard  for 
their  independence  as  a  separate  State,  which  we, 
the  Germans  of  the  Empire,  also  felt  down  to  the 
years  1866  and  1870"  (see  Grossdeutschland  und 
Mitteleuropa  um  das  Jahr  1950,  p.  13,  Thormann 
und  Goetsch,  S.W.  Bessel-Strasse  17,  Berlin,  1895). 

So  it  seems  that  twenty  years  ago  the  Germans 
trusted  to  moral  suasion  to  open  the  eyes  of  the 
Dutch  to  the  intrinsic  beauties  of  Pangermany. 
The  hope  was  built  on  the  familiar  fact  that  many 
Dutchmen,  addicted,  like  their  ancestors  for  ages 
before  them,  to  the  profitable  occupation  of  foreign 
trade,  devote  their  energies  to  the  pursuit  of  gain, 
and  have  very  little  time,  and  even  less  taste,  for 
situations  that  call  for  bellicose  resolutions.  The 
same  turn  of  mind  explains  why  ever  since  the 
outbreak  of  war  the  Germans  have  easily  found 
in  Holland  plenty  of  enterprising  firms,  which  have 
smuggled  ample  supplies  of  all  sorts  into  Germany 
and  snapped  their  fingers  at  the  blockade. 

However,  1895  is  a  long  time  ago,  and  since  then 
Pangerman  ideas  have  marched  with  the  time.  As 
we  have  seen  (p.  103),  the  plan  of  191 1  provides  for 
the  ''conveyance"  of  the  Dutch  colonies  to  Pan- 
germany under  conditions  which  would  not  allow 
the  Low  Countries  to  cherish  the  least  illusion  as  to 
the  ultimate  preservation  of  their  independence. 

But  the  revelation  of  the  German  plans  for  the 
perpetration  of  burglary  and  the  appropriation  of 
other  people's  goods,  has  had  its  effect,  and  even  the 
Dutch,  in  spite  of  their  intense  desire  not  to  be 
drawn  into  the  great  war,  are  now  forced  to  look 
hard  facts  in  the  face. 

In  truth,  the  moral  situation  of  the  Dutch  is 
hard,  for  they  are  pulled  in  opposite  directions  by 


iQo      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

sentiments  which  logically  lead  to  contradictory 
decisions.  On  the  one  side,  historical  memories 
and  ancient  rivalries  in  the  commerce  of  the  sea 
still  inspire  them  with  a  lively  dread  of  England; 
on  the  other  side,  they  are  constrained  to  admit 
that  the  Pangerman  peril  has  grown  imminent  for 
their  country.  It  is  plain,  in  fact  (see  the  map  on 
p.  i88)  that  if  Germany  were  to  tighten  her  grip  on 
Belgium,  or  if  she  emerged  from  the  war  much 
strengthened  by  the  establishment  of  her  supremacy 
over  Austria-Hungary,  Holland  would  soon  in- 
evitably be  forced,  even  in  time  of  peace,  to 
acquiesce  in  vassalage  to  her  formidable  neighbour, 
Pangermany. 

The  Dutch  are  all  the  more  perplexed  and  irreso- 
lute, before  they  can  screw  their  courage  up  to  the 
sticking  point,  because  they  are  sometimes  dis- 
concerted by  the  action  of  their  government,  which, 
as  everybody  knows,  is  open  to  both  direct  and 
powerful  German  influences.  The  situation  is 
described  as  follows  in  a  few  paragraphs  of  the 
Telegraaf,  which  earned  for  their  author  a  series  of 
prosecutions  on  the  pretext  that  they  endangered 
the  neutrality  of  the  country: — 

"For  our  part,"  said  the  Telegraaf,  "we  shall 
not  cease  to  oppose  a  Government  and  its  accom- 
plice Press,  who  under  the  cloak  of  a  '  dignified 
neutrality'  are  pursuing  a  rash  policy  of  exporta- 
tion and  provisioning  Germany  with  articles  of 
prime  necessity,  thereby  enabling  that  country  to 
continue  the  war,  and  betraying  not  only  the 
interests  of  their  own  country  but  also  the  cause  of 
humanity"  (quoted  by  Le  Temps,  30th  March,  1916). 

As  for  the  general  and  dominant  tone  of  Dutch 
public  opinion,  Mr.  Holdert,  the  editor  of  the 
Telegraaf,  who  is  particularly  well  qualified  to  form 
an  opinion  on  the  subject,  sums  up  as  follows: 

"Every  time  an  incident  occurs  that  might  lead 


STILL  NEUTRAL   STATES  191 

Holland  to  take  a  grave  decision,  before  you 
venture  to  predict,  remember  that  the  people  over 
there  do  not  want  war.  With  us,  business,  money, 
gain,  and  all  that  sort  of  thing,  is  considered  ex- 
tremely,  supremely,  infinitely  important. 

''To-day  the  majority  of  my  fellow  countrymen 
are  rolling  in  money.  Why  trouble  about  any- 
thing else? 

"Yes,  eighty  per  cent,  of  the  population  are  in 
favour  of  the  Allies.  France  especially  is  loved, 
and  she  could  ask  but  little  of  us  which  we  would 
not  give.  But  that  affection,  though  real,  is  so  to 
speak,  remote.  We  quickly  turn  over  the  page 
which  contains  the  news  of  the  war"  (see  Le  Journal^ 
5th  April,  1916). 

Thus  Dutch  opinion  seems  stagnant,  yet  it 
moves,  though  very,  very  slowly;  for  people  are 
beginning  to  ask  themselves  whether,  despite  all 
their  efforts,  all  their  intense  desire  for  peace,  this 
dreadful  war  can  end  with  the  Dutch  sword  still  in 
the  scabbard. 

No  doubt  the  military  measures  taken  by  the 
Hague  government  have  been  dictated  purely  with 
the  intention  of  defending  Dutch  neutrality.  But 
facts  such  as  the  torpedoeing  of  the  Tuhantia  go 
far  to  add  to  the  number  of  those  clearsighted  and 
energetic  patriots,  who,  like  the  admirable  and 
vigorous  artist  Raemaekers,  acknowledge  and  pro- 
claim that  for  the  sake  of  her  honour  as  well  as  of 
her  interest  Holland  is  bound  to  do  all  in  her  power 
to  favour  and  hasten  the  victory  of  the  Allies. 

III. 

The  Pangerman  aims  with  regard  to  Switzerland, 
as  set  forth  in  the  plan  of  1895,  are  summed  up  as 
follows: — 

"We  may  then  leave  Switzerland  to  choose, 
whether  she  shall  enter  the  German  Customs  Union 


192       PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

and  the  Pangerman  Confederation  bringing  all  her 
cantons  or  only  the  German  ones  with  her,  or 
whether  she  shall  form  part  of  the  German  Empire 
on  equal  terms  as  a  Federal  St^te"  (see  Gross- 
deutscJiland  um  das  Jahr  1950,  p.  17). 

The    Pangerman    programme    is,    therefore,    defi- 
nitely directed  against  Switzerland  (see  the  map  on 
p.   188),  but  Berlin  has  always  flattered  itself  wit' 
the  hope  of  absorbing  this  little  State,  like  Holland 
without   resort   to   force,    simply   in    the   course    o 
nature  and  as  a  consequence  of  the  defeat  of  thj 
great  European  powers. 

What  is  certain  is  that  before  the  war  the  prestige 
of  Germany  in  German  Switzerland  was  so  great, 
and  the  organization  of  the  German  propaganda  in 
this  part  of  Helvetia  was  so  perfect,  that  all  the 
excuses  published  by  the  Berlin  government  to 
explain  and  justify  the  violation  of  Belgium  were 
swallowed  without  winking  by  the   German  Swiss. 

But  since  then  a  slow  change  of  sentiment  has 
taken  place.  The  enormous  annexations  contem- 
plated by  Germany,  the  atrocious  manner  in  which 
she  is  waging  the  war,  and,  above  all,  the  terrible 
horrors  perpetrated  in  Serbia,  have  at  last  con- 
vinced an  increasing  number  of  Swiss  that  a  victory 
for  Germany  would  create  a  formidable  danger  for 
the  whole  civilized  world  in  general,  and  for  the 
independence  of  Switzerland  in  particular. 

A  gentleman  at  Zurich,  whose  position  affords 
him  ample  opportunity  for  forming  a  just  apprecia- 
tion of  the  state  of  affairs,  gave  me  recently  the 
following  concise  statement  of  the  real  feeling  in 
German  Switzerland:  "The  majority  of  the  in- 
tellectuals, almost  all  of  whom  have  studied  in 
Germany,  and  a  part  of  the  business  men,  are  the 
only  resolute  champions  of  Prussia.  They  would 
be  quite  willing  to  see  Switzerland  absorbed  in 
Pangermany.     But  the  Swiss  who  hold  that  view 


STILL   NEUTRAL   STATES  193 

are  only  a  small  minority.  In  German  Switzerland 
most  of  the  manufacturers,  almost  all  of  whom  have 
suffered  very  heavily  in  recent  years  through  the 
keenness  of  German  competition,  desire  a  German 
defeat,  which  would  be  in  harmony  both  with  their 
opinions  as  liberals  and  with  their  interests  as 
manufacturers,  by  relieving  the  strain  of  the  present 
fierce  competition  in  business.  As  for  the  mass  of 
the  German  Swiss — and  that  is  the  important  point 
— they  are  by  no  means  in  love  with  the  Prussians, 
as  people  in  France  wrongly  imagine.  They  are 
before  all  things  Swiss." 

The  Swiss  have  resolved  to  defend  their  neu- 
trality against  the  first  of  their  neighbours  that 
shall  violate  their  frontier.  The  Allies  wish  for 
nothing  more  than  that.  They  only  desire  that 
the  Swiss  should  impress  this  truth  more  and  more 
clearly  on  their  minds,  that  in  presence  of  the  for- 
midable Pangerman  ambition  the  victory  of  the 
Allies  is  a  condition  essential  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  Helvetic  Confederation. 

IV. 

The  accompanying  map  summarizes  and  recalls 
the  Pangerman  claims  to  such  direct  German  pro- 
tectorates in  South  America  as  were  provided  for 
by  the  plan  of  191 1  (see  p.  105). 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  the  German 
designs  on  South  America  began  just  at  the  time 
when  the  European  nations,  acquiescing  in  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  renounced  all  intentions  of  ap- 
propriating any  part  of  the  New  World.  This 
renunciation  took  place  about  1898,  the  date  of  the 
war  between  Spain  and  America.  That  was  the 
very  moment  when  the  Pangermanists  of  Berlin 
conceived  and  prepared  to  execute  the  plan  of  ex- 
tending in  the  future  the  power  of  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  to   Cape   Horn.     This  fact,   taken  in  con- 


194      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

junction  with  many  others,  serves  to  demonstrate 
the  spirit  of  conquest  and  aggression,  the  boundless 
ambition  which  animates  the  Germany  of  William  II. 
The  preparations  for  carrying  out  the  Pangerman 
plans  in  South  America  were,  as  everywhere  else, 
conducted  by  the  organizers  of  the  movement  most 
methodically. 


n::2>  » 


rr,     Z*^*  ANTILLES 


Zones  viseea  parte  Plan 
panjermaniste  pour  I'eUbliaaemtnt 
de  protectorate  allemanda. 


C0L0NI.\L  PANGERMAMSM  AND  SOUTH  AMERICA. 

Having  thus  settled  on  their  plan  of  1895,  they 
proceeded  to  draw  up  an  actual  register  of  all  the 
Germans  existing  on  the  face  of  the  terrestrial 
globe,  in  order  to  pick  out  from  them  such  as  were 
likely  to  prove  the  most  serviceable  tools  in  execut- 
ing the  Pangerman  scheme.  The  general  results 
of  this  register  of  Germans  all  over  the  world  are  to 


STILL  NEUTRAL    STATES 


195 


be  found,  in  a  concentrated  form,  in  the  Pangerman 
Atlas  of  Paul  Langhans,  published  by  Justus 
Perthes  at  Gotha  in  1900. 

So  far  as  relates  to  South  America,  this  document 
proves  that  there  were 


2,000  Germans 

3,000 

3,000 

5,000 

5,000 

15,000 

60,000 

400,000 


In  Peru  in  1890 

In  Paraguay  in  1890 

In  Colombia  in  1890 

In  Uruguay  in  1897 

In  Venezuela  in  1894 

In  Chili  in  1895 

In  Argentina  in  1895 

In  Brazil  in  1890 

These  Germans  have  been  strongly  inoculated,  es- 
pecially since  1900,  by  the  Pangerman  Societies. 
They  have  been  organized  with  particular  care  in 
the  countries  which,  like  Argentina,  and,  above  all, 
Brazil,  were  intended  to  be  the  principal  German 
protectorates  in  South  America. 

The  German  law,  called  Delbriick's  law,  of 
July  22nd,  1913,  dealing  with  the  nationality  of 
the  Empire  and  the  nationality  of  the  State,  has 
greatly  favoured  the  Pangerman  organization  in 
America.  Hence  it  is  needful  to  be  acquainted 
with  at  least  the  substance  of  the  Delbriick  law, 
since  it  formed  the  last  stage,  and  a  very  significant 
one,  in  the  Pangerman  organization  all  over  the 
world  before  the  outbreak  of  war. 

The  second  part  of  article  25  of  that  law  runs  as 
follows: — ''If  any  person  before  acquiring  nation- 
ality in  a  foreign  State,  shall  have  received  the 
written  permission  of  a  competent  authority  of  his 
native  State  to  retain  his  nationality  of  that  State, 
he  shall  not  lose  his  nationality  of  the  said  native 
State.  The  German  consul  shall  be  consulted 
before  granting  the  said  permission." 

These  words  afford  us  a  measure  of  the  depth  of 
German   astuteness.     According   to    this   provision, 


19O      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

a  German  may  become  a  naturalized  subject  of  a 
foreign  State,  but  if  he  obtains  a  written  permission 
from  the  competent  authorities  of  his  native  Ger- 
man State,  he  continues,  in  spite  of  this  naturaliza- 
tion, to  enjoy,  for  himself  and  his  descendants,  all  the 
rights  of  a  German  citizen  and  all  the  protection  of  the 
German  Empire. 

These  provisions  being  contrary  to  all  the  general 
principles  of  international  law  on  the  subject  of 
nationality,  a  German  citizen  who  benefits  by  them 
will  take  very  good  care  not  to  acquaint  the  foreign 
State  whose  nationality  he  has  acquired,  with  the 
highly  peculiar  situation  in  which  he  stands.  By 
this  process  Germany  has  been  able  to  have  in 
every  State  agents  devoted  to  her  aggressive 
policy,  without  these  States  being  aware  of  the 
danger  they  run  through  this  secret  service.  In 
fact,  these  States  had,  to  all  appearance,  to  do  only 
with  fellow  countrymen  whom  they  had  no  right 
to  suspect.  It  was  only  after  many  months  of  war, 
when  their  criminal  action  compelled  them  to  take 
ofl  the  mask,  that  the  dangerous  power  of  these 
Germans  disguised  as  foreigners  appeared  in  all  its 
formidable   and  insufferable   dimensions., 

This  state  of  things  explains  why,  during  the  first 
months  of  the  war,  intoxicated  by  the  powerful 
German  propaganda,  and  ignorant  of  the  disasters 
with  which  Europe  and  still  more  themselves  were 
threatened  by  the  Pangerman  plot,  the  States  of 
South  America  were  unable  to  perceive  the  peril  at 
their  door  and  to  understand  that  they  had  a  direct 
interest  in  the  issue  of  the  European  war.  But  now 
public  opinion  in  these  countries  is  advancing 
steadily  towards  a  complete  apprehension  of  the 
truth. 

Peru  and  Chili,  one  after  the  other,  are  slipping 
through  the  meshes  of  the  German  net. 

In    Argentina    the    movement    in    favour    of    the 


STILL    NEUTRAL    STATES  197 

Allies  is  also  growing  rapidly.  But  it  is  above  all 
in  Brazil,  the  southern  part  of  which  is  most  par- 
ticularly coveted  by  the  Germans,  that  the  progress 
of  enlightenment  is  especially  interesting  to  watch. 
For  a  long  time  the  Germans  have  concentrated 
their  colonial  efforts  particularly  on  three  Brazilian 
States,  to  wit,  Parana  (60,000  Germans),  Santa 
Catarina  (170,000),  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  (220,000). 
In  these  rich  provinces,  the  Germans,  preserving 
the  language,  the  traditions,  the  prejudices  of  the 
Fatherland,  are  almost  absolute  masters.  Only 
47,000  of  them  are  openly  citizens  of  the  German 
Empire;  the  rest,  about  400,000,  are  apparently 
Brazilian  subjects,  but  in  virtue  of  the  Delbriick 
law  a  considerable  part  of  them  have  in  reality 
remained  or  become  once  more  liegemen  of  Wil- 
liam II.  Moreover,  the  budget  of  the  German 
Empire  included  a  sum  of  500,000  marks  to  be 
devoted  to  the  establishment  or  the  support  of 
German  schools  in  Brazil.  In  1912  Prince  Henry 
of  Prussia,  brother  of  William  II.,  in  the  course  of 
his  cruise,  landed  at  the  port  of  Itajahy  to  pay  a 
visit  to  his  fellow  countrymen  in  Santa  Catarina. 
Since  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war  the  game  of 
the  Germans  in  Brazil  has  been  gradually  revealed 
in  its  true  colours,  and  it  has  been  lately  discovered 
that  the  numerous  Rifle  Clubs  were  in  fact  societies 
for  military  drill  and  dangerous  enough  to  necessi- 
tate their  disarmament. 

In  the  rest  of  Brazil,  outside  the  three  provinces 
mentioned  above,  the  Germans  are  not  numerous, 
but  they  fill  most  of  the  principal  posts  in  business 
houses  and  banks.  In  the  first  period  of  the  war 
these  Germans  founded  Germanophile  newspapers 
published  in  Portuguese,  and  thereby  prevented 
Brazil  from  getting  accurate  information  as  to  the 
origin  and  course  of  the  conflict. 

But  despite  this  clever  opposition,  ever  since  the 


iqs    pangerman  plot  unmasked 

battle  of  the  Marne  the  cause  of  the  Allies  has  been 
steadily  gaining  ground  in  Brazil.  A  powerful 
impulse  to  the  movement  has  been  given  by  the 
action  of  Portugal  in  taking  up  arms,  for  there  are 
600,000  Portuguese  in  Brazil. 

Thus  in  South  America  the  tide  is  clearly  running 
in  favour  of  the  Allies.  A  new  stage  will  be  reached 
when  these  States  come  clearly  to  understand  that 
in  view  of  Pangerman  colonial  ambitions,  which 
threaten  them  personally,  they  have  a  direct  interest 
in  the  complete  victory  of  the  Allies,  which  alone 
can  deliver  them  from  the  fear  of  the  German  peril. 
They  will  then  reach  the  same  definite  and  sound 
conclusion  at  which,  as  I  shall  show  further  on,  the 
United  States  is  logically  bound  to  arrive. 

When  that  is  so,  it  is  possible,  if  not  probable, 
that  these  South  American  States,  or  at  least  the 
principal  among  them,  will  no  longer  be  satisfied  to 
remain  neutral.  They  will  then  acknowledge  that 
a  true  view  of  their  own  interest  compels  them  to 
strike,  with  all  their  might,  a  blow  for  the  common 
freedom. 

V. 

President  Wilson,  by  his  note  to  Berlin  of  April 
2oth,  1916,  concerning  submarine  warfare,  which 
had  the  character  of  an  ultimatum,  committed  the 
United  States  to  a  first  act  of  intervention  in  the 
European  war.  The  fact  that  a  consideration  of 
their  interests  has  compelled  the  Germans,  at  least 
for  the  moment,  to  bow  to  the  mandate  of  the 
United  States,  seems  to  some  people  to  have  already 
closed  the  American  intervention.  Those  who  hold 
this  opinion  may  support  it  by  reference  to  the 
speech  which  President  Wilson  delivered  to  the 
Press  Club  at  Washington,  on  May  i8th,  1916: 
"There  are  two  reasons,"  said  the  President,  "why 
the  chief  desire  of  the  Americans  is  for  peace.     One 


STILL    NEUTRAL    STATES  199 

is  that  they  love  peace,  and  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
present  quarrel;  the  other  is  that  they  beheve  that 
the  parties  to  the  quarrel  have  been  forced  to  go  to 
such  lengths  that  they  can  no  longer  keep  within 
the  limits  of  responsibility.  Why  not  let  the 
storm  go  by,  and  then,  when  all  is  over,  make  up 
the  account?"  (quoted  by  Le  Temps,  May  22nd, 
1916). 

The  need  for  reserve,  which  his  official  position 
lays  on  President  Wilson,  has  evidently  hindered 
him  from  disclosing  his  thoughts  fully;  for,  as  we 
shall  see  immediately,  it  would  be  particularly 
dangerous  for  the  United  States  to  imagine  that 
they  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  present  quarrel, 
and  to  wait  for  the  end  of  it  in  order  to  make  up 
the  account. 

In  reality,  the  true  question  for  the  United  States 
goes  far  beyond  that  of  German  piracy  in  submarine 
warfare.  That  question  really  involves  two  quite 
distinct  American  interests;  one  of  a  moral,  the 
other  of  a  material  or  political  nature. 

From  the  moral  point  of  view  the  United  States 
must  consider  the  barbarity  with  which  Germany 
wages  war,  not  only  on  the  sea,  but  everywhere. 
Not  only  does  she  constantly  violate  the  laws  of 
war  between  belligerents,  but  also  and  above  all 
the  German  authorities  subject  to  a  frightful  reign 
of  terror  all  the  civil  anti-Germanic  populations  in 
the  territories  now  occupied  by  Pangermany  from 
the  North  Sea  to  Bagdad.  The  sufferings  inflicted 
by  the  Germans  on  the  Belgians,  the  Slavs  of 
Austria-Hungary,  the  Serbians,  and  the  Armenians 
(whom  they  have  caused  to  be  massacred  wholesale) 
amount  to  millions  of  indescribable  pangs,  of  odious 
crimes,  of  atrocious  martyrdoms.  The  Americans 
have  intervened  in  the  submarine  warfare  in  the 
name  of  humanity.  Can  they  remain  neutral  in 
face  of  this  ''ocean  of  crimes"  committed  by  the 


200      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

Germans,  without  the  smallest  excuse,  over  enor- 
mous stretches  of  territory  ? 

From  the  point  of  view  of  defending  their  own 
material  interests,  it  is  not  certain  that  enough 
Americans  even  yet  understand  the  magnitude  of 
the  formidable  problem  which  the  European  war 
compels  them  to  face  and  solve.  It  is  quite  natural 
that  it  should  be  so.  In  many  circles  of  France 
and  England  it  is  only  quite  lately  that  people 
have  come  clearly  to  apprehend,  as  a  whole,  the 
real,  the  gigantic  objects  pursued  by  Germany  in 
the  war.  Hence  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
enormity  of  the  German  plot  has  not  yet  been 
grasped  by  the  Americans  of  the  United  States, 
whose  ideas  about  Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the 
conflict  were  necessarily  just  as  vague  as  the  ideas 
of  Europeans  about  the  United  States. 

The  accompanying  map  will  enable  the  reader 
readily  to  appreciate  the  basis  of  the  real  problem 
which  the  war  presents  to  the  United  States.  As  I 
have  explained  (p.  194),  the  Germans  set  them- 
selves after  1895  to  make  a  regular  register  of  all 
the  Germans  scattered  over  the  whole  world.  Our 
map  is  drawn  up  in  accordance  with  the  data  of 
map  5  in  the  Pangerman  Atlas  of  Paul  Langhans, 
which  gives  the  results  of  the  register.  The  map 
shows  what  proportion  the  Germans,  who  had 
been  born  in  Germany  and  had  emigrated  to  the 
United  States,  bore  to  the  American  population 
about  the  year  1890.  We  can  see  that  the  pro- 
portion was  considerable,  since  at  some  points  (see 
the  map)  it  amounted  to  35%.  Further,  the 
general  view  presented  by  the  map  enables  us  to 
observe  that  in  the  United  States  the  Germans  have 
planted  themselves  by  preference  in  the  industrial 
and  commercial  regions  of  the  East  and  of  the 
Great  Lakes.  We  can  therefore  understand  what 
followed.     Ever  since  1900  the  Alldeutscher  Verhand 


STILL    NEUTRAL    STATES 


20I 


202      PANGERMAN   PLOT    UNMASKED 

or  Pangerman  Union,  in  obedience  to  secret  in- 
structions from  the  official  authorities  in  Berlin, 
has  laid  itself  out  to  select  from  this  mass  of 
Germans  in  the  United  States  all  such  as  might 
best  serve  the  cause  of  Prussian  militarism  at  any 
given  moment,  in  the  most  diverse  domains,  as 
soon  as  the  European  conflagrations  should  have 
broken  out.  Hence  for  the  last  twenty  years  most 
of  the  ten  to  fifteen  million  Americans  of  German 
origin  have  been  organized.  Little  by  little,  in  the 
midst  of  the  great  American  Republic,  there  has 
grown  up  a  State  within  a  State,  a  State  endowed 
with  the  most  powerful  means  of  influence.  In  point 
of  fact,  among  the  German-Americans  there  are 
manufacturers,  merchants,  and  bankers  of  colossal 
fortunes,  who  control  the  lives  of  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  workmen  or  employees  living  in 
dependence  upon  them.  The  German-Americans 
also  own  many  newspapers  and  associations. 
They  have  therefore  been  able  to  exert  a  con- 
siderable influence  on  the  policy  of  the  United 
States,  and  even  to  secure  the  election  to  Congress 
of  members  devoted  to  their  interests.  The 
Delbriick  law  (see  p.  195)  has  completed  the 
German  organization  in  the  United  States,  by 
enabhng  an  influential  party  of  German-Americans 
to  preserve  the  appearance  of  American  citizens, 
while  all  the  time  they  remain  pledged  heart  and 
soul  to  forward  the  Kaiser's  scheme  of  universal 
slavery. 

As  the  total  population  of  the  United  States  is 
100  millions,  it  is  easy  to  see  what  may  be  the  power 
of  10  to  15  million  German-Americans  systemati- 
cally organized  for  a  definite  purpose,  when  these 
are  opposed  to  90  million  Americans  who,  never 
suspecting  the  Pangerman  peril,  have  taken  no 
kind  of  special  precaution  against  their  fellow  citi- 
zens of  German  origin. 


STILL   NEUTRAL    STATES  203 

This  very  peculiar  state  of  affairs  explains  the 
strange  position  occupied  by  the  United  States 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War.  From 
that  time  the  German-Americans,  in  virtue  of  the 
immense  means  of  influence  and  of  action  which 
they  had  prepared  beforehand,  have  carried  on  a 
multifarious  campaign,  with  extraordinary  audac- 
ity in  furtherance  of  the  German  game.  Thus  the 
German  Ambassador,  Count  Bernstorff,  and  his 
military  attaches  von  Papen,  Boy-Ed,  etc.,  have 
aided  and  abetted  in  the  task  of  subverting  the 
United  States  by  a  multitude  of  German-American 
spies  and  agents. 

During  the  first  months  of  the  war  the  German 
propaganda,  carried  on  with  extraordinary  activity, 
was  easily  able  to  deceive  a  considerable  part  of 
American  opinion  as  to  the  true  origin  of,  and  the 
responsibihty  for,  the  carnage  going  on  in  Europe. 
Afterwards,  when  the  war  dragged  on,  and  the 
Allies  placed  considerable  orders  in  the  United 
States,  the  understrappers  of  the  professional 
German  spies  engaged  in  an  extraordinary  series 
of  outrages  in  order  to  terrorize  the  American  work- 
men employed  in  executing  the  orders  of  the  Allies. 
The  object  of  these  acts  of  violence,  combined  with 
the  frivolous  and  interminable  discussions  which 
Count  Bernstorff  carried  on  with  the  Government 
of  Washington,  was  first  to  induce  the  United 
States  to  issue  an  order  prohibiting  the  Allies  from 
arming  their  merchant  ships  for  the  purpose  of 
self  -  defence  against  the  German  submarines; 
second,  to  persuade  the  Americans  that  the  block- 
ade of  Germany  by  England  was  maintained  in  a 
manner  contrary  to  the  rules  of  international  law; 
third,  to  slacken  or  stop  the  production  of  munitions 
of  war  destined  for  the  Allies;  and  lastly,  supposing 
that  the  principal  acquisitions  contemplated  by  Pan- 
germany    had    been    efected    in    Europe,    to    induce 


204      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

President  Wilson  to  intervene  in  favour  of  peace 
under  colour  of  putting  an  end  to  the  European 
butchery — an  intervention  which,  if  it  took  place, 
would  have  the  practical  result  of  opening  the 
negotiations  for  peace  under  conditions  eminently 
favourable  to  the  German  plans  of  annexation. 

But  at  last  the  crimes  of  violence  committed  by 
the  Germans  in  the  United  States  opened  the  eyes 
of  the  American  people  and  roused  them  to  anger. 
We  must  understand  that  it  was  only  gradually, 
and  in  spite  of  great  difficulties,  that  the  real  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  hemmed  in  by  the  German 
organization  as  by  a  ring  fence,  were  able  to  acquire 
true  notions  as  to  the  European  war.  This  progress 
of  American  opinion  was  further  retarded  by  the 
circumstance  that  before  the  war,  for  various 
reasons,  the  Allied  countries  unquestionably  oc- 
cupied a  much  lower  place  in  the  esteem  of  the 
United  States  than  Germany,  which  had  gained 
for  herself  very  great  prestige  by  her  extraordinary 
activity  in  commerce,  industry,  and  science. 

As  to  Russia,  the  Americans  knew  scarcely  any- 
thing about  it  except  the  hardships  of  which  the 
Jews  in  that  country  complained.  As  many  of 
these  people  have  emigrated  to  the  United  States, 
and  there  exercise  a  great  influence  on  the  press, 
they  have  naturally  fostered  anything  but  a  sym- 
pathy for  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars.  The  Irish- 
Americans  devoted  themselves  to  the  similar  task 
of  blackening  England,  from  which  the  United 
States  had  in  days  gone  by  to  extort  her  indepen- 
dence. As  to  France,  the  Americans,  on  the  faith 
of  superficial  observations,  considered  her  to  be  in 
a  state  of  hopeless  decadence.  The  flagrant  atro- 
city of  the  prodigious  German  crimes  committed  in 
the  United  States;  on  the  high  seas  against  neutral 
passengers;  in  Belgium  against  the  Belgians;  in 
Serbia  against  the  Serbians;   in  Armenia  against  the 


STILL    NEUTRAL    STATES  205 

Armenians;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  magnifi- 
cent resistance  of  the  Allies,  these  things  have  at 
last  produced  a  revulsion  of  feeling.  The  prejudices 
of  the  Americans  against  Russia  and  England  have 
been  to  a  great  extent  mitigated,  and  the  grand, 
the  noble  attitude  of  the  people  of  France,  the 
tenacity  and  the  heroism  of  her  soldiers,  have 
proved  that  France  is  far  indeed  from  decadent. 
To-day  we  may  say,  for  it  is  the  truth,  that  France 
has  won  the  deep  and  enthusiastic  admiration  of 
all  the  really  independent  American  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  This  progressive  change  of  opinion 
has  ranged  the  Americans  more  and  more  on  the 
side  of  the  Allies. 

But  American  opinion  has  still  one  stage  to 
travel.  It  is  this.  The  American  people  must 
understand  with  the  utmost  clearness  that  the 
victory  of  Germany  would  unquestionably  mean  the 
end  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States. 
Indeed,  some  Americans,  more  clearsighted  than 
the  rest,  have  already  travelled  this  last  stage  on 
the  road  to  truth.  In  March,  1916,  Dr.  Elliot, 
formerly  President  of  Harvard  University,  and  an 
intimate  friend,  we  are  told,  of  President  Wilson, 
declared  in  the  New  York  Times:  "The  quickest, 
the  best,  the  surest  means  for  Americans  to  defend 
themselves  against  a  German  invasion  is  to  conclude 
with  France  and  England  a  permanent  alliance, 
offensive  and  defensive,  having  for  its  aim  the  main- 
tenance of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  for  the  Allies,  and 
resistance  to  any  maritime  attack.  It  is  time  for  all 
Americans  to  take  sides  openly  with  the  European 
peoples  who  for  so  many  long  months  have  been  stand- 
ing up  against  the  military  despotism  of  Prussia.'* 
(Quoted  by  Le  Temps,  15th  March,  1916.) 

Dr.  Elliot  has  thus  stated  in  terms  as  exact  as 
they  are  complete  the  real  problem  which  the 
Americans   have    to   sol-ve.     Clearly   it   reached   far 


2o6      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

beyond  the  controversies  about  the  submarine 
warfare.  It  is  not  enough,  indeed,  for  the  Ameri- 
cans to  constitute  themselves  the  champions  of 
right  and  justice  against  Teutonic  barbarity;  Ihey 
must  understand  that  the  maintenance  of  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  United  States  absolutely  depends  on  the 
complete  victory  of  the  Allies  in  Europe.  Already 
many  Americans  come  near  to  accepting  this  view. 
Thus  at  Carnegie  Hall,  New  York,  at  the  end  of  May, 
1916,  Major  Putnam,  addressing  3000  members 
of  the  "Committee  of  American  Rights,"  excited 
great  enthusiasm  by  demanding  that  America 
should  at  once  take  part  in  the  war  on  the  side  of 
the  Allies.  His  chief  argument  was:  "If  Germany 
wins  in  this  war,  her  next  aggression  will  be  against 
our  Republic."  (Quoted  by  Le  Temps,  May  22nd, 
1916.) 

But  these  clear  ideas,  involving  immediate  and 
decisive  action,  are  as  yet  shared  only  by  a  minority 
of  Americans,  better  informed  than  the  rest. 

The  progress  of  American  opinion  in  general  will 
be  complete  when  from  a  general  view  of  the  facts 
of  the  war,  as  these  have  occurred  in  America  as 
well  as  in  Europe,  the  people  shall  logically  infer 
the  formidable  consequences  which  a  German 
victory  would  entail  on  the  United  States. 

That  general  view,  which  the  great  American 
Republic  will  probably  take  in  time,  is  as  follows. 
It  will  necessarily  be  based  on  an  exact  knowledge  of 
the  German  plan  for  dealing  with  the  United  States, 
a  plan,  by  the  way,  which  is  of  long  standing. 

In  1898,  before  Manilla,  the  German  Rear- 
Admiral  von  Gcetzen,  a  friend  of  the  Kaiser,  said  to 
the  American  Admiral  Dewey:  "In  about  fifteen 
years  my  country  will  begin  a  great  war.  .  .  .  Some 
months  after  we  have  done  our  business  in  Europe 
we  shall  take  New  York  and  probably  Washington, 
and  we  shall  keep   them  for  a  time.     We  do  not 


STILL    NEUTRAL    STATES  207 

intend  to  take  any  territory  from  you,  but  only  to 
put  your  country  in  its  proper  place  with  reference 
to  Germany.  We  shall  extract  one  or  two  billions 
of  dollars  from  New  York  and  other  towns."  (See 
Naval  and  Military  Record,  quoted  by  VEcho  de 
Paris,  September  24th,  191 5.)  These  words  at 
the  time  were  regarded  as  mere  gasconade.  But  now 
it  is  indisputable  that  even  before  1898  the  Germans 
of  Berlin  had,  by  means  of  the  processes  described 
above  (p.  200),  been  systematically  laying  the 
foundations  of  a  State  within  the  United  States,  a 
State  that  has  long  been  silently  sapping  the  ground 
on  which  stands  the  American  Republic. 

A  multitude  of  recent  and  striking  facts — pres- 
sure brought  to  bear  on  politicians,  monster  strikes, 
plots  and  outrages  against  public  order  executed 
by  order  of  the  official  agents  of  the  Kaiser,  such  as 
von  Papen,  Boy-Ed,  von  Igel,  &c — have  abundantly 
demonstrated  that  the  German  organization  in 
America  threatens  the  independence  of  the  United 
States,  and  is  of  a  definitely  criminal  and  treasonable 
character.  A  phrase  in  a  letter  of  Baron  de 
Meysenburg,  German  consul  at  New  Orleans, 
written  on  December  4th,  1915,  to  von  Papen, 
German  military  attache  at  Washington,  who  or- 
ganized the  principal  outrages  in  the  United  States, 
proves  that  in  the  minds  of  Germans  behind  the 
scenes  the  turn  of  the  United  States  was  to  come  in 
due  course.  The  latter  was  lately  seized  by  the 
English:  "May  the  day  of  the  settling  of  accounts 
come  here  also,  and  when  that  day  comes  may  our 
Government  have  found  again  that  will  of  iron 
without  which  no  impression  can  be  made  on  this 
country."  (Quoted  by  Le  Temps,  January  17th, 
1916.) 

On  the  other  hand  the  Americans  cannot  shut 
their  eyes  to  the  extreme  gravity  of  the  recent 
Pangerman    manoeuvres    in    the    States    of    South 


2o8      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

America,  particularly  in  Argentina  and  Brazil, 
which  are  regarded  as  destined  ultimately  to  be- 
come German  protectorates;  also  in  Nicaragua, 
where  the  Kaiser's  agents  have  tried  to  get  a  con- 
cession of  territory  for  the  construction  of  a  canal 
to  compete  with  the  Panama  canal.  Lastly,  there 
is  the  undeniable  fact,  which  brings  the  danger  still 
nearer  home,  that  a  few  months  ago  Germany 
plotted  the  military  invasion  of  Canada,  with  the 
complicity  of  her  subjects  disguised  as  American 
citizens.  Common  sense,  therefore,  tells  us  that, 
assuming  that  the  Allies  were  beaten  in  Europe, 
Germany  would  be  the  mistress  of  Canada,  and 
would  practically  dominate  the  United  States. 
The  extraordinary  series  of  formidable  outrages 
which  the  German-Americans  have  already  con- 
cocted and  executed  on  the  soil  of  the  great  Ameri- 
can Republic,  is  proof  patent  that  the  existence  of 
Pangermany  would  be  incompatible  with  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States. 

All  that  is  more  or  less  clearly  understood  in  the 
United  States;  but  what  American  opinion  still 
needs  to  be  enlightened  on  is  the  immense  danger 
which  the  United  States  would  incur  through  the 
formidable  Berlin  trap  called  "the  Drawn  Game," 
the  most  dangerous  trick  which  the  Germans  still 
keep  up  their  sleeve.  Seeing  that  many  of  the 
Allies  do  not  yet  understand  the  enormous  peril 
of  a  Germany  yielding  temporarily  on  the  East 
and  on  the  West  in  order  to  make  herself  mistress 
once  and  for  all  of  Central  Europe,  the  Balkans, 
and  Turkey,  it  is  natural  enough  that  the  Americans 
should  not  yet  have  fully  "realized"  the  vast 
bearings  of  the  dodge  called  "the  Drawn  Game." 

The  map  on  p.  loi  enables  the  reader  to  see  what 
would  be  the  great  danger  from  the  American  point 
of  view.  As  I  have  explained  in  Chapter  V,  the 
pretended  "Drawn  Game"  would  enable  Germany 


STILL    NEUTRAL    STATES  209 

to  carry  out  her  scheme  of  domination  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  and  would  thereby 
secure  for  Berlin  the  means  of  laying  hands  suc- 
cessively on  all  the  important  strategical  points 
which  command  the  seas  of  the  whole  world.  The 
consequence  for  the  United  States  would  be  that 
with  the  keys  of  all  the  seas  in  her  hand,  Germany 
would  be  able  to  prosecute  her  intrigues  on  a  much 
greater  scale  in  South  America,  Canada,  and  there- 
fore in  the  United  States. 

It  is  deeply  to  be  regretted  that  the  very  dis- 
tinguished American  Admiral  Mahan  is  no  more. 
If  I  may  judge  by  his  powerful  book,  The  Interest  of 
America  in  Sea  Power  Present  and  Future,  the  tenor 
of  which  was  admirably  expounded  by  M.  Jean 
Izoulet  some  time  ago,  I  believe  that  I  am  not 
going  too  far  when  I  affirm  that  were  Admiral 
Mahan  now  alive  he  would,  on  a  review  of  the  whole 
situation,  sketch  as  follows  the  line  of  conduct  which 
the  government  of  Washington  ought  to  follow 
with  reference  to  the  European  war.  Admiral 
Mahan  would  doubtless  tell  his  countrymen:  "At 
no  price,  under  no  pretext,  should  the  United 
States  suffer  Germany  to  execute  her  project 
from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  that 
because  of  the  consequences  which  the  achievement 
of  that  plan  would  entail  on  sea  power  all  over  the 
world.  As  the  only  sure  guarantee  against  the 
accomplishment  of  that  plan  is  to  be  found  in 
Central  Europe  (see  p.  129),  the  United  States  has 
a  direct  and  first-hand  interest  in  solving  the  ques- 
tion of  Austria-Hungary  on  the  basis  of  nation- 
alities, that  solution  being  over  and  above  indis- 
pensable if  the  world  is  to  see  the  end  of  the 
Pangerman  peril  and  of  the  great  armaments." 

Hence,  taking  everything  into  account,  we 
conclude  that,  apart  from  any  question  of  humanity 
and  justice,  the  United  States  have  an  absolutely 


2IO      PANGERMAN    PLOT   UNMASKED 

vital  interest,  not  only  in  a  partial  victory  of  the 
Allies  in  Europe,  but  in  their  complete  victory.  It 
is  desirable  that  this  truth  should  be  admitted  as 
soon  as  possible,  for  then  the  measures,  which  the 
Government  of  Washington  could  not  fail  to  take, 
would  signally  hasten  the  end  of  the  European 
carnage. 

Plain  good  sense  suffices  to  forecast  what  these 
measures  would  be. 

It  is  as  clear  as  daylight  that  the  expedition  to 
Mexico  is  a  German  trap;  hence  the  United  States 
have  every  reason  for  awaiting  the  end  of  the 
European  war  before  committing  themselves  further 
in  that  direction.  On  the  other  hand,  now  that  the 
Allies  have  gripped  Germany  by  the  throat,  the 
Government  of  Washington  should  avail  itself  of 
this  exceptional  opportunity  for  carrying  out  with 
the  utmost  speed  the  destruction  of  that  criminal 
and  parasitic  organization  which  the  Germans  have 
contrived  to  plant  in  the  soil  of  the  United  States. 
To  arrest  the  ringleaders  who  have  been  guilty 
of  inciting  to  treason  and  crimes  against  the 
common  law,  whatever  their  social  position  or 
wealth  may  he;  to  suppress  the  associations 
which  are  nothing  but  agencies  of  the  Berlin 
government— these  are  tasks  which  the  Americans 
have  every  motive  for  accomplishing  without  delay. 

Obviously,  too,  when  the  United  States  shall  have 
wakened  up  to  the  truth,  they  will  acknowledge  it 
to  be  at  once  their  interest  and  their  duty  to  give 
the  Allies  all  material  succour,  since  nothing  but 
their  complete  victory  over  Germany  can  safeguard 
for  the  future  the  independence  of  the  United  States. 

In  the  financial  sphere  the  United  States  can 
offer  the  Allies  immense  facilities  for  raising  loans, 
which  would  be  particularly  opportune. 

Mr.  Guthrie,  Vice-President  of  the  French- 
American  Committee  at  New  York,  has  explained 


STILL    NEUTRAL    STATES  211 

as  follows  the  method,  at  once  delicate  and  in- 
genious, whereby  the  United  States  could  and 
should,  according  to  him,  give  their  financial 
support  to  France.  "The  historian  Perkins," 
says  Mr.  Guthrie,  "states  that  the  expenses  in- 
curred by  France  in  liberating  America  amounted 
to  772  million  dollars.  Of  this  enormous  outlay, 
which  ruined  the  Royal  Treasury,  not  a  stiver  was 
ever  repaid  to  France.  She  never  claimed  it,  and 
to-day  she  would  proudly  refuse  to  be  repaid, 
reminding  us  that,  in  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  6th 
February,  1778,  she  stipulated  that  she  should  re- 
ceive no  indemnity  for  her  help  and  her  sacrifices.  .  .  . 
The  generosity  of  that  treaty  was  unprecedented  in 
the  history  of  the  world.  .  .  .  Would  it  not  be 
supremely  just  if  the  American  people,  a  hundred 
and  thirty-four  years  after  the  battle  of  Yorktown, 
recognized  that  service — I  will  not  call  it  debt — by 
offering  the  French  people  commercial  credit  to  the 
amount  of  the  principal,  that  is  to  say  772  million 
dollars,  to  be  repaid  at  France's  convenience?  It 
would  be  only  the  equivalent  of  a  contribution  of 
seven  and  a  half  dollars  from  each  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  much  less  than  the  tax  that  was 
voluntarily  and  cheerfully  paid  by  the  French 
people  to  help  us  in  the  eighteenth  century.  Would 
it  not  be  noble  and  glorious,  honourable  alike  to 
head  and  heart,  if  the  great  American  bankers 
could  have  proclaimed  to  the  world  that  they  had 
fixed  the  figure  at  772  million  dollars  in  gratitude 
for  the  past?"  (see  Revue  du  XVIII.  siecle, 
janvier-avril,  1916). 

In  the  matter  of  munitions  of  war  the  United 
States  might  evidently  increase  her  production. 
Lastly,  as  has  been  said  already,  the  United  States 
would  be  in  a  position  to  furnish  the  Allies  with 
men,  since  this  unprecedented  war  requires  such 
vast  numbers  of  soldiers.     But,   as  we  know,   the 


212      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

United  States  have  not  got  a  large  army,  and  it  is 
not  certain  that  they  cither  would  or  could  rapidly 
improvise  one.  A  much  simpler  solution  might 
enable  the  United  States  to  furnish  a  very  consider- 
able body  of  men  to  the  Allies.  This  could  be 
effected  if  the  Governmefit  of  Washington  were  to 
grant  leave  to  American  citizens  to  enlist  as  volun- 
teers in  the  Allied  armies,  on  such  terms  as  might 
be  agreed  upon.  Not  only  would  English-speaking 
Americans  be  glad  to  come  and  fight  the  Teutonic 
barbarians,  but — and  this  is  a  fact  not  generally 
known — there  are  among  American  citizens  millions 
of  Slavs  who  emigrated  formerly  from  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  Balkans.  These  American  Slavs 
are  ardent  partisans  of  the  Allies,  and  many  a  time 
in  the  last  few  months  these  men,  working  in  the 
American  munition  factories,  have  frustrated  the 
German  attempts  at  outrages.  Probably  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  these  Slavs  would  gladly  come  as 
volunteers  to  fight  in  Europe  for  the  liberation  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  the  Balkans,  their  native 
land,  which  they  quitted  as  exiles  long  ago  to 
escape  the  German-Magyar  yoke.  We  see  then 
that  by  such  voluntary  enlistments  the  United 
States  could  very  soon  contribute  troops  for  the 
conflict  in  Europe  without  laying  on  its  own 
shoulders  the  enormous  burden  of  creating  a  great 
army. 

Succours  of  these  various  sorts,  furnished  by 
America,  would  evidently  hasten  the  course  of 
events.  We  may  reasonably  treat  them  as  possible, 
since  it  is  certain  that  a  German  victory  would  put 
the  independence  of  the  United  States  in  jeopardy. 


CONCLUSIONS. 

WHAT     HAS     BEEN     SET     FORTH     IN     THE     PRECEDING 

NINE   CHAPTERS  APPEARS  TO  JUSTIFY  THE  FOLLOWING 

CONCLUSIONS. 


The  temporary  achievement  of  nine-tenths  of  the 
Pangerman  plan  in  accordance  with  the  programme 
of  191 1  serves  to  refute  the  lies  disseminated  by  the 
German  propaganda  as  to  the  cause  and  authors  of 
the  war. 

The  intellectual  mobilization  of  Germany,  as 
powerfully  organized  and  carried  out  as  her  military 
organization,  has  enabled  her  utterly  to  deceive 
many  neutrals  in  the  world  as  to  the  responsibilities 
for  the  outbreak  and  prolongation  of  the  war.  The 
Allies  do  not  yet  fully  understand  how  prejudicial 
to  them  this  German  propaganda  has  been,  and 
what  dangers  it  still  involves  for  the  conduct  of  the 
struggle  and  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

This  German  propaganda  has  been  all  the  more 
successful  because  for  a  very  long  time  it  encoun- 
tered no  serious  opposition  on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 
For  they,  ingenuously  confident  in  the  justice  of 
their  cause,  which  seemed  to  them  self-evident, 
have  not  attempted  any  real  intellectual  mobiliza- 
tion. Only  quite  lately  have  the  Allies  begun  to 
organize  the  propaganda  which  must  and  ought  to 
be  carried  on  in  foreign  countries;  substantial 
progress  may  be  anticipated  in  this  direction. 

Six  main  arguments  have  been  employed  to  back 
the  German  propaganda. 

213 


214      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

1°.  Germany  has  been  forced  to  wage  the  war 
in  order  to  resist  a  coalition  treacherously  contrived 
by  England.  Therefore  Germany,  a  country  of  in- 
tellectual, scientific,  and  economic  activity,  obliged 
to  fight  for  its  existence,  deserves  the  sympathies  of 
the  whole  world. 

2°.  If  the  neutrals  are  seriously  injured  by  the 
war  and  its  prolongation  the  responsibility  rests  on 
the  Allies,  who  desire  to  destroy  the  German  people. 
The  neutrals  should  therefore  take  common  action 
and  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Allies  for  the 
purpose  of  inducing  them  to  acquiesce  in  the  German 
victory,  thus  ensuring  the  speedy  restoration  of 
peace. 

3°.  To  hasten  this  result  the  neutrals,  and  es- 
pecially the  United  States,  ought  to  oppose  th:' 
maritime  blockade  which  England  is  maintaining, 
under  conditions  the  legitimacy  of  which,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  international  law,  is  open  to  ques- 
tion. By  refusing  to  supply  munitions  to  the 
Allies,  the  United  States  would  put  an  end  to  the 
butchery  and  thus  serve  the  cause  of  humanity. 

4°.  Germany  is  really  conciliatory,  she  wants 
nothing  but  an  equitable  peace.  "We  Germans," 
declared  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  December 
nth,  1915,  "do  not  wish  to  set  the  peoples  by  the 
ears;  on  the  contrary  each  will  bear  his  share  in 
the  peaceful  labour  of  all  and  in  the  progress  of  the 
nations." 

5°.  The  neutrals  ought  all  the  more  to  help 
Germany  because  she  is  fighting  to  ensure  for  all 
the  freedom  of  the  seas,  which  at  present  hateful 
England  keeps  in  her  own  hands.  The  Berliner 
TageUatt  (quoted  by  Le  Matin  of  February  i8th, 
1916),  did  not  scruple  to  assert  that  the  achieve- 
ment by  Germany  of  her  favourite  scheme  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  would  secure  for 
all  nations  the  freedom  of  the  sea.     "If  the  econ- 


CONCLUSIONS  215 

omic  mission  of  Germany,"  said  that  journal, 
"is  to  guard  the  freedom  of  the  road  which  leads 
from  the  North  Sea  through  Central  Europe 
to  Asia  Minor,  and  to  render  it  more  and  more  ac- 
cessible, in  the  interest  of  all  who  reside  along  the 
road  in  question,  then  it  is  a  necessary  consequence 
of  this  our  mission  that  we  should  have  a  vital 
interest  in  the  sea  likewise,  since  the  Continental 
road  in  Central  Europe  is  merely  its  continuation. 
Our  interest  requires  that  the  sea  shall  be  freed 
from  the  supremacy  of  a  single  people,  that  it  shall 
be  open  to  all  honest  competition." 

6".  The  Allies  pretended  that  they  made  war 
on  Germany  because  we  violated  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium.  This  cant  only  serves  as  a  cloak  for 
their  own  hypocritical  cupidity.  It  is  not  for  the 
Allies  to  reproach  Germany,  seeing  that  they  have 
themselves  violated  the  neutrality  of  Greece. 

To  the  Allies,  who  can  have  no  doubt  as  to  the 
premeditated  character  of  the  German  aggression, 
these  main  arguments,  on  which  the  German  pro- 
paganda rests,  of  course,  are  nothing  more  nor  less 
than  "colossal"  Hes,  as  absurd  as  they  are  cynical. 
Nevertheless  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  repeated 
indefatigably  under  every  form  to  Germanophile 
neutrals  in  Europe  or  to  neutrals  in  America  and 
Asia,  who  naturally  have  but  vague  ideas  on  the 
complex  affairs  of  Europe,  they  have  enabled  the 
Germans  gravely  to  prejudice  the  cause  of  the 
Allies  through  the  moral,  economic,  and  military 
effects  which  they  have  produced.  Hence  the 
Allies  are  deeply  concerned  in  frustrating  the 
world-wide  German  propaganda  with  all  possible 
speed.  Now  that  great  object,  as  we  shall  see  later 
on,  the  Allied  Governments  could,  if  they  chose, 
very  quickly  accomplish  by  pointing  to  the  tem- 
porary success  of  the  Pangerman  plot. 

Pangermanism  and  the  dangers  which  it  involves 


2i6      TANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

for  the  future  are  now  well  enough  known  in  some 
neutral  countries,  but  the  knowledge  is  still  some- 
what vague,  it  still  lacks  that  clear  definition  and 
that  sense  of  imminent  peril  which  arouse  strong 
convictions  and  prompt  actions.  But  if  the  Pan- 
german  plan  of  191 1,  in  all  its  defmiteness  and  ex- 
tent, has  been  ignored  down  to  a  very  recent  date 
in  the  Allied  countries,  which  nevertheless  above 
all  others  are  interested  in  knowing  it,  we  can 
easily  understand  that  this  nefarious  plot  for  en- 
slaving the  whole  world  has  not  yet  been  fully 
apprehended  by  neutral  nations.  But  the  tem- 
porary accomplishment  of  the  Pangerman  plan  in 
Europe,  to  the  enormous  extent  of  nine-tenths, 
furnishes  the  Allies  with  demonstrative  arguments 
of  the  utmost  cogency,  and  thus  puts  it  in  their 
power  speedily  to  counteract  the  effect  of  the  Ger- 
man lies  all  over  the  world,  and  to  prove  the  danger 
which  Pangermanism  creates  for  all  civilized  States. 

To  achieve  this  object  it  would  be  enough  if  the 
Allied  propaganda,  which  has  begun  to  be  organized, 
were  to  be  co-ordinated  and  founded  on  a  small 
number  of  positive  arguments  drawn  from  the  re- 
sults already  attained  by  Pangermanism;  for  these 
results  would  reveal  to  everybody  Germany's  long 
premeditation,  and  therefore  her  responsibility  and 
the  scheme  of  world-wide  domination  which  she 
pursues. 

This  Allied  propaganda  ought  to  be  firmly  estab- 
lished by  the  practical  and  indisputable  proof 
afforded  by  the  geographical  superposition  of  the 
191 1  plan  on  the  territories  actually  taken  possess- 
ion of  by  Germany  in  the  course  of  the  war;  thus 
compared,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  plan  and  its  exe- 
cution tally  almost  exactly. 

The  accompanying  map  exhibits  this  incontest- 
able truth  in  a  graphic  form  by  showing  the  outlines 
of   the   actual    German   fortress  compared   with   the 


CONCLUSIONS 


217 


outlines  contemplated  by  the  191 1  plan.  Accord- 
ing to  it  the  German  conquests  were  to  have  ex- 
tended to  3,474,288  square  kilometres,  in  addition 
to  Germany  itself.  But  these  conquests  and 
seizures  at  the  beginning  of  1916  were  accomplished 
over  an  area  of  3,035,572  square  kilometres.  This 
geographical  proof  is  confirmed  by  many  manifes- 
toes which  have  appeared  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Rhine  advocating  a  policy  of  annexation.  Amongst 
these  may  particularly  be  noted: — 


RELATION  BETWEEN  THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  OF  191 1  AND  THE 
PANGERMAN  GAINS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  1916. 


1°.  The  famous  memorial  of  May  20th,  1915, 
which  the  Imperial  Chancellor  caused  to  be  pre- 
sented to  himself  by  the  most  important  associa- 
tions of  Germany  (see  p.  17). 

2°.  Germany's  manifest  desire  to  get  possession 
successively  of  Riga,  Calais,  Verdun,  Belfort,  and 
Salonika,  in  order  to  complete  the  plan  of  1911  by 
holding  the  strategical  points  necessary  for  the  pre- 


2i8      PANGERMAN    PLOT   UNxMASKED 

servation  of  the  territories  over  which  she  has  cast 
her  net. 

3°.  The  declarations  made  in  tlie  Reichstag  on 
April  5th,  191 6,  by  the  Imj)erial  Chancellor,  Herr 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  which  lend  the  force  of 
demonstration  to  the  geographical  proof. 

To  any  plain  man  these  declarations  appear  to 
amount  to  an  official  avowal  of  Germany's  intention 
to  execute  the  Pangerman  plan.  The  phrases  of 
the  Imperial  Chancellor  leave  no  room  for  ambiguity. 

"After  the  war  Poland  will  no  longer  be  the 
Poland  out  of  which  the  Russian  usurers  have  been 
cleared.  .  .  .  No.  Never  again  must  Russia  be  able 
to  march  her  armies  to  the  defenceless  frontier  of 
East  Prussia,  nay,  of  West  Prussia  {thunders  of 
applause).  Just  as  little  is  it  to  be  supposed  that 
in  the  West  we  shall  give  up  the  lands  where  our 
people's  blood  has  flowed,  unless  we  receive  solid 
guarantees  for  the  future.  We  mean  to  create  solid 
guarantees  in  order  that  Belgium  should  not  become 
a  vassal  State  of  England  and  France,  that  it  should 
not  be  turned  into  an  outwork  against  Germany 
from  the  military  as  well  as  the  economic  point  of 
view."  {Loud  applause.)  (Quoted  by  Le  Temps, 
April  8th,  1916.) 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  could  not  assert  more 
categorically  the  territorial  claims  of  Germany  on 
the  East  and  on  the  West.  As  for  the  claims 
towards  the  South  and  South-East,  consequent 
upon  Germany's  seizure  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bul- 
garia, Serbia,  and  Turkey,  Herr  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  made  no  allusion  to  them.  His  silence  is 
intelligible.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  too  much  to 
expect  that  the  Imperial  Chancellor  should  make  a 
clean  breast  of  the  burglaries  which  Germany  has 
committed  on  the  territories  of  her  own  Allies;  in 
the  second  place,  Berlin  affects  to  consider  these 
forcible  acquisitions  to  the  South   and   South-East 


CONCLUSIONS  219 

as  permanent  and  therefore  beyond  the  reach  of 
discussion. 

Moreover,  Deputy  Spahn,  leader  of  the  Centre, 
who  on  April  5th,  1914,  and  again  on  December 
nth,  191 5,  took  on  himself  to  reply  to  the  Chancel- 
lor and  to  say  outright  what  the  exigencies  of  office 
obliged  that  gentleman  only  to  hint  at,  left  no  doubt 
as  to  Germany's  intentions  with  regard  to  Central 
Europe.  "We  must,"  said  Herr  Spahn,  *' bring 
about  a  lasting  union  with  Austria-Hungary.  We 
must  have  at  our  command  territories  larger  than 
the  German  Empire.  This  war,  which  has  been 
forced  upon  us,  must  secure  for  us  a  position  of 
world-wide  power."  (See  Le  Temps,  April  7th, 
1916.) 

Thus  irrefragable  proofs,  both  material  and  moral, 
combine  to  demonstrate,  beyond  a  shadow  of  doubt, 
that  Germany  made  and  continues  to  wage  the  war 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  Pangerman  plan 
which  she  elaborated  from  1895  to  191 1. 

II. 

Nine-tenths  of  the  Pangerman  plan  of  191 1  having 
been  for  the  moment  achieved,  the  Allies  can  avail 
themselves  of  this  fact  as  evidence  to  counteract 
speedily  and  everywhere,  the  effects  of  the  German 
propaganda,  and  to  prove  to  the  civilized  world  the 
legitimacy  and  the  necessity  of  their  military  action 
against  Prussianized  Germany. 

Starting  from  the  practical  proofs  and  the  German 
declarations,  both  of  them  indisputable,  which  we 
have  just  set  forth,  the  propaganda  of  the  Allies 
should  be  able  speedily  to  demonstrate  to  neutrals 
the  absolute  falsehood  of  the  German  allegations. 
Hence  it  should  prove  that: 

1°.  Germany  made  the  war,  after  very  long  pre- 
meditation, solely  for  the  sake  of  executing  the 
Pangerman  plan  of  1895-1911,  the  aim  of  which  is 


220      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

to  effect  formidable  conquests  and  to  subject  in 
Europe  and  Turkey  127  millions  of  non-Germans 
to  the  yoke  of  77  millions  of  Germans  (see  p.  15). 

2°.  If  the  war  is  prolonged,  it  is  only  because 
Germany  has  not  renounced  her  plan  of  universal 
domination. 

3°.  In  claiming  to  carry  out  her  scheme  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,"  Germany  by  no 
means  aims  at  securing  for  the  world  that  freedom 
of  the  seas  which,  according  to  her,  has  been 
usurped  by  England;  on  the  contrary,  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Berlin  government  is,  by  means  of  the 
inevitable  consequences  of  the  "Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf"  scheme,  to  get  possession  of  all  the 
strategical  points  necessary  to  ensure  the  com- 
mand of  the  sea  all  over  the  world  (see  p.  106). 

4°.  In  virtue  of  these  consequences,  the 
accomplishment  of  the  ''Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf"  scheme  would  directly  threaten  the  inde- 
pendence of  all  the  civilized  States  in  the  world, 
especially  of  Japan,  the  States  of  South  America, 
and  the  United  States. 

5°.  No  comparison  is  possible  between  the  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  by  Germany  and  the 
Allies'   occupation   of   Salonika. 

The  Allies  did  not  go  to  Greece  to  take  possession 
of  the  country,  as  the  Germans  did  to  Belgium. 
The  Allies  went  to  Greece  to  assist  their  ally  Serbia, 
which,  moreover,  was  the  ally  of  Greece,  and  to 
oppose  the  spoliation  of  Austria-Hungary,  the 
Balkans,  and  Turkey,  by  Germany.  The  treaties 
which  give  Turkey,  France,  England,  and  Russia 
the  right  of  protecting  the  Hellenic  constitution, 
greatly  endangered  by  German  influences  at  Athens, 
are  sufficient  to  justify,  on  the  ground  of  international 
law,  the  presence  of  the  Allies  in  Greece.  But  it  is 
necessary,  further,  to  state  clearly  that  they  are 
there  in  virtue  of  a  still  higher  right,  that  of  safe- 


CONCLUSIONS  221 

guarding  the  collective  liberty  of  the  nations.  A 
comparison  will  enable  us  to  appreciate  this  point 
of  view,  the  statement  of  which  is  perhaps  novel. 
According  to  the  civil  law,  private  property  is 
inviolable.  But  if  any  man,  passing  a  garden 
which  the  right  of  private  property  forbids  him  to 
enter,  sees  on  the  other  side  of  the  garden  a  ruffian 
in  the  act  of  murdering  a  person  for  the  purpose  of 
robbing  him,  he  not  only  has  a  moral  right,  but  is 
in  duty  bound  to  cross  the  garden  to  help  his 
fellow  who  is  in  danger  of  his  life.  There  is  not  a 
court  of  justice  in  the  world  that  would  blame  the 
worthy  and  courageous  citizen  for  having  violated 
the  rights  of  private  property  in  succouring  his 
fellow  man.  But  the  Allies  went  to  Salonika  with 
exactly  the  same  intention.  They  have  passed 
through  Greece  in  order  to  seize  by  the  throat  the 
Pangerman  ruffian  who  is  violently  robbing  Austria- 
Hungary,  the  Balkans,  and  Turkey;  who  is  destroy- 
ing by  millions  in  these  countries  the  Antigermanic 
civil  populations;  who,  shrinking  from  no  crimes, 
however  heinous,  claims  to  lay  hands  on  riches  un- 
told, and  to  secure  his  illgotten  gains  by  capturing 
the  whole  region  from  Vienna  to  the  Persian  Gulf, 
which  would  furnish  Germany  with  the  means  of 
maintaining  her  world-wide  dominion  (see  p.  io6). 
Now,  as  my  readers  have  been  able  to  see  for 
themselves,  there  is,  by  reason  of  the  temporary 
success  of  the  Pangerman  plot,  abundance  of  un- 
impeachable arguments,  numerical,  geographical, 
ethnographical,  in  support  of  these  conclusions. 
These  irrefragable  arguments  are  therefore  calcu- 
lated to  make  the  greatest  impression  on  neutrals, 
because  they  are  of  a  nature  to  appeal  to  their 
higher  feelings  and  at  the  same  time  to  show  how 
their  own  interests  are  jeopardized.  If  the  Allied 
propaganda  is  once  co-ordinated  and  fortified  by 
these  arguments,  set  forth  methodically,  the  moral, 


222      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

economic,  and  military  effects,  which  the  German 
propaganda  has  undoubtedly  produced  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  Germany,  would  soon  be  annulled,  and 
the  Allies  would  justly  reap  similar  advantages, 
which  would  hasten  the  victory. 

III. 

Henceforth  the  Allies  and  the  neutral  states  must 
bear  constantly  in  mind  not  only  Germany^ s  present 
gains  on  the  East  and  on  the  West,  htit  also  her  Pan- 
german  gains  as  a  whole. 

The  accompanying  map  furnishes  the  justification 
of  this  conclusion.  It  is  obvious  that  the  German 
gains  on  the  West  and  the  East,  important  as 
they  are,  are  relatively  small  by  comparison  with 
the  enormous  seizures  which  Germany  has  effected 
at  the  expense  of  Austria-Hungary,  of  half  the 
Balkans,  and  of  Turkey.  We  must  fully  under- 
stand that  these  countries,  especially  Austria- 
Hungary,  though  they  are  allies  of  Germany,  are 
nevertheless  as  truly  under  the  German  heel  as 
Belgium,  Poland,  or  the  invaded  departments  of 
France.  There  is  therefore  good  ground  for  making 
no  distinction  between  the  Pangerman  gains 
achieved  by  Germany  at  the  cost  of  her  open 
enemies  (France  and  Russia)  and  those  which  the 
Government  of  Berlin  has  treacherously  effected  at 
the  expense  of  her  own  allies,  like  Austria-Hungary. 

What  the  Allies  and  the  neutral  states  have  to 
consider  is  the  Pangerman  gains  taken  as  a  whole, 
in  order  to  discriminate  those  which  are  calculated 
to  upset  the  balance  of  power  in  the  world,  and  con- 
sequently to  establish  German  supremacy. 

Now  it  is  certain  that  if  Germany  were  to  give  up 
her  gains  in  the  East  and  the  West,  while  maintain- 
ing her  seizures  in  the  South  and  South-East,  her 
power  would  at  that  moment  be  formidably  in- 
creased as  compared  with  what  it  was  before  the 


CONCLUSIONS 


223 


war.  That,  therefore,  would  be  an  indisputable 
and  enormous  victory  for  Pangermanism.  The 
sketch  map,  inserted  below,  represents  this  truth 
in  a  graphic  form.  From  Berlin  radiate  the  lines 
on  which  are  stretched  the  threads  of  that  immense 
spider's  web  which  covers  the  whole  of  the  enormous 
Pangerman  gains  achieved  by  Germany  in  the 
course  of  the  war.  These  gains  she  has  been  able 
to  effect  by  means  of 


THE  PANGERMAN  GAINS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  1916. 


1°.  The  very  skilful  political  turn  which  she  has 
adroitly  given  to  her  military  operations. 

2°.  The  ignorance  of  the  Pangerman  plan 
among  the  Allies.  The  knowledge  of  it  would  in 
fact  have  suggested  to  them  from  the  very  begin- 
ning   of    the    campaign    the    need    of    intervening 


224      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

through  Salonika  and  the  south  of  Hungary,  which 
would  have  destroyed  the  chief  part  of  the  German 
plan  by  rendering  impossible  the  junction  of  the 
Central  Empires  with  Bulgaria  and  Turkey. 

IV. 

The  temporary  achievement,  almost  in  its  entirety, 
oj  the  Pangerman  scheme  ^'from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,^'  proves  that  the  complete  victory  of  the 
Allies  is  necessary  for  the  freedom  of  the  world. 

As  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  question  either  the 
reality  or  the  extent  of  the  plan  of  universal  domi- 
nation pursued  by  the  Germans,  it  follows  that  all 
civilized  States  are  undoubtedly  concerned  in  the 
defeat  of  Prussianized  Germany,  since  a  German 
victory  would  have  a  most  detrimental  eflfect  on 
their  interests.  Accordingly,  the  Neutral  States 
whose  independence  would  be  especially  threatened 
by  the  accomplishment  of  the  "Hamburg  to  the 
Perisan  Gulf"  scheme,  have  a  really  vital  interest 
in  the  continuance  of  the  war  by  the  Allies  till  a 
complete  victory  crowns  their  arms.  Such  a 
decisive  victory  is  a  necessity  not  only  for  Europe, 
but  for  the  whole  world,  since  the  achievement  of 
the  "Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  scheme  would 
have  world-wide  consequences  (see  p.  107).  That 
victory  should  have  for  its  main  object  to  deliver  the 
world  from  the  Pangerman  peril,  and  therefore  to 
prevent  any  future  outbreak  of  the  intolerable  am- 
bition of  the  Hohenzollerns.  The  victory  of  the 
Allies  involves  a  pledge  to  destroy  the  "Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf"  project,  which  forms  the  in- 
dispensable but  sufficient  basis  of  the  whole  Pan- 
german plan. 

V. 

The  plan  of  slavery  pursued  by  Germany  is  now  so 
manifest   that   neutrals   or   Germanophile  groups   are 


CONCLUSIONS  225 

henceforth  morally  responsible  Jar  their  sentiments 
before  the  civilized  world. 

The  neutrals  who,  in  the  first  part  of  the  war, 
displayed  sympathy  for  Germany,  were  excusable 
because  they  were  deceived;  but  now  they  are  in 
a  different  position.  The  facts  are  patent.  It  is 
no  longer  possible  for  anyone  to  see  in  Prussianized 
Germany  anything  but  a  ferocious  burglar  and 
assassin  practising  his  trade  of  robbery  and  murder 
at  the  expense  of  the  whole  commonwealth  of 
nations.  In  the  fine  phrase  of  M.  Paul  Hyacinthe 
Loyson,  Can  neutrals  be  neutral  in  the  face  of 
crime?  Clearly  not.  As  the  Daily  Telegraph  said 
very  justly:  ^^ Those  who  refuse  to  occupy  a  vacant 
seat  at  the  Round  Table  of  chivalry  will  have  to  render 
an  account  at  the  judgment  bar  of  Humanity. ^^  As 
matters  now  stand,  in  face  of  the  crimes  committed 
by  the  ''miscreants  of  Central  Europe" — the  phrase 
is  that  of  the  Dutchman  M.  Schroeder — neutrals 
cannot  support  Germany  in  any  way  without 
rendering    themselves    her    accomplices. 

This  truth  is  made  so  manifest  by  the  course  of 
events  that  already  a  change  is  coming  over  two 
neutral  countries,  which  had  been  thought  German- 
ophile.  Spanish  opinion,  a  part  of  which  had  long 
been  deceived  by  the  German  propaganda,  is  coming 
round  more  and  more.  Sweden,  which  the  pressure 
and  the  audacious  temptations  of  Berlin  all  but 
plunged  into  the  strife,  to  the  great  benefit  of  Pan- 
germany,  is  now  anxious  not  to  separate  her  cause 
from  that  of  civilization;  her  responsible  leaders 
have  just  proclaimed  that  Sweden  will  maintain  a 
strict  neutrality. 

VI. 

The  declarations  of  the  Allies,  the  accomplishment 
of  the  "Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf^^  scheme,  and 
the  question  of  Austria-Hungary. 


226      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

In  receiving  the  French  deputies  in  London,  on 
April  nth,  1916,  Mr.  Asquith  declared:  "I  have 
said  already  in  November  that  we  would  not  sheathe 
the  sword  till  the  military  domination  of  Prussia  has 
been  destroyed  once  and  for  all.  In  this  struggle 
we  are  the  champions  not  only  of  the  rights  of 
treaties  but  of  the  independence  and  the  free 
development  of  the  weaker  countries."  (See 
VCEuvre,  April  12th,  1916.) 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  an  interview  with  a  corre- 
spondent of  the  Daily  News  of  Chicago  affirmed: 
"We  and  our  Allies  are  fighting  for  a  free  Europe, 
an  Europe  freed  not  only  from  the  domination  of 
one  nation  by  another,  but  also  from  a  hectoring 
diplomacy,  from  the  danger  of  war,  etc.  The  Allies 
cannot  tolerate  any  peace  which  would  leave  the 
wrongs  done  by  this  war  unrighted.  We  desire  a 
peace  that  will  do  justice  to  all."  (Quoted  by  Le 
Temps,  May  17th,  1916.) 

M.  Sazonoff,  speaking  in  the  name  of  Russia,  said: 
"Our  victory  must  be  absolute.  The  Allies  will 
continue  to  fight  till  mankind  is  rid  of  Prussian- 
ism."     (Quoted  by  Le  Temps,  February  27th,  1916.) 

At  Nancy,  on  May  13th,  1916,  M.  Poincare 
declared:  "France  will  not  surrender  her  sons  to 
the  danger  of  fresh  aggressions.  We  do  not  wish 
the  Central  Empires  to  offer  us  peace,  we  wish  that 
they  should  ask  it  of  us;  we  will  not  submit  to 
their  conditions,  we  will  impose  ours  on  them;  we 
do  not  want  a  peace  that  would  leave  Imperial 
Germany  free  to  begin  the  war  again  and  to  hang 
a  sword  for  ever  over  the  head  of  Europe;  we  want 
a  peace  which  shall  receive  at  the  hands  of  Justice, 
restored  to  her  own,  solid  guarantees  of  permanence 
and  stability.  So  long  as  that  peace  is  not  assured 
to  us,  so  long  as  our  enemies  shall  not  confess  them- 
selves vanquished,  we  shall  not  cease  to  fight." 
(Quoted  by  Le  Temps,  May  15th,  1916.) 


CONCLUSIONS  227 

On  May  22nd,  1916,  in  replying  to  the  members 
of  the  Russian  Duma,  M.  A.  Briand,  President  of 
the  French   Council,   similarly  declared: — 

"I  have  said,  and  I  repeat,  while  rivers  of  blood 
are  flowing,  while  our  soldiers  are  sacrificing  their 
lives  with  such  forgetfulness  of  self,  the  word  peace 
is  a  sacrilege,  if  it  means  that  the  aggressor  will  not 
be  punished,  and  if  tomorrow  Europe  shall  run  the 
risk  of  being  handed  over  once  more  to  the  humours 
and  the  caprices  of  a  military  caste  bloated  with 
pride  and  athirst  for  power.  It  would  be  a  dis- 
honour to  the  Allies.  What  answer  should  we 
have  to  make  if  tomorrow,  after  having  concluded 
such  a  peace,  our  countries  were  again  swept  into 
the  frenzy  of  armaments  ?  What  would  the  genera- 
tions to  come  say  if  we  were  to  commit  such  a  folly, 
and  if  we  let  slip  the  opportunity  which  now  pre- 
sents itself  of  establishing  a  lasting  peace  on  a  solid 
basis?  Peace  will  result  from  the  victory  of  the 
Allies,  it  can  result  from  nothing  but  our  victory." 
(See  Le  Temps,  May  24th,  1916.) 

From  all  these  declarations  of  the  Allies  two 
fundamental  ideas  stand  clearly  out: — 

Prussian  militarism  must  be  destroyed; 
The  nationalities  of  Europe  must  be  liberated 
from  the  Prussian  yoke. 
But,  as  we  have  proved,  the  accomplishment  of 
the  "Hamburg   to   the   Persian    Gulf"   scheme   has 
two  essential  objects: — 

A  formidable  extension  of  Prussian  militarism, 
which  would  have  at  its  disposal  an  army 
of  15  to  21  million  men  (see  p.  91); 
The  enslavement  to   Germany  of  all  the  non- 
German    nationalities    lying    between    the 
south  of  Saxony  and  the  Persian  Gulf. 
The   objects    of   the   war   pursued    by    the   Allies 
and   those   of   the   government   of   William   II.    are 
therefore    fundamentally    opposed    to    each    other. 


228      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

This  opposition  has  been  by  implication  excel- 
lently stated  by  M.  Marcel  Cachin,  Socialist  deputy, 
in  an  article  which  appeared  in  VHumanile,  of 
May  9th,  1916,  under  the  title  "Central  Europe." 

"The  general  plan  of  our  enemies  can  be  clearly 
defined.  In  case  they  were  victorious,  they  would 
establish  in  the  heart  of  Europe  a  formidable  power 
under  the  supremacy  of  Germany,  a  power  which, 
with  the  annexations  avowedly  aimed  at,  would 
comprise  more  than  130  millions  of  inhabitants. 

"It  needs  no  big  words  to  show  the  danger 
which  the  whole  of  Europe  would  run  were  such  a 
design  executed.  It  would  be  an  eternal  menace  to 
our  country.  No  one  can  for  a  moment  doubt  that 
so  long  as  the  existing  political  systems  of  Germany 
and  Austria  endure,  such  a  monstrous  combination 
would  be  a  permanent  danger  against  which  we 
should  constantly  be  obliged  to  be  on  our  guard. 
And  as  for  the  Slav  populations  reduced  again  to 
slavery,  as  for  the  Czechs,  the  Poles,  the  Yougo- 
Slavs,  the  Serbians,  they  would  naturally  think  of 
nothing  but  of  revenge  in  order  to  escape  from 
serfdom  and  recover  their  national  rights,  which 
had  been  trampled  under  foot.  Were  such  a  brutal 
unification  as  is  summed  up  in  Mitteleuropa  to  be 
unfortunately  accomplished  by  fire  and  sword,  we 
might  talk  of  peace  after  the  storm,  but  it  would 
be  talk  in  vain;    it  would  be  war  again,  fatal  war." 

There  spoke  sound  sense.  It  is  clear  that  to 
have  done  once  for  all  with  Prussian  militarism  is 
the  only  way  open  to  the  Allies  to  procure  a  reason- 
able guarantee  that  so  atrocious  a  war  shall  never 
be  waged  again,  and  that  millions  of  men  shall  not 
once  more  be  sacrificed  to  the  Moloch  of  Pangerman- 
ism.  Hence  the  official  declarations  of  the  Allies, 
quoted  above,  are  not  the  product  of  blind  ob- 
duracy, as  the  German  propaganda  would  make 
some  neutrals  believe.     In  view  of  the  formidable 


CONCLUSIONS  229 

plan  of  universal  domination  which  the  Germans 
still  cling  to,  the  seeming  obduracy  of  the  Allies  is 
on  their  part  the  highest  wisdom. 

VII. 

The  question  of  Austria-Hungary ,  being  the  crucial 
point  of  the  whole  problem  to  be  solved  after  the  war, 
may  become  the  common  ground  on  which  all  common 
e forts  should  be  concentrated ,  not  only  by  the  present 
Allies,  but  also  by  the  still  neutral  States  which  are 
virtually  threatened  by  the  accomplishment  of  the 
^^  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  scheme. 

It  is  probable  that  Prussian  militarism  would 
have  been  already  destroyed,  or  on  the  point  of 
being  so,  if  in  the  first  part  of  the  war  the  leaders 
of  the  AlHed  countries  had  not  committed  the  three 
capita]  mistakes  which  to-day  are  generally  acknow- 
ledged— the  Balkan  policy  of  1915,  the  Dardanelles, 
the  delay  in  sending  reinforcements  to  Serbia. 

It  is  evident  that  these  three  calamitous  mistakes 
have  entailed  a  considerable  prolongation  of  the 
struggle  and  allowed  Germany  to  build  up  the 
immense  fortress  which  extends  from  Dunkirk  on 
the  north  to  Egypt  on  the  south,  and  from  the  south 
of  Riga  to  Bagdad  (see  the  map  on  p.  72).  In 
order  to  overthrow  the  mighty  walls  of  this  formid- 
able fortress,  the  Allies  must  consent  to  sacrifices 
much  greater  and  more  prolonged  than  would  have 
been  necessary  if  the  mistakes  now  generally  ack- 
nowledged had  not  been  committed.  These  sacri- 
fices the  Allied  peoples  accept  with  a  devotion  and 
heroism  which  will  win  the  imperishable  admiration 
of  posterity.  But  just  because  the  faults  committed 
have  lengthened  the  duration  of  the  struggle,  the 
leaders  of  the  Allied  countries  are  in  duty  bound 
to  do  everything  they  can  to  accelerate  a  complete 
victory.  That  victory  would  be  considerably 
hastened   by   the   accession   of  the  forces,   whether 


230      PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED 

economic  or  military,  of  the  still  neutral  countries 
which,  though  they  are  even  yet  not  fully  aware  of 
it,  would  be  directly  endangered  by  the  success  of 
the  Pangerman  plan. 

I  have  shown  on  p.  219  how  a  systematic  propa- 
ganda of  the  AUies,  taking  as  its  text  the  temporary 
accomplishment  of  the  Pangerman  plot,  might 
speedily  demonstrate  to  neutrals  the  falsehood  of 
the  German  sophistries  by  which  they  have  been 
cajoled.  The  same  propaganda  should  have  for 
its  second  object  to  convince  these  neutrals  that 
they  have  as  much  to  gain  as  the  Allies  by  the 
destruction  of  Prussian  miUtarism  and  of  the 
"Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  project.  If  once 
this  were  clearly  demonstrated  it  would  be  both 
legitimate  and  possible  to  request  of  these  neutrals 
that  they  should  contribute,  in  the  measure  of 
their  power,  to  the  common  task  of  saving  the 
civilization  of  the  world. 

In  order  rapidly  to  secure  practical  results  from 
a  convincing  propaganda,  it  is  necessary  to  define 
very  clearly  what  in  the  vast  welter  of  the  present 
struggle  is  the  point  of  vital  interest  common  to  all 
the  States  of  the  World.  As  I  have  shown  in  the 
course  of  this  book,  what  would  provide  Germany 
with  the  means  of  establishing  her  universal  domin- 
ion would  be  the  accomplishment,  whether  direct, 
or  indirect,  of  her  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf."  On  the  other  hand,  I  believe  I  have 
demonstrated  that  to  prevent  the  accomplishment 
of  that  scheme  it  is  enough,  but  it  is  necessary,  that 
the  Latin  and  Slav  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary 
should  be  freed,  once  for  all,  from  the  yoke  which 
Germany  has  imposed  on  them  through  the  op- 
portunity given  her  by  the  war.  For  if  the  majority 
of  these  peoples  were  to  be  combined  as  a  State  in 
place  of  Austria-Hungary,  probably  in  a  federal 
form,    there   would    at   once   be   set   up   in    Central 


CONCLUSIONS 


231 


Europe  an  immovable  barrier  which  would  ensure 
the  world  against  any  revival  of  Pangerman  ag- 
gression (see  the  map  on  p.  43).  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  independence  of  the  Slav  peoples  of 
Austria-Hungary  were  not  secured  against  Berlin, 
the  extension  of  Prussian  militarism  to  the  Balkans 
and  Turkey  would  be  inevitable;  the  Allied  peoples 
would  have  made  all  their  unheard-of  sacrifices  in 
vain,  and  the  struggle  against  Prussianism  would 
be  bound  to  continue. 


EUROPEAN  STATES  INTERESTED  IN  THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE 
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  QUESTION. 

From  these  considerations  it  follows  that  the 
question  of  Austria-Hungary,  just  because  its 
solution  implies  the  downfall  of  the  ''Hamburg  to 
the  Persian  Gulf"  castle-in-the-air,  constitutes  the 
crucial  point  not  only  of  the  European  problem, 
but  of  the  whole  problem  which  the  Pangerman 
plan  of  universal  domination  raises  for  all  civilized 
States.  Consequently  the  solution  of  the  question 
of  Austria-Hungary,   on   the  basis  of   the  principle 


232      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

of  nationalities,  forms  the  bond  of  common  interest 
not  only  between  the  belligerent  Allies  but  also 
between  all  the  still  neutral  States  of  the  world 
who  are  threatened  in  any  degree  by  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf." 

The  annexed  maps  show  clearly  the  States  of  the 
world  for  which  the  solution  of  the  question  of 
Austria-Hungary  has  an  interest  greater  or  less  in 
degree  but  substantially  identical. 

It  is  clear  that  if  Germany  could  keep  her  hold 
permanently  on  Austria-Hungary,  Russia  would  be 
constantly  threatened.  In  consequence  of  the 
extension  of  Prussian  militarism  which  would 
result  therefrom,  England  would  be  forced  to 
continue  to  maintain  the  formidable  armaments 
which  she  has  accepted  only  as  a  temporary  meas- 
ure. As  for  France,  no  restoration  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  could  be  lasting,  if  the  vassal  regiments  of 
Austria-Hungary  should  give  the  government  of 
Berlin,  after  a  brief  breathing-space,  the  power  to 
wrench  again  from  France  the  provinces  which  had 
been  temporarily  ceded.  Belgium  would  be  threat- 
ened for  the  same  reason.  As  for  Italy,  German 
supremacy  over  Central  Europe  would  be  the  end 
of  all  Italian  hopes  on  the  Adriatic,  and  of  all 
Italian  expansion  over  the  Eastern  Mediterranean. 
As  for  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  that  dominion 
would  be  a  sentence  of  death  without  appeal.  For 
Portugal,  it  would  imply  the  loss  of  her  territories 
beyond  the  sea  in  virtue  of  the  consequences  which 
would  follow  the  achievement  of  the  plan  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf." 

But  countries  still  neutral,  such  as  Greece,  Rou- 
mania*,    Holland,    and   Switzerland,    at   which   the 


*  This    passage    was    written    before    Roumania   joined    the    Allies 
in  the  war.     Translator's  Note. 


CONCLUSIONS  233 

Pangerman  musket  is  levelled  point-blank,  ought 
also  to  be  convinced  that  their  most  solid  interests, 
in  complete  harmony  with  their  moral  obligations 
to  the  cause  of  civilization,  make  it  their  duty  to 
lend  the  Allies  all  the  support  they  can,  whether 
it  be  moral,  economic,  or  military. 

The  second  map  shows  the  group  of  States  in 
Asia  and  America  which,  menaced  by  the  world- 
wide consequences  of  the  ''Hamburg  to  the  Persian 


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THE  STATES  OF  ASIA  AND  AMERICA,  INTERESTED  IN  THE 
SOLUTION  OF  THE  AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  QUESTION. 

Gulf"  scheme,  have  also  a  high  and  direct  interest 
in  the  solution  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  question. 
Japan  is  already  helping  the  Allies  notably,  but 
her  assistance  might  be  still  ampler,  more  effective 
and  more  direct.  The  strictest  view  of  her  interest 
should  compel  her  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  her 
succour,  since  nothing  but  the  total  defeat  of 
Germany  in  Europe  can  prevent  Japan  from  wit- 
nessing a  long  series  of  disturbances  fomented  at 
her  expense  in  the  Chinese  Empire  (see  p.  98).  As 
I  have  already  shown  (p.  105)  many  States  in  South 
America  are  directly  aimed  at  by  the  Pangerman 


234      PANGERMAN   PLOT   UNMASKED 

plan  of  191 1.  But  that  plan  can  never  be  really 
formidable  for  these  States,  unless  Germany  should 
one  day  have  at  her  disposal  the  powerful  resources 
which  would  accrue  to  her  from  the  accomplishment 
of  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf."  Chili,  Argentina,  Uruguay,  Paraguay,  Bo- 
livia, Colombia,  Brazil,  have  all  been  the  object  of 
preparatory  Pangerman  manoeuvres.  That  warn- 
ing ought  to  convince  them  without  delay  that 
they  have  an  undoubted  interest  in  co-operating, 
to  some  extent,  in  the  common  cause.  They  could 
do  so,  particularly  Argentina  and  Brazil,  to  good 
purpose  in  the  economic  sphere. 

As  for  the  United  States,  we  have  seen  (p.  208) 
that  the  accomplishment  of  the  scheme  "from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf"  would  really 
jeopardize  their  independence  in  the  gravest  man- 
ner. No  doubt  that  point  of  view  has  not  yet  been 
generally  apprehended  in  the  United  States,  but  a 
propaganda  which  could  easily  be  carried  on,  since 
the  arguments  in  its  favour  are  abundant,  should 
serve  to  convince  the  Americans  that  in  fighting  on 
the  battlefields  of  Europe  the  Allied  soldiers  are 
really  safeguarding  the  future  of  the  great  American 
Republic.  On  the  day  when  that  conviction 
becomes  general,  the  Americans  will  not  hesitate 
to  lend  the  European  Allies  such  assistance  of 
various  sorts  as  must  hasten  the  coming  of  complete 
victory. 

To  recapitulate,  a  series  of  deductions,  all  based 
on  acknowledged  facts  and  all  easily  verifiable, 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  formidable  problem 
with  which  German  aggression  has  confronted  the 
civilized  world  is  summed  up  in  the  solution  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  question,  because  that  solution, 
which  can  be  worked  out  without  prejudice  to  the 
legitimate  interests  of  the  German  people  (see 
Chapter  VI  §  111),  is  the  only  means  of  putting  an 


CONCLUSIONS  235 

end  to  the  Hohenzollern  plan  of  universal  domina- 
tion, founded  on  the  scheme  "from  Hamburg  to 
the  Persian   Gulf." 

But  when  the  question  of  Austria-Hungary  shall 
have  been  solved,  the  problems  peculiar  to  each  of 
the  AlHes  will  by  way  of  corollary  be  solved  also. 
And  in  general,  by  securing  the  independence  of 
the  non-German  peoples  of  Central  Europe — a 
measure  the  justice  of  which  is  indisputable — we 
shall  effectually  protect  the  world  as  a  whole 
against  any  future  eruption  of  the  intolerable  Pan- 
german  ambition. 


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